15 January 2003
Defense Department Briefing Transcript
(Iraq/U.N. weapons inspections, Iraq/human shields, Iraq/opposition
training, NATO support/U.S. request, Iraq/denial and deception, North
Korea/military operations, Iraq/new regime, Iraq/air defenses,
Iraq/making a case, missile defense/Britain, Pentagon/support
diplomacy, Congress/supplemental funding, Iraq/non-compliance,
NATO/assistance, U.S.-Russia/missile defense, Iraq/Hussein regime)
(8890)
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Air Force General Richard Myers,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the news media at the
Pentagon January 15.
Following is the transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
The United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Wednesday, January 15, 2003
(Also participating was Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff)
Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. After United Nations (U.N.) inspectors
briefed the Security Council last week, a number of the observers
seemed to seize on the inspectors' statement that they found "no
smoking gun" as yet. Conversely, if the inspectors had found new
evidence, the argument might then have been that inspections were in
fact working and, therefore, they should be given more time to work. I
guess for any who are unalterably opposed to military action, no
matter what Iraq may do, there will be some sort of an argument.
Another way to look at it is this; that the fact that the inspectors
have not yet come up with new evidence of Iraq's WMD program could be
evidence in and of itself of Iraq's non-cooperation. We do know that
Iraq has designed its programs in a way that they can proceed in an
environment of inspections, and that they are skilled at denial and
deception.
The president has repeatedly made clear -- and it bears repeating --
that the burden of proof is not on the United States, it's not on the
United Nations or the international community to prove that Iraq has
these weapons. The burden of proof is on the Iraqi regime to prove
that it is disarming, and to show the inspectors where the weapons
are.
As the president said, "The inspectors do not have the duty or the
ability to uncover weapons hidden in a vast country. The
responsibility of inspectors can only be to confirm the evidence of
voluntary and total disarmament by a cooperative country. It is Saddam
Hussein who has the responsibility to provide that evidence, as
directed and in full." Unquote.
Thus far, he has been unwilling to do so. We continue to hope that the
regime will change course and that Iraq will disarm peacefully and
voluntarily. No one wants war. The choice between war and peace will
not be made in Washington or, indeed, in New York; it will be made in
Baghdad. And the decision is facing the Iraqi regime.
This is a test for them, to be sure, but it is also a test for the
U.N.. The credibility of that institution is important. Iraq has
defied some 16 U.N. resolutions without cost or consequence. The
Security Council unanimously approved a new resolution, which required
that Iraq, quote, "provide a currently accurate, full and complete
declaration," unquote, of its WMD programs, which asserted that any
false statement or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq
shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and
which declared that this was Iraq's final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations, unquote. That is what the resolution
said.
When the U.N, makes a statement like that, it puts its credibility on
the line. To understand what's at stake, it's worth recalling the
history of the U.N.'s predecessor, the League of Nations. The league
collapsed because member states were not willing to back up their
declarations with consequences. When the league failed to act after
the invasion of Abyssinia, it was discredited. And the lesson of that
experience was summed up by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King,
who declared at that time, quote: "Collective bluffing cannot bring
about collective security," unquote. The lesson is as true today as it
was at the start -- as it was back in the 20th century. The question
is the -- whether or not the world has learned that lesson.
General Myers?
Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And good afternoon.
I'd like to begin by speaking briefly of Iraq's recruitment of human
shields and the International Law of Armed Conflict.
As many of you know from news reports in Reuters and AFP, the London
Observer, and in many other newspapers around the world, Iraq
announced in late December that it will recruit and receive volunteers
from Arab and Western countries to serve as human shields who would be
deployed to protect sensitive sites. This is a deliberate recruitment
of innocent civilians for the purpose of putting them in harm's way
should a conflict occur. The last time Iraq used people as human
shields was in December of 1998, when Iraq failed to comply with U.N.
arms experts and coalition forces began Operation Desert Fox. A year
earlier, the Iraqi encouraged hundreds of Iraqi families to put
themselves at risk as voluntary human shields at palaces and strategic
facilities in Iraq when Iraq refused to allow U.N. inspectors access
to government sites.
I'd like to note that it is illegal under the international law of
armed conflict to use non-combatants as a means of shielding potential
targets. And Iraq action to do so would not only violate this law, but
also be considered a war crime in any conflict. Therefore, if death or
serious injury to a non-combatant resulted from these efforts, the
individuals responsible for deploying any innocent civilians as human
shields would be guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.
Let me also give you a quick update on where we stand with the Iraqi
opposition training. Several hundred U.S. Army trainers arrived in
Hungary late last week to prepare for the training of Iraqi opposition
who have volunteered for possible action in Iraq. The training task
force led by Major General Dave Barno is located at Taszar Air Base in
Hungary. He is there to coordinate with the Hungarian Ministry of
Defense prior to the arrival of any potential volunteers. And I'd like
to take this opportunity to publicly thank our friends in Hungary for
use of their facilities. The use of Taszar Air Base emphasizes a
rather long-standing relationship between the U.S. and Hungary, and we
thank them very much.
And with that, we'll take your questions.
Q: Mr. Secretary, NATO officials said today in Brussels that the
United States has now formally asked NATO for support in any possible
conflict with Iraq, in such areas as, oh, the possible use of bases,
refueling, and -- and other non-combat areas: air support, that kind
of thing, perhaps refueling. And that also -- that you want NATO to
provide some help to -- and support for Turkey, perhaps protection
from Scud attack. I wonder if you might comment on that, on -- on the
request --
Rumsfeld: Well, sure. We were asked when we were over there for the --
I guess the Prague meeting what -- by NATO nations what role anyone
might envisage for NATO, and we responded that we'd be happy to come
back to them. And the U.S. ambassador to NATO did in fact recently go
in to the North Atlantic Council and say that here are a series of
things that might or might not be appropriate, and opened that
dialogue.
In any case, obviously, we have to begin with the fact that the
president has made no decision to use force. But it does take time to
plan. And just as we're planning with individual countries, it seemed
appropriate to, to the extent NATO wished to, to begin that planning
process. And there were various things like force protection, and as
you point out, some others, including AWACS and a number of things
that apparently are under consideration.
Q: So these would be non-combat -- this would be non-direct combat
support?
Rumsfeld: I wouldn't prejudge it.
Q: And how about -- how about security support from Turkey?
Rumsfeld: I guess the definition of what is or is not combat is one
problem in answering that question. And, of course, we already know
that there are countries that have indicated they want to participate
individually in ways that I think would be characterized as combat.
Q: How about support from Turkey? How about --
Rumsfeld: Well, Turkey is a member of NATO.
Q: How about security support from Turkey?
Rumsfeld: Sure. Turkey is a member of NATO, and if there's a conflict
in that part of the world, that's an appropriate issue for them to
address.
Yes?
Q: Secretary, when you began today, even though you said you didn't --
Rumsfeld: Do you mean at 5:00 this morning, or began with you today?
Q: No, sir. At the moment, about five or six minutes ago --
Rumsfeld: I see.
Q: -- as you began here today, the explicit, even though you didn't go
on to law school, as you said, you sounded very much to this reporter
like a prosecutor building a good case for war. And there are some
so-called pundits or experts inside the Beltway who are saying now
that America has gone so far down the road to war that it's too late
to turn back. Do you believe that? And if not, is there a point where
we would be so far down the road we couldn't turn back?
Then I have a question for General Myers.
Rumsfeld: No, I don't -- I don't think that's the case at all. I think
the president has been determined that the Iraqi regime disarms. And
how that is to happen, it could happen because the Iraqi regime
decides to do that; it could happen because the Iraqi president leaves
the country; it could happen for -- in a variety of ways other than
war.
Q: Do you have any indication that Saddam Hussein might be willing to
leave the country?
Rumsfeld: No! He does not consult with me on things like that.
(Laughter.)
Q: And a follow-up for General Myers --
Myers: Before we finish, let me just -- can I tack onto the back,
Ivan, on that question?
Certainly from a military perspective, there is no point of no return.
I mean, I think the secretary's talking in a very broad context; but
in just a limited military context, there is no point where, you know,
and we can't adjust one way or the other depending on what the
president wants us to do.
Q: May I follow up on what you said earlier about training Iraqis --
Rumsfeld: We've got to spread this around a little bit.
Q: Well, I said at the beginning I had one question. He'd like to ask
General Myers a question. I mean, I'll defer, if you prefer, but he
just wanted to follow up what he said about training the Iraqi
dissidents. How many, and what kind of training?
Myers: How many remains to be seen. They're gathering volunteers right
now. And what else are you -- what kind of training? The training is
going to be right now scheduled for about 30 days; the real basic
training so they could potentially fit in with some U.S. units and
provide assistance with language skills, perhaps local knowledge and
so forth, if that were required. But the numbers are to be determined.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Q: I was just going to ask the same question. Is any of that in any
sense fighting forces that you're training? Or is it just enabling --
Myers: It could be. It could be. And we're going to have to see, you
know, how many finally show up, how much time we have. Of course, when
you get into the more complex training, it takes longer. And so, we'll
just have to see.
Rumsfeld: How much prior training they have.
Myers: How much --
Q: General Myers?
Rumsfeld: How much prior training they have, yeah.
Myers: The kind of volunteers you get, yeah.
Rumsfeld: Yeah.
Myers: Because they're coming from all -- I mean, presumably, they're
coming from all walks of life. Some have had prior military
experience, some have not had any experience.
Q: General Myers, I really wanted to ask you -- the first question I
wanted to ask you was your reference in your opening statement to the
shields, these human shields. As you mentioned, this was announced by
Iraq in December. I'm wondering what -- why you'd mention this today
as something that you've learned; that they are proceeding with this
or already started to do this? Or --
Myers: No, I didn't say -- just trying to -- when I saw it in the
paper, truth is, I said, "I think we ought to say something publicly
about this," and today was the day we decided to do it. Just limited
-- you know, we come out about once a week, and this was in the queue
to come out.
Q: What are U.S. forces prepared to do if in fact that tactic is used?
Rumsfeld: Well, I think this is a big crowd. You may want to hold it
down to one or two questions, but --
Q: I'd like to hear the answer to that. (Laughter.)
Q: Yeah, it's a good question.
Rumsfeld: So would I. (Laughter.)
Q: Bring it on!
Q: That's to you, General.
Myers: The question is, what would we do in case of human shields?
Q: What would you -- how would you deal with that kind of a problem?
Myers: Well, I -- you know, it's going to get into the specifics of
each situation. And I think there will be some situations where
military necessity, if it's a case of defending your -- the friendly
forces, that you'd have to take action, probably. And there are other
cases where, if you can avoid it, you would, of course. You know, the
object is clearly to not engage noncombatants. That is clearly the way
we'd like to do it.
I think in many cases, as we read in the paper, you might not know
where there are noncombatants. And so that would be clearly up to the
Iraqi regime. That would be on their hands, certainly not on ours.
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Q: But for the cases where you could -- where you would actually --
Myers: Well, I don't know. It's -- it really gets into the
hypothetical. And the inherent right of self-defense is always the
guiding light, and the other -- or guiding statement. But the other
issue is, you know, we're not into killing. I mean, that's -- that, I
think, is one thing that separates us from the al Qaeda, certainly
from the Iraq regime, from the newspaper reports -- is that we don't
want to take on civilian populations, we don't want to take on
noncombatants, and we'd take every measure to avoid doing that.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you talked about Iraqis are skilled at denial and
deception. Wouldn't it make sense for the inspectors to burrow into
the concealment mechanisms of the regime, particularly its special
security organization, going into their headquarters? That apparently
hasn't been done yet. Is that something you think they should be
doing?
Rumsfeld: I tell you, I'm not inclined to give advice to the
inspectors. We're giving assistance. We're providing intelligence
assistance. We're giving sites that they ought to look at -- the
Central Intelligence Agency is. And I'm so distant from what they're
actually doing on the ground that for me to be telling them what they
ought to be doing...
The one thing I will say is what we've said from the beginning and
which is in their resolution: we do continue to believe that it's
terribly important for them to take people, knowledgeable people --
scientists, technicians, people who have been in involved in weapons
of mass destruction programs -- and get them out of the country, with
their families, so that they can speak honestly and tell the truth,
because the success that inspectors have had in the past is not as
finders, not as discoverers, not running around peeking under every
rock, but by talking to knowledgeable people, defectors, people who
will talk to them, and then being cued as to where they can, in fact,
go find something. And it strikes me that if that was the magic
formula the last time, it's very likely to be the formula this time
that would work.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, in your opening remarks you didn't really say so
specifically, but it sounded like you would rule out any suggestion
from inspectors that they'd like months more to continue their work.
Rumsfeld: That's not a call for me; that's a call for the president.
Q: But from your opening remarks, it sounds like you're saying that
basically if Iraq has not made a voluntary statement, then it's time
to call a halt to (inaudible).
Rumsfeld: I don't find that in there. In my remarks I find nothing
that suggests what you're talking about.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Q: General Myers, I wanted to ask you a couple of military perspective
questions about North Korea. What military significance, if any, do
you see in their recent increased patrols and movements in the
demilitarized zone (DMZ)? Similarly, what military significance to
them accelerating their winter training cycle? And thirdly, as a
matter of prudent planning, which one can only assume you and the
secretary do all the time, what progress in reviewing military options
for North Korea if and when to be ready should the president ask you?
Myers: The last one will be real easy because I'm not going to get
into any -- much detail on that. But as you said, you would expect the
secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the whole Department of Defense community to be working all sorts of
contingencies for various situations, and you can be assured that's
happening.
In terms of the DMZ and the winter training cycle, I don't -- I don't
see issues with either of those that would tell me that North Korea is
on a different footing today than they were, let's say, 30 days ago.
We know this is the most intensive time of training for them. That's
always the winter training cycle where they conduct the majority of
their training, their most intensive training. And so, as we watch
that, which we do every year, we see that proceeding apace.
The incidents in the DMZ, I think, are related to other issues,
perhaps, that have to do with authorities in the DMZ and so forth and
do not have to do with the current issue with their nuclear programs.
Q: But to be clear, you are doing prudent military planning vis-a-vis
North Korea?
Myers: You said it; you would expect us to do that. And that's, we do
that -- and we were doing that before North Korea declared that it was
not going to be part of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and we are
continuing.
Rumsfeld: Been doing it for years.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you've said many times from the podium here that
you'd like to see Saddam Hussein just pack up and leave Iraq and it
would be a nice thing for everybody. If that indeed happened and
someone else in the regime stepped up to take over, and they continued
to say that they didn't have weapons of mass destruction, would the
situation change at all?
Rumsfeld: Indeed, it would. The -- were that the case, then we'd be
exactly where we are now, just with a different leader. If a new -- if
somebody takes over that country, whether because Saddam Hussein
leaves, or because he's displaced by somebody in that country, or
somebodies, plural, the same principles that we've indicated would
pertain. Number one, we would expect the ability to get in on the
ground and assure that weapons of mass destruction have been located
and destroyed. And that the new government would agree that it would
not have weapons of mass destruction, that it would not threaten its
neighbors, that it would maintain a single country and not divide it
up into parts, whether ethnically or religiously, and that it would
have put in place a process so that to -- there would be a path
towards something like representative government, so that there would
be assurances for the elements within that country that they would be
able to participate in the governing of that country. No particular
template or formula. We're not talking about U.S.-style democracy.
We're
-- look what's happened in Afghanistan with the loya jirga -- it's
distinctive to that country. So it would -- my guess is that what I've
just said is probably what would happen.
Q: Wouldn't that significantly delay things, trying to figure out if
this new person was potentially willing to let that happen?
Rumsfeld: I wouldn't think so. I wouldn't think so.
Yes.
Q: General Myers, I have a question about Iraq's air defenses. Every
so often a story comes out saying that the hits in the south are
somehow degrading their entire air defense system. Can you give us a
reality check on the density and sophistication of the central
region's air defense systems, the level of effort that would be needed
to take that down if, in fact, the president decided to go to war, and
what impact, if any, these various strikes in the South would have on
that more dense system in the central region?
Myers: Okay, I'll try to do that here in just a brief statement.
For the last many years, Iraq has tried to build considerable
redundancy in its air defense system, particularly in the command and
control arena. And those are some of the targets that you see being
hit in the South. Those are the fiber optic cable repeater stations,
some of the air defense command and control facilities, trying to take
those down. Like I said, they're fairly redundant, so you -- there are
lots of targets in that target set.
The air defenses around Baghdad remain formidable. They have the same
surface-to-air missiles that they've had for some time. We think
they've even upgraded some on their own, they've tried some
experiments on their own. And they have a fairly large number of early
warning radars and such. On the other hand, they're in a fairly finite
area, if you will. They're around the Baghdad area, and they're dealt
with appropriately in the war plan.
Q: To be clear, though, the attacks in the South, though, would have
minimal to no impact on those areas around Baghdad? That would take a
different level of effort?
Myers: Well, I think, you know, it's all part of the same command and
control network. This is a network that's throughout the country that
connects the early warning radars in the South and their capability to
engage in the South with anti-aircraft fire or with missiles that
might deploy down there; same in the North -- it connects all that,
and so it would have an effect on it. And we think it has, actually.
Q: Mr. Secretary, the largest teamster local in your hometown,
Chicago, held an anti-war organizing meeting over the weekend. About
110 officers from labor unions around the country attended and they
raised $30,000 in a day to form a group called U.S. Labor Against War.
And they say that -- and the reason the local did that was because
they say there's such overwhelming opposition in their union to any
war. And they say that they're a conservative union -- truck drivers,
UPS people, delivery people -- but that the average working guy in the
union just doesn't quite understand -- and it's their brothers and
sisters, children, who would go -- who would fight a war -- just don't
understand, given that it wasn't Iraq that attacked us in 9/11, and
they say the president just has not made a case the average person can
understand why we need to attack them.
I'm just wondering what your thoughts are.
Rumsfeld: Well, I guess what I would say is that the president made a
case that Iraq should disarm that was persuasive to the Congress, and
they voted overwhelmingly to support him.
Second, he made a case at the United Nations that the inspectors
should return, and the other stipulations, some of which I cited here
this afternoon. And it was a unanimous vote in the United Nations
Security Council -- 15 to 0.
The president has not made a case for going to war because he has not
made such a decision. So one ought not to be surprised that, in fact,
there are people who look at the situation and may come to a
conclusion that that case hasn't been made at this point. And I think
that's a fair comment. And that view on the part of the individuals
you cited is part of our democratic system. That's part of our
Constitution -- free speech for people to say what they think.
Q: Mr. Secretary, your British opposite number has been taking some
heat today over the decision to give permission for the Fylingdales
radar base to be used as part of your missile defense system. You've
outlined in the past how this should benefit the U.S., but what does
Britain get out of it?
Rumsfeld: I think that I have probably, if not always, almost always,
avoided describing how missile defense could benefit the U.S. In fact,
we dropped the phrase "national missile defense." We talk about
missile defense. Because what's "national" depends on where you live,
and what's "theater" and what's "strategic" depends on where you live
and where our forces are. We have forces in Europe; we care about
them. We have allies and friends in Europe, and we care about them.
And the missile defense program that's been outlined is, in large
part, been a research and development and a demonstration program, a
testing program. It's now moving to the next phase, where it will
begin to put in place a test-bed that could be used to provide some
very preliminary capabilities in some period of years.
And to the extent other countries recognize the growing ballistic
missile threat and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
And if anyone wants a visible recent example, look at what North
Korea's doing with respect to the possible production of additional
nuclear weapons. Here's the world's biggest proliferator of ballistic
missile technology; if it ends up with additional nuclear weapons, it
might very well be in the business of proliferating them to other
countries.
Now, every country in the world has their own right to make their
judgments about that. And we've worked closely with a number of
countries, including the United Kingdom. And I think that anybody --
any country that is involved with this evolving preliminary testing
capability -- I don't want to overstate it -- clearly ought to have an
interest in to what extent it might conceivably provide some ballistic
missile for them. And one can be sure that countries that do
participate will participate because it will in fact, as it evolves,
provide them somewhat higher levels of security than they would
otherwise have.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, you talked at the beginning about how you need to be
prepared and in position for military action, and that was your
explanation for your consultations with NATO. I wonder if you could
extend that to the deployment issue a bit. You've signed a number of
deployment orders in the last few weeks. How are you thinking about
how urgent it is to get large numbers of forces deployed there, versus
what issues might arise if they end up having to wait a long time?
Rumsfeld: Well, you know, there's no perfect model for what we're
trying to do. What we're trying to do is to support the diplomacy. And
the process of working -- the State Department sent out, you know,
three or four or five dozen cables asking for countries that are
interested in cooperating and getting involved in the planning process
so that in the event force has to be used, that planning will have
taken place. The same thing's true with NATO. We are proceeding to
flow forces in an orderly way. We're doing some herding, we're doing
some mobilizing, and we're doing some deploying.
We also recognize that the timing of the decision-making is not in our
hands. So what we have to do is to try to do what we're doing in a way
that gives the president and the world options to use force if, in
fact, that becomes necessary, while at the same time recognizing that
you -- one can't pick a date certain, or even a time frame certain.
And, therefore, what you must do is also have back-up plans so that
you don't overstress the force and that you manage it in a way that's
appropriate. And we're doing the very best we can. And so far, so
good.
Yes. Way in the back.
Q: How close are you to the point where you'll need to go to Congress
for supplemental funding to deal with the costs of these movements?
Rumsfeld: Well, I have my opinion, and the executive branch, the White
House and the OMB are currently wrestling with my opinion and the
opinion of other agencies that are in a similar circumstance.
There's no question but that if you think back, we asked for an
additional $10 billion for the global war on terrorism, excluding
anything involving Iraq. The Congress didn't decide to provide that.
Therefore, our budget was passed absent that $10 billion, even though
the global war on terrorism is going on. It involves forces in the
United States, force protection overseas, a variety of things are
going on, as you know, in six, eight countries.
Now, what does all that mean? It means that we are -- we've gone
through October, we've gone through November, gone through December,
we're now going through January. That's four months. That's roughly a
third of a year, if my memory serves me correctly. And what do you do?
You're conducting the government's business, the business of our
country, at the request of the Congress and the president, and you're
doing it without having your budget approved for those particular
activities: the global war on terrorism. Nor, despite the resolution
in the Congress on Iraq, have we received funds for the Iraq component
of the global war on terrorism, which is a part of it.
That means that we're robbing Peter to pay Paul. It's a terrible way
to manage your affairs. I think it was a mistake that we didn't have
the $10 billion approved. We knew we were going to spend it. We knew
the global war on terrorism wasn't going to go away. And yet it wasn't
approved. So that means we need a supplement. And the question is,
when do you need it? Well, obviously, we shouldn't have needed it
because it should have been appropriated in the first place.
Therefore, every month that goes by, you're robbing Peter to pay Paul
in a way that's not good management practice, it's not good business
practice, and it's not something that we like to do. And there is a
point where you can't do it anymore.
Q: How much?
Rumsfeld: It's up to the president.
Q: Give us a sneak preview.
How about you?
Rumsfeld: Oh, I wouldn't think of it.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how much you've spent so far on
these deployments, approximately? Any guesstimate of how much --
Rumsfeld: I could, but I'm not going to. You know, it is so
approximate, and then we'd have to disaggregate things that are
Iraq-related from things that are global war on terrorism directly
related; that piece, although they're all connected, this particular
spike in spending and activity, clearly, as an element of the global
war on terrorism, is something that's distinctive. And trying to try
to do that from this podium, I think would not be useful. My -- full
stop.
Q: Oh, please! Please! (Laughter.)
Q: Considering your opening statement that the lack of a smoking gun,
or Blix's statement about that could be evidence in and of itself of
Iraqi non-cooperation, which if I understand the U.N. resolution
correctly, a finding of Iraqi non-cooperation itself could be a
trigger for war, is that an argument that the United States is
advancing now, or planning to advance in the near future, is my first
question.
My second question is --
Rumsfeld: Let me just do one at a time.
Q: Okay.
Rumsfeld: It's late in the day.
First, the resolution itself, as I recall it, said that the Iraqis
were in violation, material breach. They said that they're required to
submit a declaration, and in the event it is not accurate, that that
would be a further -- I think was the phrase -- material breach. And
they submitted a declaration, which people who have looked at it and
read it, including, I believe, Mr. Blix, have characterized as
something less than fulsome.
The next thing is, they're continuing to shoot at our aircraft, as
General Myers has stated. To the extent they then, in terms of looking
at their behavior with inspectors, behave in a way that is not
disclosing, not allowing everything to be seen, not coming forward and
asking to be inspected and being willing to disarm, one would assume
that the resolution -- somebody, sometime, will conclude that that's
still a further breach.
Now, what does that mean? At what point -- how many further breaches
is the U.N. going to want? How many further breaches is the United
States going to want? That's not for me to decide. Our task here is to
be prepared to provide options for the president.
Q: Mr. Secretary, whether or not --
Q: Mr. Secretary, on the question that -- getting back to the question
of aid from NATO. Could I ask you to elaborate on the things, the
elements besides AWACS that are under consideration? And I was
wondering, among those, which do we want the most? Which do we need
the most? Can you speak to that at all?
Rumsfeld: I could, but I don't think I will. The discussions are in
the very preliminary stage. The things that are being discussed are
the logical things that would be discussed by the 19 members of NATO.
They're the same things being discussed with other countries, all the
Partners for Peace and countries that are involved in NATO at all.
Q: (Off mike) -- AWACS, I wonder if you would --
Rumsfeld: I thought I mentioned AWACS, but I don't mean to exclude or
include anything; it's just the normal things that those countries
that have those capabilities would make a judgment about. And at such
an early stage, I think to suggest, gee, we asked for this or
something, we didn't. We were asked to -- somebody, military people,
were asked to come up with ideas as to what are the kinds of things
that NATO might do. Various people did, not just from our country, and
those are the kinds of things that are now being discussed and
elaborated on.
Q: Mr. Secretary, to go back to the question of missile defense, the
Russian defense minister suggested today that his country was going to
go ahead with its own anti-missile program.
Rumsfeld: It already has one.
Q: Do you feel --
Rumsfeld: It has a ballistic missile defense --
Q: -- (off mike)?
Rumsfeld: No, it has one in place. It has a missile defense program
around Moscow with nuclear-tipped interceptors, has for decades.
Q: But a further system like ours, with theater mid-course and long
range?
Rumsfeld: The Russians look at the world, just like we do, and they
see countries that are developing longer-range ballistic missiles.
They see the proliferation of chemical and biological and nuclear
capabilities to countries that it is extremely worrisome that they
have them.
Myers: And as you know, we've had missile defense exercise with them.
I think we've done at least two now, and we have one more in the
planning stages. I think there have been some planning conferences
here in the United States with the Russians on that. And we've also
offered to work with them on some of the technical aspects of missile
defense as well.
Q: Mr. Secretary, whether or not there is a war, will you say -- will
Saddam Hussein still be in power a year from today?
Rumsfeld: Oh, my goodness. That's not for me to say. I think that -- I
can take you through a logic -- a brief logic chain. He is a vicious
dictator who is repressing his people. He has had in the past weapons
of mass destruction, and he used them against his own people, and he
used them against his neighbors. He's fired ballistic missiles at two,
three or four countries in the past. He has challenged the legitimacy
of most of his neighbors at one time or another. He has demonstrated
in the past an unwillingness to cooperate with 16 U.N. resolutions.
The United Nations has now said that they want him to disarm and they
want him to reveal his weapons of mass destruction capabilities to the
inspectors. I think the -- if you drop a plumb line through everything
that's happened since the passage of that latest resolution, one would
have to conclude that he has not been forthcoming.
What will happen next, I can't say. That's well above my pay grade.
Q: You seem to be indicating --
Rumsfeld: But the president of the United States did take the time
yesterday, I believe, to say something like, quote, "time is running,"
unquote.
Q: You seem to be indicating, from your opening comments, that somehow
the world is not seeing this quite the way that you want them to see
it.
Rumsfeld: Don't mean to do that. It's not --
Q: Do you think the world does see it the way the U.S. is presenting
it --
Rumsfeld: I don't know. I don't know.
Q: -- and that the world doesn't need a smoking gun? I mean, the
argument you are making is, don't look for a smoking gun; it's
probably -- it's not necessary.
Rumsfeld: Well, I --
Q: But the world keeps talking about "Well, we need some evidence. We
need some" --
Rumsfeld: Well, the world doesn't talk. The media talks, and people
talk.
Q: Various leaders of various governments --
Rumsfeld: Yes, yes. Let me go back to what's been going on up on the
Hill. They have been trying to connect the dots about September 11th.
What did somebody know? How did it happen? Was there some way to stop
and save the lives of those 3,000 people?
In the case of Iraq, the task is to connect the dots before there's a
smoking gun. If there's a smoking gun, and it involves weapons of mass
destruction, it is a lot of people dead, not 3,000, but multiples of
that.
And that is what the world is going through. The world is doing it at
a time in a new century, with a new set of facts, where the power, the
lethality of these weapons, is so vastly greater than conventional
weapons and as has historically been the case.
And what the world is doing is it is wrestling with a dilemma. The
dilemma is that, historically, we've tended to not do things until
attacked. That has been generally the pattern. Not always. There have
been plenty of people in the history of warfare who have seen people
massing on their border and decided that that was a target of
opportunity and went after the massing force near their border before
they could attack. We'll call that a preemptive action. The United
States did not wait for al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan to keep
continuing attacking us; we went after them.
Now, what the world is trying to get comfortable is if
-- if we behave like we behaved in the 20th century, and we said "Fair
enough. We don't believe in attacking other countries. We believe we
should wait and be attacked." And if that attack were to involve a
biological weapon -- or a nuclear weapon -- the price to be paid for
waiting would be enormous. Therefore, in trying to connect the dots
before the fact, you have to do it in an environment that's not
comfortable with that, that hasn't really been through this much. And
it isn't surprising that there's a debate. It isn't surprising that
people are weighing these things and giving them a value and an
importance and a significance that they merit. These are big issues.
Q: Many leaders are arguing they want clearer evidence
-- from U.N. inspectors, from the United States --
Rumsfeld: Right.
Q: -- before any preemptive action should be taken, and that they
accuse --
Rumsfeld: Exactly.
Q: -- some are accusing the U.S. of thinking of taking the law into
its own hands, which is --
Rumsfeld: The right of self-defense is inherent in the sovereign
state. So that -- that issue is, it seems to me, clear and
self-evident.
There isn't anybody who wouldn't love to have all the dots connected.
Why -- why isn't it -- it -- wouldn't it be wonderful if someone came
down, walked in the room right now, and said, "Gee, here are all the
dots. Let's connect them for everybody so life is simple." Life isn't
simple. Life is complicated. You're dealing with a very tough apple.
He's been in power a whale of a long time. He has killed a pile of
people. He's attacked a number of nations. He's used chemical weapons
on his own people and on his neighbors. And he's got a very effective
denial and deception program. And if someone is sitting here thinking,
"Well, wouldn't it be nice if somebody walked up and handed you a
chemical or a biological weapon, or physical evidence that they're
within 15 minutes of having a nuclear weapon," that would be
wonderful. It isn't going to happen! It will only happen if he decides
to do it.
Q: Well, why not release more intelligence that you have, so people
can connect the dots?
Rumsfeld: The United States is cooperating fully with the inspectors.
We're offering intelligence capabilities in the air, we're offering
specific information as to sites. Those sites are being inspected.
And this is a country that is enormous. This is a country that has
vast underground capabilities to deceive and deny. It is a country
where the people are intimidated and frightened to death that they'll
be killed, if in fact they cooperate at all with those inspectors. It
is a country where we have not yet gotten scientists and technicians
and knowledgeable people to either defect or to leave the country,
which the resolution called for, with the approval of Saddam Hussein.
It isn't for us to grab those people and abduct them. His job, under
that resolution, was to offer them up, to volunteer them so that the
inspectors could take them and their families outside the country, to
Cyprus, and talk to them.
Q: But the inspectors have said you've only just started releasing
intelligence to them. I mean, do you feel under pressure to release a
lot more intelligence or are you afraid those sources and methods --
Rumsfeld: It's not my decision. It's the Central Intelligence Agency
that's been assigned by the government to work with the inspectors.
Q: Surely you must have an opinion on this.
Rumsfeld: I have both opinions and knowledge. And what I just said is
correct; that they are -- the United States government, the Central
Intelligence Agency, is in fact giving site locations and specific
information to the inspectors. They are doing that.
Q: And what is the status of that offer to provide overhead
surveillance for the inspectors?
Rumsfeld: You might comment on this. This is interesting.
Myers: We've offered the U-2 and Predator to the U.N. To date, they
have accepted the use of the U-2; it would be under U.N. auspices --
flown under U.N. auspices. And we -- any time. We're ready to go.
We've got the modalities in place. We've talked to UNMOVIC about all
that.
But it was interesting that the Iraqi regime sent a letter to UNMOVIC,
to Dr. Blix, and said, gee, we'd have a real problem with a U-2 flying
over central Iraq because we'd have trouble deconflicting from all
those other aircraft that are flying around that we're shooting at
currently. (Laughter.) And --
Rumsfeld: Which they shouldn't be shooting at!
Myers: Which, if you read the resolution real carefully, they
shouldn't be shooting.
So, UNMOVIC is working through that. We're ready to go whenever
they're ready to go.
Q: But does that in effect give Saddam Hussein veto power over what
surveillance is offered to UNMOVIC?
Rumsfeld: That's between the Iraqis and the inspectors.
Q: Well, if UNMOVIC is willing to negotiate with Saddam Hussein about
how they're going to carry out those inspections, then how effective
can those inspections ever be?
Rumsfeld: Time will tell.
Q: Just to clarify, you --
Q: Do you think --
Rumsfeld: We -- we -- we --
(Cross talk.)
Rumsfeld: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait!
We're so far over. We've gone 45 minutes.
Q: Do you think it --
Rumsfeld: We've been up testifying before the Senate Committee --
Q: Do you think it may become necessary to put some evidence out there
in public in order to bolster your case? You've stood there and said
you know they have weapons of mass destruction --
Rumsfeld: Well, let me phrase it this way. The intelligence community
of the United States of America has assessed not that they have
nuclear weapons, but that they have an active, ongoing nuclear
program. That's public. There's an NIE, a National Intelligence
Estimate, on that. And if it weren't public, it now is.
They have assessed that they have chemical and biological weapons. The
Iraqis have -- Iraqi people who have been involved in some of those
programs have told us that. The stories by the Iraqi people who have
been involved in some of those programs and told us that have been
corroborated by still other people.
The Iraqi government has, in effect, told us a good deal, explicitly,
in their prior declarations and their current declarations about the
programs they have had and the information that we've gotten from
defectors. And they've really told us something implicitly, in the
sense that they're so actively engaged in denial and deception about
what they're doing. Why, for example, would they be out buying things
that are critical to biological or chemical programs or nuclear
activities and trying to do it in secret?
Q: Like what?
Q: Can you give some examples of --
Rumsfeld: I could have, but I won't.
Q: Well, could you give --
Rumsfeld: I could, but I won't.
Q: I know you can't. But --
Q: That's what the world's asking for --
Rumsfeld: Let me finish my thought. Let me finish -- let me finish --
Q: That's what the world's asking for, that information --
Rumsfeld: The world doesn't ask, Charlie!
Q: What world leaders are --
Q: That's what critics of possible war are asking -- for the
information that you have --
Rumsfeld: And that's fair. That's fair. They should ask, and --
Q: But why don't you provide it?
Rumsfeld: Well, it's not for me to decide these things. It's --
there'll be people who will make judgments about what -- if a decision
is made to use force, you can be sure that the president, who makes
that decision, not this department, would take it -- all of your
advice about the world is -- what the world is waiting with bated
breath for and make a judgment and decide what can be disclosed that
would not jeopardize the use of force and make that case. Who -- who
will do that? I don't know. I suppose it's the intelligence community
and others. But that -- the president has not made a judgment that
it's necessary to use force. Therefore, one ought not to be surprised
that he hasn't done that.
Q: But you're saying there are specific instances within the last two
months of inspections where denial and deception has been detected. I
mean, in terms of --
Rumsfeld: Well, of course. They're good at it. They're pros.
Q: And you can't share --
Rumsfeld: Their programs are designed to function in an inspections
environment.
Q: I understand. But you can't share any examples of that, where the
inspectors have been hoodwinked, so to speak.
Rumsfeld: The inspectors haven't been hoodwinked. Look at -- they're
-- these are, I'm sure -- I don't know any of them. But I'm sure
they're perfectly sincere, responsible people. They're not in there to
discover things and find things
-- they're in there to inspect things that the Iraqi government
decides to disclose to them. That is what the job of an inspector is.
This business that's being around -- oh, maybe they'll discover this
and discover that -- that isn't what inspectors do. Inspectors are
asked by the country to come in and look at what we have, because we
have decided as a good citizen of the world to stop having these
things. And we want to prove to the world, therefore we invite
inspectors in. Look at what we're doing. Let us help you. Here is what
it is. Destroy it for us. That is not what's going on.
Q: Why don't we offer them U-2s or Predators, then, if that's not --
Q: If you're not looking for something, what is the point of all this?
(Cross talk.)
Rumsfeld: The reason we're doing it is because the president of the
United States made a decision that it was in the interests of the
United States and the world to go to the United Nations and seek a
resolution. And the resolution provides that these -- these activities
that are currently underway will take place. And member states of the
United Nations were asked -- and we agreed -- to provide appropriate
assistance to see that those U.N.-mandated activities proceed. It's
not complicated.
Q: But you're -- but you're not --
Q: But you're going to be able to go to those locations and find
something, correct?
Rumsfeld: What -- I think I've said this before, and I hate to repeat
myself, but they began in material breach. It was said that if the
declaration is not fulsome, it would be a further material breach, and
third, that there would either be cooperation, or if there were
non-cooperation, that would be a still further breach. Therefore, it's
up to the U.N. and the United States at some moment to drop a plumb
line through all of that and say, "Was the declaration adequate? Most
people seem to think not. Is the cooperation that we're receiving
appropriate?" That's the judgment that is yet to be made.
Q: But you --
Rumsfeld: You say, "Well, why are you doing all this?" Because the
U.N. decided to do it. And the president decided to go to the U.N. And
we agreed to cooperate. So we are cooperating. And we'll see -- this
is a test. It's a test for Saddam Hussein. Is he going to be seen as
being cooperative by the world community or not?
Q: But again, if you give them specific intelligence on particular
locations, you want them to go there to find something, one would
think.
Rumsfeld: That's right.
Q: So they'll find something.
Rumsfeld: Well if, as you give somebody information, it then finds its
way to the Iraqis before the inspectors arrive, you might very well
not find something.
Q: You believe --
Q: (Inaudible) -- monitors there.
Q: But you are trying to find something, which is exactly opposite of
what you've been saying, that you don't expect to find anything.
Rumsfeld: I didn't say I don't expect to find anything. I said very
clearly that inspectors find things when the host country decides to
be cooperative and says, "Here it is." And the question now is, to
what extent is Iraq or not being cooperative? This is not complicated.
This is not rocket science.
Q: The intelligence is used to find a "gotcha," isn't it? Like, "Hey,
here it is. They didn't tell us this, but we"
--
Rumsfeld: I think -- I think trying to find something that someone
could characterize in that inelegant way is not likely. I think it's
very hard to do that. As I've said repeatedly, I honestly believe that
the way information is gained is through defectors and through people
that are taken out of a country with their families and given a chance
to tell the truth. And in the event that information like something
approximating a smoky gun -- smoking gun is to be found, it will, I
suspect, be via that route.
Thank you very much.
Q: Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
