12 February 2003
Kansteiner Tells Congress the U.S. Supports Cote d'Ivoire Peace Accord
(Marcoussis accord a framework for "moving towards peace") (2340)
"The Marcoussis agreement [between the Government of Cote d'Ivoire and
rebel forces] offers a workable framework for moving towards peace and
reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire," Walter Kansteiner, assistant
secretary of state for African Affairs told the House Committee on
International Relations February 12.
The agreement, reached with the active participation of the United
States, France, ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African
States), and the opposing parties in Cote d'Ivoire, was endorsed by
the United Nations, under UNSC Resolution 1464, which called on the UN
Secretary General to examine ways in which the United Nations could
assist in its implementation. The accord provides "a format for
addressing some of the key contentious issues -- citizenship, land
ownership, and eligibility for the presidency, which Ivoirians have
debated for some time," Kansteiner said.
However, implementation "will not be easy," Kansteiner testified,
since "important elements among President Gbagbo's supporters have
reacted negatively to the proposed participation of rebels in the new
government," singling out the French for principal blame. However,
Gbagbo has "urged his countrymen to give the accord and Prime
Minister-Designate Diarra [the consensus prime minister under the
accord] a chance to restore peace," according to Kansteiner
International peacekeeping is taking place with external forces from
neighboring African nations under ECOWAS aegis, and French forces, and
the United States is aiding the deployment "both with $1.5 million in
contractor and logistics support, primarily in the areas of
transportation and communication, and equipment from our regional
storage depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone," said Kansteiner, including
trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles, generators, and communications
equipment
Following is Kansteiner's testimony as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Statement by Walter H. Kansteiner
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
On Prospects for Peace in Cote d'Ivoire
February 12, 2003, before the House Committee on International
Relations
The political situation in Cote d'Ivoire escalated into an
international crisis on September 19, 2002, when a coup d'etat
attempted but failed to dislodge the government of President Laurent
Gbagbo. The violent incidents of September left rebel forces in
control of slightly more than half the country. Only the intervening
presence of French military forces prevented the rebels from marching
from Bouake, in central Cote d'Ivoire, on Abidjan.
In immediate response to the attempted coup, the United States worked
closely with the French to protect American lives, to draw down our
embassy presence and to take initial diplomatic steps in the regional
and international community to encourage a political settlement. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) acted immediately
to form a "contact group" to bring an early end to the fighting. An
ECOWAS team obtained a ceasefire on October 17, and negotiations on a
permanent settlement opened shortly afterwards in Lome, Togo, under
mediation of Togo's President Eyadema. To monitor the ceasefire,
ECOWAS promised to provide a military observer mission. It asked the
French to take on the task on an interim basis until such a force
might be deployed.
In order to provide momentum to the peace process, which appeared to
have become stalemated, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
invited the Ivoirian "political forces," i.e., the parties represented
in the parliament plus representatives of the three Ivoirian rebel
groups to meet in Paris in January 2003. Out of these intensive
negotiations emerged the Marcoussis agreement, signed on January 24,
2003.
The Marcoussis accord provides a format for addressing some of the key
contentious issues -- citizenship, land ownership, and eligibility for
the presidency, which Ivoirians have debated for some time. The
participants in the negotiations made clear their understanding that
many of the measures agreed upon would require legislation, and in
some instances, changes to the constitution to implement. All parties
present pledged to support these measures. To implement the agreement,
the parties agreed that a "Government of National Reconciliation"
would be formed around a consensus prime minister. A transitional
power-sharing arrangement called for the transfer of some presidential
powers to the new prime minister. Marcoussis did not, however, specify
how ministerial portfolios would be distributed
The Marcoussis agreement offers a workable framework for moving
towards peace and reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire. The U.S. has
repeatedly affirmed its support for the agreement. Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Bellamy
represented the U.S. at the Paris heads of state meeting and expressed
support for the agreement. The U.S. actively supported United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1464, which endorsed the Marcoussis accord
and called on the UN Secretary General to examine ways in which the
United Nations could assist in its implementation.
Implementing Marcoussis will not be easy. Important elements among
President Gbagbo's supporters have reacted negatively to the proposed
participation of rebels in the new government. They have demonstrated
vociferously and sometimes violently. In particular, they singled out
the French as responsible for perceived flaws in the agreement. French
military forces remain on high alert and the French are acting to
protect the lives and property of more than 16,000 French citizens
still in Cote d'Ivoire.
President Gbagbo, I believe, walks a narrow line. He has made clear
his opposition to awarding portfolios in the new government to the
rebels, and his determination to defend the Ivoirian constitution. On
Friday, February 7, President Gbagbo addressed the nation, stating
that he accepted the "spirit" of Marcoussis, albeit not all of the
specifics. He urged his countrymen to give the accord and Prime
Minister-Designate Diarra a chance to restore peace. He said he would
not, however, transfer his executive powers to the Prime Minister nor
override the constitution. He also stated that he was not prepared to
accept the rebels as members of the government.
The Ivoirian rebels insist that, having dropped their demands for
Gbagbo's ouster and early elections at Marcoussis, they should be
awarded the ministries of Defense and Interior in the new government.
They claim they were promised these posts in Paris. They have given
President Gbagbo until the end of this week to implement Marcoussis
fully or face a resumption of hostilities.
To try to break the present impasse, President Kufour, the new
President of ECOWAS, convoked Gbagbo, Diarra, and the rebels to meet
with him and the ECOWAS contact group in Cote d'Ivoire's
administrative capital, Yamoussoukro on February 10. The rebels
indicated that they would not appear. Nevertheless, P.M. Diarra was
officially installed.
Preserving Peace with International Peacekeeping
Achieving and preserving peace and stability in Cote d'Ivoire will
require external forces. French forces in Cote d'Ivoire have risen
from 600 present on September 19 to approximately 3,000. The French
have maintained buffer positions along an east-west axis dividing
government-held territory from that held by the Popular Movement for
Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI). In the far west, French forces interposed
between government forces and the Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ)
and the Ivoirian Patriotic Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) have
been confronted on several occasions by rebel forces and have suffered
casualties.
Regional peacekeepers from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo,
under ECOWAS aegis, began arriving in Cote d'Ivoire in January.
Approximately 800 are now in country; we expect this number to
increase initially to 1,300. We have applauded the ECOWAS leaders for
their readiness to assume direct responsibility for regional security.
For more than half a decade, we have worked with ECOWAS to develop a
regional peacekeeping capability. We are gratified to see large
numbers of personnel who have received training under our (old) ACRI
(Africa Crisis Response Initiative), (new) ACOTA (African Contingency
Operations and Training Assistance), and Operation Focus Relief (OFR)
among the units deployed. The readiness of ECOWAS members to
participate in Cote d'Ivoire peacekeeping was recognized in the
Security Council in UNSCR 1464.
The United States has so far supported the ECOFORCE deployment, both
with $1.5 million in contractor and logistics support, primarily in
the areas of transportation and communication, and equipment from our
regional storage depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone. That equipment
includes trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles, generators, and
communications equipment. We envision that this equipment will be
returned to the U.S. upon completion of this mission.
A resumption of fighting is, of course, a possibility. That said, we
continue to caution all the parties that this would be a tragic
mistake that can bring nothing but further suffering to the region. We
do not believe that any party is capable of achieving a military
victory. Certainly, no party should attempt to pursue one.
Laying Down Markers to Neighboring States
We have made clear to all of Cote d'Ivoire's neighbors that we cannot
tolerate interference to further destabilize the country. We, and
others, have made this point with particular emphasis to President
Compaore of Burkina-Faso and President Taylor of Liberia. While both
presidents deny any connection with or support for the rebels,
circumstantial evidence suggests there is ample reason to remain
concerned and vigilant.
Several of the key coup plotters enjoyed sanctuary for some time in
Burkina-Faso immediately before the coup. The level of coordination
and planning, the infrastructure, and the weaponry available to the
rebels all suggest a pattern of outside assistance.
Liberians are certainly fighting with both rebel groups in the west,
along the Liberian border. While President Taylor insists he opposes
the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, there is no doubt that there is an
extensive movement across the Liberian/Ivoirian border. Liberians are
bringing looted items back home and mercenaries easily cross into Cote
d'Ivoire. I would point out, in addition, that several ethnic groups
straddle the border, and it is easy to recruit fighters ready to
settle old grudges.
We are looking very carefully at Cote d'Ivoire's borders, and are
maintaining a high level of diplomatic activity to ensure that others
are also paying close attention to President Taylor's and President
Compaore's behavior.
United States Policy
Since September 19, the U.S. recognized that civil war in Cote
d'Ivoire posed a significant threat to stability and security in West
Africa, threatened important economic interests, might trigger
deep-seated ethnic tensions and risked endangering the lives and
safety of American citizens.
Our immediate and continuing concern is the safety of American
citizens. Immediately after the failed coup, a European Command
(EUCOM) Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT) arrived to assist Ambassador
Arlene Render and her staff at the American Embassy in Abidjan to
organize and carry out the evacuation of American citizens from
dangerous locations and to find safe havens in Abidjan and in other
states in the region. To the best of my knowledge, all American
citizens are accounted for and are safe. At present, approximately
1,400 of the 3,500 American citizens resident in Cote d'Ivoire on
September 19 remain in country. The Embassy remains in very close
touch with the American community through its warden system.
In late October, the official American mission in Cote d'Ivoire was
placed in a status of "ordered departure." The Embassy was reduced to
an essential core of approximately 40 key American officials,
including security.
Our principle political objective in Cote d'Ivoire is the restoration
of peace and stability in the country and in the region. We believe
the best way to achieve the necessary peace and reconciliation is
through a more open, transparent, and inclusive democratic process.
The Marcoussis accords provide for this type of process, but it is up
to Ivorians to make it work. We are prepared to work with Ivoirian
leaders to help strengthen democratic principles and governance in
Cote d'Ivoire.
We do not want to see civil war destroy the Ivoirian economy. To date,
there has not been a great deal of damage to the economic
infrastructure. However, there has been considerable social
disruption, and normal transportation and communication routes have
been made unusable or unreliable. In the past, Cote d'Ivoire's ability
to transcend ethnic and political divisions was due in part to its
productive economy. National wealth gave the country an infrastructure
and economic promise that have been the envy of the region. Preserving
and restoring the economy will be no easy task.
It is essential to also make clear the role that Cote d'Ivoire has
played as a vital and vibrant economic engine for the region. Cote
d'Ivoire has absorbed excess population from its neighbors, providing
cash incomes from which they remit substantial sums to their families
in the region. The country is the region's major market and
transportation hub. Although the conflict has redirected some economic
activities to its neighbors, without the dynamism of the Ivoirian
economy to bolster the region, over time a diminished Cote d'Ivoire
will begin to send workers home, possibly as refugees. If not dealt
with, this conflict has the seeds not only to become a center of
political instability, but one which spreads economic stagnation and
collapse.
Finally, we are speaking out about the deterioration of the human
rights situation in the country. We have witnessed the killing and
wounding of the innocent since the first day of fighting. Moreover, as
the conflict has continued to fester, we have noted the emergence of
what appear to be clear cases of extra-judicial killings and
disappearances. These must stop, and those responsible must be brought
to justice. We are alarmed by rhetoric that incites mob violence, that
enhances ethnic distrust, and that preaches hate. This will not
restore democracy.
The situation in Cote d'Ivoire is difficult and complex. The country
has significant issues of inclusion and participation that it must
solve. Its leaders must come to grips with the realities of its
current ethnic composition, and again assert leadership that looks to
the future, not the past. We are prepared to work with them, as we are
with other African peoples, nations, and leaders, towards a better
common future for all.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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