Military

DATE=10/16/02

TYPE=INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

TITLE=MATTHEW LEVITT

NUMBER=3-387

BYLINE=KENT KLEIN

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

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VOA INTERVIEW WITH MATTHEW LEVITT, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY BY VOA'S KENT KLEIN - OCTOBER 16, 2002

HOST: Some experts have suggested that recent terrorist activity believed to be related to the al-Qaida network indicates that al-Qaida is becoming less centrally managed by Osama bin Laden and more dependent on small "sleeper" groups. Matthew Levitt is one of those experts. He is the senior fellow on terrorism studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and he tells V-O-A News Now's Kent Klein it appears to him that al-Qaida is becoming a more de-centralized operation....

MR. LEVITT: I don't think so much that al-Qaida itself has changed its operational targeting practices so much as it has opened the door to greater decision-making at the field level. We know that al-Qaida leadership has sent out the message, saying, go ahead and conduct attacks on your own.

We have decimated the command-and-control structure that existed in Afghanistan. We should no longer expect that we will find pre-operational surveillance video, for example, as we did in the case of the plot that was attempted in Singapore.

So, when you do that, you not only increase the capability for cells to conduct attacks on the ground, because they don't have to go through anybody, but you also open the door to all kinds of attacks. So I think it is a combination of the fact that, because of our crackdowns, we have hardened many of the kinds of targets that they would prefer to attack, and then, when faced with a situation where it's harder to attack an embassy or a military position or a barracks, they will hit a softer target.

Combine that with the fact that people are now making these decisions on their own on the ground, you have on the ground very frequently people who are more extreme, who don't take larger political considerations into account, the type of things that a headquarters might have done in the past, and that's not happening now. It may not have happened anyway given the circumstances of the war on terrorism.

So I don't think al-Qaida has changed its tactical operations so much as it has expanded them in light of the situation.

MR. KLEIN: Do you think al-Qaida is stronger or weaker now than it was, say, several months ago?

MR. LEVITT: I think that over the course of the past year we have in fact done a whole lot of good in terms of constricting al-Qaida and other terrorist groups' operating environment. And so, in that sense, they are much weaker and we are much safer. But we are not yet safe and they are not yet weak. They are very resilient and really, more importantly, very flexible.

I think what we are going to find more and more, unfortunately, is that on top of attacks conducted by core al-Qaida members or attacks carried out by members of affiliated groups who fall under the al-Qaida umbrella -- the North African and other groups, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and elsewhere -- I think we are also going to find an increase in attacks by random individuals or random cells who either went through the training camps in Afghanistan or just for other reasons feel some affinity for bin Laden, or feel that the situation in the Middle East, be it the Iraqi situation or the situation in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, or the perceived arrogance of the United States in its unilateral expansionist policies -- based on any or all of these perceived wrongs, may conduct attacks on their own.

It appears that that is a possible explanation for the attacks in Kuwait. And there are a rash of attacks internationally, including some small-scale activities in the United States, that appear to be along these lines.

On top of all that, the threat is not just from al-Qaida. We are focused on al-Qaida, with good reason, because al-Qaida carried out the September 11th attacks and is clearly the group most intent on targeting us. But even beyond al-Qaida and its affiliated groups, groups like Hezbollah are not our friends. Al-Qaida will never be as professional as Hezbollah already is. And I believe that groups like Hezbollah and even some of the Palestinian groups like Hamas, they don't target us practically today because they have a first primary purpose that they need to achieve in terms of dealing with Israel. That does not mean that they shed a tear when an American is killed. And it does not mean that if they were to achieve their immediate objectives they would not then step up their attacks more directly against Americans.

One of the issues that I have with the war on terrorism is that in fact it has really been a war on al-Qaida and not a war on terrorism, which is very shortsighted. If we have learned anything from our experience in supporting the mujahedin over the last decade or two, and without paying attention to the long-term ramifications that we are dealing with today, then there is a problem. And it appears from the way that we are not dealing with all these other terrorist groups that we are conducting the same types of mistakes all over again.

It is not that we should not be focusing on al-Qaida. It is not that that should not take most of our resources. That's understandable. But it is a fallacy and it's a copout to say that we can't deal with other terrorist groups at the same time.

HOST: Matthew Levitt is the senior fellow on terrorism studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He spoke to VOA News Now's Kent Klein.

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