17 October 2002
Defense Department Briefing Transcript
(Afghanistan/Kuwait, Iraq/congressional vote, North Korea, U.S.
military capabilities, Pentagon/Rumor of leadership exclusion,
Iraq/consideration of risks/costs of military action, DC sniper
hunt/military assistance) (5300)
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and JCS Chairman Gen. Richard B.
Myers briefed the media October 17 at the Pentagon.
Following is the official transcript:
(begin transcript)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL UPDATE BRIEFING
BRIEFER: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; GENERAL RICHARD MYERS,
USAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PENTAGON BRIEFING ROOM, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
1:32 P.M. EDT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002
Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. First, I want to express our sorrow at the
death of an Afghan child who was hit by a vehicle driven by a U.S.
soldier in Kabul two days ago. Certainly no one can think of a pain
worse for a parent than the loss of a child, and certainly our hearts
go out to his family.
I also want to express my sympathies to the family of Lance Corporal
Antonio Sledd, who was killed on October 8th in Kuwait. Lance Corporal
Sledd died in service to his country. We are grateful that his
colleague Lance Corporal George Simpson Jr. survived and is -- seems
to be recovering well.
Their sacrifice and that of all U.S. and coalition forces that have
been killed or injured in this war remind us all of what a difficult
and dangerous challenge we face in the global war on terror.
Last week there was a strong vote in Congress to authorize the
president to use force. It sent a strong signal to the Iraqi regime
and to the world that our country is united in its goal of working
with the United Nations to seek disarmament in Iraq.
As the president made clear in his address last week, none of us
desire to see military conflict, because we know the awful nature of
war. A decision to use force is never easy. No one with any sense
considers war a first choice. In the recent congressional debate, many
important questions were raised about the risks of military action.
When I came to the Pentagon last year, I prepared a list of issues
that I have found useful in considering before making a recommendation
with respect to the use of force. I update those guidelines from time
to time, and I thought I would mention a few of them today. A copy of
the guidelines is available in the press office, if anyone wants one.
First, is the proposed action truly necessary? Certainly if lives are
going to be put at risk, whether they're U.S. lives or the lives of
other foreign nationals, there must be a darn good reason.
I suggest that all instruments of national power should be engaged
before, during and after any possible use of force. There is clearly
an interaction between diplomacy and the potential of the use of
force.
And I would submit that -- a good example of it exists today. The
Iraqis have refused inspections for years now, and because of the
threat of the use of force and because the United Nations is
considering that, the Iraqis have now volunteered that they might
consider one type of inspection or another. Whether they'll stick with
that or not is another question. But I think it's an example of that
interaction.
When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable and at an
acceptable risk. It has to be something that the United States is
truly capable of doing. We need to understand that we have
limitations. There are some things that this country and other
countries simply can't do. There should be clear goals both as to the
purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success so we can
know when our goals have been achieved. Decisions, in my view, ought
not to be made by committees. If the U.S. needs or prefers a
coalition, which in my view it almost always will, it's important to
avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that it
could compromise the goals or jeopardize the command structure. The
mission needs to determine the coalition.
Third, if a proposed action is necessary and doable, is it worth it?
If an engagement is worth doing, then we need to recognize that
ultimately lives could be put at risk, and leaders have to be willing
to invest the political capital necessary to marshal support necessary
to sustain the effort for whatever period of time conceivably could be
required. When there's a risk of casualties, that risk should be
acknowledged at the outset, rather than allowing the American people
or others to think that an engagement can be executed antiseptically.
Next, before acting, one needs to consider the implications of the
decision in other parts of the world. When the United States does
something in one location, that action is read all across the globe.
So too with an inaction -- it can be read all across the globe. And
those actions and/or inactions can contribute either favorably or
unfavorably to the U.S. deterrent and to our influence in other parts
of the globe.
Finally, if there's to be an action, it seems to me that it's
important to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and to
act forcefully during the pre-crisis period to try to alter behavior
and prevent a conflict; if that fails, to be prepared to use whatever
force is necessary to prevail, plus some.
It's important not to dumb-down what's needed by promising not to do
things, it seems to me. We've seen instances where people have said,
"We won't use ground forces," or "We won't risk lives," or "We won't
permit collateral damage," or "We won't bomb below 15,000 feet," or
"We'll set an arbitrary deadline that it will end as of this date."
Those promises, those declarations, it seems to me, have the net
effect of simplifying the task for an enemy, and it makes the task for
the coalition much more difficult.
I think it's also important to be brutally honest. We need to avoid
making any effort sound even marginally easier or less costly than it
in fact could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we
promise less, or at least know more, than we believe we can deliver.
And remember that it's a great deal easier to get into something than
it is to get out of it. There may be times when national security
requires that the U.S. act without clear answers to some of these
questions. These questions, really, that I've posed to myself I think
of as guidelines: not a perfect checklist, but simply -- and certainly
not hard and fast rules. But they're prepared as a checklist so that
as people are considering the possible use of force, it is done with
the fullest appreciation of our responsibilities and all the risks.
General Myers.
Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and good afternoon.
Let me just add my condolences to those of the secretary for the
family and friends of the young child killed in Afghanistan, and for
the family and friends of our Marine that was killed in Kuwait. I'd
also like to add condolences to the victims and their families and
those injured and killed in the bombings in Indonesia and in the
Philippines. I think if it points out anything, it points out the need
for continued international cooperation as we come to grips with and
try to destroy and disrupt these terrorist organizations that would
carry out these heinous acts.
And with that, we'll take your questions.
Rumsfeld: Yes, Charlie.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you and the president have said repeatedly that one
thing that separates -- one major thing that separates Iraq from the
rest of the axis of evil is that Iraq has been in long violation of
international agreements on weapons of mass destruction. Now North
Korea says openly that they are violating such an agreement and are
actively developing nuclear weapons. Should not now North Korea become
a candidate for possible preemptive defensive action, and that weapons
program? And if not, why not?
Rumsfeld: Those are questions not for me, but for the president and
the Congress and the country. And the United States government has --
is in the process of talking to our friends and allies in Japan and
South Korea. And I believe there will -- either have been or will also
be discussions of that subject with the People's Republic of China,
with Russia, and possibly with the European Union members. It is a
fact, it is a reality that they are -- they stand in direct breach of
I guess four separate agreements, by their own admission. They have
indicated that they have violated the Nonproliferation Treaty, the
IAER Safeguards agreements, the North- South Denuclearization
agreement, as well as the so-called agreed framework. The United
States has indicated that it will be talking with our friends and
allies and discussing the seriousness of the problem.
Q: Is it time to demand that North Korea admit inspectors to prove
that it will or can give up its weapons of mass destruction?
Rumsfeld: I said before that the idea of inspectors ought to be
considered in the context of a cooperative government. The idea of
inspections is when a country says, "We've decided that we want to
conform to international standards and agree to international
resolutions and requirements and agreements, and therefore, we're
going to cooperate. And we'd like to prove that we're not doing any of
these things, therefore we'd like inspectors to come in and validate
that truth for the entire world."
Now, what you're asking is is it appropriate for inspectors? They just
said they're violating it. They're not even denying that they're
violating it. They've admitted that they're violating all four of
those agreements. What does one inspect when they are already stating
for the world that that's their position?
Q: Mr. Secretary.
Q: Has there been any change of posture for the U.S. troops in Korea
since the revelation?
Rumsfeld: We don't talk about troop deployments or changes.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like you to be brutally honest now for a moment
if you would.
Rumsfeld: I just was. (Laughter.)
Q: Well, on another issue, if I might.
Rumsfeld: Oh. (Laughter.) Okay.
Q: There was a front page story in the Washington Post earlier this
week putting in print whispers and comments that many of us have heard
since you took on this job, and that is that the top military
leadership and civilian leadership in the services are out of the
loop, and that you rely on a small cadre of civilians, Steve Cambone
and others. One, is that true? And two, are you doing the operational
planning for any kind of an attack on Iraq?
Myers: Can I be brutally honest? (Laughter.)
Q: That's not fair, because you're standing by his side, General.
Myers: That's okay, I'll stand over here. (Laughter.) Doesn't matter
where I stand. Let me just say that the first part of your question --
not the Iraq part, but the other part -- and I think I was quoted
fairly in that article on this point, I can't remember exactly -- but
it's my view -- and of course I don't have all the historic context
here, but I doubt, if you go back in history, that you will find a
civilian structure and a military structure in this building that
collaborates more than we have in the last year and a half or
whatever. Go out and ask the other service chiefs, go ask the people
that you would expect to be at his level collaborating, and even those
that maybe shouldn't be at -- in some of the meetings. And that's my
view.
And so I think -- I think the innuendo in that article is absolutely
wrong.
Q: Second point, please, sir? Are you doing the operational planning
without consulting the senior military leadership?
Rumsfeld: (With a laugh.) Ask Dick! I mean, it's nonsense! I called
one of those articles a world-class thumb-sucker. I'd like to
apologize. This one was a world-class one; that one was second rate!
(Scattered laughter.)
Myers: I'll just restate what -- I'm trying to think of a matter that
we are not -- that the senior military officials in this building, and
out in the unified commands anywhere, where there's expertise that
needs to be brought to the problem, where they're not consulted on --
not consulted, not only just consulted, but a part of the planning and
the programming, the allocation of resources, and deeply involved in
the execution.
And as you would expect, the secretary, being the secretary of Defense
and in the direct chain of command from the commander in chief to the
combatant commanders, the secretary plays a very active role. But he
doesn't play that role solo; everybody is involved, to include the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, other members of OSD, and
anybody that would have a valuable input.
I mean, it's just -- those sorts of -- I don't know why -- we've said
that several times from here and it just keeps bubbling up. But
nothing could be further from the truth.
Q: One quick follow-up.
Rumsfeld: Just a second. I suspect -- I don't know this, but somewhere
there's the numbers; I would guess that I've probably met more with
the senior military leadership in the United States of America in the
last 20 months than any other secretary possibly ever did in four
years. It is continuous. I could be wrong on that. And certainly in
modern times that's the case.
The other thing I would say about it is, the article had the tinge
that there's something wrong with civilian control. And it struck me
as a little odd. Someone ought to go back and read the Founding
Fathers and what they had in mind. It is intended that there be
civilian control in this department. That's the design of the system.
Clearly, it's done with extensive consultation and discussion. But one
ought not to go away with an impression that that's something that's
an anomaly in our system because it's central to our system. In fact,
one of the stipulations we have in terms of our relationships with
other countries is a preference on their part that they have civilian
control of the military as opposed to military control over the
military.
Q: One quick follow-up, if I may. There is one point in the article,
perhaps, that is accurate, for those of us who know you, Mr.
Secretary. It says you're a "tough hombre" in your dealings and --
Rumsfeld: I am sweet and lovable. (Laughter.) Goddang.
Q: General Myers, can I take you back to North Korea a second? What
are the military implications in terms of readiness if the U.S. had to
plan for heightened tensions in that region of the world from, you
know, precision-guided weapons, chemical protection suits, transport,
as you've simultaneously planned for potential action against Iraq? Is
this a major problem potentially looming from a readiness standpoint?
Myers: Well, you know, I'll go back to the QDR and the strategy that
came out of there that had about five tasks for us in the military to
do. And the major piece of that, the middle piece of that was to be
able to swiftly defeat the efforts in two separate parts of the world
and one to take to a win-decisively conclusion. So -- and we have the
forces, and then there are other things, homeland security, to be
forward postured in four regions as well, and then have a strategic
reserve. And if you take all that in balance, you know, we're ready to
carry out that particular strategy. I'm not going to get into the
what-ifs because we have not -- we don't have a presidential decision
on Iraq and we have no indications right now that anything unusual is
going to occur, necessarily, in North Korea. So.
Q: But that planning assumption assumed that the -- the agreed
framework would continue and that you would have --
Myers: The planning assumption was not based on a particular country;
it was capabilities-based. And so it did not -- it didn't
-- I mean, in fact it didn't take that into account.
Rumsfeld: Absolutely did not.
Q: It absolutely did not.
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that Iraq is more dangerous than
North Korea today, now that this nuclear program is no longer secret
in North Korea?
Rumsfeld: I agree with the president's speech to the United Nations
and to the American people that Iraq has unique characteristics that
distinguish it and that suggest that it has nominated itself to -- for
special attention because of the threat of what they're doing.
Q: Mr. Secretary, the Iraqi National Congress and the other opposition
groups have put forward a couple of thousand names of folks they would
like to have get military training, everything from forward air
controllers to military police training. Any sense when that might
occur?
Rumsfeld: Gosh, I'd have to talk to the folks here in the department
who are working on that. You're right; there -- that is a process
that's beginning. What its current status is and when it might
actually start, I don't know. I'd have to check.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, you've talked about being honest with the American
people in talking about -- thinking about the consequences elsewhere
in the world and not making things seem easier than they are. I'm
wondering if you think the administration has been as forthcoming as
it should be in terms of the risks. There's been {talk} of action.
There's been a lot of talk about -- a lot of speculation by the
present administration about what might happen if we don't act. But
has there been enough talk about what might happen if we do act, in
terms of sparking the use of weapons of mass destruction, dragging
Israel in, inflaming terrorism, the long-term commitment and the
costs, and so on?
Rumsfeld: There's been a great deal of discussion of a list of things
like that numbers some four or five pages, 30 or 40 items that I've
prepared myself and discussed internally and discussed in the
interagency process. It is -- those things are being addressed, and
addressed seriously and fully. And they're real. There is no question
but that there are risks to action, just as, you point out, there are
risks to inaction.
The extent to which any one or more of them should appropriately be
discussed with the American people, it seems to me, depend first and
foremost as to whether or not a decision by the president gets made to
do something with respect to Iraq. And clearly he would make a
judgment at that point as to what would be appropriate to do.
Some of the things that could go wrong simply by talking about them
and suggesting them could lead to their going wrong, if you will. And
that would not be helpful.
Q: There seems to be no hesitation to discuss or speculate on the
dangers of inaction. But whenever people are asked about the dangers
of action, such as sparking the use of weapons of mass destruction,
those questions usually turn into "Well, he's
-- yes, he's dangerous; therefore, we need to take action," as opposed
to really leveling --
Rumsfeld: That's -- I don't think that's quite fair. I testified for
hours and hours before the House and the Senate and discussed a number
of those questions, in response to questions, and some I volunteered.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Q: Could I ask you a question on North Korea again? Do you view the
North Korean admission of this nuclear program as a sign of
belligerence, or is it a good sign that they're coming clean about it?
Rumsfeld: (Chuckles.) I don't think there's any way in the world
anyone could say it's a good sign that when they were called and
confronted and told that we have evidence that they are violating all
four of these agreements by engaging in a highly enriched uranium
route development program for additional nuclear weapons -- I don't
see how anyone could say that that's a good sign. They were told that
we had that evidence; they denied it. The next morning they came back
and confessed it. I suppose anyone's speculation as to why they might
have denied it and then confessed it is as good as anybody else's
speculation. Why they are doing what they're doing, of course, is
something for them to answer. They have said they wouldn't, (they)
entered into a series of four agreements saying they would not, (they)
received from the United States and from other countries a great
(amount of help) -- billions of dollars of things -- energy, oil,
food, what have you -- and put all of that at risk by proceeding with
a nuclear program that they had agreed in four instances they would
not do, and then when caught, ultimately confessed. So characterizing
that as a good sign, it seems to me, particularly when one goes to the
tone with which they did it, which was belligerent.
Yeah.
Q: Mr. Secretary, just tell us, what's the difference in Saddam
Hussein and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il? They're both dictators,
they threaten their neighbors, they both have nuclear programs, and
they are abusing the human rights. Why don't you take the regime
change, or change of regime in North Korea like you do in Iraq?
Rumsfeld: The -- if you -- you can get a copy of my testimony before
the Congress, I describe differences in the testimony and in the
questions. Each of those countries in the terrorist list are
different. They're different in a variety of different ways. I've
explained the differences from this podium on a number of occasions,
and I explained it in my testimony, and I'd prefer to leave it there.
Yes.
Q: Either one of the gentlemen, we've turned to the military
assistance to try and find the sniper here in Washington D.C. Can you
tell us a little bit more, either one of you, about your thinking
about this effort? Do you, in fact, view this as an extraordinary use
of the military assets, how you plan to keep it within the legal
framework? And I guess also, a real harsh reality check: do you have
the slightest indication, worry or concern that this is, in fact,
possibly terrorist-related?
Rumsfeld: I have no information that it's terrorist- related.
Do you?
Myers: I do not. That would be a good question, though, for the FBI,
since they're the ones -- seriously.
Q: Well, I just --
Rumsfeld: The FBI -- it's a law enforcement matter. The FBI is in
charge. They have come to us and asked for some assistance. We have
looked at our assets and capabilities and tried to determine what we
might do to be of assistance to them that's consistent with the law,
the Posse Comitatus law. Just as I have not thought it helpful for me
to describe what other countries are doing with the global war on
terrorism, I don't think it's helpful for me to describe what the
FBI's doing in terms of law enforcement. They have the best gyroscope
to determine what's appropriate and what's inappropriate. I would much
prefer to have them tell the world whatever they think is appropriate
about what we're doing to help them. We do know that what we're doing
is fully consistent with the law, full stop.
If you go to a related subject, if you think about, oh, gosh, three or
four weekends ago, there were some surface-to-air missiles located in
close proximity in the capital. There were some stingers and a variety
of formats. We have combat air patrols flying over Washington and
other parts of the country on a -- not a random basis, but on an
irregular basis. Just as I think it would conceivably be unhelpful
from a law enforcement standpoint for us to talk about what we're
doing to help the FBI, because it informs the sniper, so too I think
it's personally unhelpful for us to discuss every time we have a CAP
over this city instead of that city. I think the irregularity of it
serves as a deterrent, and the irregularity of it complicates the task
for others. And so to with Stingers on the ground.
So we don't talk about it. If somebody thinks it's a good thing to
print that the Stinger's there today, it's not there tomorrow, or they
saw a CAP over here and they didn't a CAP over some other place, I
supposed that's what the free press can do. But from our standpoint,
the irregularity is by design. The goal of not simplifying it, from
the standpoint of law enforcement or from the standpoint of our
national security, is by design. And we feel it's the right thing to
do.
Q: But what about, sir, the principle of precedent of using the U.S.
military for a civilian law enforcement function?
Rumsfeld: Well, think if it. We had 5,300 people, if my memory serves
me correctly, in Utah for the Olympics.
This is far from the first time that the United States military has
ever done anything in support of law enforcement or situations in the
United States. It is not infrequently done. We have military people
who have been functioning out in the West fighting fires.
What happens is that we have a law, and we have a practice, and we
have a history in this country of not using the armed forces for law
enforcement, and so we don't. There are times when in a supporting
role we get asked to do things that are within the 50 states --
therefore domestic. Some are of a national defense category, like the
combat air patrols flying, looking for airplanes that might crash into
the White House or the Capitol or the Pentagon or the World Trade
Center, some -- which is clearly of a defense nature, but it's
stopping a bad act; it's not quite law enforcement. But we do a number
of things all the time. So I think it -- it is not a perfect line
that's been drawn, but we're sensitive to it and we do it in a
supporting role almost exclusively, and not in a role where we are
supported by others.
Q: But has there ever been an instance where --
Myers: Just let me follow up on that. Everything that the Department
of Defense assets will do, the technical assets, will be under the
direction and the supervision of the FBI. So they'll do the planning
and so forth, and DOD personnel will not be involved in those typical
law enforcement activities, such as searches, seizures or arrests. The
law enforcement does all that. So we are in technical support. That is
not unusual, actually.
Q: Now, I want to change my follow-up question. You used some very
interesting words, sir, on North Korea a minute ago when you said --
talked about their highly enriched uranium program and you used the
words for "additional" nuclear weapons. So, do I take that to mean
that in your mind there is absolutely no question that they currently
possess nuclear weapons, since you said "additional" nuclear weapons?
Rumsfeld: You have a sharp ear. I did say "additional" nuclear
weapons.
Q: You did.
Rumsfeld: I think the correct way to say it -- you said, is there no
doubt in your mind? I guess the reality is we're dealing with a
dictatorial, repressive, closed state. I have not physically been in
there to touch and look at and test and examine their nuclear weapons.
Nor has any other American. So what do we do? We take all of the
intelligence we can gather over a period of years, drop a plumb line
through it all, ask the experts at the Central Intelligence Agency to
come up with a community opinion or view. And the words that they use,
on an unclassified basis, are, quote: "The U.S. has been concerned
about North Korea's desire for nuclear weapons, and has assessed,
since the early 1990s, that the North may have one or two weapons."
That is the assessment of the intelligence community. I have not
touched them, they have not touched them, no one that I would have any
confidence in their judgment has touched them. But I believe they have
a small number of nuclear weapons.
Q: This revelation by North Korea, then, to you: how much of a
surprise was this?
Rumsfeld: I guess at my advanced age I am almost stopped being
surprised.
We -- I will say it one more time, and I hope everyone will not chime
in in unison just to embarrass me. But the truth is, there are things
we know, and we know we know them -- the known knowns. There are
things we know that we don't know -- the known unknowns. And there are
unknown unknowns; the things we do not yet know that we do not know.
Now, what does that tell us? It tells us that the world we live in is
a tough world, it's a big world, it's a complicated world, that denial
and deception is rampant through -- across the globe. Things are being
done underground, things are being done very cleverly. And we live in
a world of surprise. We live in a world of little or no warning. And
the only surprise ought to be
-- if we're smart enough to know what I just said is true -- and it is
true. If we're smart enough to know that, then we ought not to be
surprised. We ought to expect that there are going to be things that
occur that we didn't know.
Anyone with an ounce of sense can look back at the intelligence and
find out that from the time something began until we figured it out,
in dozens of cases it took two, four, six, eight, 10, 12, in one case
13 years, and I was informed today that there may be one that's 17
years, between the time it happened and the time we found out about
it. Does that mean we're not good at intelligence? No, it doesn't. It
means we are good at intelligence. It just means it's a very tough
world we live in. And it's a very complicated world. And we have to
expect that whatever comes out on an agency piece of paper with an
agreed-upon community opinion and assessment, that it is based on what
they know. And it is not based on what they know they don't know, and
it's not based on what they don't know they don't know. Therefore one
has to assume that this is the least of it.
Myers: (Off mike.) Let me just follow up (with)just one bit of context
on the first piece of what the secretary said, but it's something we
do know, which kind of adds to the -- you know, this question of
surprise. We do know that North Korea has the fourth- largest armed
forces in the world. We know that. We also know that it's estimated,
because -- you get very little bit, because it almost doesn't
register, but their GDP is the 143rd largest in the world. Quite a
mismatch. So you can talk about intent, and -- but you it in that
context, and things wouldn't be --
Rumsfeld: I am due at a meeting in -- across the river. Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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