04 June 2002
Defense Department Briefing Transcript
(NATO/New Threats, Afghanistan/Allied Troops, Rumsfeld/NATO Bilateral
Meetings, Georgia/U.S. Military Advisors, al-Qaida/Pakistan,
Philippines/Abu Sayyaf, India/Pakistan, Philippines/U.S. Mission,
9/11/CIA and FBI, Georgia/Terrorists, India-Pakistan/Command and
Control of Nuclear Weapons, India-Pakistan/Domestic Political
Considerations, 9/11 Attacks/Intelligence) (6,600)
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Marine General Peter Pace, vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the media June 4 at the
Pentagon.
(begin transcript)
United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Tuesday, June 4, 2002 -- 1 p.m. EDT
(Also participating was Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff)
Rumsfeld: Good afternoon.
I plan to depart for Europe this evening, stopping first in London,
where I'll meet General Myers. And we will have an opportunity to
thank the folks at the defense ministry for Britain's strong support
in the war on terrorism and discuss with them the way ahead with
respect to the global war on terrorism. I'll then go to Brussels for
the biannual meeting of NATO defense ministers.
From the very first day after the September 11th attacks, NATO nations
have played a critical role in the global war on terrorism. They've
contributed air and sea and ground forces, as well as intelligence,
humanitarian assistance, ships, planes, aerial surveillance,
leadership interdiction, maritime interception operations, combat air
patrols, airlift, basing, refueling, overflight, mine clearing and
special operations, as you know, because there are currently some
activities of that type going on. Their contributions have not been
without cost; allied troops have been killed and wounded in the war on
terror, and we're very grateful for their support and their sacrifice.
During our meetings at NATO, we will discuss the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist movements and
terrorist states and how the alliance has to transform to deal with
those threats. I'll have a number of bilateral meetings on the edges
of the NATO meetings, including a meeting with the minister of defense
of Russia, Sergei Ivanvov, to discuss a range of issues, including
South Asia.
After Brussels, I'll stop in Germany to visit with some NATO AWACS
crews who patrolled U.S. skies, helping to protect our country in the
aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Some 830 crewmembers from 13
NATO countries flew nearly 4,300 hours and over 360 operational
sorties over the United States before returning home on May 15th. I
look forward to meeting some of them and having a chance to thank them
personally for helping to defend our country.
I then will stop in Estonia for the annual meeting of the
Nordic-Baltic defense ministers. Each of those countries is making
helpful contributions to the war on terrorism. We'll discuss ways we
can improve our defense cooperation in the period ahead, and I'll have
some bilateral meetings there, as well.
I also hope to visit several Persian Gulf states, important U.S.
friends and allies who are helping in the war effort. The last time I
was in the Gulf region, I was not able to get around to as many
countries as I had hoped. And needless to say, we have a long-standing
interest in the security and stability of that region. I will
certainly reaffirm our country's commitment to the region and visit
with some of the troops that are stationed there as well.
I also hope to stop in India and Pakistan before returning home. The
U.S. has a growing defense and security relationship with each of
those countries. We've been actively working to strengthen our
military-to-military relationships with these important South Asian
nations. Each is important to us. I look forward to again meeting with
their senior leadership.
And we'd be happy to respond to questions. Yes, Charlie?
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said you hoped to stop in India and Pakistan. I
assume you plan to stop there.
Rumsfeld: I do plan. That's a better word.
Q: And --
Rumsfeld: We're working out dates and times because the schedule's
been in a state of some flux, and folks in those countries have
travels as well. So we're trying to mesh schedules.
Q: I see. Do you see any easing of the tension in that area? And might
you offer some plan or some road map for the two countries, perhaps,
to ease the tensions now, given the nuclear danger in that area?
Rumsfeld: You know, commenting on the first part of your question, as
to whether or not you see some easing, I'm -- suspect General Pace
feels the same way -- we see several times a day reports on various
aspects of the situation in -- between India and Pakistan. And it's
quite true that at various times during the day, you might say, "My
goodness, that's a good sign," or "My goodness, that's not such a good
sign." And it happens that from day to day it shifts and changes
somewhat. So I don't know that trying to reach in and comment on the
situation at any given moment necessarily, absent a trend -- if
there's a trend, it's worth commenting on it. If it's simply a daily
or hourly fluctuation, it probably isn't.
In terms of our country's role there, needless to say, the president
of the United States and Secretary Powell and the -- our ambassadors
and leaders from other countries have all had a very active interest
and involvement. Deputy Secretary Armitage will be going in sometime
in the latter portion of this week. And I think that very likely what
we'll do is I'll have a chance to meet with him or talk with him after
he has completed his visits. And we'll see what happens.
Q: Mr. Secretary, may I do a follow-up on that, please? As you
probably know, both sides are refusing to meet with Russian President
Putin face to face, so apparently he's going to have to meet with them
individually.
Rumsfeld: I don't know that that's true.
Q: Okay, well, given that your knowledge is certainly better than
mine, but it's just what I hear. But even if they do, and with the
full-court international press to try and resolve the issue between
India and Pakistan, with Dick Armitage going and then you going, one
would have to ask, are you being thrown into the breach? I mean, we
know you're a bright, resourceful guy, but what do you really hope to
accomplish here? What can you do that the rest of them are not or have
not done?
Rumsfeld: Well, no, I'm not being thrown into any breach. We have a --
I have been to those countries previously. I have met with their
leadership there and in this country, as have other senior officials
of our government. It is a continuing process. They're important
countries in the world, and we have relationships with each that we
value and that have been strengthening over the past year-plus. And we
value them. They're -- the visits that -- and phone conversations and
meetings that take place are all part of a continuum.
Q: One would have to ask why now, sir? I mean, what do you hope to
accomplish as far as, you know, preventing war between those two
nations?
Rumsfeld: They are two sovereign nations that are going to make their
own decisions. They're going to do it based on their best information.
And they are, as is not surprising, taking their own counsel and
visiting with people from other countries, multiple countries, on a
continuing basis.
Q: What's your point in going to Pakistan? You talked a little bit
about efforts to root out al Qaeda in the northwest areas. General
Hagenbeck said, I think, there are roughly 1,000 al Qaeda up there as
well as Taliban and al Qaeda leadership. Can you talk about what's
going on to get to those people? Is Pakistan doing the job, and do you
hope to get more U.S. support in there to --
Rumsfeld: Pakistan still has their divisions along the border. And for
that, we're pleased. Pakistan, as you know, we've announced on several
occasions -- one notable one where some 11 different sites were hit by
the Pakistan government officials, as well as with some U.S.
cooperation. There were, I believe, over 50 people captured during
that period and a large number of items which add to the intelligence
knowledge of those who are involved in this coalition.
There have been other such activities of a smaller size, and those
types of things have been continuing. I don't intend to talk about any
current ones or prospective ones, but I think it's obvious that
Pakistan has been quite cooperative.
Q: Sir, since Pakistan has moved some of its assets away from the
border, are you seeing that the India-Pakistan problem has begun at
all to affect the fight against al Qaeda or Pakistan's contributions
to the fight against al Qaeda?
Rumsfeld: The elements that have moved away from the Afghan border
area have, as I said, been relatively small, modest elements and not
larger units. The larger units are still there. And -- is the tension
between Pakistan and India a distraction from the efforts against the
global war on terrorism? Why, I would say yeah. Has it specifically
damaged in -- oh, precise ways what we're trying to do? Not that I
know of.
Yes.
Q: Have you seen any evidence or do you have any concern that elements
of al Qaeda may be trying to exploit that tension, perhaps by creating
some incidents in that area or even in Kashmir, itself, in order to
bring about precisely that diversion that you say has not been --
(inaudible)?
Rumsfeld: Let me think if I can -- (to General Pace) -- I couldn't
specifically identify anything, could you?
Pace: No, sir. I -- nothing specific, but it would be certainly
reasonable to expect that they would try to exploit this.
Rumsfeld: It would be, you know, most unfortunate if someone saw it in
their interest to create incidents on either side of the LOC or the
border in the hope that those incidents would be judged to be by the
other party and thereby incite people to activities they would
otherwise avoid. But I don't know of any instances of that happening.
Yes.
Q: What are your recent thoughts about expanding or extending a
mission in the Philippines? And what is your thought generally about
the mission in the Philippines?
Rumsfeld: Well, Pete, you may want to jump in, but thus far, the
mission in the Philippines has proceeded in precisely the way it was
intended. It has gone well. The reception on the part of the Filipino
people, from everything I can tell, has been very positive. The
attitude of the Philippine government has been very positive, from
everything I can tell. You may recall in the early days there had been
some -- oh, public debate among various elements of the Philippine
government as to what ought to be done or how much ought to be done or
in what way things ought to be done. And that, to my knowledge, has
been -- completely disappeared. And from everything I can tell, there
is a very positive attitude about the activities of U.S. troops there,
both from the standpoint of the training and also from the standpoint
of the civil affairs.
With respect to what the next step might be -- as everyone has read in
the paper for weeks now, various people have proposed that there be
some sort of a follow-on step -- that is under consideration.
Q: And have you made a decision about extending it past the July
deadline? And also, during Wolfowitz's trip they were saying that they
hoped that the military might be able to go out with the Filipino
forces and have trainers with the Filipino forces.
Rumsfeld: I've read all of that. And no, I've not made a decision on
it.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, while we're on the subject of your thoughts, I'm
just curious as to what your thoughts are at this point regarding what
members of Congress are investigating regarding the intelligence,
communications, et cetera, pre-September 11th. And the reason I ask
you this is because there were 189 people who died in this building,
and I'm just wondering what your thoughts are about the communications
between the FBI, the CIA and those kinds of things?
Rumsfeld: Well, I don't know that I can add anything to it, really. I,
like everyone else, have been reading various things in the
newspapers. But my impression is that the congressional committees --
or I guess it's a single committee -- (Aside) -- Is it a joint
committee?
Pace: Sir, I'm not sure.
Q: Joint.
Q: Joint.
Rumsfeld: It is a joint committee? Is -- is -- has been gathering
mountains of information, which they have been analyzing and
considering, and that they're now at the beginning stage, I believe,
of starting to call people forward to discuss it with them, which, as
a former member of Congress, I must say, I think that's a perfectly
orderly process and a proper thing to do.
Q: Well, do you see any -- did you see any lapses, do you think, in
this? (Off mike) -- bluntly.
Rumsfeld: Well, I haven't -- you know, to comment on that, one would
hope that the people commenting would have invested the kind of time
so that they could comment knowledgeably, and I haven't. In other
words, I just haven't had the time to sit down and go through this
mountain of material that apparently is being gathered together to --
from all across the government, so that people can analyze it. There's
dozens and dozens of people poring over all this, trying to learn what
happened and what took place. Clearly everyone has an interest in
knowing what took place, and -- as do I. But in terms of feeling that
I'm in a position to comment authoritatively, I'm simply not.
Q: Mr. Secretary, does the United States have a good feel in India and
Pakistan for the command and control mechanisms in both countries that
are in place and would presumably be exercised if those two countries
were to ever go nuclear? In other words, do you have a sense of how
the nuclear weapons are controlled and how they would be released if
it were ever to come to that? Do you have some confidence in those
mechanisms?
Rumsfeld: I guess what I would say is, if the import of that question
is, do we have confidence that they have procedures and that they
understand their procedures, and that they recognize the power of
those weapons and the importance of them being managed and controlled,
I would say yes, I do have confidence that the leadership in those two
countries are fully respectful of the power of the weapons and the
importance of their being managed and controlled in a way that
reflects that fact.
If you're asking, does the United States have detailed knowledge of
all of that -- but clearly, countries properly maintain a reasonable
degree of security and secrecy about how they manage things, and that
is not surprising -- that each of those countries do that. So I am
sure there's a great deal that nobody knows, except the individual
country.
(To the general.) Is that what your estimate would be, Pete?
Pace: Yes, sir. It sure is.
Q: The confidence issue goes to whether or not you have confidence
that these governments, these militaries have full control over the
mechanisms for release of these small nuclear -- small but deadly
nuclear arsenals.
Rumsfeld: And I think I answered that rather well. I did.
Q: Mr. Secretary --
Rumsfeld: Do I have a vote on it? No. (Laughter.)
Pace: I think you did great, sir.
Rumsfeld: (Laughs.)
Q: Can we go back to the Philippines for one second?
Rumsfeld: Why don't we let a few of the other folks here have a
question?
Q: Yeah, Mr. Secretary. Do you -- are you worried that the -- a
possible war in India -- between India and Pakistan could threaten the
U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even their very presence there?
Rumsfeld: I think that -- how do I say this? -- clearly no one wants a
conflict between those two countries, of any type, in any location. It
-- they -- that thought is something that is what a great many people
in this government and other governments and, I'm sure, in those two
governments are hoping will not happen. And I don't know that
elaborating more than I have adds anything to the discussion.
Yes?
Q: Sir, when you said small and modest elements of Pakistani troops
have been moved away from the Afghan border, are you talking
squad-level companies --
Rumsfeld: Oh, handfuls of people -- some reconnaissance people or some
communication elements, but nothing like large elements of troops.
Okay.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up on Tom's question about this
notion that remnants of al Qaeda could be in Pakistan or Kashmir
helping the Islamic militants foment violence over there. Are you
saying you don't -- you have not seen any intelligence to indicate
that fact, to corroborate all these reports that have been floating
around, or you just haven't looked, or it hasn't been brought to your
attention?
Rumsfeld: I can't remember. I've seen speculation that there are --
oh, we're reasonably confident that there are al Qaeda and Taliban in
Pakistan.
Q: Right.
Rumsfeld: We -- as I'm sure they are in Iran and other neighboring
countries -- that had been in Afghanistan and have been driven out.
To what extent they're involved in the Kashmir situation precisely --
you've seen pictures of that area. It is a tough area. And it's 15 to
20,000 feet high, and it's mountainous, and it's hard to know what's
going on up there.
Q: Because the intelligence is unclear or fuzzy in terms of the
action, then --
Rumsfeld: Well, people make -- there's a lot of misinformation that
flies around. People suggest that, you know, Joe did it. So there's
that type of thing. I just don't know. (To the general.) Do you have
better knowledge of that?
Pace: I do not, sir.
Rumsfeld: That's a relief. We must be reading the same things.
Q: The intelligence you're getting, General Pace, doesn't verify one
-- it doesn't add -- shed light one way or the other?
Pace: I get the same intelligence the secretary does. And as in any
situation, there is things that you know and things that you know you
don't know, and then there's a pile of things that you don't know what
you don't know, and it's hard to know at any point in time where you
are in that -- on that complete spectrum.
Regardless, it would be prudent to assume that there are al Qaeda and
Taliban in Pakistan and that we should be trying to find ways that
they may or may not be trying to influence and exploiting this
particular problem.
Q: Prudent to assume, but not proven to any great depth by
intelligence. Is that --
Pace: I have not seen anything that would lead me to believe one or
the other, black or white, that that -- that there's a truth to be had
at this moment about that, that we know about.
Rumsfeld: Way in the back.
Q: Neither India or Pakistan, for political -- for domestic reasons,
can be seen to withdrawn or step back first, before the other, which
would suggest -- it seems to suggest that anything has to be done
simultaneously or in parallel tracks, as far as any progress. How do
you try to synchronize what they do? And is that complicated if you
can't meet with both countries together?
Rumsfeld: Well, look: I'm not going out there as some sort of a
mediator, if that's the implication of your question. Secretary
Armitage -- Deputy Secretary Armitage is going to be there. There are
lots of people -- Mr. Putin's been meeting with them -- other -- Prime
Minister Blair has met with each of the individuals. It is not
possible to know how things will play out. But my guess is, and
certainly my hope is, that two countries as important as they are will
figure out ways to get from where they are to where the world would
like them to be, which is in a less-tense situation.
Yes.
Q: But could you articulate for us what your message to these two
nuclear powers will be?
Rumsfeld: Well, I could; it's not clear to me that that's a useful
thing to do -- to -- if I'm going to meet with them, one would think
you would want to tell them what you had on your mind, and it partly
will depend on how things play out between now and then and what comes
out of the Armitage meetings.
And it is -- let me just re-emphasize what's important: We have a
relationship that has been developing well with Pakistan. We have a
relationship that has been developing well with India. We put value in
those relationships. We think they're important for our country. We
also believe they're important for their countries. And our hope is
that those relationships will be useful in having those two countries
find their way to right decisions with respect to the tension that
exists.
Yes.
Q: Mr. Secretary, this morning you're reported in The Washington Post
as saying that al Qaeda appears to be active but that is not
apparently being led by Osama bin Laden. Could you elaborate on that,
and --
Rumsfeld: (Inaudible) -- elaborate on something I haven't seen?
There's no question but that intelligence suggests that al Qaeda is
active. That is to say that people are doing things who are connected
to that global terrorist network. They're doing a range of things,
like moving from place to place and moving money around and talking to
each other and planning things and that type of thing. Now there's
nothing new. There's no change there. If you get asked that question,
you answer that question.
Then you had a piece of it regarding Osama bin Laden?
Q: (Off mike) -- the command structure.
Rumsfeld: The command structure?
Q: If Osama bin Laden is not running it, who is?
Rumsfeld: Well, as I think I probably said to The Washington Post,
although I don't recall precisely what I said, but I'm sure it's
roughly what I say all the time. And that is that there are clearly
any number of people in that apparatus who are perfectly capable of
knowing roughly where those bank accounts are; roughly who are the
people that are trained; roughly where were they sent; and roughly
what their skills and talents, if you want to call them skills and
talents, are to kill innocent men, women and children. And it -- I
have always believed that absent UBL there are probably a couple of
handfuls of people who are perfectly capable of picking it up and
going on. No one is indispensable.
Our task is to find the networks, wherever they are, and do everything
to put pressure on them and to capture or kill them. And our
assignment further is to try to put pressure on those countries that
harbor them and provide safe haven so it won't happen. But in terms of
any greater detail than that, I'd be surprised if I had some sort of
magical insights beyond what I've just said.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, back on the Philippines.
Rumsfeld: Ask Pete Pace a couple.
Q: Well, let me ask you both. The Filipino army commanders say that
the mere presence of the United States on Basilan Island has done a
great deal to quell Abu Sayyaf's activity there. Is that part of the
reason why we're considering extending our stay there and possibly
increasing the intensity of the U.S. soldiers' operations, allowing
them to operate on a company basis instead of a battalion basis?
Pace: Want me to start?
Rumsfeld: Sure.
Pace: I think it's great that our counterparts in the Philippines are
saying that our presence there has helped them. That's exactly what we
hoped to do in going out to train alongside of them. The kinds of
training we're doing, like the engineers, are honing skills that they
would need anywhere in the world, but they're building roads and
they're digging wells. So, as they hone their skills, they're also
making life better for the people in the Philippines. The fact that
that then assists in the quality of life on that island and reinforces
the democracy that exists in that country is very good. And it would
certainly be a reason for us to continue to look at the way ahead.
But, as the secretary said, Admiral Fargo who is the commander in the
Pacific, is looking at the situation, and he is going to come in to
the secretary with his recommendation for the secretary to look at and
make a decision.
Rumsfeld: I would agree with everything General Pace said, except I'd
throw in one cautionary footnote. And that is that what the people in
the Philippines are saying is undoubtedly exactly correct, that it has
improved the circumstance on that island. However, the presence of
U.S. forces there in improving the circumstances on that island may
very well be a contributing factor to providing incentives for the
terrorists that were on that island to leave that island and to go
somewhere else.
So -- so my point being that you can improve the situation in one
place by your presence, but unless you get the terrorists, you have
not improved the situation net in the world. And there has been very
little of getting terrorists in the Philippines thus far.
A parallel to that is that we've been told by folks that the small
U.S. training presence in Georgia has led some folks to think, "Well,
maybe Georgia isn't the best place to be, and maybe we'll go somewhere
else and make mischief."
So you can't be everywhere in the world. And I don't deny for a minute
that U.S. presence can be helpful in calming an area and dissuading
people from thinking it's free play and easy to use that area as a
terrorist training area. But unless you get them, unless you find
them, unless you capture them, unless you stop them, they are still
out there and they are going to move to a place that is a bit more
hospitable than in this instance was the Philippines or another
instance might be Georgia.
Q: If I could follow up, is this a model that has been successful
enough so far that we would consider extending it to other areas in
Southeast Asia?
Rumsfeld: I think the president talked a bit about that in his recent
speech. What we have to do is a series of things. We have to, wherever
we can find them, stop them. And to the extent there are countries
like the Philippines and Georgia, as examples -- Yemen -- where they
want to help and they want to be cooperative, and they would like some
assistance and some training and ways to improve their skills in
tracking down terrorists or defending their country against terrorist
presence, then to the extent we can, we and other countries want to do
that.
The same thing in Afghanistan. I mean, the French are helping train
the Afghan army with us; the Germans are helping train the Afghan
police forces. It's a similar thing.
Q: Is it possible, Mr. Secretary, under the expanded role that's under
consideration, that U.S. troops could get involved in actual direct
combat with some of the terrorist forces there in the Philippines?
Rumsfeld: Well sure. I mean, you -- anyone who would suggest that that
couldn't happen I think would just not understand how confused life
can be. If a terrorist decides they want to attack our folks, and
they've indicated repeatedly in the intelligence that we gather that
they'd like to, not just in the Philippines but anywhere on the face
of the earth, and if you put your forces in locations other than right
here in the United States, clearly, they're possible targets. We know
that. And if they're targets, they could end up in combat. So that's
the risk we take.
Q: And back to what the U.S. intelligence community may have known or
didn't know before 9/11, based on what you know, do you believe there
was a serious intelligence lapse leading up to 9/11? And do you think
that if that information had been better handled, that the attacks on
9/11 could have been averted?
Rumsfeld: I've already answered that question. I would want to have
invested an appropriate amount of time poring through literally
thousands of documents and pieces of information to develop conviction
about what I think on that. I'm interested. And I think it's perfectly
appropriate that the government and that the Congress are interesting
themselves in those questions. But for me to opine on that, having not
invested the time necessary to have any conviction at all about it,
would be a disservice, it seems.
Q: Question for General Pace.
Rumsfeld: Terrific! (Laughter.)
Q: General, you may have heard of this, but during Operation Anaconda,
six Canadian snipers were very helpful to our troops, who at one point
early on in the conflict were hunkered as the unfriendlies had the
high ground and were lobbing mortars and RPGs down. And these snipers
managed to help a great deal. In fact, one of them, using a 50-caliber
sniper rifle, took out an unfriendly at a distance of what he says is
1,430 meters, about a mile and a half, which is an incredible shot.
And these guys apparently did a great deal to allow our troops to
advance and eventually get back to the conflict. And there has been a
recommendation over there to award these Canadians some sort of
recognition, some sort of U.S. medal. Are you aware of that? And will
that be done as far as you know?
Pace: I'm not aware of it yet, but clearly the coalition effort over
there has been very solid. I can give you an example of the AWACS
crews that were flying here in the United States -- I know the
secretary mentioned that earlier on in his comments -- looking at the
appropriate way to recognize the great service they did to our
country. It is well within the prerogatives of U.S. commanders on the
ground to recommend troops from other countries for U.S. awards. And
if they do that, I think that would be a great thing and it would come
up the chain of command for the secretary's approval.
Rumsfeld: Yeah.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a few moments ago that folks in the
Philippines might want to leave, terrorists in the Philippines might
want to leave. To the extent that they would do so, one way might be
over water. Are you establishing any kind of quarantine or blockade
similar to what you did off the coast of Pakistan earlier, to try and
look for folks who might be leaving by water? And if not, why not?
Rumsfeld: When I said "leave," I didn't mean necessarily leave the
Philippines; they could leave that island and relocate elsewhere in
the Philippines or elsewhere. You're quite right.
There have been Navy ships in the region -- U.S. ships. If your
question is, has there been something that one would characterize as a
full-time quarantine around -- sealing that island from water escape,
the answer is, not to my knowledge.
Pace: That's correct.
Rumsfeld: And it would be a sizable task, and it hasn't happened.
Q: A question for General Pace?
Rumsfeld: Sure.
Q: Marine Corps Times had an interesting story this week about U.S.
military advisers looking at the Israeli incursion in Jenin for tips
on urban warfare techniques. Are you familiar with that? And if so,
what lessons have you drawn from it?
Pace: I am not familiar with the article. I do know that the Marine
Corps specifically is very interested in honing its skills on combat
in the urban terrain, has been doing so for many years and
consistently and routinely goes out for lessons learned worldwide to
help hone our skills.
Q: You don't know anything about -- pointing to the Jenin scene in
particular for that?
Pace: Not particularly, but it wouldn't surprise me to be able to --
that the Marine Corps would be looking for lessons learned, because
that is part of what they do routinely.
Q: Sir, can I clarify something on the Philippines issue? Are you
saying that you have concluded that the terrorists have left Basilan
Island and moved elsewhere and you have evidence to that effect? Or is
that just a supposition based on the lack of captures or attacks, for
instance?
Rumsfeld: No, I'm only saying that -- when one puts pressure in one
location, one finds that a couple of things happen: People in that
location feel the pressure and want to move, and they either do that
successfully or unsuccessfully. And people thinking of using that area
for terrorism tend to be dissuaded and go somewhere else. I didn't get
into the question of where we think anybody is at any given time.
Q: To follow up on that: Sir, since two of your combatant commanders
successively have suggested training at the company level and the
possibility is foreseen in the agreement that was signed with the
Philippine government, what would be your reason for not wanting to go
ahead into that phase now? Do you feel it's not needed or haven't
gotten around to it, or do you have major misgivings about it?
Rumsfeld: I just haven't had it presented to me in a way that I felt
sufficiently comfortable that I understood what was involved, what the
cost would be, what the numbers of people would be, what the benefit
might be. And therefore, I'm kind of -- the kind of person who says,
"Well, come back and come at me again with that."
Q: So it wasn't that on the other side there were really big concerns
outweighing or anything --
Rumsfeld: No, it's not a matter of this or that, where you just have
to decide it; it was a matter that I needed a greater -- I need a
greater comfort level that I understand what I am recommending to the
president this country get involved in, in terms of people, in terms
of dollars, and in terms of potential benefit. I do that with a lot of
things.
Q: From what arises your discomfort?
Rumsfeld: Just lack of sufficient knowledge on my part as to what
people think they think.
Q: Would it be fair to say that General Pace would recommend that the
mission be expanded, but you have not actually agreed to that, then?
Rumsfeld: That happens to be pretty close to true, but it wouldn't be
fair to say it. (Laughter.)
Q: General Pace?
Pace: I will answer that. Remember, the chain of command for this
country and its military goes from the secretary of Defense to his
commander in the Pacific and the --
Rumsfeld: Actually it goes from the president --
Pace: Yes, sir.
Rumsfeld: -- to the secretary of Defense --
Pace: From the president to the secretary to -- so that, what I'm
trying to get to, is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
vice chairman are not in that chain of command. And we are here to
give our best military advice. And we listen to the data that comes in
from the commanders in the field and we digest that based on our
experience, and we make our recommendations to the secretary and he
takes that and puts that into his body of knowledge and makes his own
decision of what's going to happen.
Q: And your recommendation was?
Pace: Great -- it was a great recommendation. (Laughter.)
Rumsfeld: And I -- I do what I do. I ask a lot of questions and probe
and push and try to satisfy myself that the people making
recommendations have thought things through and understand the
implications and have, to the extent possible, nailed down precisely
what the benefit is to the country and what the burden is and what the
time frames would be.
And then I have to take into account not just that issue in isolation,
but then weigh that issue against other uses for money, other uses for
people, talents, men and women in uniform, and compare those benefits
against it. So you could end up agreeing completely with the people
recommending something in a given instance and saying, in their shoes,
you would do exactly the same thing and recommend the same thing, and
still deciding no, not based on the fact that their judgment's wrong
or bad, but when you've balanced it against other things that you have
to take into account, which they don't. And so it's -- it is that type
of a thing that I have -- that's my -- responsible to do -- my
responsibility.
Q: Mr. Secretary --
Rumsfeld: It's different from the combatant commander. So the fact
that two combatant commanders recommend something -- I forget who said
that -- is fair enough. The predecessor and the current combatant
commander in that region have recommended something. It's slightly
different, but in the ballpark. And the fact that they each recommend
it and one doesn't immediately say, "Terrific, let's do it," is not
unreasonable.
Q: That presence ends in a little over six weeks, I think. Wouldn't
preparations have to be made now to extend it?
Rumsfeld: We'll get it done in time.
Q: Could you say anything more about Georgia and terrorists leaving
there -- any more information, give us numbers --
Rumsfeld: No. No, no, not at all. What you get is -- almost even
before we went in, when we were talking about sending a modest number
of people in, which is very recent, as you know, although the talks
started months before, you begin to get little information that people
are thinking that, well, hmm, the United States is going to have some
folks in there; obviously, they're going to be a little more helpful
to Georgia than they were before, and Georgia's part of the NATO
Partnership for Peace, and they're going to have some trainers in
there. And if you're looking -- you know, people look for the most
hospitable place to be. And if at the margin that makes Georgia
modestly less hospitable to terrorists, one ought not to be surprised
that that happens because of that presence -- just that presence.
Q: Can you enlarge the little information?
Rumsfeld: I could, but I'm not going to.
Thank you very much, folks. Good to see you.
Q: (Off mike.)
Q: Again, have a safe trip.
Rumsfeld: Thank you. Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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