Military

DATE=07/04/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01150

TITLE= PAKISTAN'S FIGHT AGIANST TERRORISM

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: Pakistan's fight against terrorism, next On the Line.

Host: Pakistan is stepping up its efforts against terrorists. Hundreds of troops are now scouring the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan for al-Qaida fighters who escaped from Afghanistan. Ten Pakistani soldiers were killed when they approached an al-Qaida hideout and were ambushed. President Pervez Musharraf says he will not allow Pakistan to be used as a base for terrorist activity. Police have begun a "Most Wanted" terrorist campaign and are offering rewards for information. They are also mounting raids in response to recent terrorist attacks such as the bombing at the U-S consulate. Critics, however, complain that far more can be done. Is Pakistan doing enough? I'll ask my guests, Husain Haqqani, a Pakistan journalist who is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace; Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Marin Strmecki, former congressional staff member and Defense Department official. Welcome, thanks everyone for joining me.

Host: Husain Haqqani let me ask you first. What is actually going on right now militarily in Pakistan, particularly in the border tribal regions of northwest Pakistan?

Haqqani: According to government statements, there are twenty-thousand Pakistani troops trying to seal off the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It's an impossible border to seal. There are more than six-hundred crossing points and rugged mountainous terrain. And then the Pakistani tribal areas that straddle Afghanistan basically are inhabited by tribes that have always been autonomous, and Pakistan does not have normal, regular law-enforcement there. So it is unusual for Pakistani troops to go in there. And the operation is intended to find al-Qaida escapees from Afghanistan as well to stop any further crossings from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Whether the operation is entirely successful is something that needs to be [seen]. The verdict needs to awaited.

Host: Terisita Schaffer, how successful is this operation so far?

Schaffer: Well, I agree with Husain Haqqani that you can't tell yet. But I think there are two aspects of the operation that you need to focus on. First, the relationship between Pakistan and the tribal areas. These are, as Mr. Haqqani said, areas where Pakistan's writ did not run in recent years. The entrance of Pakistan's military opens up the possibility that Pakistan will want to administer these areas more vigorously. That would be a big change. It is not inconceivable to me that that might succeed. But the second aspect is the actual hunt for al-Qaida. And there you focused on the military operations in the tribal area, but I think that any reasonable reading of the news from the past month - really the past six months - suggests that there are elements of al-Qaida in many different parts of Pakistan. That's the only explanation I can find for the pattern of four major attacks aiming at foreigners, starting with the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl and winding up most recently with the bombing of the U-S consulate in Karachi. So that this has become part and parcel of Pakistan's effort to reclaim the state's authority over members of militant groups who had begun to challenge it in very serious ways.

Host: Marin Strmecki, let's talk a little about this effort to gain some authority over the tribal areas. In an interview with the Associated Press, just recently, one of the leaders of a radical Islamic party, Maulana Fazle ur-Rehman, head of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, said, "I warn Musharraf to refrain from expanding operations in tribal areas where tribesman are extremely upset. things will slip out of my hands if these American-backed operations continue there." A threat not to mount these operations -- is that a threat that has resonance with the tribal elders in Pakistan or not?

Strmecki: I think that there is resonance for that kind of a threat and it stems from two things. One, genuine disaffection by more radical elements or tribal elements in parts of Pakistan. But the state itself in trying to rebuild its authority has to deal with the fact that key institutions in the state have been compromised by radical Islamist groups, essentially the I-S-I, the intelligence service of Pakistan. One of the most important instruments in this battle has a history of supporting these groups, being interconnected with the radical groups in Pakistani society -- and whether [Pervez] Musharraf can get that agency to fully fight this war I think is the big question.

Host: Now if Musharraf were able to get the I-S-I to fully fight this war, wouldn't they have a treasure trove of knowledge about who the militants are in Pakistan?

Strmecki: I think that the I-S-I does have that that treasure trove of information. After all, al-Qaida was created in Pakistan in the late 1980s and the safe houses that have been created throughout Pakistan were done under the watchful eye of the I-S-I. So I think there was much more known in that agency than he has come forward with.

Host: Husain Haqqani, what is I-S-I doing now? Are they engaged in this effort to fight terrorism in Pakistan or are they hindering it?

Haqqani: If one believes U-S officials who are interacting with the Pakistanis, at the moment the I-S-I is helping them. But that help may actually be selective. And that is where the real problem lies because this is an integrated problem. Pakistan got into all of this because Pakistan thought the Islamic militants would help it in its fight with India, that these would be people who would be able to help the Kashmiris gain their freedom and at the same time challenge the authority of the Indian state. And India, of course we know, is much larger than Pakistan and has more resources. So this is an easy, cheap way of fighting the battle with India. Unfortunately it has repercussions both in domestic terms, where they have spawned sectarian terrorist groups who have been killing members of the Shia minority, and at the same time, they have become part of the international terrorist network. Now, to try and make a distinction between those who were Pakistan's former allies in the battle against India and those who are international terrorists, I think is something that will not work because all of these people do see themselves as allies of each other and they will work and continue to work closely to each other. So what the I-S-I now needs to do is make no distinction and try and restore the writ of the state. And I don't think that that is taking place at the same level as we would expect or want it to be.

Host: Teresita Schaffer, let's talk a little bit more, though, about the tribal areas and whether Pakistan is being successful in looking for al-Qaida in the tribal areas. The Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider told reporters recently that tribal elders were cooperating fully. Is that a hopeful statement or does that reflect the reality on the ground?

Schaffer: It's very hard to get independent information about what actually is going on. I think that probably has elements of both. But I think again, the important thing to recognize is that whatever Pakistan is doing here, if it's going to be effective, will have to be done as Pakistan's issue and not as "cooperation with the Americans." Because the real challenge to the Pakistan government is not whether they can help the U-S out in this struggle, which is obviously of enormous interest to the United States, but whether they will be able really to reclaim and ultimately rebuild the institutions of the state. And this is a major kind of existential challenge for the Pakistani state.

Host: Do you believe, Marin Strmecki, that Pakistan has recognized that this fight against terrorism is -- that terrorism poses as much of a threat to the existence of Pakistan internally as it does to other nations?

Strmecki: I think much of Pakistani society understands that, because much of Pakistani society would opt for a moderate and secular government. But I think that the key figure, President Musharraf is still a very ambiguous one. He came from the military and from the world in which the I-S-I and the radical Islamists inhabit and hold power. And he has been forced, tactically, to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism, but you don't see that he's chosen that from his own volition. He knows that he doesn't have legitimacy with the rest of Pakistani society, and therefore he doesn't want to fully break his ties with those in the military, those in the I-S-I who are behind some of these problems.

Schaffer: I basically agree with that analysis, but I think I'd put it a little bit differently. I think that when the United States came to President Musharraf in September and said, "Are you with us in this campaign against terrorism?" and he said "Yes," I think his hope was that he would be able to strike an implicit bargain: that if he changed his policy on Afghanistan, he would get two things. First of all, he would get the opportunity to do something he wanted to do, namely close down the sectarian violence within Pakistan that Husain Haqqani spoke about, which he very much opposes and which has been tearing Pakistani society apart. But I think the other part of the implicit bargain was that the United States would at least look the other way and perhaps even do more than look the other way when it came to his agenda in Kashmir. Now, there were two problems with that. First, I don't think you can make that distinction anymore between the domestic violence and the Kashmir agenda because the same people are doing both. Second, the Kashmir agenda erupted when the Indian parliament was bombed in mid-December and it became apparent at that time and especially since, that the U-S wasn't prepared to go along with turning a blind eye.

Host: Husain Haqqani, actually, let me ask you a little bit about the sectarian violence that you brought up. There seem to have been a number of reports recently that suggest that al-Qaida people who have moved into Pakistan are making alliances with the very people who had been doing sectarian violence and looking for targets together. Do you think those reports are justified?

Haqqani: I think those reports are actually reporting something that has gone on for much longer. The fact remains that when Afghanistan became a safe haven for all kinds of terrorists with Islamic banners, then that included people who had a sectarian agenda within Pakistan as well. The important thing is that there were people who wanted an independent Muslim state in southern Philippines, people who wanted an independent state in Chechnya in Russia, people from Pakistan. So all kinds of people gathered together in Afghanistan. Now it is naïve to think that when they go back, they will not retain that brotherhood that was forged in Afghanistan before the United States started bombing Afghanistan. And this is where I think that Pakistan has to review the situation and see it not in parts but as a full picture. And General Musharraf really has to persuade his colleagues -- and of course the Pakistani nation will firmly support him in doing that -- that whether it is sectarian terrorism, whether it's militancy across the border in any other country, or whether it's militancy emanating from Afghanistan, they are all part of a similar point of view. Pakistan has legitimate concerns about Kashmir. Pakistan needs to pursue those through diplomacy and politics and at the same time de-weaponize Pakistani society so that Pakistani society can be free of the impact of terrorism. Now we must understand, al-Qaida is a loose network. It is not a classical organization as we know it in the West, so this, being a loose network, it can actually accommodate many, many different groups and among those groups are the sectarian groups within Pakistan.

Host: Marin Strmecki, a journalist from Pakistan who's written extensively about al-Qaida and the Taleban, Ahmed Rashid, recently told the B-B-C that, "The Pakistani regime is at the moment running scared of the fundamentalists. Although this is a military regime, I think they're unwilling to do anything seriously to crack down." He also said, "Most of the Taleban cabinet is living in Peshawar untouched. They go shopping. They meet people. They have dinner parties. They invite people into their homes. Many of them are living in Quetta and many of the other Taleban and al-Qaida are living in Punjab and in Karachi." Is he right about that?

Strmecki: Is he right about that? I think that he is. I think that what you have in Pakistan is that the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani people have been marginalized from politics. And so the main players are Musharraf and the government and then the radical Islamists and those who support the Taleban. And those who are capable of bringing people into the streets and pressuring the government through these bombings that are designed to push the government out of Pakistan, have disproportionate leverage when there's not a functioning political process that can bring forth the views of the Pakistani people as a whole.

Host: Teresita Schaffer, how does that functioning political process get reintroduced into Pakistan?

Schaffer: The theoretical answer is that there are elections coming up in October to elect both the parliament and state assemblies and that this will be the opportunity to reintroduce electoral politics into Pakistan. Unfortunately, what we have seen so far suggests that the elections will at least be very carefully choreographed. The government has talked about introducing massive constitutional changes by decree. There's been a lot of debate back and forth over how the power was going to be apportioned between the president and the prime minister. The president is talking about unity of command and is talking about the prime minister having all the power but the president having the power to dismiss him. At a minimum this is a very uneasy relationship, and my fear is that these elections, like the referendum of last April, will have very limited credibility. I think the rebuilding of institutions is absolutely crucial. The judiciary, the parliament, the parties which in all of South Asia are suffering from leadership sclerosis [poor leadership] and badly need to have internal leader selection processes reintroduced. This is not a job that can be done by October or indeed within the next year or so. This is the job of a generation, but it needs to start soon. And I think as Marin said, that the Pakistani people would welcome it. And in many ways, this is the language that President Musharraf has been talking. So that if he could see this in a larger picture, I think you might be able to find support for this kind of an institutional agenda. But right at the moment that's not what people are focusing on.

Haqqani: In my view, the crucial thing is that the war against terrorism should not be allowed to be used by General Musharraf and his colleagues in the military establishment to actually keep democracy away from Pakistan. They should not be able to tell the West: "Well, because you need us in the war against terrorism, therefore we should be allowed to continue business as usual with some semblance of democracy." The truth is that a broader-based government in Pakistan, a more democratic government in Pakistan and a pluralist environment in Pakistan are conducive to eliminating terrorism. Because the terrorists have always operated in the shadows, they do not have public support. An overwhelming majority of Pakistanis in election after election has always voted for mainstream liberal political parties, which do not share the same agenda as the Islamists. So actually, a militarist-militant alliance has existed in Pakistan and that alliance needs to be broken if terrorism is to be completely eliminated and if Pakistan is not to be allowed to become a safe haven for terrorists who are escaping U-S bombing in Afghanistan. We can't foresee the U-S bombing targets in Pakistan. The only thing the U-S can do is put pressure on Pakistan to make sure that Pakistan understands its own interests. And its interest is in building Pakistan as a modern state rather than a state with lots of things happening outside the rule of law.

Host: Marin Strmecki, is Pakistan moving away from democracy or are there some efforts to reinvigorate democracy in Pakistan?

Strmecki: I think that Ambassador Schaffer's characterization of it is very accurate. There's an attempt to create the semblance, or the appearance of democratic processes, but the reality is not there because of the overweening power of the military. And as a result of this recent referendum, the continued rule of Musharraf unchecked by any political competition really robs the process of any substance.

Host: Teresita Schaffer, let's talk a little bit about the connection between the al-Qaida fighters in the region, in the tribal region and then also having spread out through all of Pakistan, as you mentioned earlier, their involvement in the terrorist acts in the murder of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter, and the bombing of the U-S consulate and the bombing of a hotel that killed eleven French engineers. What are the police in Pakistan doing now to try to solve those cases and bring some pressure through police activity on the terrorists?

Schaffer: Well, the first point to make is that as Husain Haqqani said, you're talking about a loose network, not a tight organization. And so, consequently, it's perfectly possible to have people who escaped from Afghanistan and are hiding out in the frontier and others who are sitting in safe houses with friends or whatever in cities around Pakistan, who essentially have nothing to do with each other but who are loosely connected all to this same network. The sense I have is that the Pakistani police and various American authorities have had good professional communications. There have been a number of well-publicized busts in various cities in Pakistan at which the announcement has been made that various leadership figures in al-Qaida have been picked up. I have no particular reason to doubt this. But the whole business of police actions of this sort is extremely complicated. Pakistan police have huge problems of efficiency and integrity. And under the best of circumstances, this again is the work of a generation, or at least a good number of years. I think probably Husain Haqqani knows more about that than I do and the details.

Host: Husain, we only have a minute or so to go. One thing in particular, these ads now being taken out in the Dawn newspaper with sort of "Most Wanted" posters of various terror suspects. Is this new?

Haqqani: We've had ads like that before, but a lot of times these ads are only meant to give the impression that something is being done because after all, Pakistan does not have a very large newspaper readership. The question is, are these ads being put out in posters in the travel areas, and my answer to that is, as of now, no. At the same time there have been mistakes made in pictures. In some cases they have put in pictures of people who were not really wanted as wanted and then apologized for it. So that all shows that there is a lot of incompetence as well.

Schaffer: And Dawn is an English language newspaper.

Husain: Which is hardly read by the kind of people who would know where these people are. The real issue is not advertising, not emulating the U-S method of law enforcement and trying to impress the U-S saying, "We are doing exactly what you would do in a similar situation."

Host: I'm afraid that's all the time that we have for today. I'd like to thank my guests: Husain Haqqani of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Marin Strmecki of the Smith Richardson Foundation. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.