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Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft: The Future of Maritime Patrol

NAVAIR News Release

Release Date: 1/15/2003

Introduction

Since its humble beginnings in WWII, the U.S. Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) has long been a transformational power. Originally intended to survey and monitor the blue water ocean, the MPRF has continually evolved over the years, developing and integrating new technologies and systems that allow it to go beyond providing for dominance over undersea and surface threats by way of its traditional roles in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), to conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control and communications (C3) missions in support of blue water, littoral, land, and amphibious operations.

The latest P-3C configuration, a product of the ASuW Improvement Program (AIP), was developed in response to requirements from Fleet commanders to improve the surface warfare and maritime strike support capability of the P-3C Update III aircraft. Making its début in NATO's Operation Allied Force, it gave P-3s not only increased ASuW capabilities, but also increased their ISR ability - eventually helping them to move on to terra firma to perform certain ISR missions. This innovative way of employing the P-3, first used in Kosovo and later in Afghanistan, proved the concept of evolutionary acquisition and design and the dynamic capabilities it provides to the warfighter.

In fact, because of this and previous improvement programs, P-3s and their signals intelligence (SIGINT)-gathering counterpart EP-3s have been getting a lot of use recently - despite what many U.S. Navy officials projected following the end of the cold war and associated Russian submarine threat a dozen or so years ago.

Unfortunately, the MPRF aircraft fleets of the U.S. and its allies are getting old. The last U.S. Navy P-3C came off the production line at Lockheed's Burbank, California plant in April 1990.

During the past decade, P-3s have experienced a steady decline in operational availability and a steady increase in Operations and Support (O&S) costs. Moreover, the recent tempo of military operations is putting these aircraft into overtime, which further accelerates their retirement.

The U.S. Navy currently expects P-3s to begin arriving at the end of their service life in 2007. By 2010, sources say there won't be enough P-3s to meet the U.S. Navy's operational demands. EP-3s are in a similar situation, but they are facing retirement as early as 2005 due to an even greater tempo of operations.

So who will come to the rescue? What's the recapitalization plan?

P-3/EP-3 Alternatives

In the late 1980s, when the cold war still provided a viable reason for large-scale defense upgrades, the U.S. Navy initiated the Long Range Air ASW Capable Aircraft (LRAACA) program and, after a competitive selection, contracted with Lockheed to design, build and test two prototype aircraft to replace the P-3. This effort was later known as the P-7 program. But this effort, and a parallel program to upgrade the mission avionics by Boeing called Update IV, eventually was terminated, leaving the P-3 without a workable successor for the foreseeable future.

In the fall of 1997, the U.S. Navy acknowledged that if something didn't happen soon, they might lose their only blue water and littoral long-range armed-ISR platform and primary airborne ASW capability. Based on an assessment of the lessons learned from the earlier P-3 update programs, and fresh examination of National Defense needs, the U.S. Navy began to formulate the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) program, a recapitalization solution for the P-3 and EP-3 inventories.

The MMA team began weighing their options: Should they attempt to sustain the current force by extending the fatigue lives of the old P-3s by refurbishing them, or should they re-open the P-3 line and create more P-3Cs, some of which could be converted into EP-3s? Or, should they put money toward a completely new program that recapitalizes both the P-3 and EP-3 with modernized vehicles and systems?

The first option would allow the U.S. Navy to prolong the use of the aircraft and potentially add new sensors until, they hoped, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or another, better and cheaper alternative would take over the role. The second option, which gained significant support after Taiwan intimated its desire to reopen the P-3C production line and procure current configuration aircraft, would be more expensive and wouldn't improve any of the capabilities, but it would be a longer-term solution. And the third endeavor would provide the U.S. Navy with a solution with the greatest promise, but unless action was taken immediately, it might not be ready in time to avoid an MPRF inventory shortfall. Plus, it would pose potentially the highest risk, due to the difficulty of initiating a new major defense acquisition program in today's budgetary climate.

What eventuated were several analyses conducted with insight gleaned from the lessons learned from the P-7 programs and subsequent study efforts and other recent acquisition programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) . These analyses - including a mission area analysis, a shortfalls analysis, and a technical and economic feasibility analysis of several potential aircraft alternatives - led U.S. Navy officials to determine that there was a need for a MPRF replacement aircraft, and recommend that, because of budget shortfalls, it could not be operational in any form (at this point, notionally a remanufactured P-3) until 2015.

Their recommendation led to a pre-concept exploration work effort called the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft program. This effort supported the development of a Broad Area Maritime and Littoral, Armed ISR Mission Need Statement (MNS), which was validated and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on February 29, 2000. The MMA program, now housed within the Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Program Office of the Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, Maryland, had come to life, but because of the previous unsuccessful programs, many at NAVAIR had an absence of faith. But the small MMA team had hope.

Since the current rate of P-3 and EP-3 retirement would cease to fulfill the U.S. Navy's operational demands by 2010, the U.S. Navy leadership originally thought that a P-3 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was required to bridge the current operational force with the MMA force.

Then, on March 22, 2000, MMA reached perhaps the most important milestone up to that point - Milestone 0 (now called Milestone A) - when they were approved for entry into Concept Exploration. An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was conducted in this phase, further defining how best to recapitalize the P-3 and EP-3 Force. The AoA, reviewed by a senior team of Navy and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) representatives, approved by the appropriate authority in the USN, and endorsed by OSD, expanded the initial notional concept of a remanufactured P-3 to include many other options, including: 23 military and commercial land-based aircraft derivatives; new design medium and large turbo-fan and turbo-prop aircraft; planned satellite capabilities; land- and sea-based UAVs (with weapons delivery augmentation as appropriate); combinations of destroyers, helicopters and submarines; and airships. Its results reflect the overall value of each alternative as well as several capability combinations (e.g., sustaining P-3 forces until UCAV technology can be fielded).

It found that manned, land-based aircraft, based on modifications to existing commercial or military aircraft designs, are a key element of any solution to fill the need expressed in the MNS. Through examining the role of off-board sensors and platforms, the AoA also identified a potential role for UAVs in meeting some of the MMA mission requirements. But, because of the embryonic state of UAV and UCAV technology, the language in the AoA was left open to interpretation.

This stage not only better defined MMA, it also gave it more immediacy. In January 2001, the Secretary of the Navy accelerated the MMA program by three-to-five years to attain IOC in the Fiscal Year 2010 to 2012 timeframe - thereby obviating the SLEP requirement. The Navy is developing a P-3 sustainment bridge to MMA by using a combination of Special Structural Inspections (SSI) and targeted structural repairs on high value assets to permit limited operation above 100% Fatigue Life Expended (FLE).

The SSI, in combination with the USN's AIP, has continued to provide MMA with valuable information and, more importantly, time. Both programs have helped build a viable bridge to MMA by enabling P-3 operation on a waived basis to as much as 130 percent fatigue life expended. AIP is also developing follow-on sensors and other technologies that will potentially adorn the new MMA aircraft.

Recent Program Accomplishments

On January 18, 2002, MMA received approval to enter the Component Advanced Development (CAD) work effort, previously called the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) stage. CAD was divided up into two separate industry work efforts, called Industry Phase I and Phase II, respectively. This approval made way for the initial source selection evaluation, during which time proposals from BAE Systems, Boeing Co., and Lockheed Martin Corp. were submitted for Industry Phase I. On September 10, 2002, Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. were each awarded $7 million contracts for the first five months of CAD. BAE Systems was also offered a $7 million contract at this time, but instead of accepting, withdrew their proposal.

The current CAD phase represents the first five months of a 16-month industry effort that will allow the contractors to perform requirements analysis in support of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), define the MMA system architecture, quantify and reduce concept risks, evaluate total ownership costs, and develop detailed plans and schedules for each MMA system alternative concept.

According to the most recent statement of objectives, CAD Industry Phase II will commence in February 2003 with both contractors still committed. Each contractor will provide a proposal to study both the Search-and-Attack (SA) variant and the Surveillance-and-Intelligence (SI) variant, providing an opportunity for Industry to refine their proposed concepts based on the results of CAD Phase I. This 11-month effort will continue until Milestone B, planned for January 20, 2004, at which time the System Development and Demonstration phase will begin and a single prime contractor will be selected. The schedule beyond MS B is alternative dependent; however, if the current pace is maintained, the first flight of the MMA can be expected as early as the fall of 2007.

According to the MNS, interoperability and connectivity between services and between U.S. and Coalition forces is mandatory. In an effort to adhere to this constraint, MMA has been keeping abreast of the progress of other U.S. reconnaissance platform development efforts, including the Air Force's Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A), the Army's Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) and the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV program.

International Expansion

Since the commencement of the initial MMA studies, several countries have expressed a strong interest in MMA based on interoperability concerns or as a source to replace their MPRF systems, most notably Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is interested in creating mission system commonalities between their indigenous P-3 solution, the P-X, and MMA. A joint work effort between the Japan P-X and U.S. MMA programs focusing on avionics and mission systems interoperability, has been highly successful, according to officials from both sides. The JMSDFrecently awarded the production of the P-X to Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Gifu, Japan.

Australia is planning several research and development programs to modernize and eventually replace their AP-3 aircraft - eventuating with UAV integration into their maritime and littoral defense program. They have expressed sincere interest in forming a cooperative agreement with MMA.

The UK's Ministry of Defence, which is currently overseeing the Royal Air Force's Nimrod MRA.4 development activity, has been consistently appraised of MMA's proceedings and will further discuss with U.S. Navy officials parallels between their relative systems.

Many other countries are exploring alternatives to recapitalizing their retiring maritime patrol forces. Some that have expressed interest in learning more about MMA are Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and potentially Taiwan - none of which have yet signed official cooperative agreements with MMA.

The Future

In support of the U.S. Secretary of Defense's objective of acquisition streamlining, the Navy has identified MMA as a candidate for a program being initiated that will receive that special consideration in the form of support for adequate and stable funding, quicker routing and staffing of documentation, and "stakeholder" support from the outset that focuses on providing a product to the Fleet in the shortest amount of time. This program, dubbedFast Track, is the Navy's acquisition equivalent of the Air Force's "Pathfinder" program - a program created to increase the potential for attaining an earlier operational capability for a weapon system.

The Fast Track program will be tailored to each candidate program - right now, only MMA and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a smaller, more specialized variant of the DD(X) family of future surface combat ships. Eventually the streamlining initiative will become part of the process but in the meantime, MMA will enjoy high-level visibility inside the Pentagon.

MMA is a key capability provider in the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO's) Transformation Roadmap (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing). It will have the significant ability to operate with U.S. and Coalition forces in defending the Homeland against external attacks; in deterring aggression and coercion in critical regions; in swiftly defeating adversaries in two overlapping wars while preserving options for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and in conducting a limited number of lesser contingency operations.

MMA has plans to transform how the MPRF will train, man, operate, and deploy and will extract more combat capability with a smaller force and less infrastructure. According to MMA's slogan, it is the Future of Maritime Patrol and is the last chance the U.S. Navy has to recapitalize the MPRF. Let's ensure this transformational capability comes to fruition.