16 May 2002
Byliner: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Transforming the Military
(Op-ed column from The Washington Post on Thursday, 5/16/02)(770)
(This byliner by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, first appeared
in The Washington Post May 16 and is in the public domain. No
republication restrictions.)
A Choice to Transform the Military
Donald Rumsfeld
The decision to recommend termination of the Army's Crusader artillery
program has little to do with the weapon itself. If it could be
produced and fielded as designed, it would be a fine piece of
artillery -- the natural evolution from the current system, Paladin,
which entered production after the Gulf War in 1992.
But we do not seek evolutionary progress in our ability to defend
ourselves. So little is certain when it comes to the future of
warfare, but on one point we must be clear: We risk deceiving
ourselves and emboldening future adversaries by assuming it will look
like the past. Sept. 11 proved one thing above all others: Our enemies
are transforming.
Will we?
In the context of the Crusader decision, it is worth reviewing a
statement by President Bush on the need to change the way we think
about the future battlefield: "I expect the military's budget
priorities to match our strategic vision -- not the particular visions
of the services -- but a joint vision for change.... I will direct the
secretary of defense to allocate these funds to...new programs that do
so. I intend to force new thinking and hard choices."
Perhaps most remarkable about that statement is that it was not made
in the current Crusader context. Then-Gov. Bush said it in a speech to
the cadets at the Citadel in September 1999.
"We are witnessing a revolution in the technology of war," he warned
that day. "Power is increasingly defined not by size but by mobility
and swiftness. Influence is measured in information; safety is gained
in stealth; and forces are projected on the long arc of
precision-guided weapons."
Once elected, the president charged me with the responsibility to put
structure behind that vision, to identify the tough choices we faced
in order to best prepare ourselves for a future about which the only
thing certain was uncertainty.
The decision to recommend termination of the Crusader program was
reached after many months of careful review, wide-ranging discussion
and in-depth planning and analysis. This was a review not just of the
Crusader program but also of future capabilities, of the strategy to
guide us and of a framework for assessing and balancing risks.
The senior uniformed and civilian leaders of the Defense Department
spent countless hours discussing these matters in a process that
started well before Sept. 11. Tragically, Sept. 11 confirmed many of
our conclusions.
Addressing these issues forces one to scrutinize systems envisioned a
decade ago or more, such as Crusader. The decision to recommend its
termination is based on our assessment that we must forgo a system
originally designed for a different strategic context to make room for
more promising technologies that can accelerate the transformation of
future warfare on terms the United States must dictate.
The world has stood by in some amazement at the effectiveness of
precision munitions in Afghanistan. There is no reason we cannot apply
that technology to the Army's land warfare capabilities. Resources are
always finite, and we believe we must give preference to capabilities
such as increased accuracy, more rapid deployability and "networked"
combat. These capabilities will make the Army much more effective --
and relevant -- on the battlefields of the 21st century.
Taken together, the systems we want to accelerate in lieu of Crusader
can offer greater improvements in precision, range and deployability
-- central objectives to the Army's broader transformation vision. We
have the opportunity to produce revolutionary capabilities faster and
ensure their earlier integration into the Army.
The question we must answer is: Are the interim capabilities Crusader
would provide -- and not for several years -- worth the delay in
acquiring truly transformational technology that can sustain our
combat advantage well into the future?
In his September 1999 remarks, President Bush told those cadets, "I
will not command the new military we create. That will be left to a
president who comes after me.... The outcome of great battles," he
said, "is often determined by decisions on funding and technology made
decades before, in the quiet days of peace."
The decisions about which he spoke are tough decisions. But if we do
not make them now, when shall we?
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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