13 September 2002
Text: State's Haass Says None Should Be Complacent About Terrorist Threat
(He says new norms and arrangements critical to combating terror)
(4090)
The war against terrorism is fundamentally different from other wars:
it is a war with multiple foes, it is without clear battlefields or
fronts, it must be fought with vastly different weapons, and it cannot
be waged and won by a single country, says Ambassador Richard Haass,
director of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff.
"The task is enormous, and it is open-ended. None of us can be
complacent about the threat of terrorism or the work that needs to be
done to build and solidify new international norms and arrangements
critical to combating terror," Haass said September 13 in an address
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 2002 Annual
Conference in London.
While counterterrorism is a priority, it is not an organizing
principle of U.S. foreign policy, he said. It will influence the focus
of U.S. attention and resources, and will require the United States to
address other foreign policy challenges such as state failure and
nation building, he said.
"If we are under constant attack from terrorists or are consumed with
our own personal and national security, we will be unable to advance a
more positive international agenda," he said. "We need to combat
terrorism -- with the help of friends and allies -- but not simply as
an end itself. Instead, we will fight terrorism so we can make the
most of our unusual status as the world's only superpower and to
ensure that globalization is harnessed more for good than evil."
Following are terms or abbreviations used in the text:
-- billion: equals 1,000 million.
-- WMD: weapons of mass destruction.
-- ICC: International Criminal Court.
-- AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System.
-- ABM Treaty: 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Following is a text of Haass' remarks:
(begin text)
Reflections a Year After September 11
Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff
U.S. Department of State
Remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies' 2002 Annual
Conference
London, the United Kingdom
September 13, 2002
It is a pleasure to be back at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), a place I first came to know well as a
research associate 25 years ago. The Institute holds many good
memories and is still home to many good friends. Having spent the bulk
of my 2.5 years in residence at the IISS offices on Adam Street, I
confess to still thinking of the "new" building as the one on
Tavistock Street. Worse yet, I can remember when the IISS was only the
ISS.
A quarter century has passed, but some things haven't changed -- most
notably the seminal role of the IISS as a forum for serious foreign
and security policy thinking. I want to applaud the Institute and its
director, Dr. John Chipman, on the establishment of the "Shangri-La
Dialogue," which provides a much-needed setting to discuss
Asia-Pacific security matters. I'd also like to congratulate the
Institute on its recent publication of a net assessment of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, which provides extremely useful
background on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and
the history of international efforts to control them.
I am delighted to be here today to share some thoughts on where we
find ourselves, just one year after the tragic events of September 11,
2001. It is tempting -- particularly for Americans -- to attribute
most of what we see in the world today to the events of last September
and their aftermath. 9/11 was a terrible day by any measure. There is
no question that it had a dramatic and lasting impact on how Americans
think of the world and our place in it. It is indisputable, too, that
9/11 has shaped how the United States conducts itself in both the
domestic and international arenas. And there is no doubt that the U.S.
response to 9/11 is still evolving.
Many people have spoken out or written on September 11th and its
consequences. This first anniversary of 9/11 provides additional
opportunity for reflection. Enough perspective exist to begin to
assess how lasting are the effects and how fundamental are the changes
that 9/11 wrought. How much has the world really been transformed? How
different is American foreign policy as a result? What have we learned
in the past year and what lessons have we not yet fully come to terms
with?
Today, I would like to address some of these questions. I won't claim
to have the definitive answers. 367 days is too short a time to fully
absorb the impact of 9/11 or to completely separate out the permanent
changes from the transitory blips. Don't worry, I won't quote [former
Chinese premier] Zhou Enlai on the French Revolution. What I will do,
though, is highlight a dozen or so reactions to and lessons of 9/11
that I see as the most salient.
-- Changing How Americans Think about Foreign Policy: Perhaps more
than anything else, 9/11 brought foreign policy issues home for
Americans in a way that had not been true for half a century. On
September 10, 2001, millions of Americans watched the evening news to
learn what was happening in their communities, their states, or in
Washington. But what was happening beyond our borders was of little
interest to most. Today, our focus is not only at home, but abroad. We
learned the hard way that American primacy does not mean American
invulnerability. Even a country with unprecedented global power and
influence cannot be fully insulated from every threat or hazard,
particularly in a world marked by globalization. In the wake of 9/11,
Americans recognize that what happens "out there" can have a major
effect on their lives. A failed state in Central Asia, the curriculum
in religious schools in Pakistan, lawlessness in the Andes, drug
trafficking in Central Asia, instability in Africa -- all have the
potential to affect U.S. national security. We now understand that
even if we choose not to engage with the world, it will engage with
us, and not always in welcome ways. As a result, there is much greater
American willingness to commit resources to national security and to
use them. In 1997, I wrote a book about American foreign policy called
The Reluctant Sheriff; if I were writing the same book today, I'd
describe the sheriff as considerably more resolute.
-- Transforming Our Understanding of Terrorism: Before 9/11, many of
us working in this field tended to view terrorism as a nuisance, just
one of many transnational problems. Terrorism was of course tragic for
its victims. But it was not seen as a major challenge to what the
United States did in the world or a pressing threat at home. Terrorism
is now viewed as the principal foreign policy challenge to the United
States. Yet, at the same time, we recognize that we are not dealing
with the same beast of past decades. First, the nature of terrorism is
changing -- and in ways that make it potentially more destructive and
more difficult to address. As President Bush pointed out in this
year's State of the Union address, the intersection of terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction is of the greatest concern. We are not
simply worried about a reoccurrence of 9/11, but are working to ensure
that the intentions of terrorists are not married to the capabilities
of WMD. Second, globalization has led to the super-empowerment of
non-state actors, benign and malign alike. We must adjust our thinking
and our actions to a world where state actors no longer have a
monopoly on the use of potentially catastrophic force. This has
profound implications for how we think about foreign policy writ
large. In the 1990s, it became fashionable to think and talk about
"exit strategies." There can be no exit strategy in the war against
terrorism. It is a war that will persist. There is unlikely to be an
Antietam, a decisive battle in this war. An exit strategy, therefore,
will do us no good. What we need is an endurance strategy.
-- The Need for Multilateral Action: Terrorism forces us to rethink
globalization. Globalization has brought Americans, Europeans, and
hundreds of millions of others around the world a higher standard of
living, the ability to bridge distances, and a greater choice in what
we buy and what we do. But globalization itself is not inherently good
or evil. It is a description of the state of the world and a dynamic,
evolving process that creates new vulnerabilities along with new
opportunities. Globalization ties us together for trading goods and
knowledge, but it is also a conduit for the spread of disease, crime,
financial contagion, global climate change, drugs, WMD proliferation,
and trafficking in men, women, and children. What is no less clear is
that transnational issues demand multinational responses. No matter
how powerful the United States, without partners it cannot easily or
efficiently tackle problems that transcend borders. Al-Qaida operates
in some 60 countries. There is simply no way the United States alone
can be present everywhere to deny it funding, or, better yet, to find
it and destroy it. A total of 20 countries provided direct military
support for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan; nearly that many are
participating in ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] in
Afghanistan; and over 160 have frozen a total of more than $100
million in assets of terrorists and their supporters. Although there
will be occasions when unilateral action is warranted or necessary,
collective efforts need to be the norm, not the exception, if we are
to successively address the transnational challenges that define this
era.
-- Underscoring the Importance of a Full Toolkit: Just as the United
States needs the cooperation of many allies and friends, so too must
it employ a full range of foreign policy instruments. Our new resolve
for engagement in the world, and our new appreciation for the
magnitude of the threats we face, has brought with it a willingness to
use military force when it is the best path to achieve our objectives.
But in many cases, force will not be the most useful or appropriate
tool in the kit. Instead, we will need a mix that includes diplomacy,
economic coercion and inducement, intelligence, and law enforcement.
Foreign assistance will also be critical. Here I would call to
attention to the Millennium Challenge Account, in which President Bush
will seek an increase in America's core development assistance by $5
billion a year over current levels in just three years. That
represents a 50 percent increase in U.S. funding. This aid will be
channeled to developing countries strongly committed to good
governance, investment in the health and education of their people,
and economic policies that foster enterprise and entrepreneurship. So
used, foreign resistance can bolster the capacity of states to meet
internal terrorist challenges.
-- Growing Awareness of the Implications of State Failure: We now are
more sensitive to the possible consequences of state failure. Before
9/11, state failure was mostly seen as a humanitarian problem. Today,
we also view it in strategic terms. A state that no longer has control
over its territory, that no longer has credible, unifying
institutions, is a threat to its people, its neighbors, and the
international community. Diagnosing state failure as both a strategic
and a humanitarian problem has implications for how we address it.
Building the institutions of failed states -- as we are doing in
Afghanistan -- is no longer discretionary. Strengthening or reforming
the institutions of weak states -- as we aim to do through our
educational assistance to Pakistan -- is a priority. And ensuring that
new states are born with viable institutions -- be it East Timor or
Palestine -- is a serious responsibility. Those of us who long
distinguished between hard and soft areas of security studies need to
think again.
-- Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Justified Intervention: 9/11
and its aftermath accelerated new thinking that had already begun
about the limits of sovereignty. The 1990s saw a major departure from
the traditional notion of near-absolute sovereignty. The horrors of
Rwanda - and the collective failure to adequately respond to them -
convinced many that sovereignty should only provide immunity from
intervention if the government upholds basic, minimum standards of
domestic conduct and human rights. This new understanding of
sovereignty guided the intervention in Kosovo. 9/11 again expanded the
circumstances in which most countries condoned external intervention
in the affairs of a state. Virtually everyone agreed it was legitimate
for the United States to intervene in Afghanistan and target the
Taliban, even though the Taliban had enabled -- but not executed --
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Sovereignty
can provide no protection for governments that carry out or abet such
terrorism. Today, we are on the cusp of a third adjustment to our
thinking about sovereignty. Classical notions of deterrence have
little relevance for groups like al-Qaida, which have no
constituencies to defend, no borders to protect, and no traditional
national assets to preserve. We need to act against these threats.
Similarly, deterrence and containment may well prove inadequate for
dealing with Saddam Hussein, someone who has repeatedly violated his
international obligations and who is doing everything in his power to
develop and conceal weapons of mass destruction. In this new
international environment where terrorism and WMD are intersecting, we
cannot allow a regime like Saddam's to flout the demands of the
international community. Given Saddam's history of violence against
his neighbors and his own people (including the use of chemical
weapons) and his aggressive pursuit of nuclear and other weapons, the
dangers of inaction outweigh the costs of action. In these extreme
circumstances, a strong case can be made for preventive military
action. As President Bush said in his speech at West Point in June,
"New threats require new thinking." And as President Bush said just
yesterday in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly,
"We cannot stand by and do nothing while danger gathers."
-- Not Losing Sight of Principle: Counterterrorism is a security
challenge that will be an important element in bilateral
relationships. The challenge for the United States will be striking
the right balance between pursuing counterterrorism and advancing
other goals. We must be careful not to avert our eyes from unpleasant
realities simply in the name of counterterrorism -- as we did on
occasion during the Cold War in the name of anti-communism. Striking
the right balance does not mean steering clear of governments that
engage in practices of which we do not approve. But it does mean
making domestic reform an important element of our bilateral
relations. In some instances, such as in Afghanistan or even Pakistan,
we can already point to improvements in human rights and women's
issues and discern a gradual movement toward greater political
openness. In other countries, such as those in Central Asia, joint
efforts against terrorism can serve as a foundation for a broader
agenda, including the promotion of political and economic reform.
Getting this balance right is essential, as there is no question that
democratic governments make the most stable, sustainable partners in
combating terrorism and other transnational challenges.
-- Re-orienting Relations with the Arab World: 9/11 also forced us to
reexamine our relationship with the Islamic world and Arab countries
in particular. At the same time, 9/11 helped focus attention within
the Arab world on their own societies. The recently released Arab
Human Development Report (2002), authored by a group of prominent Arab
scholars and analysts, demonstrates this new self-reflection.
Together, Americans and many Arabs look to the Middle East and see
societies struggling under the weight of burgeoning populations;
societies that have largely missed out on the liberalizing trends of
globalization and the prosperity that comes from embracing market
economies; and societies where people strain to enjoy basic political
and social rights. This picture, more so than 9/11, has influenced our
thinking and will increasingly shape our policy toward the Arab world.
We realize that it is no longer sustainable to have narrowly-defined
relationships that focus almost exclusively on access to energy
resources or basing rights. Ignoring internal dynamics in many of
these societies only allows alienation and despair to multiply,
creating a climate where support for terrorism can grow. Instead, we
need to forge new, broader relationships that encourage and enable
Arab regimes to gradually address the freedom deficit that has
developed in their own societies. We need to gently recalibrate our
policies to place greater emphasis on promoting market economies,
educational reform, the participation of all citizens -- men and women
-- in society, and the gradual strengthening of democratic
institutions and procedures. Such a reorientation is not simply "the
right thing to do." It makes strategic sense. If we fail to reorient
our policies to address the lack of opportunity in these states and
their resulting brittleness, our allies in the Arab world will grow
weaker -- not stronger -- and our interests will suffer.
-- Rethinking U.S.-Europe Relations: During the Cold War, Europe was
understandably a -- or even the -- geographic focus of international
relations. Today, Europe's importance is derived less from its
location and more from its ability to be a partner in tackling global
issues. NATO's invocation of Article V and the AWACs that patrolled
American skies with European crews after 9/11 were tangible evidence
of deep transatlantic ties. The U.S.-Europe relationship is
sufficiently robust that even discord in discrete areas -- be it trade
or the ICC -- will not jeopardize the core relationship. But neither
Americans nor Europeans can afford to be sanguine. If the United
States and Europe come to see the world in different ways, if we grow
to see the solutions to problems as being down separate paths, if we
no longer maintain a habit of cooperating, we inevitably will grow
apart. The real danger is not so much a gathering crisis as it is the
possibility that the U.S.-European relationship will become
increasingly less relevant to the conduct of global affairs. Both
Europeans and Americans have a stake in ensuring this does not occur.
The United States must hold genuine consultations with its European
allies and work to accommodate their concerns; Europe must enhance its
own capabilities -- including military capabilities suitable for force
projection -- so that it can be more of a full partner to the United
States beyond Europe.
-- Turning the Absence of Great Power Rivalry into Opportunity: The
20th century was marked by the struggles between great powers. There
is no reason why the 21st century should bear the same stamp. Already,
transformed relationships among the United States, Russia, China,
India, Europe and Japan suggest that these next 100 years are likely
to be markedly different. President Putin's response to the 9/11
attacks accelerated the transformation in U.S.-Russian relations that
already was taking root. Russia's cooperation on counterterrorism, its
willingness to embark on a new, positive relationship with NATO, and
its acceptance of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty paved the way for
cooperation on a range of transnational issues. Russia's actions also
opened the door to its gradual integration into the global economic
order. The mood between Washington and Beijing has also changed
appreciably, from one of rancor and incrimination to one marked to a
considerable degree by the rhetoric of cooperation. This new context
-- and China's own evolution as a global power -- could create broader
avenues for U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the future on matters ranging
from infectious disease and trade to non-proliferation and promoting
stability on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.-Indian relationship is
acquiring new significance as consultations on regional and global
issues multiply and cooperation in science and technology advances.
The United States-Indian relationship should also benefit from further
increases in trade and investment. This said, we should not be content
with the absence of great power conflict today. Instead, the objective
should be to integrate the principal centers of power in today's world
into a widely accepted international system of rules, norms, and,
where possible, institutions -- a system with the potential to promote
peace, freedom, and prosperity for decades.
-- Promoting Homeland Security: The traditional division between
foreign and domestic policy is increasingly and necessarily blurred.
The 9/11 terrorists came from abroad, but trained for their mission in
the United States. Our national security apparatus has been focused on
external threats and is inadequately organized to respond to the enemy
within. The President has proposed a restructuring of the U.S.
government -- the most dramatic since the National Security Act of
1947 -- to bring order and greater efficiency to the defense of our
homeland. The new Department of Homeland Security will be charged with
the primary mission of countering the terrorist threat within the
United States. At the same time, in a world where the terrorist pays
no respect to traditional boundaries, a successful strategy for
homeland security must be intrinsically international. The United
States, Europe, and others must work together to tighten border
controls, improve travel document security, and protect global
communication and commercial networks. In so doing, however, the
United States cannot shut itself off from the world. America has
always been a free, open, welcoming, and dynamic society -- and that
has helped make us such a powerful force for good in the world. One of
our defining challenges is to balance both collective security with
individual rights and prudent controls with desirable openness. We
must find a way to confront the terrorist threat without undermining
the principles fundamental to our country. As Secretary of State
Powell has remarked, "What [we] must not do is become afraid. We must
not be afraid to travel, we must not be afraid to enjoy ourselves, we
must not be afraid to assemble. We must not be afraid to let people
from overseas come to America."
Final Reflections
Exactly one year has passed since the awful devastation of September
11, 2001. These past twelve months have not been enough time to heal,
but they have provided enough time to learn some important lessons
about how best to deal with the challenge of modern terrorism. And the
lessons are clear. The war against terrorism is a fundamentally
different kind of war. It is a war against multiple foes. It is a war
without clear battlefields or fronts. It is a war that must often be
fought with weapons other than bombs and bullets. It is a war that
cannot be waged and won by any single country.
The task is enormous, and it is open-ended. None of us can be
complacent about the threat of terrorism or the work that needs to be
done to build and solidify new international norms and arrangements
critical to combating terror. Yet, it would be misleading to say that
fighting terrorism has replaced containing communism as the defining
foreign policy challenge of this era.
The battle against communism was an ideological, economic, diplomatic,
and military struggle waged in every corner of the globe.
Counterterrorism, by contrast, is a priority, not an organizing
principle for American foreign policy. It will influence the focus of
attention and resources and will require that we address other foreign
policy challenges such as state failure and nation building. But
counterterrorism cannot be a doctrine. There are simply too many
critical issues for which opposition to terrorism provides little or
no direction, including implementing a new global trade agenda,
building civil societies or advancing democracy around the world,
meeting the transnational challenges from infectious disease to
climate change that increasingly define this era, or integrating
China, Russia, India and others into the major undertakings of this
era.
Successful counterterrorism will, however, be a necessary precondition
of a broader foreign policy agenda. If we are under constant attack
from terrorists or are consumed with our own personal and national
security, we will be unable to advance a more positive international
agenda. We need to combat terrorism -- with the help of friends and
allies -- but not simply as an end itself. Instead, we will fight
terrorism so we can make the most of our unusual status as the world's
only superpower and to ensure that globalization is harnessed more for
good than evil. We will fight terrorism to increase the prospects for
peace in Colombia, the Middle East, and South Asia. And we will fight
terrorism to create the space in which we can promote our values,
build a peaceful international order, and create global opportunities
for economic growth and personal freedom. Making opportunity of
adversity has always been an American quality. That has not changed
since September 11th.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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