Military

Wolfowitz Says Indonesian Democracy a Prime Terror Target

(Deputy defense secretary interviewed by CNN November 5) (6410)
In the aftermath of the recent terrorist bombing in Bali, U.S. Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the Indonesian government has
become "much more serious, much more focused" on the dangers of
terrorism, and the government's effort to combat terrorism is
improving.
"In many ways, I think Indonesian democracy is the prime target" of
international terrorists, Wolfowitz said in a November 5 interview
with CNN International television. "I think what they'd like to do is
to radicalize the population of Indonesia and other Muslim populations
in Southeast Asia."
Calling terrorists' claims to commit crimes in the name of religion "a
hijacking of Islam," Wolfowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia,
said "the people in Indonesia are incredibly decent people and their
vision of Islam is so completely different from this extreme version
that the terrorists peddle that I believe in the long run --
hopefully, in the short run as well -- it's going to be a huge asset
in the fight against terrorism."
Acknowledging that the U.S. decision to rebuild ties with Indonesia's
military in the fight against terrorism is "admittedly controversial,"
Wolfowitz said that the Indonesian government itself realizes that "a
successful relationship with its own security forces" is necessary,
and so "those of us in the international community that have close
relations with Indonesia ought to be helping that democratic
government to achieve that goal."
"My experience with Indonesians over many years has been that their
pace is different from Americans, but they are very serious people and
I believe that they will get serious about this problem, if they
haven't already. Many of them are already," Wolfowitz said.
Turning to the Philippines, Wolfowitz noted that alleged use of Moro
Islamic Liberation Front training camps by al-Qaeda and Gama'at
al-Islamiyya terrorists is "the kind of thing we've got to be very
concerned about." He said the Philippines "probably was the first to
discover that [terrorism] had an international dimension as well as a
domestic one."
As for Malaysia, he said its cooperation with the United States led to
the discovery that a September 11 planning meeting took place in
Malaysia in early 2000.
Wolfowitz said what has struck him most about what has been learned of
al-Qaeda since military action in Afghanistan is "first of all, the
murderous intent that just keeps being confirmed.."
On Yemen, he said, "We've had pretty good cooperation with the
government of Yemen, and it's certainly improved a lot. . I think the
progress we made in Afghanistan certainly contributed to much better
cooperation from a number of governments, including the government of
Yemen."
As for a focus on Iraq hurting the war against terrorism, Wolfowitz
flatly said "I don't believe it." He asked how the anti-terror effort
could be concerned with eliminating countries such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Yemen and Indonesia as safe havens for terrorists while
leaving alone a country which is a state sponsor of terror.
"I mean, if you're going to eliminate sanctuary, you've got to look at
it in a global way," he said.
Following is the transcript of Wolfowitz's remarks:
(begin transcript)
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With CNN International
U.S. Department of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
November 5, 2002
(Interview with Maria Ressa, CNN International)
Q: I'm Maria Ressa, at the Pentagon with Deputy Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz, how would you characterize the threat of al-Qaeda in
Southeast Asia?
Wolfowitz: I think it's important to start by recognizing it's a
worldwide threat. I mean, we think there are al-Qaeda in some 90
different countries, including here in the United States. And any time
we start to talk about a particular place, sometimes people think that
we're zeroing in on them. I know the Indonesians are particularly
sensitive about what they think as somehow being singled out. They're
not being singled out.
But it is also true that Southeast Asia has one of the largest
populations of Muslims in the world, nearly a quarter of a [billion],
I think, if you count all of those countries. It's actually, overall,
one of the most moderate Muslim populations in the world in terms of
their religious views and their attitudes toward other religions. I
was ambassador to Indonesia for three years, and I know just how
wonderfully tolerant Indonesians are, and how proud they are of the
tolerant traditions of their country. But that doesn't prevent a few
hundred or a few thousand extremists from slipping in, especially in a
democratic country, and finding places to hide.
I think it's, we can see it from their web sites, that al-Qaeda views
this as a major target for disruption and recruitment and for
conducting terrorist attacks. In fact, the people who planned the
original World Trade Center bombing -- excuse me -- carried out the
original World Trade Center bombing in 1993, then moved on to Manila
where they had a base for a year-and-a-half and were on the verge of
some more horrendous acts when they got captured.
Q: For our American audience, should they be concerned? I know you're
concerned about not pinpointing countries, but should they be
concerned about events in Southeast Asia? Does that have any effect on
them at all?
Wolfowitz: Yes, they should. They should also be concerned about
events in Yemen, events in Iraq, events in Iran, events in the United
States, events in Europe. This is a worldwide struggle. It's going to
take a long time to root these people out and to eliminate the source
of support, and clearly Southeast Asia is one of those places. Each
one is a little bit different. I think the Philippines is different
from Indonesia; both of them are different from, let's say, Singapore
and Malaysia.
Ironically, for many years Americans complained that the government of
Indonesia was too authoritarian. We wanted to see democracy in
Indonesia, which I devoutly wanted myself. Now we have democracy and
some people are saying, 'Well, why are they so concerned about civil
liberties? Why don't they just lock them all up and put them in jail?'
In many ways Indonesia and the Philippines have the same challenge
that other democratic countries have, which is how to get the right
balance between law enforcement and civil liberties, and they're
working on it.
Q: I'm going to bring you back again to the threat in particular.
Since the worst terrorist attacks since September 11th happened in
that area, operational capabilities of [the south] link to al-Qaeda,
obviously still there. Governments in the region [are] doing different
things in the war on terror. There seems to be, and you can tell me if
you disagree, some sort of denial, different levels of denial among
the countries of Southeast Asia. How are you handling that?
Wolfowitz: I think you're right. I think again, unfortunately, it's
Indonesia particularly that is in a bit of denial, but I believe that
the horrible bombing in Bali has been something of a wakeup call. I
still think there are a few too many Indonesians who haven't quite
heard the call yet. But certainly the government itself, I believe,
understands what the challenge is and understands that the target
isn't just Australians and Americans. In many ways, the prime target
is Indonesian democracy. This is not the kind of government that
al-Qaeda wants to see governing the Muslim world. They'd like to
create the kind of economic misery, the kind of divisions between
Indonesia and the West that can lead to ultimately turning Indonesia
into the worst kind of Islamic state. They have a very long way to go
if they're going to succeed, because that's not the way Indonesian
people are. But they, I think, are prepared to kill hundreds of
thousands of people to try to achieve that goal.
Q: In the weeks before the Bali bombing, the U.S. was working very
quietly behind the scenes to try to get Indonesia to take care of the
problem that was there. How would you describe the situation in
Indonesia now?
Wolfowitz: I think much more serious, much more focused. The
Parliament itself is looking at new legislation. The government, I
think, has been more outspoken about the kinds of problems they face.
But there's still a public opinion, which I've encountered that
entertains some of the most absurd notions, like the absurd notion
that somehow we did this to ourselves. And unfortunately, the
terrorists have one advantage, which is they do this with a small
number of people and then they go and hide, and we're not completely
sure who did it. But I think anybody looking at the evidence of
everything that's been happening over the last 10 years, and
particularly the last 18 months, would have to say this has all of the
earmarks of an al-Qaeda operation. And if you go and look at some of
their web sites, which are pretty horrendous things... I can't say
I've looked at them because my Arabic isn't quite that good, but I've
seen translations of articles that just openly boast about, "We did
the attack on the Marines in Kuwait; we did the attack on the
Synagogue in Tunisia; we did the attack on those awful, corrupt
nightclubs in Bali, and it's all a wonderful thing and it's all in the
name of Islam."
Well, it's a hijacking of Islam. It's a distortion of Islam. And this
is the one thing that gives me some confidence, ultimately, is that
whatever skepticism there is in Indonesia, whatever failure to
understand the real problem, and there is a certain amount of it, the
people in Indonesia are incredibly decent people and their vision of
Islam is so completely different from this extreme version that the
terrorists peddle, that I believe in the long run -- hopefully in the
short run as well -- it's going to be a huge asset in the fight
against terrorism.
Q: But presently is there enough being done to dismantle the network
that exists there?
Wolfowitz: One can always probably do more. One of the challenges in a
democracy is how much can you do before you start to infringe on
fundamental civil liberties. There's no question there are things we
don't do in this country that might help in fighting terrorism because
there's a limit to what we think is appropriate consistent with our
Constitution. Indonesia has had a much more -- it's had very recent
experience with the abuse of that kind of authority. So I think there
are people who think pretty cautiously in thinking about what
authority to give the government.
It's hard, I think it's almost inappropriate for an outsider to start
judging where to strike that balance, but I think what we can do as
Americans or as the international community is: No. 1, to try to give
them as much information as we possibly can about the nature of the
threat; and secondly, to do everything we can to bolster their
democracy in other ways, through economic assistance, through
political support, and frankly, also through this admittedly
controversial idea of rebuilding ties with the Indonesian military. We
don't do that because we're under illusions that the Indonesian
military is just a perfect institution with no problems. It has
enormous problems. I would submit those problems have gotten a lot
worse over the last 10 years, and I'm not sure I'm saying cause and
effect, but over the last 10 years we have had a policy of isolating
the Indonesian military. I wouldn't say it's been a stunning success
in terms of promoting a better behavior by the military, more
disciplined behavior by the military.
I think it's clear that the democratically elected government of
Indonesia believes that in order for democracy to succeed in
Indonesia, the government has to be able to have a successful
relationship with its own security forces. It seems to me that those
of us in the international community that have close relations with
Indonesia ought to be helping that democratic government to achieve
that goal.
Q: How do you put that together with, say, the U.S. intelligence
report that says members of the Indonesian military may have been
involved in the plot to kill Americans, the two Americans in Westport?
First, how credible do you take those intelligence reports?
Wolfowitz: Well, you know, when people start to leak intelligence
reports, they put people like me in an impossible position because we
don't discuss intelligence. That doesn't mean, therefore, that I'm
either confirming or denying it. I'd love to say more, but I can't.
But I think the real point is that, there is an important issue of
what took place in Freeport and who was behind those killings, and I
don't think we've yet gotten to the bottom of it. I guess by which I
mean I don't think the Indonesian authorities have yet gotten to the
bottom of it. I think they've got to get to the bottom of it and
they've got to punish whoever is responsible no matter what, whether
they're official or unofficial. And the more successfully they can do
that, I think the more confidence the rest of the world, particularly
the United States, will have in dealing with them. But I wouldn't jump
to conclusions based on -- I have to say, there are intelligence
reports and there are intelligence reports. You've been to Jakarta.
You know there are rumors every day about almost everything, and I'm
sure some of that finds its way into secret reports labeled
intelligence. It's up to law enforcement to get to the bottom of this
one.
Q: Let me ask you, over the last year or so the U.S. has been working
quietly behind the scenes with Indonesia, especially since the Bali
blast. Do you think this is an effective strategy, given that since
the attacks on Bali we've seen really the arrest of Bashir and then
nothing more concrete behind trying to dismantle --
[Pause to fix technical difficulties]
Q: Do you think that the strategy that you followed in dealing with
Indonesia has been effective?
Wolfowitz: I'm not sure there's really an alternative. It sort of...
let's begin by understanding that we're not the ones who can deal with
terrorism in Indonesia; the Indonesians have got to do it themselves.
We can encourage them; we can try to give them information. I think
you used the word "denial" earlier as to whether the Indonesians have
accepted the reality. I think it's probably fair to say that until
September 11th of last year, Americans were in denial. We knew these
people were out to get us. We read their fatwas. We knew they'd killed
people in embassies. The idea that they could kill thousands of
Americans in the United States, though, was if someone had said it, I
think -- you'd just have to say we were in denial also.
I believe there's no question that what happened in Bali has been
something of a wake-up call for Indonesians. Whether it's had enough
of an effect or whether the effect will wear off rather quickly, is
something time will tell.
I do believe that Indonesians need to understand that this is not
something they do as a favor to the United States, or to the outside
world. If they want to have a successful democracy, they've got to get
this problem under control. If they want to have a thriving tourism
industry, they clearly have to get this problem under control. If they
want to attract foreign investment, they have to get this problem
under control. Does it mean perfect control and no terrorist events?
None of us can do that sort of thing. But I think what outsiders can
judge and will judge over time is what is the level of effort, as
opposed to what is the record of terrorism. And if there's a
succession of terrorist events and seeming lack of energy from the
government is going to have bad consequences for Indonesia, no matter
what any of the rest of us say.
Q:  How would you judge the level of effort now?
Wolfowitz: It's improving. It's going up. I remember years ago, when I
was with the Secretary of State, we were dealing with the dictatorship
in the Philippines. An Asian friend of mine said, "you need a little
patience, we're Southeast Asians," he said. "Things go on a different
schedule, but they go."
My experience with Indonesians over many years has been that their
pace is different from Americans, but they are very serious people and
I believe that they will get serious about this problem if they
haven't already. Many of them are already.
Q: Let me switch you to the Philippines. The Philippine government
overnight said they were notified by the U.S. government that it was
planning on putting the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front] on its
list of terrorist organizations, the Morozan Corporation from the
largest Muslim separatist group in the Philippines. Is that the case?
Wolfowitz: We try to stay in our lane here at the Defense Department.
That's a State Department issue.
There are concerns about that organization, but obviously also there
are important Philippine views about whether these people are
terrorists and whether they're people you can in fact negotiate with
politically. And I'm sure that that's the subject now of pretty
intense discussions.
Q: Given the near-concrete links that have come out over the last few
months about the MILF training camps being used by Gama'at
al-Islamiyya and al-Qaeda, is this something that the United States is
concerned about?
Wolfowitz: Obviously that's the kind of thing we've got to be very
concerned about.
Q: Is it true that President Arroyo has lobbied the U.S. government
against putting the MILF on its list?
Wolfowitz:  I couldn't answer that one way or the other.
Q: The MILF is one of the groups in the southern -- the U.S. has
placed the Abu Sayyef squarely on it, but the MILF has been pegged for
many of the bombings that have been linked to al-Qaeda and Gamma'at
al-Islamiyya. How does the U.S. look at the MILF right now?
Wolfowitz: Well, as I say, it's got some ambiguous qualities and this
is something we are discussing with the government of the Philippines.
But I think we've got to be very careful about people who present a
nice warm political face and then underneath that surface are
conducting and supporting terrorism.
Q: It's been several months now since we first talked about this. What
more have you learned about the way al-Qaeda works globally and in
particular in Southeast Asia?
Wolfowitz: I think we've learned quite a bit of detail, particularly,
it's amazing to me how much some of these senior al-Qaeda people have
divulged once they've been captured. It's encouraging, actually. It
doesn't, in my view, fundamentally alter the picture. I'm trying to
think now, but there's nothing that I think we've learned that changes
fundamentally the way we look at it. We've learned more about their
tactics, somewhat more about hiding places, somewhat more about the
connection between them and a variety of foreign governments. But I
think, first of all, the murderous intent just keeps being confirmed
in everything we learn. And secondly, there is --unfortunately, I
think -- a striking resemblance between this organization and a cancer
that has metastasized, if that's the right word. It's not something
where you just cut off the head and the organization withers. It's
cells all over the place, cells with connections with other cells,
terrorist groups with connections to other groups. Many different
governments, terrorist-supporting governments, that play a game of
help of one kind and disowning them in other ways. So it's -- I think
what it confirms, unfortunately, is what President Bush has been
saying from the beginning, which is this is not a problem that's going
to be successfully dealt with by an isolated action in Afghanistan, or
successful capturing of a handful of terrorists. We've really just got
to change the whole world climate in which terrorism was once accepted
as a sort of necessary evil, and understand that in an era of weapons
of mass destruction that connection is just no longer something we can
live with.
Q: How would you gauge the way the U.S. has conducted the war on
terror? How are we doing in the war on terror?
Wolfowitz: I think we've had some extraordinary successes. I believe
when the president or Secretary Rumsfeld has said this may be like the
Cold War, we may be at this for a very long time. To be honest,
initially I thought it can't be that long. Well, I don't think we
know. We do know that these evil networks have burrowed in very, very
deep, and we also know that the extremist education that has created
much larger numbers -- particularly in places like Pakistan -- of
people who are unfortunately sympathetic to that kind of outlook has
burrowed deep in a number of important countries. And it's going to
take not only dismantling those networks and getting states to stop
supporting terrorism; it's also going to take, I believe, remaking the
educational system in a number of countries, and opening up
opportunities, particularly for young Muslims, to see that there's a
lot more to life than this kind of extremism. It's what President Bush
spoke about in his State of the Union message as building a better
world beyond the war on terrorism. You don't build a better world
overnight. It takes time.
Q: Those are longer-term measures. But in the short term, in terms of
strategy, what we saw in Yemen, for example with the CIA strike. Is
that [a] change in strategy now?
Wolfowitz: Not fundamentally. It's a very successful tactical
operation, and one hopes each time you get a success like that, not
only to have gotten rid of somebody dangerous, but to have imposed
changes in their tactics and operations and procedures. And sometimes
when people are changing, they expose themselves in new ways.
So we have just got to keep the pressure on everywhere we're able to,
and we've got to deny the sanctuaries everywhere we're able to, and
we've got to put pressure on every government that is giving these
people support to get out of that business.
But then on the other side of it, it is very important -- it may be a
long-term project but you don't get to the long term unless you start
in the short term -- to begin looking at things like the educational
systems that are producing people who are inclined in this direction,
and not just looking at the bad ones but looking at how to build an
alternative that's attractive to young people.
Q: Were you working with the Yemen government on that? And is this
something that we expect to see more of in the future?
Wolfowitz: We don't discuss future operations. We've had pretty good
cooperation with the government of Yemen and it's certainly improved a
lot. You asked about the kind of progress we've made; I think the
progress we made in Afghanistan certainly contributed to much better
cooperation from a number of governments, including the government of
Yemen.
Q: I asked you earlier about countries in Southeast Asia being in
different stages of denial. Can you tell me in your view what that is,
what that means for each of the -- I'm looking specifically at
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.
Wolfowitz: I know I've heard Singaporeans, including the Senior
Minister himself, say that they were astonished when the JI [Jamaa
Islamiya] people were arrested in Singapore, that there could be --
it's not a large number, but that there could be any people with those
sort of fanatical views who have successfully operated in Singapore
who were on the verge of actually blowing up an American ship. Maybe
on the verge of [inaudible], but not too far from being at the point
of doing that. They thought this was something that happened in Yemen,
it doesn't happen in Singapore. And they thought the Muslims of
Singapore are different from the Muslims of the Middle East, and by --
there are huge differences, but I think what they came to an awakening
about is it doesn't take a large number of fanatics to do enormous
damage, and if they can pile damage on damage on damage, they begin to
radicalize people who aren't fanatics.
I think that is their goal. I think what they'd like to do is to
radicalize the population of Indonesia and other Muslim populations in
Southeast Asia.
I think for Indonesians it took something as horrific as the bombing
in Bali to recognize that Indonesia has a real terrorist problem. And
I hope they will understand that it's not an admission of guilt to say
we have a problem. No Americans feel that we as Americans are guilty
because some foreign Muslims came into this country and committed a
bombing, but maybe it's because Indonesia is a 90-percent Muslim
country, there's a little more resistance to the idea that that
happened and we're not responsible. Indonesians are not responsible,
but they are responsible for taking serious measures to try to get
these kinds of people under control.
Q:  What about Malaysia and the Philippines?
Wolfowitz: I think the Philippines actually have probably been living
with this far longer, certainly aware of it longer, and not only in
the form of indigenous insurgent groups and terrorist groups whose
target was the Philippines, but it's been a base for international
terrorism with Ramzi [Ahmed] Yussef and bin Laden's uncle, who was in
Manila in the mid-1990s. We've had, going back to at least that
period, very close cooperation with Philippine law enforcement. Ramzi
Yussef is now serving a life sentence in a jail in the United States.
That wouldn't have happened without what the Philippine law
enforcement people did, as his colleague in crime, Mr. [Abdul Hakim]
Murad, is here now. So I think the Philippines probably was the first
to discover this problem and to discover that it had an international
dimension as well as a domestic one.
The Malaysians are clearly on top of it now also, and I think the fact
that we know that one of the meetings that seems to have been a
planning meeting for September 11th took place in Malaysia in early
2000 -- of course we discovered that thanks to cooperation from the
Malaysians. I have to say that very clearly. But I think they've known
for a couple of years that they are a potential platform for this kind
of [inaudible].
Q:  Something they never quite admit, though.
Wolfowitz: You know, the Secretary also has been very clear -- some
countries are going to find it comfortable to cooperate with us
privately but not publicly. Some will cooperate publicly but not
privately. That's not so great, actually, although I can't think of an
example, to tell you the truth.
What we're interested in is serious policy and serious action, and if
sometimes it's the judgment of a government that they are going to
keep private about what they do, I think we're going to judge things
by results, not by what people say.
Q: Are we seeing -- is that what's happening also with Indonesia?
Could it be, are they doing more than what is actually being admitted?
Wolfowitz: I think they're doing a lot. Could they do more than
they're doing now? Probably. But as we said earlier, I think that, in
Indonesia it's a more complicated question than in Singapore, because
of the nature of the post-Suharto government.
Q: How will the war on terror in Southeast Asia be affected if the
U.S. strikes Iraq?
Wolfowitz: Let's start by making it very clear that the president's
goal is to achieve the peaceful disarmament of Iraq, and we're not
going to achieve that unless Saddam Hussein is finally convinced that
it's his only way to survive, so there has got to be some threat of
force behind it.
If we get to that point -- and I sincerely hope that we will -- I'm
not sure I want to start placing bets on what Saddam Hussein is going
to do, but if we get to that point, there's still going to be one of
the worst tyrants in the world ruling one of the most talented
populations in the Muslim world, and I don't see how that can last
forever, and hopefully it won't last for very long. And at some point,
you're going to get to a point I think where one way or another, with
or without American help, there's going to be a liberation of the
Iraqi people. And when that happens, instead of people talking about
attacks on Iraq, I think they're going to start to say, 'Well why
didn't all these wonderful humanitarians in Europe, why didn't all the
liberals of the West, why didn't all the people who say they care
about democracy and human rights do something for the Iraqi people
sooner?' That's what the issue is.
This isn't -- we're not talking about an attack on Iraq. We're talking
about trying to end a threat from Iraq that threatens all of us, and
we're trying to free, as I say, one of the most educated, most
talented people in the Arab world from one of the worst tyrannies in
the world. The only one I can think of which is in the same league is
North Korea.
Q: But if you look to North Korea, in that sense the U.S. isn't taking
the same kind of action, pressure on North Korea that it is with Iraq.
Wolfowitz: Well, the cases are different and the instruments are
different. There are a lot of differences. We've got 16 U.N. Security
Council Resolutions that Iraq has been in defiance of for 11 years. On
the other side of the coin, we have very substantial economic leverage
that can be brought to bear on North Korea, whereas Iraq seems to be
using economic leverage on our friends to keep them from taking the
problem seriously. So, each situation is different.
The president, in the State of the Union message where he talked about
the axis of evil, identified a very clear problem, which is: countries
that have weapons of mass destruction that support terrorists and that
are hostile to the United States, but he didn't say there's a "one
size fits all" policy that deals with every one of these countries the
same.
In fact, I think the difference between strategy and tactics is
understanding the difference between the goal which the president
defined and the means by which you get there and the timing by which
you get there.
Q: Maybe that's more of my question, is in terms of timing, the kind
of, the threat of force against Iraq or the possibility of that could
actually have a very negative impact on the war on terrorism in
Southeast Asia.
Wolfowitz: I don't believe it. I know people say that, but let me say
two things. Number one, I don't see how you can set about trying to
eliminate sanctuaries for terrorists in Pakistan, which we're doing
with the cooperation of the government of Pakistan, to eliminate
sanctuaries in Yemen which we're doing in cooperation with the
government of Yemen, to eliminate them in Indonesia, which we're
trying to do with the cooperation of the government of Indonesia, and
continue to allow them in Iraq because the government of Iraq actively
supports terrorists. I mean, if you're going to eliminate sanctuary,
you've got to look at it in a global way.
The other thing is that people are properly fearful about military
action. Wars are a terrible thing and they have all kinds of
unpredictable consequences. But the demise of this tyranny in Iraq,
and the liberation of some 20 million very talented people, the
testimony they're going to give when they are finally free to talk
about how horribly the government has treated them for the last
several decades, I think is going to, if anything, inspire a certain
amount of guilt on the part of those people who say we should have
left this regime in power.
Just think about how attitudes changed when the Taliban fell in
Afghanistan and the world finally had a clear view of how terrible
that regime was and how badly it treated women, and how badly it
treated its minorities, and how it was starving its people and keeping
girls from going to school. I would say, as an American, I don't think
we got quite the credit we deserved for liberating a Muslim people,
but I think certainly the whole view of that war changed once people
had a chance to get in there and see what the regime had been like.
Q:  So you think the Muslim world will rally behind --
Wolfowitz: Not necessarily rally behind, but they will certainly have
to take a different view of it when 20 million Muslims in Iraq are
saying you should have come and helped us sooner.
Q: Actually, I'll throw in one for CNN Presents...one for [inaudible].
[Laughter]
Abu Bakar Bashir, for many, many months, was allowed to go free in
Indonesia. He had dinner with the Vice President in Indonesia. A man
called an agent of Osama bin Laden. During the time that that was
happening, what was the U.S. ... what did you think about that and
what were you doing about that?
Wolfowitz: Let's take a different example. I don't remember the man's
name, and it's probably just as well, but there is a very prominent
preacher in England who spews hate every Friday in the mosque, and who
certainly, if you didn't care about civil liberties, you would say he
ought to be in jail, but we don't go in and tell the British what
their laws are and what they allow them to do.
I think there are similar problems in Indonesia. I'm not in a position
to say in detail. Clearly there's a line when people actually conspire
to kill people and conduct criminal acts. Unfortunately, the
terrorists don't usually lay out their plans out in the open so you
can draw those dots so clearly even after the fact.
How you deal with people who are inciting to violence, who are
preaching violence, whose words are dangerous but whose deeds can't be
tied to horrific events is a problem for every democracy. It's
unfortunately the case that some of the countries that are most
effective against terrorists are the ones that we have problems with
on the civil liberties side of the coin.
So I think we need to be careful about preaching to Indonesians. At
the same time, I think they should stop being in denial and stop
pretending there's no terrorist problem and stop pretending that this
is just something the Americans invented and get on with developing
good, solid democratic methods for dealing with these people.
Q: [inaudible] for a one-hour special that we're working on. You know
we're doing this for three different things.
Wolfowitz:  This has got to be the last one.
Q: I think the public, normally when they think of al-Qaeda they think
of Afghanistan, maybe now Pakistan. Southeast Asia is a relatively new
landscape for the public to understand about al-Qaeda.
How important is Southeast Asia from what you know for al-Qaeda's
goals as a base? Just [inaudible].
Wolfowitz: I think actually this is a very good question and I think
for Americans to understand it, it probably is helpful to think of
Indonesia as something much closer to Germany than to Afghanistan. By
that I mean in two respects. Number one, Afghanistan in the old days,
or parts of perhaps Yemen or Iran or Iraq today, where they can set up
training camps, they operate fairly openly either because they are in
inaccessible parts of the country or because the government isn't
interested in chasing them.
In Indonesia, if you actually knew where terrorists were operating the
government would go and get them. It's like Germany; the problem is
they go underground. And like Germany, it's a democratic country, so
there are limits on what law enforcement is willing or able to do.
The difference between Indonesia and Germany is it's a 90-percent
Muslim population in Indonesia. Given that, actually it's surprising
that there aren't more terrorists there and that they haven't made
deeper inroads. But it's very much a matter of working with a
democratic country through law enforcement methods to root out cells
that are hiding in apartment houses and appearing to be perfectly
innocent people. Afghanistan was a completely different proposition
when you had a government that was openly sheltering terrorists and
setting up training camps. That's a military problem. We in the
Pentagon know how to deal with that one. But going and rooting out
people who are renting apartments in Hamburg or Jakarta is law
enforcement work, and it's difficult.
Q: What would you say if some people call this, Southeast Asia, the
second front. Are we going that route, or --
Wolfowitz: I think -- second of how many? Seven, eight? [Laughter] The
United States is probably the first front. I know what they actually
mean is it's second after Afghanistan. That's very misleading, I
think. I don't want to start nominating other countries; we've seen a
problem in Yemen just now. But it is a huge mistake to think that this
is a problem that is isolated to one or two principal fronts, or one
or two principal countries. It's a global problem. And not only do you
need to go after it everywhere, but when you have a success in one
place it can lead you to success in other places.
The reason this guy was killed in Yemen was because they got chased
out of Afghanistan. The reason we were able to round up the gang in
Singapore was because we found a videotape in Afghanistan that led us
there.
Each time we have a success in one place, it tends to disrupt their
network, give us more information, and sometimes leads to success
halfway around the globe.
Q:  Thank you very much.
Wolfowitz:  You're welcome. It's good to see you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)