16 May 2002
White House Early Afternoon Briefing Transcript
(President's schedule, statement on threat reports pre-9/11,
India/President's comments to Prime Minister Vajpayee) (8190)
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer briefed.
Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
May 16, 2002
PRESS BRIEFING BY ARI FLEISCHER
INDEX
-- President's schedule for the day
-- Statement on threat reports pre-9/11
-- India/President's comments to Prime Minister Vajpayee
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
May 16, 2002
PRESS BRIEFING BY ARI FLEISCHER
The James S. Brady Briefing Room
12:03 P.M. EDT
MR. FLEISCHER: Good afternoon. Let me give you a report on the
President's day. Then I have a brief opening statement, and I'll be
happy to take your questions. The President began this morning with
his usual round of briefings. And then he departed the White House and
attended the National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast.
Later today the President will head up to Capitol Hill, where he will
make remarks before the Senate Republican Conference, at which he will
remind the Congress of the importance of passing the vital domestic
agenda that we face, particularly in terms of securing trade
agreements for the United States, getting welfare reform, passing a
prescription drug program within Medicare to help seniors, including
Medicare reform.
And then the President will make remarks at the Congressional Gold
Medal ceremony for President and Mrs. Reagan. And then the President
will return to the White House in the afternoon.
I want to make a statement about another matter. Throughout the
summer, the administration received heightened reporting on threats on
U.S. interests and territories, most of it focused on threats abroad.
As a result, several actions were taken to button down security. All
appropriate action was taken based on the threat information that the
United States government received.
The possibility of a traditional hijacking, in the pre-September 11th
sense, has long been a concern of the government, dating back decades.
The President did not -- not -- receive information about the use of
airplanes as missiles by suicide bombers. This was a new type of
attack that had not been foreseen. As a result, a series of changes
and improvements have been made to the way the United States deals
with a terrorist threat. And I'll be happy to talk about those during
the briefing.
Ron.
Q: Can you tell us specifically what date the President was briefed
that there was a threat of hijacking, where he was when he got the
briefing, who he gave -- a couple more -- who gave him the briefing,
what agencies were warned about the threat, and what did those
agencies do in response to that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Okay. Ron, as the President has said, throughout the
summer, beginning in May, the President received, as I indicated,
reporting on threats and intelligence hits throughout the summer,
mainly focused on overseas. In August, the President, as you know, was
at his ranch in Crawford. As part of his morning daily intelligence
briefing from the CIA, he received that generalized information that
I've talked about, vis a vis hijacking.
Q: Wasn't Tenet --
MR. FLEISCHER: No, the Director did not personally deliver that
briefing.
Q: What date?
MR. FLEISCHER: It was early August.
Q: So before the arrest of Zacharias Moussaoui?
MR. FLEISCHER: Early August. I know it was the first week of August.
Ron, did you have anything else?
Q: If you can get us the exact day. And then what happened with that
threat? What agent -- what law enforcement or federal agencies were
told about it, and what did they do in response?
Q: And the threats -- just for clarification -- were related to al
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, right?
MR. FLEISCHER: Throughout the summer, they received numerous threat
warnings, as I indicated. In fact, as the President -- let me cite you
the President's words, as he described the information that was
available to him. This was what the President himself said on December
20th, 2001, to The Washington Post in an interview he gave them.
"We also had been getting some intelligence hits throughout the summer
-- mainly focused overseas, by the way -- and there had been a series
of responses that we took to harden embassies. But it was clear that
bin Laden felt emboldened and didn't feel threatened by the United
States."
As a result of the information that came in beginning in that May
period and throughout the summer, embassies were hardened throughout
the world, military installations went through their normal procedures
to harden against potential terrorist attacks. Those are a series of
concrete actions that are taken by the embassies and by installations.
Domestically, through normal security channels, the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration were made aware
of general information that, while mentioning hijackings, did not
include specific and detailed warnings. This information, as with all
sensitive security information, was passed on to the carriers through
a series of briefings and notifications. It is important to note that
this was non-specific threat that mentioned hijacking.
Q: Well, I'm confused. Is that in response to the information that
started coming on May 5th, or in response to the briefing he got the
first week of August?
MR. FLEISCHER: As I indicated this morning, keep in mind exactly the
process of how information flows to the President when it comes to
these type of briefings. When the information comes to the President,
it's because the agencies have developed in a period of time prior to
the briefing. So this information developed earlier in the course of
the summer, beginning in May. It was shared with the President in
August in the sense of what I have described to you. So throughout
this period, this information was conveyed to these agencies,
throughout the summer period.
Q: The agencies were warned before the President of the United States
was?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, of course, as the agencies get this information
-- they have it. The FBI, CIA, they get the information. They, of
course, by definition, have it prior to the President. That's how they
can brief the President on it.
Q: Anybody else besides DOT that was given a heads up?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me do this on the question of exactly how the
information flowed, how it was conveyed, I'm giving you these answers
-- Dr. Rice will be available later this afternoon for an on the
record, on camera briefing, and she'll have a clearer time line and
she'll be able to share that with you in fuller length.
Campbell.
Q: Just to clear up, when you say that DOT and FAA were given a
warning relating to hijackers potentially, were they given any
specific instructions in terms of how they should deal with it, or
they were just -- here's the warning, do whatever you think is
necessary?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, this information was passed on and it's part of the
whole security environment, the security atmosphere that exists on a
regular basis throughout America prior to September 11th. And their
security people make the assessments they deem fit to make based on
the information. The information, as you now know, has been very
generalized; there was nothing specific, as I've indicated, about
anybody using airplanes as suicide bombs, or using airplanes as
missiles. The information was very generalized. And just as I read,
that information -- the generalized information was conveyed.
John.
Q: The CIA also was warning about attacks against -- attacks on U.S.
soil. So, in that context, raising the potential hijacking issue, why
didn't the DOT and FAA not suggest to the airlines that they take
greater steps to ensure security, as this administration did with
embassies and military installations?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think what I just read to you is that they were
made aware of the information and it was passed on --
Q: But they were not recommended to take increased security?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think we can get you a little more information
about the exact specific nature. But when they receive information of
this generalized nature, they take the steps that they deem necessary.
But I want to remind you, information about hijackings in the pre-9/11
world is totally different from information about hijackings in the
post-9/11 world. Traditional hijackings prior to September 11th, it
might as well be a different word and a different language from what
we've all, unfortunately, come to know about the post-9/11 world. For
decades, governments have taken steps about warnings on hijackings.
Never did we imagine what would take place on September 11th, where
people used those airplanes as missiles and as weapons.
Q: But, Ari, post-9/11, when hijacking had taken on that word, new
context, new meaning, several administration officials, including as
you just pointed out, the President of the United States himself, was
asked about what did the White House know, and the President, when
asked, said we had intelligence hits. He didn't say, and you know, we
had a warning about hijackings. Why not? Why didn't he level with the
American people about what he knew?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President did level with the American people, and
so did Director Tenet, so did all people that I have seen -- I have
several statements from government officials exactly about what the
government knew and what was said prior to September 11th, and let --
Q: But none of them used the word "hijacking," though. Vice President
Cheney, when he spoke on Meet The Press on the 16th of September, said
--
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, Terry, I think it's a fair point that you raise.
But the simple answer is that you are using the post-September 11th
knowledge of what a hijacking could be and applying it to August,
prior to September 11th, and changing what was then the traditional
understanding of what a hijacking represented. It was a total -- it
was a total sea change.
Q: These questions were asked after September 11th. These questions
were asked after September 11th of the President, of the Vice
President, of you, yourself. And no one in the White House said, yes,
the information had come in that al Qaeda was planning hijackings.
MR. FLEISCHER: Because that information, as I indicated at the top of
the briefing, that information is so generalized it did not contain
any information specific to using airplanes as weapons, exactly what
took place on September 11th. That was the generalized nature of the
information, which puts it in a totally different category. And again,
the sense, pre-9/11, of what a hijacking represented was how that
information was heard and understood.
Q: But even in hindsight -- even in hindsight, why didn't somebody
come forward and say, by the way, we had information about a hijack?
MR. FLEISCHER: Steve?
Q: Will the White House cooperate with any congressional investigation
into these matters?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, the White House will, of course. The White House
is working with the congressional committees that are investigating
this matter, and we will continue to do so.
Q: Will you hand over the -- any documents or information pertaining
to the August briefing? Senator Shelby would like to see those.
MR. FLEISCHER: We'll continue to work with the Congress on that. Many
documents have already been handed up, and we'll continue to work with
them.
Q: How about specifically on top secret briefing with the President?
Can you imagine turning that over?
MR. FLEISCHER: We will continue to work with Congress on those
matters.
Helen.
Q: Can you say how this story -- I mean, you always tell us that
intelligence briefings, of course, are top secret. So how did this
story break? I mean, were you surprised when it came to light? And
what was your reaction? Was it leaked by the government, itself, just
to get it out on the table, or --
MR. FLEISCHER: Helen, I have no idea who leaks information. Q Do you
have any curiosity as to how --
MR. FLEISCHER: The story broke on the evening news last night.
Q: -- the information got out?
MR. FLEISCHER: I always have curiosity about how information gets to
reporters. But I don't know how it got to the reporters.
Q: So you don't know where it came from?
MR. FLEISCHER: Of course not.
Jeanne.
Q: Ari, back on the August briefing, since this information was
floating around from May until August, what changed to make someone
decide that it was time to tell the President? And who told the
President in August? And after that information was conveyed to the
President, did that -- did new information go out to the departments,
perhaps raising the level of alert?
MR. FLEISCHER: As I indicated, Condi will be available a little later
today to go through the exact sequence and timing. I've indicated to
you that the information was conveyed -- conveyed to the FAA, conveyed
to DOT, State, Defense, et cetera -- and that the government took all
appropriate actions based on the information we received.
What happened in August was that the President asked for a summary of
all the information that was known about the potential threats at that
time. And that was as a result of, as he indicated, that there were
these series of intelligence hits over the course of the summer. And
Director Tenet has talked about how there was a spike-up of
information early on in the summer, and the President asked for a
compilation of that information. And then it was shared with the
President.
Q: So was this a longer-than-usual briefing, if this was one the
President specifically asked for?
MR. FLEISCHER: I was not present at the briefing. I don't know how
long it lasted.
Q: And who gave the briefing?
MR. FLEISCHER: His regular CIA briefer.
Q: When did the White House find out about this report from the FBI
agent in Phoenix about people taking aviation courses, and he was
worried it could be terrorists?
MR. FLEISCHER: I don't know the exact date the White House heard about
it. I've seen reports about it in the papers. I don't know the exact
date the White House heard about it.
Q: Would you say recently, or before?
MR. FLEISCHER: I just don't know the date.
Ken.
Q: Ari, after the alert was sent out to federal agencies, do you know
whether or not airports, like, for instance, Logan, actually had been
given some kind of a warning, to at least -- a heads-up, be on alert
for potential hijackings?
MR. FLEISCHER: The information was provided to, as I described it, to
the carriers, as a result of it being provided. And it was generalized
information.
Q: Are you aware of any extra security measures being taken at any
American airports because of this information?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think that would be idiosyncratic. As this
information flows, different airports, different people do different
things with the information.
John.
Q: Two on this point. You say information about the threat of
hijacking goes back many years. It has been a recurring theme from
time to time. Was this August report the first time that this
President received an intelligence briefing that linked the prospect
of a hijacking to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda?
MR. FLEISCHER: John, I cannot speak and will not speak about
everything the President hears in his intelligence briefings, since
I'm not in the room when he has his CIA briefing in the morning. But
the general knowledge of hijackings has, as I indicated, long been a
concern to the government, including this one.
Q: So this information is conveyed to the President by the CIA in
early August. And you say the concept then was that it was vague and
general, and that the idea that this would be a traditional hijacking.
Was there no discussion of the previous arrests in the Philippines,
information shared with the United States government about people who
said, perhaps not reliable, but who said that there was a plan to
hijack a plane and fly it into the CIA briefing? Any discussion about
arrests in France, where people said there was a plan to fly a plane
into the Eiffel Tower?
MR. FLEISCHER: What you're asking about is the so-called dots, and
whether or not it was possible for anybody in the government to
connect all those dots. And the simple answer to that is, as a result
of September 11th, our government learned a lot of things. There were
a lot of lessons to be learned, and a lot of changes were made as we
evolved from a nation at peacetime to a nation at war.
And as we became a nation at war, the President made a series of
changes involving how he receives his information, and involving how
we protect the United States. I want to walk you through a couple of
those changes that were the result of our nation being attacked.
Q: I understand the changes, but was there not enough threshold
evidence to think of the threat of using a plane as a bomb?
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, the question is, how does the government connect
the dots. And the answer to that question is the series of steps that
the President took as a result of the lessons learned from the attack.
And those actions were, one, the creation of the Office of Homeland
Security, led by Governor Ridge, to pull information together from the
various agencies.
The President changed the morning briefings, so the morning briefings,
for the first time, began with both the FBI Director and the CIA
Director present to share information fully with the President. The
FBI reorganized -- the FBI reorganized to an entity that was set up
not only now to catch criminals, and find evidence and prosecute them
in a court of law, but to prevent the United States from being
attacked. A major change that could only result -- as a result of,
unfortunately, an attack on our country.
The very fact that we have gone to war is a change. And finally, a
recognition by the Congress that the tools available to the
intelligence community and to the FBI were not sufficient. And that's
why the Congress, to its credit, passed the Patriot Act, giving the
administration and the intelligence community and the FBI greater
resources to fight terrorism. Those were a series of changes that we
made together with the Congress.
Q: Are you suggesting that before these changes there was no way to
connect those dots, Ari?
MR. FLEISCHER: Goyal?
Q: Ari, the Indian Prime Minister is very angry -- I'm changing the
subject to India-Pakistan -- he's very angry, according to the report,
that India and Pakistan border may bleed anytime. They got another
bombing, bus bombing like in Israel, against innocent people, killing
over 30. Now, I understand the President spoke with Prime Minister
Vajpayee. If he spoke also with General Musharraf, and if he's going
to give him the same word that he did to Arafat to stop terrorism,
because now what they are saying, the Parliament of India and the
Indian Prime Minister, that enough is enough, because he is under
pressure from the public --
MR. FLEISCHER: Goyal, both the President and the Secretary of State
have worked very hard directly with Prime Minister Vajpayee and
President Musharraf to decrease the tension that has been longstanding
in the Kashmir area.
The President did speak with the Prime Minister. I think you can -- I
would refer you to the State Department to learn about any other
conversations that took place involving Pakistan. It's a very
important region, and it's a very important message that the President
has worked long on to reduce the tensions. And the President condemned
the terrorist attack that took place.
Mark?
Q: Ari, you've spoken about how this is an entirely different world
since September 11th. In this post-September 11th world, would this
warning generate a different response?
MR. FLEISCHER: You know, Mark, it's an impossible question to ask.
It's a hypothetical about information. The answer is the approach the
administration has to when we receive information that can contain a
threat, even a vague or generalized one like this one, how does the
administration react to that information and does it get shared, or
not? And that is a judgment that is made involving the FBI, the CIA,
the Office of Homeland Security, as they weigh whether the
dissemination of this threat information can help to reduce or
eliminate the possibility of an attack; whether it can be information
that is used by law enforcement communities to gear up to prevent an
attack, versus a series of alerts that can be seen as false alarms if
none of them come true.
The administration has repeatedly issued such alerts since September
11th, based on the information we have. The answer will always come
down to the exact nature of the information, how specific it is, how
corroborated it is, how accurate we believe it is.
Q: But you're aware of what was briefed to the President in August.
Why can't you say that --
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, again, as I indicated, this is generalized
information about potential hijackings.
David?
Q: Ari, two related questions on this briefing. First is, my
understanding from last night and this morning was that this was a
point that came up in the course of his ordinary morning brief.
MR. FLEISCHER: Correct.
Q: But something you just said before made me think that perhaps this
was a broader briefing on the compilation of everything that we knew
about the --
MR. FLEISCHER: David, the President typically asks for information to
be used for followed on for follow-up briefings.
Q: So when this piece of information --
MR. FLEISCHER: The briefing is an interactive process. The CIA will
come to the President with bits of information. The President will
say, here's what I want to you to do. I want you to prepare this, I
want you to look at that. And that's something -- it's an interactive
briefing process.
Q: I understand. So when he got this piece of information the first
week of August, was that because they were coming back to him from a
previous request, or was it at that meeting that he asked for --
MR. FLEISCHER: That's why I'm drawing your attention to earlier in
May, as the information started to spike about potential threats. That
information was in the system, that information was shared with the
community. That's why -- you remember, it was very public at the time,
the actions that were taken on the Arabian peninsula to button down
our installations. That was all a result of that chatter, so-called
chatter, that's in the system. And that's why all the actions based on
the information developed, beginning in that May period.
Q: I'm not sure you've fully responded to my question though. When he
got this briefing in August, was it part of a broader review that
morning of Osama bin Laden's activities, or was it just one piece of
information --
MR. FLEISCHER: Oh, I assure you -- no, I assure you there was
additional information in there, most of it dealing with threats
abroad.
Q: That were Osama related?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes.
Q: Okay. And the second and related question to this is, we have
previously, if I had understood it, been led to believe that there had
been concern about Osama bin Laden and action in the United States
through July 4th, and that after that, the intelligence stream sort of
went much quieter. Was the briefing the first week of August based on
some new information gleaned from the end of the 4th of July through
to whenever this briefing took place in August, or was it simply that
it finally came up in the President's brief? Was it based on new --
MR. FLEISCHER: I think Dr. Rice will be in a fuller position to answer
that.
Q: Just to put a finer point on Jacobo's question, the FBI warning out
of Phoenix, do you know if the President got that at all, or if he
would have heard about that before --
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, Jacobo asked me that question. I indicated I don't
have the answer to that.
Q: You were asked this morning about that question. Can you get us an
answer to that question?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm working on it. I just don't have it right now.
Q: And also, we found out about this now, about the early August
briefing. Were there any other briefings over the course of the year
where the President might have received a piece of information that
could have indicated that the September 11th attacks might occur?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me do this for you. Let me try to get to the nub of
the matter, which as you're asking, did the President or did anybody
in the administration have information that could have prevented the
attacks, based on intelligence.
Q: I'm not asking if they could have prevented the attacks. I'm asking
if there's any other information --
MR. FLEISCHER: About -- let me answer your question.
Q: -- that could have indicated that the attacks were on the way, that
we don't know about?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me answer your question. And I want to refer you to
an April 11th speech, just a month ago, by Jim Pavitt, who is the
Deputy Director of Operations for the CIA. This is a speech he gave at
Duke University. And he said the following:
"We had very, very good intelligence on the general structure and
strategies of the al Qaeda terrorist organization. We knew and we
warned that al Qaeda was planning a major strike. There need be no
question about that. What didn't we know? We never found the tactical
intelligence, never uncovered the specifics that could have stopped
those tragic strikes that we all remember so well. And as a reality of
the difficult and often frustrating fight against terror, the terror
cells that we're going up against are typically small, and all
terrorist personnel in those cells, participating in those cells,
perpetrating the acts of terror -- all those personnel were carefully
screened. The number of personnel who knew vital information --
targets, timing, the exact methods to be used -- had to be smaller
still."
He continued, "Some of you out there may have heard bin Laden himself
speak about that on the shocking videotape that we recovered in
Afghanistan. On that tape, when he was speaking to his friends as he
sat around a little room, he talks about the fact that some of the
hijackers -- indeed, some of the most senior members of his inner
circle -- had been kept in the dark about the full extent of the
destruction and the operation that took place in New York and in
Washington on the 11th of September."
And then he concludes, "Against that degree of control, that kind of
compartmentation, the depth of discipline and fanaticism, I personally
doubt -- and I draw, again, upon my 30 years of experience in this
business -- that anything short of one of the knowledgeable
inner-circle personnel of hijackers turning himself in to us would
have given us sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented the
horrendous slaughter that took place on the 11th."
So the answer, again, as you will typically find in intelligence, and
exactly as the Vice President said to Tim Russert in an interview he
did immediately after the attack, we had generalized information, we
had broad knowledge that Osama bin Laden wanted to attack. Director
Tenet has gone to the Hill and, on the record, told members of the
Senate Intelligence Committee in 2000, 2001, 2002, that Osama bin
Laden wants to attack the United States. But did we have information
more specific than that? The answer is, we had that generalized
information, Keith.
Q: I want to get back a little bit to John King's question about
thinking of a pre-September 11th version of a hijacking versus a
post-September 11th. We know -- we knew publicly about the information
that had been gathered in the Philippines, because I believe it had
actually come out in the course of one of the New York trials. We also
knew publicly about the French plot against the Eiffel Tower. And we
also knew that the Cole bombing and the African embassy bombings, and
the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in the '80s were all
suicide bombings against American targets. So I'm just -- I continue
to be -- I just continue to have a question about why, at that moment
in time, logic that would have been available to a person who read the
newspapers did not seem to be in the flow of the thinking here.
MR. FLEISCHER: As you cite, Lebanon, Paris, Cole, all these operations
took place --
Q: And the Philippines --
MR. FLEISCHER: Philippines -- took place overseas. And as I indicated,
as the President said in December, the preponderance of information
that we were receiving of this general nature dealt with events
abroad. And you all were there, you saw it yourself and covered it
yourselves, about the actions that were taken to button down our
embassies and our military installations, particularly in the Arabian
Peninsula at that time, based on the information we had.
Q: Was the White House put on tactical alert?
Q: Ari, can you say whether the President asked his briefers whether
or not they felt that domestic sites might be in Osama bin Laden's
thinking? That would have been something the President might have
thought of when they were talking about abroad, threats abroad.
MR. FLEISCHER: In terms of asking what the President talked to his
briefers about, I think Dr. Rice may be able to shed a little more
insight into that than I am. But again, I would draw you to Director
Tenet's public testimony, where he has warned that Osama bin Laden
wanted to hit the United States. He said that going back to the
previous administration, in 2000. I mean, that's general information
that was well-known.
Q: But you don't know when the President first started to discuss this
with Director Tenet, to ask probing questions about how concerned they
were about U.S. targets -- U.S.-based targets?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think one of the reasons you saw the United
States be able to move so quickly and effectively against the al Qaeda
was because we did have a real focus on the war against terrorism
prior to September 11th. And that's one of the reasons we had so much
information of that general sense developed about Osama bin Laden, in
our work with the Northern Alliance, for example. So a lot of that was
developed, and led to the successful prosecution of the war.
Q: So that was a reasonable thought, that U.S. --
MR. FLEISCHER: Listen, it's no surprise to anybody that Osama bin
Laden wanted to attack the United States. But as the CIA Deputy
Director for Operations just pointed out, the question was how, what
methods, where, when? That information is a different category than
the generalized information.
Q: So the President --
MR. FLEISCHER: Jim?
Q: Ari, were there any other pieces of information last summer that
prompted the administration to warn the FAA and the airline carriers
that there was an increased likelihood, or should be a heightened
awareness of the possibility of hijackings?
MR. FLEISCHER: As I indicated, information was passed on through the
security channels by DOT and FAA to the carriers. So the information
about that generalized nature was passed on, on more than one
occasion.
Q: On more than one occasion last summer?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's correct. That's correct.
Q: I'm trying to determine if there was something particular about the
information that was received in August, or something new about the
information that was received in August, that prompted a different
kind of warning to the FAA and the airlines.
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, I indicated, we'll provide the exact chronology,
but much of this took place as a result of May, earlier than August --
the May reporting indicated the threats. But again, all of this is in
the context of the pre-9/11 world about traditional hijackings and
what they mean, which is such a far and different cry from what we all
have come to learn now.
Q: I'm just trying to determine -- there's a sense that suddenly the
U.S. got new information in August that there were hijackings -- there
were threats of hijackings. What you seem to be saying is that that is
not the case, that there were warnings for months, if not years, in a
general sense, but certainly months over the summer. And you're saying
now that there were previous warnings given to airline carriers and to
the FAA that there was an increased danger of hijackings?
MR. FLEISCHER: Jim, I think the airlines have long known, for decades,
that Muslim terrorists seeked to hijack United States airplanes. That
is not news, that is not a surprise, that is longstanding. And as we
developed generalized information it was shared with the airline
industry, with the carriers, and that's the facts about what took
place.
Q: Could I just ask one more thing -- did the President ask, or was
that information shared with the Senate or House Intelligence
Committees?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me refer you to the words of Congressman Porter
Goss, who is the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee -- I
think that's a very important question. He, this morning, has
indicated that the House Intelligence Committee got generalized
information on threat reporting, including potential hijacking by
Osama bin Laden. Again, the question about are there Muslim
extremists, including Osama bin Laden, who seek to hijack American
airplanes? Everybody knows that's the case dealing with terrorism.
Peter.
Q: Ari, the carriers last night told us --
Q: I think he called on me.
Ari, did the President personally issue any orders or call for any
action based on what he heard in August?
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, the information developed earlier than that, in
May, and that's when the timeline begins about the information that
was shared. And again, the key actions taken, particularly abroad,
were the buttoning down, which took place earlier than August, of our
facilities abroad -- because that's when the threats had spiked up. I
think what you can look at August as --
Q: At any point in this timeline --
MR. FLEISCHER: -- August was a summary of the earlier data that had
been provided. The actions that were taken took place throughout the
summer.
Q: At any point in this May to August timeline, did the President
personally issue any orders calling for any actions by people under
him?
MR. FLEISCHER: What typically happens is the President reviews the
information, discusses it with his national security team, and they
work together and they say, we need to get the word to DOD, get the
word to State, get the word to DOT, FAA, to button up and take these
security measures. That all flows from one team.
You know, if you're asking me did the President particularly, himself,
the answer is, he works this together with his team. They all come to
these ideas together. The President, of course, is part of those
morning briefings.
Q: Is he satisfied with the leadership of the intelligence agencies?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, he is.
Q: Can I just follow?
Q: Does he think anything was mishandled?
MR. FLEISCHER: Bob?
Q: Ari -- and you're calling on me this time, right? I just don't want
to set anybody off.
MR. FLEISCHER: Mr. Kemper.
Q: But let me ask you, the carriers last night, United and American,
told us that they had not been told by the FAA or by the government
that there was a threat. Are you sure that the FAA talked to them?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think, frankly, it's very important for the
press, as they ask people about "the threat", to define it. If you
were to say, did you receive generalized information, not specific to
9/11, about potential hijackings, that information was conveyed. But
if you ask people, did you receive information about the possibility
of a 9/11 attack? That information could not have been conveyed,
because that information was not at the hands of the United States
government. So I think it's important here for the press to make sure
you don't jump to conclusions in the way you present the information,
which was generalized.
Q: You're certain that the airlines were, in fact, told of this after
the August briefing, that there's a heightened possibility of a
hijacking?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me read you the statement again. So, again, you
changed the words of what I said as you described the information the
government conveyed. Here's what I said: "Through normal security
channels, the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration were made aware of the general information that, while
mentioning hijackings, did not include specific and detailed warnings.
This information, as with all sensitive security information, was
passed on to the carriers through a series of briefings and
notifications. It is important to note that this was a non-specific
threat that mentioned hijacking." And that's what we're dealing with
here.
Q: Can I follow on that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes, sir.
Q: Did that series of notifications expressly include a so-called
NOTAM, or notice to air personnel, pilots, that there was a heightened
-- did this go through the corporate channels of these airlines, or
did it go to operations, or did it go to front office --
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me see if we can't get you an answer to the exact
NOTAM -- I'm not familiar with the acronyms.
Q: Ari, is there any sense in the White House that congressional
Democrats may be pursuing this issue for political advantage?
(Laughter.)
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me just say -- let me just say that one of the
things this President has done since September 11th is bring our
country together. This President has done so on the basis of
bipartisanship and a spirit that says that we as a nation were
attacked, and we're all in this together. And I think it is important
to know what information the Hill has.
As Congressman Goss said, members of the Intelligence Committee were
provided with this generalized information on threat reporting,
including potential hijackings. So, on the one hand, there's a lot of
information that's there that was provided, as it should be provided,
to the House Intelligence Committee. And we will continue to cooperate
with the Congress, because that's the spirit that the President will
continue to govern in as he leads this nation, since September 11th
especially.
Go ahead. We're going to people who have not had questions.
Q: Ari, was the early August briefing the first one where the
President received a warning about the word "hijacking"?
MR. FLEISCHER: Let me -- again, I do not, as you all know, sit in on
the President's classified CIA briefings. We're going to provide a
briefing to you later today that, while Dr. Rice, of course, will not
be able to describe every piece of classified information, she will be
able to help you more to develop the timeline and the information.
That's why she's coming out. I think it's important to share this
information. The President wants it shared with the American people.
These are legitimate questions, and the fact of the matter is I think
you will all come to the conclusion that as you see them having been
answered from the morning, there appears to be a whole lot less
"there" there than I think people first thought.
Les.
Q: Ari, I do believe I am not alone in being very impressed with the
large number of issues in which you are well-informed, as well as your
dedication in seeking information where you're not.
Q: Careful, you're being set up. (Laughter.)
Q: -- so that you can now assure us that the President is not sending
a still criminally investigated man to the Independence Day ceremony
of East Timor on Sunday, because the Pardongate investigation of Mr.
Clinton is over, isn't it, Ari?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President has made an announcement about who will
be attending in East Timor, and that list is public.
Q: Does your hailing of former President Carter as a champion of human
rights mean that the President is considering asking Mr. Carter to go
to Jerusalem next?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, Les, I have no information for you on that.
Campbell?
Q: Ari, the August briefing, at that point -- it seems like that
briefing was a culmination of everything that had been building up
over the summer. Was there discussion at that point about bombing al
Qaeda camps in Afghanistan?
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, I will let Dr. Rice speak about everything in
the briefing. But the events of September 11th changed everything.
So -- John?
Q: Ari, following on John and Terry's questions, which seem so long
ago now, are you suggesting that before the President enacted these
changes in the intelligence community that there was no way for them
to connect the dots?
MR. FLEISCHER: Director Mueller is the first to say that the FBI has
changed, and as a result of, now, an emphasis on more fusion and more
synthesis, as he put it, and an ability to make certain that all
information is shared in a centralized place, the FBI -- which was
previously, in peacetime, an entity set up mostly to catch domestic
spies and to provide information for the purpose of prosecution of
typical-type domestic crimes -- kidnapping, things of that nature --
the mission of the FBI has changed because our nation got attacked.
The mission now is focused much more on prevention of new attacks. And
thanks to the Congress for giving the FBI more tools to do it, which
they did not have prior to September 11th.
Q: I understand that, but are you suggesting that prior to these
changes they did not have the ability to connect the dots that were
out there, that John mentioned?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think the FBI Director has said that they've made
changes to make it easier for the purpose of fusion and synthesis of
information.
Q: Just on Terry's question, if the warning about potential hijackings
by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda was what, as intelligence officials
said, led this administration so quickly to suspect Osama bin Laden in
the September 11th attacks, why, when administration officials were
asked if they had any inkling that something like this could happen,
nobody said, by the way, we had a warning about potential hijackings
at the hand of al Qaeda?
MR. FLEISCHER: John, I think the reason that people reached the
conclusion Osama bin Laden did this was because there was abundance of
information, public, from Osama bin Laden and other places, about bin
Laden to do this. But this is very important. I want you to understand
something. The fault lies with Osama bin Laden and the terrorists who
did this. That's who's to blame.
Q: I fully understand that. But I'm just interested as to why the Vice
President, you, the President -- nobody said, when asked after
September 11th, was there any inkling that something like this might
happen, none of them pointed to this briefing in early August.
MR. FLEISCHER: The reason for that is very simple --
Q: And regardless of whether we're looking at this through a post-9/11
prism or not.
MR. FLEISCHER: But that does change everything, John. I think it's
fair to say that if I had walked up to you in August of 2001 and said,
we have information that Muslim extremists seek to hijack American
airplanes, you'd have said, so what, everybody's known that for a
long, long time. The nature of the information --
Q: If you said it was Osama bin Laden, I would beg to differ with you
on that.
MR. FLEISCHER: The nature of the information about traditional
hijackings prior to September 11th is a totally different issue from
what we have, unfortunately, come to learn as a nation about what they
did in a hijacking, using an airplane as a missile, which was not
foreseen.
Terry?
Q: Ari, two quick questions. In buttoning down U.S. installations, was
the White House itself on a heightened state of security because of
these warnings on September 11th?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I have no information suggesting that was the case,
Terry. I don't think that's the case at all.
Q: Okay. And then, just let me make sure, this "chatter", as you
described it, that was coming through the system through the spring
and summer of last year -- at some point, the President said, I need
to know exactly what's going on here, and put it all together, what is
the nature of the threat? And that was the August briefing, when
someone said to him that part of this is they want to hijack
airplanes?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's correct. That was one of the many pieces of
information, most of which focused on events abroad.
I'll take one or two more, then I've got to leave with the President
to get up to the Hill. Mike?
Q: Ari, if I may rephrase John's question, why was the information
that was provided last night not provided sometime in the previous
eight months?
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, the President, in his interview with your
newspaper, The Washington Post, explicitly talked about the
generalized nature of the information we received. But again, you're
attaching a different definition post-9/11 to a traditional hijacking
pre-9/11, which I don't think is a fair or accurate way to describe
what was known at the time.
Q: But, Ari, the question was asked after 9/11.
Q: -- "August briefing" or "hijacking" in that interview.
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, the President described the generalized nature
of the information. And the information we had prior to 9/11 was
generalized.
Q: But let me follow --
MR. FLEISCHER: John, and then Ron, and then I'm going to go.
Q: Let me try this one more time. So if the hijackers on September
11th had hijacked those planes and shot the passengers, somebody after
the fact might have said, damn, you know, we had this generalized
briefing, I wish we knew more. But because they flew them into
buildings and killed the people, nobody said, damn, we had this
generalized information, I wish we knew more?
MR. FLEISCHER: John, unfortunately, the threat of hijacking is not
new. What was new was the manner in which this was done post -- on
September 11th.
Q: That's not the question here. Why did nobody mention -- nobody's
trying to blame anybody. But why in eight months has nobody said there
was this general mention of the possibility of a hijacking, I sure
wish we knew more?
MR. FLEISCHER: Because the hijacking information was so general it did
not include any information about the use of airplanes --
Q: A hijacking --
MR. FLEISCHER: -- about the use of airplanes as they were done on
September 11th.
Ron? Last question.
Q: Well, Ari, I'm still having a hard time understanding why, in the
post-9/11 environment that we were in every day after 9/11, throughout
that period, that you, the President, your allies made a very detailed
case against Osama bin Laden to build up the rationale for going to
war against the Taliban in Afghanistan -- why, in building that case,
it was never mentioned, oh, and one more piece of evidence is we knew
in August there was a threat that they wanted to hijack our airplanes?
MR. FLEISCHER: Because of the value attached to that information about
hijackings was not the value attached to what we all know now about
September 11th. As the Deputy Director --
Q: You were putting out every little piece --
MR. FLEISCHER: -- of the CIA indicated --
Q: -- putting out every other piece of information --
MR. FLEISCHER: -- the nature of the information we had was not
specific enough to lend to that conclusion.
I've got to go. Thank you.
Q: Ari, what time is the briefing?
MR. FLEISCHER: We'll let you know. We'll announce the time.
END 12:42 P.M. EDT
(end White House transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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