Military

DATE=APRIL 24, 2002

TYPE=INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

TITLE=JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

NUMBER=3-145

BYLINE=TOM CROSBY

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

INTERNET=

/// Editors: This interview is available in Dalet under SOD/English News Now Interviews in the folder for today or yesterday ///

HOST: U-S officials say Abu Zubaydah, the highest-ranking member of the al-Qaida terrorist group in U-S custody, has told them the terrorist organization knows how to build a "dirty bomb." They say such a bomb might be capable of spreading radioactivity across a wide area, but they are not sure if Abu Zubaydah can be believed. He was captured last month in Pakistan and recently told federal officials terrorists were targeting banks in the northeastern United States. That prompted an FBI alert last week of a possible attack on the financial institutions.

As for his claim about al-Qaida having the knowledge to make a "dirty bomb"...the experts say it isn't hard to do. Joseph Cirincione tells VOA's Tom Crosby whatever Abu Zubaydah says about al-Qaida having some knowledge about building such a nuclear weapon must be taken seriously. He is a co-author of the soon-to-be-published book "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction." He is also the head of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

MR. CIRINCIONE: It fits with both the intent and the capabilities of the al-Qaida network; that is, a dirty bomb is something that is a logical step for a terrorist group. It builds on what they already know how to do -- make truck bombs using conventional explosives -- and then add in this dangerous new element of radioactive material that they could either buy or steal from a nuclear source.

MR. CROSBY: A dirty bomb, of course, with radioactive material, the initial blast will cause some damage; does it, though, cause widespread radioactive disbursement?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Yes that's the whole idea. Imagine the Oklahoma City bomb that blew up the Federal building there. A truck bomb of 1 or 2 tons of explosives could cause massive conventional damage. But then, on top of that, you could have a radioactive substance, perhaps cobalt-60, commonly used in anticancer treatments, sprayed outside the whole area. This would immediately inhibit any kind of rescue effort, where first-responders -- ambulance, police, firefighters -- could not enter the area for risk of radiation exposure.

Of course, the victims themselves, those who were not killed by the blast but might be hurt by the blast, would then be subject to this radiation poisoning.

And, finally, if the radiation was significant enough, it could take months, even years, to thoroughly clean up the site, adding additional billions in expense.

MR. CROSBY: Does your experience tell you, Joe, that when people like this acquire radioactive material, they leave footprints leading to the source of it?

MR. CIRINCIONE: It would be difficult but not impossible to identify the source of the material, especially, for example, if it was a spent fuel rod. You might be able to determine afterwards, by the mix of radioactive materials, a likely source for it. This is assuming that we don't already know where it has come from by a report of the theft of the material itself.

MR. CROSBY: You and your co-authors, of course, have the new book "Deadly Arsenals" coming out. In researching "Deadly Arsenals," do you find that there is a black market out there, an extensive black market, for radioactive material?

MR. CIRINCIONE: It's not an extensive market, but there have been repeated incidents of buyers looking for this material or sellers willing to sell it. A number of sting operations by German police in the mid-nineties turned up quite a few Russians who were willing to sell material that they were either guarding or could steal. Most recently, just two years ago in Czechoslovakia, there was a case where quite a significant amount of highly enriched uranium -- over 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium -- was offered for sale and was seized by Czech authorities.

So, it's there. We're fortunate that, at least as far as we know, none of this material has actually gotten into terrorist hands yet. The danger is we don't know what we don't know. Some of it may have happened and we're just not aware of it yet.

MR. CROSBY: How does one go about telling potential buyers, hey, I've got this material available?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Some of this goes through some of the traditional mafia networks, Russian mafia networks in particular. Some of it comes from just poor workmen or, at least in a couple of cases, soldiers, who stole some of the material and then made connection with gangster networks. Some of it went through Chechnyan terrorist networks.

The one incident of a radiological bomb, for example, was a group of Chechen terrorists who, several years ago, placed a device with cesium, a radioactive substance from nuclear power reactors, in downtown Moscow, and then phoned in the threat. Fortunately, that device was disarmed before it could explode. But that is the kind of incident that gives us worry now, because we know there have been links between the Chechen terrorists and al-Qaida.

HOST: Joseph Cirincione, co-author of the soon-to-be-published book "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction," spoke with VOA News Now's Tom Crosby from his office at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here in Washington.

TC/ml