24 April 2002
Grossman Outlines Terrorist Threat to Colombia
(Argues that U.S. aid should support counterterrorism initiatives)
(3920)
In view of the continuing threat to Colombian democracy from
narco-terrorist guerrilla groups, President Bush believes it is
necessary to adjust the counternarcotics focus of U.S. aid to Colombia
to include counterterrorism, says Marc Grossman, under secretary of
state for political affairs.
Testifying on April 24 before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations' Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peace Corps,
and Narcotics Affairs, Grossman told legislators that the president is
seeking new authorities to "address the problem of terrorism in
Colombia as vigorously as we currently address [the problem of
illicit] narcotics."
Colombia has been beset by civil war for decades, pitting its
democratically elected government against armed insurgents whose
activities are largely funded by profits from the illicit drug trade.
The principal narco-terrorist organizations in Colombia are the
so-called Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish
acronym, FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
In an effort to assist Colombian authorities, the United States has
contributed funds for Plan Colombia, a comprehensive strategy designed
by Colombian President Andres Pastrana to restore the rule of law,
combat narco-trafficking, and rebuild his country's shattered economy.
A more broad-based U.S. assistance program for Colombia, Grossman
said, would "enable Colombia to use U.S.-provided helicopters and the
counter-drug brigade from Plan Colombia to fight terrorism some of the
time, as needed." He emphasized that the president's request for new
authorities does not signal a retreat from U.S. concerns about human
rights abuses in Colombia, since "we will not stop our human rights
vetting of all Colombian military units receiving U.S. assistance."
Nor does the request signal "an open-ended U.S. commitment in
Colombia," he declared, noting that the White House proposal "will
maintain the 800-person cap on U.S. military personnel and contractors
providing training and other services in Colombia."
Because of escalating violence by insurgent guerrilla groups, Pastrana
broke off peace talks with their representatives and ordered the
Colombian military to seize control of a demilitarized zone that had
been ceded to the guerrillas. "President Pastrana has announced plans
to increase Colombia's defense budget, currently at 3.2 percent of
GDP, to cover the cost of heightened military operations, and to add
10,000 soldiers to the army," Grossman observed. "He also requested
additional aid from the U.S. to help cope with the increased terrorist
threat."
The new legal authorities sought by the White House would allow U.S.
assistance to Colombia to be used "to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other
threats" to Colombia's national security, Grossman reiterated. "These
new authorities recognize that the terrorist and narcotics problems --
together -- threaten Colombia's security, prosperity and democracy."
If approved by Congress, the proposed authorities "will give us the
flexibility we need to help the government of Colombia attack this
[narco-terrorist] threat more efficiently and more effectively, in the
shortest possible time, with resources already in Colombia," the under
secretary concluded.
Following is the text of Grossman's testimony, as prepared for
delivery:
(begin text)
Testimony of Ambassador Marc Grossman,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peace Corps, and
Narcotics Affairs
April 24, 2002
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on our policy in
Colombia.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to exchange views on how we can
best help Colombia address the tremendous challenges it faces, as well
as to review with you how we are doing in trying to advance American
interests in Colombia. I will also detail the new authorities the
Administration is seeking in order to better meet these challenges and
enable Colombians to defend their democracy and achieve a secure and
prosperous future.
Colombia matters to the United States.
Congress has been a key partner in our efforts to help Colombia defend
its democracy from the demons of narco-trafficking, underdevelopment,
human rights abuses, and terrorism.
Many of you have traveled to Colombia. I thank you for your
engagement. For those who are considering travel to Colombia, I urge
you to go. Your visits make clear everything America stands for --
democracy, security and prosperity -- both in the U.S. and in
Colombia.
I cannot pass up this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to urge you to pass
the Andean Trade Preferences Act as soon as possible.
-- Renewing ATPA is a national security issue.
-- ATPA has been an effective weapon in our fight against drugs by
fostering economic alternatives to illegal narcotics production.
-- ATPA will promote economic development, which in turn will help
defeat the scourge of drug trafficking while building stronger
democratic institutions.
-- ATPA is a reflection of a long-term U.S. commitment to working with
the Andean region to address issues of fundamental interest to all of
us.
On March 21, the Administration asked the Congress for new
authorities. The terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are
intertwined. President Bush recognized this link when he stated on
April 18, after his meeting with President Pastrana, "We've put FARC,
AUC on our terrorist list. We've called them for what they are. These
are killers, who use killing and intimidation to foster political
means... By fighting narco-trafficking, we're fighting the funding
sources for these political terrorists. And sometimes they're
interchangeable. It is essential for Colombia to succeed in this war
against terror in order for her people to realize the vast potential
of a great, democratic country ... I am confident that with the right
leadership and the right help from America, ... Colombia can succeed.
And it is in everybody's interests that she does succeed." The
president added that he discussed with President Pastrana "how to
change the focus of our strategy from counternarcotics to include
counterterrorism."
Here is what the new authorities we seek would allow us to do:
-- address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as vigorously as we
currently address narcotics; and
-- help the government of Colombia address the heightened terrorist
risk that has resulted from the end of the demilitarized zone.
Here is what we will not do:
-- We will not stop our human rights vetting of all Colombian military
units receiving U.S. assistance. We are committed to abiding by the
Leahy amendment.
-- We will not exceed the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel
providing training in Colombia, nor the 400-person cap on U.S.
civilian contractors. We are committed to abiding by the Byrd
amendment.
-- We will not do away with the requirement in the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act that the Secretary of State certify on Colombian
Armed Forces' human rights record before we can provide assistance to
the Armed Forces.
-- We will not bypass regular reprogramming requirements.
We are not interested in stretching the existing counter-drug
authorities, and because we are committed to abiding by the
restrictions and laws you enact, we come to you today to seek new
authorities to respond to the needs for a new mission -- to combat
terrorism.
The authorities we seek would enable Colombia to use U.S.-provided
helicopters and the counter-drug brigade from Plan Colombia to fight
terrorism some of the time, as needed. Let me be also clear that use
of those helicopters and all other equipment and units would continue
to be subject to existing Leahy restrictions.
I look forward to discussing this proposal with you.
HEMISPHERIC VISION: DEMOCRACY, PROSPERITY AND SECURITY
We can be proud of the hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy,
rule of law and human rights, open markets and social progress. As
President Bush stated at the April 2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas,
"We have a great vision before us, a fully democratic hemisphere bound
together by goodwill and free trade. That's a tall order. It is a
chance of a lifetime. It is a responsibility we all share. ... The
interests of my nation, of all our nations, are served by strong,
healthy democratic neighbors, and are served best by lasting
friendships in our own neighborhood."
At Quebec, 34 democratically elected heads of state and government
agreed on:
-- a democracy clause which makes democratic government a requirement
for participation in the summit process;
-- an approved action plan to promote economic prosperity, protect
human rights, and fight drug trafficking and organized crime; and
-- a 2005 deadline for the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
Democracy, security, prosperity: What good will these principles be if
they are trampled in Colombia?
COLOMBIA: ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY
Colombia's 40 million inhabitants and its democracy are under assault
by three narco-terrorist groups -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
The three groups -- with a combined force of over 25,000 combatants --
regularly engage in massacres, kidnappings, and attacks on key
infrastructure. The FARC and AUC are involved in every facet of
narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing, and
transportation. The income they derive from narcotics, estimated at
over $300 million a year, has been key to their expansion -- both in
numbers and armament -- over the last ten years.
These groups attack your counterparts. AUC killed two Colombian
legislators over the last twelve months. The FARC kidnapped six
Colombian legislators, including presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt. The three terrorist groups assassinated 12 mayors in 2001.
FARC efforts to disrupt the March 10 legislative elections failed, but
the terrorist group will undoubtedly try to interfere with the May 26
presidential elections as well.
COLOMBIA: ASSAULT ON PROSPERITY
ELN and FARC bombings of the key Caño Limón oil pipeline cost the
government of Colombia almost $500 million in lost revenue last year
-- equal to almost one-third of Bogota's spending on health [care] for
its citizens. FARC strikes against the country's power grid in
February left 45 towns, including two departmental capitals, without
electricity for days. The FARC also attempted twice to blow up a dam
near Bogota, actions which -- if successful -- could have killed
thousands of civilians. Fortunately, Colombian security forces
thwarted both attempts.
COLOMBIA: ASSAULT ON SECURITY
Terrorist attacks on Colombia's security have resulted in over 3,000
Colombians killed in 2001. Another 2,856 were kidnapped, with the ELN,
FARC and AUC responsible for almost 2,000 victims.
In the former demilitarized zone, the Colombian military recently
found two large FARC-run cocaine laboratories and 7.4 metric tons of
cocaine.
AUC Commander Carlos Castaño has publicly admitted that the AUC
obtains 70 percent of its income from narcotics. FARC and AUC
activities in southern Colombia have been a major obstacle to our
aerial eradication and alternative development programs, especially in
Putumayo and Caqueta.
The FARC, ELN, and AUC also threaten regional stability. The FARC
regularly uses border regions in Panamá, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela
for arms and narcotics trafficking, resupply operations, and rest and
recreation. The insecurity created by the FARC, AUC, and ELN creates a
haven for criminal activity that affects Colombia's neighbors.
Since 1992, the FARC and ELN have kidnapped 51 U.S. citizens and
murdered ten. Colombia supplies 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in
the U.S. It is also a significant source of heroin.
COLOMBIAN RESPONSE TO GROWTH IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE
In 1999, President Pastrana responded to the crisis undermining
Colombia's democracy, prosperity and security with the launch of the
six-year, $7.5 billion Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia calls for
substantial Colombian social investment, judicial, political and
economic reforms, modernization of the Colombian Armed Forces, and
renewed efforts to combat narco-trafficking.
The government of Colombia is well on its way to funding its
commitment under Plan Colombia, having spent $2.6 billion for Plan
Colombia-related infrastructure projects, including a hospital in
Puerto Guzman, a school in Orito and a farm-to-market road in Mocoa,
as well as projects regarding human rights, humanitarian assistance,
local governance, and the environment. Colombia has also spent $426
million on social services and institutional development, including
family subsidies and programs for job creation and youth training.
The government of Colombia's contribution to Plan Colombia is being
used for counterdrug efforts and social and economic development
projects. These projects include social and infrastructure programs in
Putumayo Department, in southern Colombia, the site of the heaviest
concentration of coca growth. Colombia has also continued to modernize
its armed forces, stabilized its economy in accord with IMF
guidelines, and undertaken an aerial eradication program resulting in
the destruction of unprecedented amounts of coca.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR PLAN COLOMBIA
U.S. support has been a key component of Plan Colombia. With your
support, since July 2000, the U.S. has provided Colombia with $1.7
billion to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen
democratic institutions and human rights, foster socio-economic
development, and mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombian
civilians. Our assistance to Colombia using Plan Colombia funds is
limited to support of counternarcotics activities.
Have we had any success? Let me give you eleven examples of what we
have already in the works:
-- First, we have delivered to the Colombian National Police eight of
the 11 helicopters to be provided under Plan Colombia. The Colombian
military has received 35 of the 54 helicopters that it is programmed
to receive under the plan.
-- Second, the government of Colombia extradited 23 Colombian
nationals to the U.S. in 2001, an unprecedented level of cooperation.
-- Third, we trained, equipped, and deployed the Colombian Army's
counternarcotics brigade, which destroyed 818 base laboratories and 21
HCL (hydrochloride) laboratories, and provided security for our aerial
eradication operations in Southern Colombia. Operating as part of a
Colombian Joint Task Force (JTF-South), we judge it the best
brigade-sized unit in the Colombian military.
-- Fourth, with Colombians we sprayed a record potential 84,000
hectares of coca cultivation last year, up from 58,000 in 2000, and
have set a goal of 150,000 hectares in 2002.
-- Fifth, through Colombia's Ministry of Interior, we have funded,
since May 2001, a program that has provided protection to 1,676
Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights
workers, labor activists, and journalists.
-- Sixth, the U.S. government-funded Early Warning System alerts
Colombian authorities to threats of potential massacres or other human
rights abuses, enabling them act to avert such incidents. To date, the
EWS has issued 106 alerts.
-- Seventh, the U.S., working with non-governmental organizations and
international agencies, has provided assistance to 330,000 Colombians
displaced by violence since mid-2001.
-- Eighth, our program to demobilize child soldiers has helped 272
children to re-integrate into society.
-- Ninth, we have implemented programs to help the government of
Colombia reform its administration of justice and strengthen local
government. We have opened 18 Casas de Justicia, which provide
cost-effective legal services to Colombians who have not previously
enjoyed access to the country's judicial system.
-- Tenth, our program to help municipalities improve their financial
management, fight corruption, and boost community participation has
completed six Social Investment Fund projects in southern Colombia.
-- Eleventh, we are also helping the Prosecutor General's Office set
up human rights units throughout the country to facilitate the
investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
We remain committed to alternative development as a key component of
our overall effort in Colombia.
Promoting alternative development in Colombia is not easy. The
security situation is a major obstacle and there is no alternative
agricultural production that can match the income of coca production.
The limited institutional capacity of the Colombian government agency
charged with implementing the programs has also been a problem.
I have great respect for the people in our Mission in Bogota, and
USAID here in Washington, who recognized that we were not achieving
the results we hoped for in alternative development and are making
adjustments to our program.
USAID wants communities to participate in drug control efforts and is
designing programs that are less risky to implement under current
security conditions. These adjustment include:
-- Working more closely with individual communities to tailor the
program to help these communities with the needs they identify. For
example, many villages are willing to abstain from coca production in
return for access to potable water or a road to link them to a
neighboring market.
-- Funding activities which improve the economic potential of isolated
regions such as Putumayo and boost temporary employment and income of
rural residents, encouraging them to make the transition from coca to
legal crop production or employment opportunities.
-- Extending the alternative development program to areas beyond
southern Colombia, where conditions may be more favorable for
alternative income generation.
As we move forward, we need keep in mind that, as the recent General
Accounting Office February report on alternative development in
Colombia noted:
"Without interdiction and eradication as disincentives, growers are
unlikely to abandon more lucrative and easily cultivated coca crops in
favor of less profitable and harder-to-grow licit crops or to pursue
legal employment."
Therefore, it is critical that we continue an aggressive spraying and
eradication campaign if we are to persuade communities to participate
in alternative development programs.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights concerns are a central element in our Colombia policy. In
meetings with senior Colombian civilian and military officials, U.S.
officials regularly stress the need for Colombia to improve its human
rights performance. During my visit to Bogota last February, I
emphasized to President Pastrana that the Colombian military must take
additional actions to sever any links between military personnel and
paramilitary forces. I also met with the leading presidential
candidates and made clear our expectation that they too be fully
committed to improving human rights. Chief of Staff of the Army
General Eric Shinseki and Acting Commander for the Southern Command
Major General Gary Speer have also traveled to Colombia and delivered
strong human rights messages to their counterparts in the Colombian
Armed Forces.
Our human rights message is making a difference. President Pastrana
and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have repeatedly denounced collusion
between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitaries.
The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitaries and killed 92 in
combat last year.
Eight military personnel, including two colonels and a lieutenant
colonel, were charged in civilian courts with collaborating with
paramilitaries or with committing gross human rights violations in
2001. A senior Colombian naval official's career has effectively ended
because of allegations that he collaborated with paramilitaries.
Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security
forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with state security
units. Those responsible for such actions must be punished. The
establishment of the rule of law and personal security for all
Colombians cannot happen if human rights abuses and impunity for the
perpetrators of such crimes continue to occur.
The best way to ensure that Colombia continues to make progress on
human rights is through continued U.S. engagement. In fact, when I
visited Colombia in February, representatives from civil society and
human rights groups said that what Colombia needed most was a
professional, accountable and strong military that can provide
security against the terrorist actions of the FARC, ELN and AUC
throughout the country. They said strong United States involvement was
needed to make this happen.
Colombia needs more U.S.-provided training and human rights vetting,
not less. We would do this under the new authorities and programs we
are proposing.
NEW SITUATION REQUIRES NEW AUTHORITIES ADJUSTMENTS
On February 20, President Pastrana ended the demilitarized zone and
the government of Colombia's peace talks with the FARC.
Since February 20, the Colombian military has reoccupied the main
urban areas in the former zone, while the FARC has continued its
terrorist violence.
President Pastrana has announced plans to increase Colombia's defense
budget, currently at 3.2 percent of GDP, to cover the cost of
heightened military operations, and to add 10,000 soldiers to the
army. He also requested additional aid from the U.S. to help cope with
the increased terrorist threat.
We answered Pastrana's request for immediate help by providing
increased information-sharing on terrorist actions, expediting the
delivery of helicopter spare parts already paid for by the government
of Colombia, and assisting the Colombians with eradication activities
in the former zone.
In the counterterrorism supplemental submitted on March 21, we are
seeking new legal authorities that would allow our assistance to
Colombia -- including assistance previously provided -- to be used "to
support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist
activities, and other threats to its national security."
These new authorities recognize that the terrorist and narcotics
problems -- together -- threaten Colombia's security, prosperity and
democracy.
Expanding the authorities for the use of aircraft and other assets to
cover terrorist and other threats to Colombia's democracy does not
ensure that Colombia will be able to address these multiple threats in
the short term. However, if approved, they will give us the
flexibility we need to help the government of Colombia attack this
threat more efficiently and more effectively, in the shortest possible
time, with resources already in Colombia.
Our request for new authorities is not a retreat from our concern
about human rights nor does it signal an open-ended U.S. commitment in
Colombia. Our proposal expressly states that we will continue to do
human rights vetting of all Colombian military units receiving U.S.
training or equipment and will maintain the 800-person cap on U.S.
military personnel and contractors providing training and other
services in Colombia.
In addition to new legal authorities, we are also seeking $35 million
in the counterterrorism supplemental to help the Colombian government
protect its citizens from kidnapping, infrastructure attacks and other
terrorist actions. Our $35 million request is broken down as follows:
-- $25 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) funding for anti-kidnapping training and
equipment for the Colombian police and military;
-- $6 million in Foreign Military Funds (FMF) funding to begin
training for Colombian military units protecting the key Caño Limón
oil pipeline; and
-- $4 million in International Narcotics Control Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funding to help organize, train, equip and deploy Colombian
National Police units that will provide security for the construction
of reinforced police stations to enable the police to re-establish a
presence throughout Colombia.
PEACE PROCESS
The U.S. government remains supportive of the peace process. We are
encouraged by the current talks between the ELN and the government of
Colombia, and hope that they will soon produce a viable, lasting peace
accord.
COLOMBIAN COMMITMENT
The U.S. is committed to helping Colombia in its fight against
terrorism's assault on its democracy, prosperity and security, but
Colombians must take the lead in this struggle. Colombia needs to
develop a national political-military strategy, boost the resources
devoted to security, implement economic reforms, improve human rights
protection, and sustain vigorous and effective counternarcotics
programs.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, your support will be crucial
in the days ahead as you discuss our proposal for new and supplemental
funding requests for our assistance to Colombia, as well as our FY-03
budget request. I look forward to maintaining a dialogue with you as
we work together to help provide Colombia's democracy the tools it
needs to build a secure, prosperous and democratic life for its
citizens. The people of Colombia must not be denied the opportunity to
enjoy the benefits of a hemisphere united by open markets, democratic
governments, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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