DOD NEWS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT
CENTCOM CINC GENERAL TOMMY FRANKS
FRIDAY, MAY 24, 2002
GEN. FRANKS: How you all doing today? Indeed, it's a -- it is good to
be with you this afternoon.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As we start this very special
Memorial Day weekend, and it is in fact a special one for reasons that we all understand,
I want to share some thoughts that I've been having recently about some of these
operations and some of
these magnificent young people that we have involved in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Memorial Day, I've learned, was once upon a time known as
"Decoration Day"; had its origins in 1868 when a day was set aside to honor
those who gave their lives during the Civil War. And it's interesting to me that when I
was growing up, I'm not sure that I ever
actually realized when I was young -- I'm not sure I ever actually realized the difference
between Memorial Day and Labor Day; they just represented a time off.
But I think that what we see ongoing today in this global war on
terrorism gives us all to pause a little bit and think something about Memorial Day. And
several events over the last few days have caused me to reflect on that a bit, and that's
what I wanted to talk
about.
Yesterday I was up in Newport, Rhode Island, visiting some of the most
incredibly bright young officers at the Naval War College. And I saw in their eyes great
eagerness to get on with business, and I saw a great intellect, and I saw the strength of
their
conviction. And I thought about them as both present and future leaders, and I was
inspired by that.
And then last night, I was in New York City at a great gala event
that's associated with Fleet Week, which is a time when naval vessels come into New York
harbor from a number of nations; a great many of our own sailors show up there, for about
a week of festivities.
And to watch the relationship between those people and the Americans of New York was also
inspiring.
And then over the last few days I have had a chance to review, and
after -- a set of after-action comments that we'll talk a bit more about in a minute, that
have to do with a mountaintop called Takur Ghar in Afghanistan -- and think about seven
incredibly brave young
Americans who lost their lives on that mountain during Operation Anaconda. I thought about
that, and it occurred to me that as we approach Memorial Day, we ought to think about that
a little bit.
So that's why I'm standing before you now. Most impressive, this
business of Takur Ghar. Touching. Such an example of dedication to a mission, and bravery,
selfless courage and in fact brotherhood. That fight is a microcosm of men and women who
wear their nation's
uniform every day.
Now while the details of the global war on terrorism, where it's been
and where it's going are very different than previous wars, the character of war hasn't
changed. Combat is a dirty, nasty, deadly business, and it costs us lives. Takur Ghar,
that battle, showed
heroism. It showed fog, uncertainty. It showed friction -- elements common to every war I
think we've ever fought.
But at the end of the day, what we needed was, we needed to own a
mountaintop called Takur Ghar. And in the end, the bravery and the audacity and certainly
the tenacity of the people involved in that operation carried the day. I am terribly proud
of the accomplishments of those people and all those who continue to serve in Enduring
Freedom. You, too, will be proud as you receive a background brief immediately following
this press conference to include a handout, which we'll have for you here in Tampa, that
describes that
operation. Entirely remarkable.
If you think back about Operation Anaconda, and you think about the
character of it, and you think about the way I described it and others described it on a
map in this room, you think about the fact that you had very high elevations, valley area
in Afghanistan to
the east and south of Gardez. Operation Anaconda sought to clear the enemy in that valley
area and in those hills, succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not
been able to get that done.
The character of that operation had reconnaissance forces, special
operating forces in a whole variety of places around that battlefield at the start of
Operation Anaconda. And as that fight developed, additional reconnaissance forces were
added to key terrain as a
part of Operation Anaconda.
Well, that mountain, Takur Ghar, was one such location; a piece of key
terrain. Elevation a bit above 10,000 feet, which will be described in greater detail
later. But it was on that hilltop that the determination was made that we were going to
put a reconnaissance element. When that reconnaissance element first went in on the
insertion, the helicopter took immediate ground fire. When that happened, a young SEAL by
the name of Roberts was lost out the back of the helicopter. And the events that
surrounded that will be described by a special young man here a little bit later.
That helicopter, which was terribly damaged, was able to get off that
hilltop, move to the north some 7 or 8 kilometers, successfully get itself on the ground.
But it also recognized, despite some terrible communications problems -- fog, friction --
that there was a young SEAL left on top of that mountain. Well, over the course of the
next hour or so, people were able to get themselves together, get on another helicopter
and go back in. Some say, "Well, why would you go back in?" And the answer is
brotherhood. And so this team went back in to get Roberts.
The people in that team were able to get off of that helicopter on the
ground up on top of Takur Ghar and begin their search for this young SEAL. As they did
that, that helicopter got away, and a Quick Reaction Force was formed with some Rangers to
go back in on Takur Ghar in order to pick all of these people up. When that helicopter
arrived up on this mountaintop, once again, terrible enemy fire, grazing fire on that
helicopter forced it to the ground. These young people got out of that helicopter, did
what they needed to do, fought a ferocious al Qaeda enemy up on top of that mountain.
Subsequently to this particular event, a more substantial Reaction Force was brought in
and the event was brought to a conclusion.
A total loss of seven great young Americans. An incredible story of
bravery. And I think that it's worth you knowing about and that it's worth you hearing.
So as I said, I am proud of the accomplishments of these people. I
think you will be. And here we are at the start of Memorial Day. So we're about to have
this holiday again this year, and I think that it may be that over time we have forgotten
a bit about the significance of this day.
The events of the past few days, as I just described them to you, have
reminded me of the value of service, sacrifice and what these people do. I wanted to share
that with you. And now I'd be pleased to take your questions. We'll start in Tampa.
Please. Ma'am?
Q Good afternoon, General. Diane Pertmer, WFLA TV. I'm wondering,
although we'll get the details about what you're referring to, how has what you know now
-- how is that shaping the decisions that are being made as we go forward?
GEN. FRANKS: Right. In the same way that what we learned in Mazar-e
Sharif shaped our subsequent activity, the same -- or in Ali Khel or in Tora Bora, or in a
variety of the specific fights and battles that we've undertaken, we have a process called
after-action review. And what we -- and I think many people will ask, "Well, how
about the investigation? How about the inquiry?" In fact that's a different sort of
set of issues.
What we do with every action we undertake is, the people involved in
that action at all levels will go through the results of that action and see what we can
learn. And we break the things that we learn into two categories. We'll try to decide what
didn't go as well as we want it to, and why. And we'll try to decide what went just like
we wanted it to, and we'll sustain that. And so that's the process. And this particular
event actually is not different than others we have seen during the course of Enduring
Freedom.
Please.
Q General, George Coryell, Tampa Tribune.
GEN. FRANKS: Hi, George.
Q The Post article today indicated a breakdown in liaison between
SOCCENT and Hagenbeck. I'm wondering, was -- did that contribute to the problems?
GEN. FRANKS: The -- in terms of communication, communication issues,
fog and the friction of broken radios and that sort of stuff, to be sure. But in terms of
the personalities, their relationships to one another, their ability to coordinate, I
think, not a factor.
I think the best thing is to take the results, the unclassified
results, which are substantial -- and we'll pass them out to you -- and you can form your
own view. But that's my opinion. Okay?
To Washington, please.
Q General, Charlie Aldinger with Reuters.
Is any blame or responsibility being laid here for not knowing at
higher levels that those helicopters would take immediate and heavy fire when they landed,
which, in large measure, was responsible for the deaths of the seven?
GEN. FRANKS: I wouldn't validate your question, Charlie. What I would
say is that those we find responsible for this particular activity are al Qaeda. They were
on that mountaintop, and most of them are dead.
I think that any tactical situation that we find ourselves in, as I
think I've said before, will never have that perfect intelligence. We just really won't.
And so each time we put people in one of these assault helicopters to move in to one of
these locations -- and as you'll recall, we went into a great many locations in
helicopters in Operation Anaconda. I think that we all recognize that we're subject to
come under immediate attack when we do that. And so that's sort of the assessment that I
make of it. And I think we'll continue to see that, because we'll never have the precise
picture of any particular place where we're conducting an operation.
The Pentagon, please.
Q General, Matt Kelly (sp) with the Associated Press.
What changes, if any, have you made to the Joint Forces Command
structure in Afghanistan as a result of this? You mentioned that there was some fog, some
difficulty in communications between General Hagenbeck and the Special Operations forces
command. Have
there been any changes made to help smooth that as a result of this?
GEN. FRANKS: Actually, I have not found that there was a breakdown, as
you indicated. What I found was that a variety of radios and helicopters which had been --
(chuckles) -- which had been struck during the course of this firefight made it not
possible for people who were actually on the ground, operating in these helicopters, to
contact the people who were controlling the overall operation.
I have no finding with respect to the point that was made earlier by
Charlie that there was some breakdown in communications at a higher level. I actually have
not seen that.
I think General Pace's comment earlier in this is a valid comment. And
I know you heard it. But let me sort of restate it.
The view that we will inevitably get from two or three different people
involved in an operation like this will be absolutely factual and valid in the view of the
people who are absolutely and honestly on the ground seeing what they saw. And so I would
not debate the reports or comments that people have made. I will just -- I'll simply say
that I think the relationships between the command elements [were] pretty solid in this,
and so I did not see the breakdown that you described.
Back to the Pentagon. One more.
Q General, this is Jamie McIntyre from CNN. There's no -- please don't
read any criticism or second-guessing implied in my question, but I'm just looking for a
little information really, and then this gets to the fog of war. But why didn't the first
helicopter, when it went in, know that there were so many enemy forces in that area? Why
didn't the second helicopter that went in know that Petty Officer Roberts was already
dead? Why didn't the third helicopter that went in know that the SEALs had already moved
off the ridge? It seems like all of those were pretty major factors.
GEN. FRANKS: And, Jamie, I won't -- I really won't read criticism into
it. I think the questions are valid. And I think that -- and I think the detail in the
briefing, that you're going to get in a few minutes, will provide some information that
you're looking for.
Let me say that in a period -- during a time of year at an elevation
above 10,000 feet, where one's constantly seeing snowfall, then I think it's not
unreasonable to expect that periods of reconnaissance over a prolonged period of time may
or may not be able to identify that you have enemy located on top of that hill. That is
sort of the response to the first part of your question.
The only response that I'll give you with respect to the second part of
your question, in some cases where there is not communication that is telling people
what's going on on the ground, it will be because you have some sort of a radio problem or
a radio has been shot, or something like that. In other cases, you may well know that
there is an enemy situation at a point on the ground, but you may still choose to go there
in order to do the work that needs to be done. And I think, once again, there's more
insight that you'll get out of that as you go through the details.
I'm very comfortable that this particular fight evidences a variety
things. I think it evidences that the fog and the friction that I referenced and that you
also referenced and -- what's that mean? Well, what that means is that things break. And
people have attention on one thing or another thing when, in fact, there may be a great
many things on the battlefield where attention will be drawn from time to time. And so I
think you'll see all of this, but I think what you'll see is that the reaction of the
people to the situation they saw, given the terrain upon which they were operating -- good
reaction.
I've asked that you be given a shot of what this terrain looks like --
(clears throat) -- excuse me -- photography and what it -- I mean, as you look down on it,
as well as what you're able to see once you're down on the ground. Helicopters will only
land in certain places. And this is a reasonably isolated, peaky kind of a place. And when
one considers how long it would take to land a helicopter down off the mountain, walk
people up and so forth, I think you'll find that that played a part in the decision making
that was made on this day.
Back to Tampa, please.
Sir.
Q General, it's Mark Wilson from WTBT here in Tampa.
GEN. FRANKS: Hi, Mark.
Q These are details that will probably come later in the briefing, but
I thought I'd at least ask. What made it so difficult to combat those al Qaeda forces in
there? Specifically, was it the fact that they had so many numbers there? Was it the
positioning, the cliffs, the places where they were hiding, per se?
GEN. FRANKS: Right. Right. Essentially, the latter. I don't recall
exactly the number of people. The number of people -- al Qaeda -- that were up on that
mountain, of course, changed over time. The number was not a terribly large number. I
mean, you're not talking about 100 people up there or something like that, although, over
the course of this battle, one may well find that at some point, there are 15; at some
point, there are 35 or something like that. But it was not one of these very large
formations of al Qaeda. The terrain was a major factor, and I think once you see the map
and once you see the photography and see what the point of this particular mountain looked
like, then you can see that it is key terrain, because the visibility that one has from up
on top of that hill is just enormous. And so I think those are probably the factors.
Tampa, again. (Pause.)
Back to the Pentagon.
Q General, Thelma Le Brecht for the Associated Press Broadcast. I
realize that we're going to have a background briefing later, and we keep pointing to
that, but for the American people, who are not going to be able to see that background
briefing, could you explain to them the importance of this report, what you see as the
significance and just a general overview of it?
GEN. FRANKS: Sure. I think the general overview is what I gave you a
minute ago. It is that this battle is characteristic of so many battles in our history
where we have seen a group of wonderful people doing their job in the toughest possible
terrain. It is the stuff of which heroes are made.
I guess my message for the American people is, as we approach Memorial
Day, let's think a little bit about where we have people serving, where it's tough, who do
not back away from the mission. And as Jamie McIntyre asked, why would you do it again and
again and
again? Because we needed to have somebody on that hill. That was the mission. That's the
mission that these young people took in stride.
And coupled with that is the business of brotherhood. One never leaves
a brother behind. And so I think that's the message that I'd take from it.
Back to the Pentagon, please.
Q General, I'm Carl Osgood with Executive Intelligence Review. Now
correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that most of the ground forces that you have are
light infantry and Special Forces. Has your review of this action suggested maybe beefing
up these forces or anything along those lines?
GEN. FRANKS: A fair question. Actually, the review has not indicated
the necessity of changing the force mix. As one -- well, we talked about it the other day.
But as one thinks about the altitude of this operation, the cross-compartmentalization of
the terrain in here, light forces, well-equipped, which our people were, and Special
Operations Forces are the right forces to have been used here, and I truly believe that.
Take one more from the Pentagon, please.
Q General, Eric Schmitt from the New York Times. Can you tell us
specifically what specific changes have been made in the command relationship, at whatever
level, either within -- between Special Forces and conventional forces, or within those
two areas, as well as any specific changes in equipment that you all have made as a result
of this after-action review?
GEN. FRANKS: The answer is command arrangements, command relationships,
we have made no change.
In terms of the equipment being used, the briefer may be able to
indicate something to you. I'm not aware of a change of any equipment. I think that the
equipment that we expect to serve our people serves our people very, very well. I think
what one also finds is that in the middle of a firefight, things will get shot up, and
things will get torn up. And we'll certainly from -- on one occasion or another, we'll
have gone on the wrong frequency and we'll talk to the wrong person, and that sort of
stuff. So there's a human dimension involved in this.
But I'll tell you this, if you drop a plumb line all the way through
this from top to bottom, and you consider the mission that was to be done, the quality of
the people who did the mission, the quality of the equipment which supported the mission,
and to the very best of my knowledge and understanding at this point, the judgments that
were made around that plumb line, then what you find is a bunch of people serving their
nation well who went into harm's way, and seven great Americans died.
Back to Tampa, please. Please.
Q General, I'm wondering if you might be able to offer us any details
about the confrontation that might've taken place this morning in Southern Afghanistan.
GEN. FRANKS: You mean out west of Kandahar? Yeah. Not a great deal more
than I think was given to the press up in the building a few hours ago. Out west of
Kandahar, we had reason to believe that several compounds which were being used by
Taliban, potentially some Taliban leadership.
Over a course of several days, we accumulated information on these
particular compounds, went in with special operations forces of several nations, as well
as with an Afghan contingent and some of our own Special Forces, reduced the potential
threat there -- killed one enemy, captured I think 57 -- 55 or 57 were detained and -- two
of whom were
wounded.
And we're in the process right now of going through photographs, going
through the screening that we do in order to determine, have we picked up, you know,
people, as I've said before, who are farmers and were not involved in some form of illicit
or enemy activity. And if so, we repatriate them. Or have we come across some Taliban or
al Qaeda in these compounds? And we probably won't know the answer to that for several
days. So that's where the operation stands right now.
Back to the Pentagon, please.
Q General, Bradley Graham from the Washington Post.
On the issue of these communication glitches that occurred on March 4th
and interfered with the information flow to the Rangers: Are you saying that nothing can
be done to improve that situation? Nothing has been done to improve that situation?
GEN. FRANKS: What I would say is, if we're talking about communications
issues, then what an after-action review will do in each and every case is indicate that
if a person is in the wrong place or a frequency is wrong or the troops went someplace
without equipment
that they should've had with them -- those will be the kinds of things that will be taken
care of.
I do not have visibility, but I believe your briefer will, that'll talk
to you, about whether, in fact, there has been a need to replace any equipment. Not to my
knowledge, as I said. Whether there has been a need to change some relationship
communications-wise between the units, not to my knowledge. But it would not surprise me,
if at the level where this command and control took place someone had decided to rearrange
something But in terms of overall command and control relationships, Bradley, the answer
is no, I have not seen that change.
Back to the Pentagon, please.
Q General, this is Drew Brown with Knight-Ridder Newspapers. Given the
ferocity of the firefight that was raging while these men were trapped on the hill, why
wasn't the AC-130 gunship that was overhead, why wasn't it used, particularly since these
types of units plan for that sort of asset in their operations?
GEN. FRANKS: Right. Let me just -- let me ask you to defer that. Let me
give you a general answer, and I think you'll get a little bit more detail from the
briefer.
In fact, I think the secretary said this -- I believe he did -- but the
briefer that we're going to have talk to you conducted a very, very thorough inquiry into
this particular thing for the purpose of obtaining a review. The word "inquiry"
not to be -- not to be confused with "investigation" and so forth. We're talking
about an after-action review. This officer conducted a very, very thorough review of all
of the events associated with this, and I think probably he'll be able to give you the
best -- give you the best, you know, sort of an honest answer with this.
I will tell you at this point that one will always want to be sure,
whether it's with an AC-130 or whether it's with close air support, that we have a good
appreciation of what the situation is on the ground, which is to say where are the
friendlies and where are the enemies. And I think the answer I've given you will make a
good deal more sense once you see the whole context of it.
Back to the Pentagon for a last question, please.
Q General Franks, it's Jamie McIntyre again with a quick follow-up. To
wrap this up, after you've received this review, do you believe that your commanders all
made the best decisions that they could make, based on the information they had at the
time, or in retrospect, do you think that some mistakes were made?
GEN. FRANKS: Jamie, I appreciate the question. From what I know now,
based on the information available to the commanders on the ground at this time, I think
their judgments were good.
And I do appreciate the way you asked the question, because I think if
we were to sit here now and know things that we can know now, that those commanders on the
ground did not know at that time, then we can say, "Aha! Aha! Mistake!" But I
like the way you asked
the question, because my belief is that those commanders, knowing what they knew, at the
time they made their decisions, followed good logic and did a good job in this operation.
Thanks a lot. Good Memorial Day. God bless.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
