16 May 2002
White House Early Morning Briefing Transcript
(Hispanic prayer breakfast, pre-9/11 terrorism warnings) (3400)
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer briefed.
Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
May 16, 2002
PRESS GAGGLE WITH ARI FLEISCHER
The James S. Brady Briefing Room
9:50 A.M. EDT
MR. FLEISCHER: Good morning, good morning. Let us begin. The President
had his usual round of intelligence briefings this morning, and then
he left the Hill for the National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast. Later
this afternoon, the President will depart the White House to head up
to the Capitol, where he will make remarks to the Senate Republican
Conference, where he will talk about the important upcoming items on
the congressional agenda.
Particularly, there's an important issue involving trade. The White
House understands that Senator Rockefeller will be offering a steel
health care amendment to the trade bill. This deals with so-called
"legacy costs." The administration views this as a troubling signal
that the Senate is seeking to undermine the possibility of passage of
free trade. This amendment imperils the trade bill, and we call on the
Senate not to pass unrelated items or amendments and get the job done
in passing trade promotion authority.
Following that, the President will make remarks at the Congressional
Gold Medal ceremony for President and Mrs. Reagan, then he will return
to the White House. And those are his events for the day.
Q: So, Ari, if the President had a warning that al Qaeda operatives
might be --
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm sorry. Whose tape recorder is ticking? (Laughter.)
Q: It's from Al-Jazeera.
MR. FLEISCHER: There we go.
Q: If the President --
Q: There was a warning about that last --
Q: If the President had a warning that al Qaeda operatives might
engage in hijacking operations, why was airline security not stepped
up prior to 9/11?
MR. FLEISCHER: John, information to the government about hijacking has
been known for decades. Information about potential Islamic
terrorists, including bin Laden, who may seek to hijack airplanes has
long been an issue that the United States has dealt with on the
domestic front. This is exactly why we have security operations at
airports.
Q: But again, it doesn't speak to the idea of why, after a warning
that al Qaeda might be involved in hijacking operations, wasn't
security increased. You're saying, I take it that you're saying we get
these warnings all the time, why increase security?
MR. FLEISCHER: Okay. Let me walk you through a little context to this.
Throughout the summer, beginning in May, the government received
heightened reporting on threats to United States interests or
territory. Most of it focused on threats abroad, and as a result
several actions were taken to button down security. This involved
directions to embassies abroad, to our military facilities, a pulling
together of domestic agencies to make certain that they were aware of
this information. And all appropriate action was taken based on the
threat information that we had.
But I want to stress that the possibility of a traditional hijacking
in the pre-9/11 sense has long been a concern of the government,
dating back decades. I don't think this should come as any surprise to
anybody. But the President did not -- not -- receive information about
the use of airplanes as missiles by suicide bombers. This was a new
type of attack that was not foreseen.
Q: But hold on, Ari. I mean, there were people, I think in the early
'90, 1993, in the Philippines that were arrested and named Ramzi
Youssef was the person who talked specifically about ramming the CIA
headquarters with a commercial jetliner. Why were the dots not
connected at that point?
MR. FLEISCHER: Okay. Again, the general threat of hijacking had well
been known to the government. That's exactly why the government has a
vigorous program to protect against hijacking through the use of
security at airports --metal detectors and so on. The information
about hijacking, again, is not new or surprising. I dare say -- I
think it's a fair statement that in August of 2001, if anybody had
come to you as the press and said, we have a tip, we have information
that Osama bin Laden might seek to hijack a United States airplane,
chances are you wouldn't even have aired it, because warnings about
Muslim extremists seeking to hijack airplanes were nothing new.
Q: On a couple of points, first to go back to John's point, which is,
what specifically was done as a result of the information. You talk
about all the appropriate agencies here and abroad being informed. But
was it necessary, were there specific steps taken at this country's
airports --
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me do this. Given the generalized nature of the
information that was available to the United States government, let me
go back and take a look and try and see exactly what was done. I
mentioned to you that domestic agencies were pulled together in the
summer of 2002, made aware of this information. Let me see if I can't
learn more about what exactly was done. But again, I want to remind
you, the information was generalized information about hijackings and
Osama bin Laden.
Q: Can I just follow on that? Should the American public have been
told about this? We're certainly told now about general warnings in
the 9/11 world.
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes. Well, the world before 9/11 was an entirely
different world from the world post-9/11. The security measures that
have been put in place, the changes in the United States government to
deal with the post-9/11 environment are the differences between a
nation that was at peace and a nation that is now mobilized for war.
And a couple of the lessons learned from 9/11 involve, of course, the
creation of the Office of Homeland Security to better bring together
information. The morning briefings that the President receives since
September 11th now represent a fusion of the CIA and the FBI together
in one room to present information to the President. The
reorganization of the FBI is a recognition of the fact that we're now
a nation at war.
The Patriot Act -- the Congress deserves credit for recognizing that
the laws on the books were not sufficient prior to 9/11 to give the
intelligence agencies all the tools that they needed to collect
information to prevent attacks. Congress, to its credit, recognized
that shortcoming and passed legislation that the President signed into
law. All those are the realization of the horrible crime and the
horrible attack that took place in our country, and a government that
mobilized as a result of it.
Terry.
Q: The FBI was looking into the possibility of an attack from flight
schools -- the FBI agent in Phoenix who sent in an alert, the
Moussaoui case. Was what the President told based at all on that, on
what the FBI was working on, or were the dots not connected? Was this
essentially foreign intelligence information?
MR. FLEISCHER: That was pretty well addressed by Director Mueller in
his open testimony on the Hill, where he's the first to say that one
of the lessons learned of September 11th is a need to have better
fusion and better synthesis of all the disparate pieces of information
that come in.
For example, again, in terms of what did the United States government
know prior to September 11th, I want to cite for you, going back a
little bit of time, because I think this is important, public
testimony of Director Tenet. On February 2, 2000, before the Senate
Intelligence Committee, he said -- and I'm quoting -- "Osama bin Laden
is still foremost among the terrorists because of the immediacy and
seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything we have learned
recently confirm our conviction that the wants to strike further blows
against the United States. We're learning more about -- although 1999
did not witness dramatic terrorist attacks that punctuated '98, our
profile in the world, and thus our attraction as a terrorist target
will not diminish anytime soon." That's in 2000.
In 2001 --
Q: Who was speaking?
MR. FLEISCHER: Director Tenet, in open testimony to the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
In 2001, the Director again pinpointing, putting his finger accurately
on the generalized nature of the threat to the United States, said,
"Terrorists are becoming more operationally adept and more technically
sophisticated in order to defeat counterterrorism measures. For
example, as we have increased security around government and military
facilities, terrorists are seeking out softer targets that provide
opportunities for mass casualties." That's what he said publicly in
2001.
And, of course, he testified in 2002, and when he was asked about any
information the government may have had prior to 9/11, on February 6,
2002, he said, "It was very clear in our own minds that this country
was a target. There was no texture to that feeling. We wrote about it,
we talked about it, we warned about it."
And this is why, as the Vice President said when he was on Tim
Russert's show on September 16th, right after the attacks, he said in
reaction to a question, we're you surprised by the precision and
sophistication of the operation, "Well, certainly we were surprised in
the sense that, you know, there had been information coming in that a
big operation was planned. But that's the sort of trend that you see
all the time in these kind of reports."
The fact of the matter is, as the President has said publicly numerous
times, we're up against a very sophisticated enemy that worked very
hard to conceal what they were doing. And while we were aware of the
general chatter in the system, which is something the President
himself publicly talked about since September 11th, I reiterate, the
President did not receive any information about the possibility of use
of airplanes as missiles by suicide bombers. Very different measure.
Q: This was a third dot, in a way. In other words, it has no relation
to the other information about this attack that was being developed in
Minnesota and --
MR. FLEISCHER: Terry, the intelligence world is full of dots. That's
the very nature --
Q: Right, I'm just confirming that this is --
MR. FLEISCHER: -- the very nature of intelligence information that is
not specific as to what took place on September 11th.
Q: And what the President did in receiving this information was
distribute it to the appropriate agencies?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's as I indicated, over the course of the summer as
the threat reporting heightened, that information was shared with
agencies. Not only shared with agencies, but keep in mind -- and this
is important for the White House press corps to understand -- when the
information comes to the President, it's typically at the end of the
process as the agencies gather it. It's not as if the President
himself goes out and gathers information. So the agencies themselves
develop that information; they have it, they're aware of it. Again, in
connection with the specific questions here, the information was about
Osama bin Laden and hijacking in that generalized sense.
Mike.
Q: Ari, could you elaborate on your statement that the notification to
the appropriate agencies is probably one of the reasons the attackers
used box cutters and plastic knives to get around America's system of
protecting against hijackers?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, when the President says we were up against some
sophisticated enemies, and when Director Tenet talks about how we have
measures against terrorism, it's just a statement of the fact that,
obviously, since September 11th we have heightened the security at all
the airports. And we have a very, in the case of September 11th,
sophisticated enemies who got around the systems that were in place to
protect the traveling public.
Q: That doesn't answer his question.
MR. FLEISCHER: Go ahead, I'm not sure I understand your question.
Q: Pre-9/11, you told Ron that the notification to the appropriate
agencies, "I think that's one of the reasons that we saw the people
who committed the 9/11 attacks use box cutters and plastic knives, to
get around the system." I was asking you to elaborate on what the
connection was.
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, if I was indicating that specific to the
notification, that would not be the case. Obviously, the people who
carried out the attacks knew that we have metal detectors that can
detect metal knives. That's not related to any of the information the
President got about generalized information. So if I indicated it was
tied to the President's information in August, that's not tied to what
the terrorists did. I don't know that information.
Q: Ari, why did you wait eight months to tell us that the President
had received this briefing?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, it's -- again, the information about hijacking is
generalized information going back over decades. But in fairness to
the President, what he did say in his interview with the Washington
Post for that lengthy series they did -- and I'm quoting from the
President; this was in December 2001 -- he said, "We also had been
getting some intelligence hits throughout the summer -- mainly focused
overseas, by the way -- and there had been a series of responses that
we took to harden embassies, and -- but it was clear that bin Laden
felt emboldened and didn't feel threatened by the United States."
So the President did share the fact that over the summer we received
this type of intelligence hits, but information about hijacking, as I
indicated -- I think if I had said to anybody in this room in August
of 2002 that -- I'm sorry, 2001 -- that we have information Muslim
extremists want to hijack a United States airplane, you wouldn't have
even walked out to the lawn with it.
Q: Why weren't we informed --
Q: Ari, why on September 11th did you tell the pool --
Q: Can you give us that chance next time?
Q: Why, on September 11th, did you tell the pool in response to a
direct question whether the President had a warning, you said no
warnings?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President did not have any warnings, as I
indicated, about the possibility of people using airplanes as
missiles.
Q: He knew in August that this situation was possible.
MR. FLEISCHER: What's "this situation"?
Q: That a terrorist hijacking was possible.
MR. FLEISCHER: Hijackings have been possible in the United States for
decades.
Q: He knew in August. But on September 11th, in the pool, on the
second gaggle that you did on the flight from Shreveport to Nebraska,
in response to a direct question from the pool, "did the President get
any warnings," a general question about general warnings, you said, no
warnings.
MR. FLEISCHER: If you can imagine the context of any question on
September 11th, it's warnings about the attack on New York, the
Pentagon, the use of airplanes as missiles. I think it's impossible to
interpret that question in any other context than warnings about what
had just taken place literally moments and hours ago. So that's not a
fair characterization of the question or the response.
Q: But the President did know this information that we're discussing
now on September 11th?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President himself has said, repeatedly and
publicly, that we had information about -- and Director Tenet said it
in open testimony, I just read from it -- about the possibility of
attacks on the United States. But as I indicate, the President did not
have any information about the use of airplanes as missiles.
Q: When the President gets his intelligence briefing, which you tell
us about every day, is that a synthesis of all the intelligence
agencies?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, it's a good question. Since September 11th, the
very nature of that briefing has changed, at the President's
direction. Prior to September 11th, it was a briefing -- the way
briefings had been done for years in the United States government,
which is really just Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of
September 11th, the President directed a change. And that's the fusion
now of the FBI with the CIA, sharing information and doing it
together. And the President has publicly talked about the better
integration of FBI-CIA since September 11th.
Q: And does he ask questions? Does he give orders as a result of these
briefings?
MR. FLEISCHER: He does. And what he typically will do -- I'm not going
to get into anything specific, of course, about his intelligence
briefings, but what the President will often do is ask questions to
hold people accountable, make sure they're following up on the
information they've provided to him.
We'll take two more, and then I'll be back for the briefing.
Q: Ari, coming back to the connect the dots question, I'm still not
sure or clear what exactly was the information that the President was
briefed on. Was the Moussaoui thing included, was the FBI memo thing
included? Did all those dots come together in his office when he was
briefed?
MR. FLEISCHER: I do not have information about every single
intelligence briefing the President of the United States has received.
What I can tell you is, on the question here, that the President
received information about hijacking of airplanes, and Osama bin
Laden. That's what he received.
Q: Ari, on that point, given what you say Director Tenet had talked
about as early as 2000, I mean, it's no secret that Osama bin Laden
was the terrorist that we feared most in the world. And now the
President gets information that his organization would try to hijack a
plane. Yes, that's a very '70's thing, I mean, it's been going on for
a long time, and it's always a threat. But why wouldn't it have been
appropriate to take draconian measures to protect airports against the
most infamous and frightening terror organization in the world,
according to this government?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think it's fair to point out that you are describing
the pre-9/11 world in the post-9/11 sense. People now have, of course,
knowledge post-9/11 that takes the traditional meaning of the word
"hijacking" and puts it in another language. The word "hijacking"
prior to 9/11 might as well have been in a different language than the
word "hijacking" now, since 9/11, given what we know.
All right, last question. Mark?
Q: Ari, if --
Q: -- why more wasn't done at the airports?
Q: -- if the President received such a warning --
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I said I'm going to go back and try to get that
information. I told you that.
Q: If the President received such a warning today, will there be a
public advisory to the -- that he has received such a warning? And
would it engender more reaction?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, as you know, since 9/11, the government has been
forced to ask itself exactly how do we handle information about
threats and threats alerts? And as you know, we find that right
balance between putting out information in an attempt to thwart
attacks and to provide greater protection to the public -- there have
been a series of those alerts put out -- while not alarming the
public. Typically, the reaction, of course, has been, Why are you
making any type of threat known?
Q: But knowing what you know of the warnings that he got in August,
would it engender something today? A more public warning today?
MR. FLEISCHER: You know, that's a hypothetical. I don't know how to
answer that, Mark. It depends on the facts --
Q: Based on the specifics of what he --
MR. FLEISCHER: It depends entirely on the facts of the information
provided.
All right, I'll be back for the briefing.
Q: Are we going to hear him today?
MR. FLEISCHER: Pardon me?
Q: On this?
MR. FLEISCHER: There's no plans for that now. I'll be back for the
briefing.
END 10:07 A.M. EDT
(end White House transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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