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SLUG: 5-51645 Intelligence Failures
DATE:
NOTE NUMBER:

DATE=05/20/02

TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT

TITLE=INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

NUMBER=5-51645

BYLINE=JIM MALONE

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

VOICED AT:

INTRO: As members of Congress prepare to investigate what they call intelligence failures associated with the September 11th terrorist attacks, policy makers and average citizens alike are asking why U-S intelligence agencies don't cooperate more closely. But as National correspondent Jim Malone reports, getting the F-B-I and the C-I-A to share information is not quite as simple as it sounds.

TEXT: In July of last year, an F-B-I agent in Phoenix sent a memo to Washington warning that Osama bin Laden may be using U-S flight schools to train terrorists. The memo was never acted on or widely shared with other intelligence agencies.

The so-called Phoenix memo has now become a symbol of U-S intelligence agencies failing to share information and is sure to be a focal point in the upcoming congressional investigation of what went wrong before September 11th.

/// OPT /// It is an issue drawing concern from the highest levels of the U-S government. This is Vice President Dick Cheney on N-B-C's "Meet the Press":

/// CHENEY ACT ///

What has been lacking, I think, was effective coordination between our international intelligence collecting operations and our domestic law enforcement. I think also in terms of our ability to analyze data.

/// END ACT //END OPT ///

Some members of Congress have been upset with the inability of intelligence agencies to cooperate for sometime. Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama is the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. He said on the C-B-S program "Face the Nation" that President Bush has been poorly served by the intelligence agencies:

/// SHELBY ACT ///

He didn't know a lot of things because the F-B-I and the C-I-A and other people have not done their job, at least not shared information, not done it properly.

/// END ACT ///

Part of the problem is that the C-I-A is restricted by law to focus on international terror threats, while the F-B-I is responsible for counter-terrorism efforts at home.

/// OPT /// Neal Livingstone is a terrorism expert based in Washington:

/// 1ST LIVINGSTONE ACT ///

So what you have is a system that has basic structural flaws in it. You have a director of central intelligence, but he can't really operate effectively in the United States. You have an F-B-I, which does not operate (overseas) except in certain criminal activities abroad.

/// END ACT //END OPT ///

Despite the bureaucratic intelligence divide, the C-I-A and F-B-I do share some information. Buck Revell is a former counter-terrorism chief for the F-B-I who says any expansion of information sharing would require congressional action:

/// REVELL ACT ///

I was in charge of F-B-I operations, including counter-terrorism, for 11 years and I had daily contact with the (C-I-A) agency and with N-S-A (National Security Agency) and D-I-A (Defense Intelligence Agency). We had exchanges on the very highest levels. We had mechanisms set up that ensured that we did have an exchange. Now, there were certain compartments and certain limitations on all sides. Some of those are legal. Some of those are through regulations such as Attorney General guidelines and the Privacy Act.

/// END ACT ///

Some experts believe that it would be a mistake to centralize all intelligence gathering and analysis into one government department.

Terrorism expert Neil Livingstone argues that it is better to gather as much intelligence from as many different sources as possible:

/// 2ND LIVINGSTONE ACT ///

Some independence of viewpoint is important in the various intelligence agencies and if you try to homogenize this process and make everyone accountable within the same system, often times you will only get one viewpoint. And sometimes what you are looking for is numerous viewpoints from numerous different organizations.

/// END ACT ///

Mr. Livingstone also contends that agency limits on intelligence sharing are a sound precaution against spies. For example, he says that former F-B-I agent turned Russian spy, Robert Hanssen could have been even more destructive had he been privy to classified information from the C-I-A. (SIGNED)

NEB/JBM/RH



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