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20 June 2002

Text: U.S. Official Outlines Agenda for Peace and Security in Colombia

(Cites Colombian initiatives, U.S.-funded programs)  (3190) 
The incoming administration of Colombian President-elect Alvaro Uribe
"faces tremendous challenges" in grappling with a decades-old civil
war fueled by narco-terrorist groups in Colombia, says Lino Gutierrez,
principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere
affairs.
Gutierrez, speaking June 20 at a conference on Colombia sponsored by
the Woodrow Wilson International Center, declared that Uribe's task is
to build "on the progress made under President [Andres] Pastrana" to
reduce violence and reinforce the rule of law, strengthen democratic
institutions, facilitate economic recovery and improve the observance
of human rights in his country. The United States, Gutierrez said,
intends to work closely with the Uribe government to help promote
peace and security throughout Colombia.
U.S. policy toward Colombia "seeks to help Colombia establish control
over its national territory in order to develop a prosperous democracy
that respects human rights and the rule of law and is free from
narcotics production and trafficking and terrorism," Gutierrez added.
"With strong support from the United States, the administration of
Andres Pastrana embarked on its 'Plan Colombia' in 1999" to address
the "multiple ills" stemming from guerrilla warfare and the narcotics
industry.
Uribe won election "by campaigning on a platform that promised a more
vigorous program to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism,"
Gutierrez said. He noted that during Uribe's June 18-20 visit to
Washington, the president-elect met with President Bush, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, congressional leaders, and others.
To date, U.S. support "has been a key component of Colombian efforts"
to combat the illicit drug trade and terrorism, to strengthen
democratic safeguards and human rights, to foster socio-economic
development and to mitigate the impact of the ongoing violence on
Colombian civilians, Gutierrez said. While the United States will
continue to assist those efforts, he said, the Bush Administration is
now advocating a more unified approach by U.S. and Colombian personnel
to address what White House drug-policy experts describe as "the
intertwined terrorist and narcotics problems."
Gutierrez said that "human rights concerns have been and will remain a
central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia." Moreover, "the United
States believes Colombia needs to continue a strong counternarcotics
program," including drug interdiction, aerial spraying of illicit
crops, alternative development projects, and extradition of suspected
drug traffickers, he said.
At one time, "some of these guerrillas [in Colombia] may have had
ideological motives" for their actions, Gutierrez conceded. "But in
today's world, there is no justification for a movement that kills,
kidnaps, terrorizes or relies on narcotics trafficking to fund [its]
goals." A reinvigorated, prosperous and democratic Colombia "has to
win this war for the good of the country and the region," he
concluded. "And the United States is committed to helping our
Colombian friends."
Following is the text of Gutierrez's remarks, as prepared for
delivery:
(begin text)
[Note: In the text, "billion" equals "thousand million."]
Opening Remarks
Lino Gutierrez
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Woodrow Wilson International Center 
International Crisis Group
U.S. Institute of Peace
June 20, 2002
Peace and Security in Colombia
Thank you for that generous introduction, and for inviting me to
participate in this conference, which comes at a particularly
significant point in U.S.-Colombia relations.
I understand that the purpose of this meeting is to explore the
security, economic and political dimensions of conflict resolution in
Colombia. Building on the progress made under President Pastrana, the
incoming Uribe administration faces tremendous challenges. It must
provide for increased security, strengthen democratic institutions,
promote economic recovery and improve the observance of human rights.
It must also find the increased resources that will be needed to do
this.
This conference contributes to those goals by providing an opportunity
to exchange views on how we can best help Colombia and the incoming
administration of President-elect Uribe to address the tremendous
challenges that he and his country face. To explore these issues, I
want to describe what the Administration is doing and hopes to do in
order to support progress towards their resolution.
Note that I said "progress toward their resolution," and we intend to
work with the Colombian government for this, but with the realistic
recognition that there are no easy or quick solutions.
The first thing that needs to be recognized is that no single
explanation fully addresses the deep roots of Colombia's present-day
troubles, but they include limited government presence in large areas
of the interior, the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, endemic
violence and social inequities.
The United States policy towards Colombia seeks to help Colombia
establish control over its national territory in order to develop a
prosperous democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law
and is free from narcotics production and trafficking and terrorism.
With strong support from the United States, the administration of
Andres Pastrana embarked on its "Plan Colombia" in 1999 to address
these multiple ills. Although widely described as a counternarcotics
program, "Plan Colombia" was a comprehensive effort by Colombia to
deal in a holistic way with the country's longstanding, mutually
reinforcing problems. The primary objectives of "Plan Colombia" were
to promote peace, combat the narcotics industry, revive the Colombian
economy, improve respect for human rights and strengthen the
democratic and social institutions of the country. The Pastrana
administration deserves credit for its articulation of these goals and
its programs to implement them; these programs were generally accepted
by all the candidates in the recent elections as the basis for many of
their own proposals.
Having said that, it is also important to note that Alvaro Uribe won
election without a runoff -- a first in recent Colombian history -- by
campaigning on a platform that promised a more vigorous program to
combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism. His message quite clearly
resonated with the Colombian electorate. By the end of the peace
process with the FARC in February, it had become clear to all that the
FARC had no interest in a real peace or serious negotiations.
Our meeting here today comes as a number of developments are taking
place. The Administration continues to urge early adoption by the
Congress of renewed Andean trade preferences and is optimistic of its
passage.
More immediately, President-elect Uribe is completing a week in the
United States where he will have met in New York with U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and here in Washington with President Bush,
National Security Adviser Rice, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld, and ONDCP Director Walters, Assistant Secretary
Reich, as well as congressional leaders. This has given us an
opportunity to learn more of his plans and to discuss the role of
future U.S. support.
Before talking about that role, let me review what has been
accomplished with Colombia so far:
-- The United States has trained and equipped the Colombian Army's
counternarcotics brigade, which has destroyed over 800 coca base
laboratories and 21 HCL (hydrochloride) laboratories and provided
security for aerial eradication operations in southern Colombia. With
Colombia, we sprayed a record 84,000 hectares of coca cultivation in
2001 and have set a goal of 150,000 hectares in 2002.
-- In 2001, the Colombian government extradited for trial in the
United States 23 Colombian nationals here on serious narcotics
charges.
-- Through Colombia's Ministry of Interior, we have funded a program
that has provided protection to nearly 1700 Colombians whose lives
were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists and
journalists.
-- The U.S. government-funded Early Warning System alerts Colombian
authorities to threats of potential massacres or other human rights
abuses. While still incomplete and not perfect, it has made a
difference.
-- Working with non-governmental organizations and international
agencies, the U.S. has provided assistance to 330,000 Colombians
displaced by violence since mid-2001.
-- Our program to demobilize child soldiers has helped 272 children to
re-integrate into society; this is a small beginning but one that we
hope will grow. One of the most egregious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law is the forced recruitment of
children, especially by the FARC.
-- We have helped the Colombian government implement programs to
reform its administration of justice and strengthen local government.
We have opened 20 "Casas de Justicia" to provide cost-effective legal
services in poor neighborhoods.
-- And we are helping the Prosecutor General's Office set up human
rights units throughout the country to facilitate the investigation
and prosecution of human rights abuses.
We also remain committed to alternative development as a key component
of our overall effort in Colombia. Promoting alternative development
has not been easy. The security situation is a major obstacle and in
most cases there is no alternative agricultural production that can
match the income derived from coca production. Because the results we
had hoped for were not being achieved, we are now making adjustments
to our program. This includes working more closely with individual
communities to tailor programs to help with needs they identify or to
fund activities which improve the economic potential of isolated
regions, such as Putumayo, and boost the temporary employment and
income of rural residents.
As we move forward on these refocused programs, we will need to keep
in mind the recent GAO report on alternative development in Colombia,
which noted: "without interdiction and eradication as disincentives,
growers are unlikely to abandon more lucrative and easily cultivated
coca crops in favor of less profitable and harder-to-grow licit corps
or to pursue legal employment."
U.S. support has been a key component of Colombian efforts. Since July
2000, the United States has provided Colombia with $1.7 billion to
combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democratic
institutions and human rights, foster socio-economic development and
mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombian civilians. This
includes $380.5 million approved by Congress in the FY-02 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act to continue these programs.
The Department of State has asked for $439 million in its FY-03 budget
request, again for these and similar programs. Also, in the FY-02
emergency supplemental, the Department of State has requested $35
million for three initiatives in Colombia: $4 million to support
re-establishment of a Colombian National Police presence in areas it
had been forced to abandon; $25 million in anti-terrorism and
anti-kidnapping program funding and $6 million to jump-start training
for Colombian army units designated to protect a vital oil pipeline.
The House and the Senate are shortly to meet in a conference committee
to reconcile differences in the emergency supplemental legislation
each has passed.
In addition to the $439 million for FY-03 I mentioned just a moment
ago, we are also asking Congress for $98 million to train and equip
Colombian military and police units protecting the Cano Limon-Covenas
pipeline. This proposal, which goes beyond our already established
programs in Colombia, is intended to help the Colombian government
defend a vital economic asset threatened by terrorist attacks and
whose closure for over 240 days during 2001 resulted in nearly $500
million in foregone revenues and royalties lost, funds that otherwise
would have contributed to the country's legitimate economy and to
social and economic development programs. Often overlooked, oil spills
as a result of attacks on the pipeline have caused serious
environmental damage.
The proposed change that has caused the most commentary is the
Administration's March 21 request to the Congress for new legal
authorities to address the intertwined terrorist and narcotics
problems, the relation being something that perhaps we had not
previously appreciated adequately.
As you know, Colombia's 40-million-plus citizens and its democracy are
under sustained assault by three narco-terrorist groups: the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the National Liberation
Army (ELN); and the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces (AUC).
These three groups in varying degrees regularly engage in massacres,
kidnappings and attacks on key infrastructure. To support their
terrorist activities they -- and the FARC and AUC especially -- are
intimately involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking, including
cultivation, processing and transportation.
President Bush recognized this link when he stated on April 18, after
meeting with President Pastrana, that "we've put the FARC, AUC on our
terrorist list. We've called them for what they are. These are
killers, who use killing and intimidation to foster political means
... by fighting narco-trafficking we're fighting the funding sources
for these political terrorists."
Along these lines, I would note that yesterday the State Department
expressed its appreciation to the Government of Suriname for having
expelled into the custody of the United States a Colombian narcotics
trafficker and member of the FARC 16th Front who had been indicted in
March 2002 for being engaged in cocaine trafficking into the United
States.
Polls in Colombia have consistently shown that these groups have only
minimal public support. As in Africa, where the proceeds from illicit
diamond sales have been used to fund violence and intimidation, in
Colombia it is narcotics that provides the fuel. This is why a unified
approach, one that recognizes the cross-cutting relation between
narcotics trafficking and terrorism, is needed.
The new authorities the Administration is asking of Congress would
allow us to:
-- address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as vigorously as we
currently address narcotics; and
-- help the Colombian government confront the heightened terrorist
risk that has resulted from the end of the FARC demilitarized zone.
The primary difference between what we do now and what we hope to do
is that we are asking Congress to authorize the use of equipment
previously made available to Colombia for counternarcotics purposes --
and in particular, helicopters and the battalion the U.S. has trained
and supported -- for counterterrorism operations.
Expanding the authorities for the use of aircraft and other assets to
cover terrorist and other threats to Colombia's democracy does not
promise a short-term solution. It is not a silver bullet. However, if
approved, this will give us the flexibility we need to help the
Colombian government respond to this threat more efficiently and more
effectively in the shortest possible time, with resources already in
Colombia.
This new initiative does not mean a retreat from our concern about
human rights, nor does it mean an open-ended U.S. commitment in
Colombia. Specifically:
-- We will not stop the human rights vetting of all Colombian military
units receiving U.S. assistance;
-- We will not exceed the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel
providing support to Plan Colombia nor the 400-person cap on U.S.
civilian contractors;
-- We will not send U.S. combat troops to Colombia. President Bush has
made this crystal-clear.
Human rights concerns have been and will remain a central element in
U.S. policy toward Colombia. In meetings in Colombia with senior
civilian and military officials, including with President-elect Uribe,
U.S. officials, including Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor Lorne Craner, and Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Otto Reich have regularly stressed the need for Colombia to
improve its human rights performance and sever remaining
military-paramilitary ties.
We believe our human rights message is making a difference:
-- The counternarcotics brigade that we trained and equipped has
compiled an unblemished human rights record to date.
-- President Pastrana and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have
repeatedly denounced collusion between elements of the Colombian
military and the paramilitary terrorists.
-- The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitaries and killed 92 in
combat last year, three times more than the previous year.
Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security
forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with them. Those
responsible for such actions must be brought to justice. The
establishment of the rule of law and personal security for all
Colombians will not be created through human rights abuses or impunity
for the perpetrators of such crimes.
Under Section 567 of the FY-02 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
the Secretary of State is required to certify as to the Government of
Colombia's progress in meeting three human rights-related conditions:
-- that Colombian Armed Forces members who have been credibly alleged
to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or
abetted paramilitary groups are being suspended;
-- that the Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian
prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting and punishing in
civilian courts those members of the Colombian Armed Forces who have
been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human
rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups; and
-- that the Colombian Armed Forces are taking effective measures to
sever links with paramilitary groups, and to execute outstanding
orders for capture for members of such groups.
The Secretary takes very seriously his responsibilities under the Act
and carefully weighed all the facts before certifying on May 1,
thereby releasing 60 percent of the funds appropriated in the FY-02
Foreign Operations Act for the Colombian military. A second
certification is required before the remaining 40 percent can be
released, and it too will be carefully considered.
The United States believes Colombia needs to continue a strong
counternarcotics program, including interdiction, spraying,
alternative development and extradition. Colombia must also make solid
advances on human rights and ending ties to paramilitary groups,
increase GOC revenues to meet increased needs and undertake to
increase security spending, but not at the expense of socio-economic
development programs.
The commitment we have made to Colombia -- to sustain our
counternarcotics programs, step up our counterterrorism assistance,
strengthen programs to protect human rights, and help to foment
alternative development, among other areas -- cannot succeed absent a
sustained commitment of even greater magnitude by the Government of
Colombia.
President-elect Uribe received a solid electoral mandate for his
pledge to establish government authority throughout Colombia and has
said he intends to increase defense spending, add soldiers and police
and create a civilian defense force for intelligence collection. He
has also said he would call on the United Nations to provide
assistance in peace negotiations.
The devil is always in the details, but this strikes us as a good
beginning.
As you look at the issues to be posed by the three scheduled panels --
Economic Foundations for Peace; Military and Security Foundations for
Peace; and the Basis for Negotiating Peace -- I hope you will find
that the programs and policies I have outlined contribute to these
goals.
The Colombian people have fought long and hard for peace. I remember
when I lived in Colombia as a child, reading in the newspaper about
atrocities committed in the countryside, in what was then described as
"La Violencia." Some of these guerrillas may have had ideological
motivations at that time. But in today's world, there is no
justification for a movement that kills, kidnaps, terrorizes or relies
on narcotics trafficking to fund their goals. The Colombian nation
state, Colombian democracy, has to win this war for the good of the
country and the region. And the United States is committed to helping
our Colombian friends.
Thank you very much.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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