10 April 2002
NATO's Lord Robertson Focuses on Response to Terrorism
(Says alliance provides defense, security amid uncertainty) (3210)
NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson says that in an unpredictable
and interconnected world, alliances and partnerships are vital for
ensuring defense and security.
"If the post-Cold War world has a lesson, it is that threats, risks
and challenges are diverse and often unpredictable," he said. "Our
response must be inherently flexible to cope. And NATO is a key
element in ensuring this flexibility."
In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations April 10 he described
the Bush administration's coalition-building efforts after the
September 11th terrorist attacks as "a masterful example of active
diplomacy." He added that the United States began by building on the
largest permanent coalition in the world -- NATO.
The day after the terrorist attacks, the NATO membership invoked
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter, providing that an attack on
one member is treated as an attack on all members, Robertson said.
Shortly after that the 27 other countries that are part of NATO's
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council joined the anti-terrorist coalition.
"You cannot build this level of support and partnership overnight," he
said. "And NATO is a unique vehicle for doing so, with staunch friends
from Vancouver to Vladivostock."
Robertson has been holding meetings in Washington April 9-10 with
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, as well as
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and members of the U.S.
Congress.
The meetings have focused mainly on common threats to Europe and North
America, including weapons of mass destruction and, within this
context, Iraq, according to a NATO press release. Robertson also
discussed the upcoming NATO summit in Prague in November at which
enlargement of the current 19-member North Atlantic alliance will be a
primary focus.
Following is the text of Robertson's remarks:
(begin text)
At the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, USA
10 April 2002
"NATO on the Road to Prague"
Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson
I am very pleased to back here in Washington: the city where NATO was
born 53 years ago this month, where its founding principles and
enduring vision were first enshrined, and where in 1999 the capstone
was placed on a decade of post-Cold War change. If the Atlantic
Alliance has a spiritual home, this is surely it.
What better place could there be then to set out how NATO is once
again adapting itself to a third set of challenges? First, the frozen
certainties of the Cold War threat to Europe. Then the diverse risks
to security and stability in the post-Cold war Euro-Atlantic area. And
now, the fight against terrorism, the threat from weapons of mass
destruction and the opportunities of building a real and lasting
relationship with Russia.
My aim today is two fold: to reinforce some truths about NATO that can
sometimes be forgotten by even the most partisan Atlanticists; and to
dispel some myths that could, if left unchallenged, gnaw away at
opinion on both sides of the ocean. In doing so, I will set out my
vision of what NATO is for in the 21st century.
The core of that vision is deceptively simple. NATO embodies the
transatlantic link between North America and Europe, the most
successful alliance in history. As President Truman said when the
Washington Treaty was signed, NATO safeguards the peace and prosperity
of our community of nations.
If anything, September 11th has reinforced that purpose. During its
first half-century, NATO sometimes appeared something of a one-way
street, with the United States exporting security and deterrence to a
potentially vulnerable or unstable Europe.
No longer. We are all targets now. And we surely do not need to be
convinced that NATO's core business, of defending the homelands of its
members from attack, is as important now as at any time since 1949.
In this unpredictable and interconnected world, we all need alliances
and partnerships to ensure our defense and security. This
Administration's exercise in coalition building after September 11th
was a masterful example of active diplomacy. Do not forget, however,
that in assembling the coalition against terrorism, the United States
could build on the largest permanent coalition in the world in NATO.
Secretary Powell did not need to ring each of NATO's 19 member
capitals to start the process that led, on September 12th, to the
declaration that the attack on the United States was an attack on all
NATO countries. All he needed to do was to ring me.
Nor did he need to ring each of the 27 other countries who are part of
NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, countries as important to
the coalition as Russia and the Central Asian republics. Once NATO was
engaged, the Partnership Council produced an equally robust
declaration of support within a day.
You cannot build this level of support and partnership overnight. In
diplomacy as in life, friendship must be worked at. And NATO is a
unique vehicle for doing so, with staunch friends from Vancouver to
Vladivostock.
Nor was invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty simply a
political statement. It has become fashionable to acknowledge NATO's
value in mobilizing international support while decrying its practical
contribution in responding to the terrorist threat.
Like most followers of fashion, these critics should get out more
often into the real world. They should look up into the sky over
American cities where NATO early warning aircraft have been helping to
prevent a repetition of September 11. They should look at the Balkans
where NATO forces have been smashing Al-Qaida terrorist cells. They
should read the reports of a unique meeting in Rome earlier this year
where NATO and Russian officers started a process of cooperation in
developing the military contribution to the war on terrorism.
Perhaps most importantly, the critics should look at Afghanistan where
Canadian and Norwegian forces are searching for Al-Qaida fighters
alongside their American comrades. Where French fighter aircraft are
flying dangerous low-level missions. Where British tanker aircraft are
refueling U.S. Navy bombers because U.S. Air Force tankers are
incompatible and cannot do so. Where 14 NATO countries are
contributing troops on the ground to bring stability to Kabul.
NATO has not led the operations in Afghanistan. But it is no
coincidence that America's military partners in Afghanistan are
overwhelmingly its NATO allies. Without NATO, these coalition
contributions would have been impossible. As in the Gulf War, this
coalition can only work together effectively because of decades of
practical cooperation in NATO, building interoperability and common
operating procedures.
The Duke of Wellington famously said that the battle of Waterloo was
won on the playing fields of Eton School. By the same token, Desert
Storm and Enduring Freedom were won on the training grounds of NATO.
And the fact that NATO has not been in the lead in Afghanistan should
not be taken to mean that it will not lead in other military
operations in the future. To paint this single mission, successful as
it has been, as the sole model for subsequent deployments would be as
misguided as to have argued in the 1990s that Desert Storm or Kosovo
should be the unique templates for the future.
If the post-Cold War world has a lesson, it is that threats, risks and
challenges are diverse and often unpredictable. Our response must be
inherently flexible to cope. And NATO is a key element in ensuring
this flexibility.
On that theme, let me slay one final myth. Some commentators base
their critique of NATO's alleged irrelevance on a fundamental
misreading of the Alliance's role in the Balkans. In particular, they
portray the 1999 campaign in Kosovo as an example of how not to run a
military operation. "War by committee" is the commonest jibe. NATO's
multinational decision-making process is said to have slowed down and
blunted the air campaign.
This interpretation of the Kosovo campaign is quite simply wrong. Of
course, there were wrinkles in the early days. I cannot think of a
military operation of any kind where that was not the case. But they
were ironed out quickly and thereafter military decisions were taken
rapidly and smoothly.
The man who should know best, General Wesley Clark, the American
commander of the NATO operation, said last February that his problems
"were less a function of war by committee than a result of divisions
within the US government."
Kosovo was not the model for all operations. But neither did it
invalidate NATO's capacity for conducting complex military missions.
Quite the contrary. NATO's campaign was an extraordinary success. It
achieved its aim of reversing Milosevic's ethnic cleansing and averted
a human catastrophe in eleven weeks with little loss of life and no
allied battle casualties.
Milosevic is now on trial in The Hague and Yugoslav membership of
NATO's Partnership for Peace is on the agenda in democratic Belgrade.
Nor is NATO a one trick pony in the Balkans. Last year, two small NATO
operations -- one to collect arms, the other to protect international
monitors -- helped avert a civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia.
That crisis had the potential to ignite a tinder-box of instability
across the Balkans and beyond. The cost in lives and human misery, and
in all likelihood the costs of a much larger international
intervention, were saved by early NATO action. Without NATO's
engagement, the US could have faced a broader Balkan war in parallel
in with September 11.
So the first part of my argument is that the mythmakers have got it
wrong: NATO is as central to security today as at any time in its
history. It has never been the only show in town. But NATO is the most
important multinational organization in its field. If it didn't exist,
after September 11 we would undoubtedly be looking to invent it.
I recognize, however, that no organization can afford to rest on it
laurels. Even if the need for NATO remains as great as ever, the
challenges it faces are undoubtedly very different. The Alliance's
constituents, in Washington, elsewhere in the United States and
indeed, in every NATO country need therefore to know that NATO is
adapting to meet today's new risks as effectively as it fulfilled its
traditional agenda.
Our November summit in Prague is the focus for this process of the
change. NATO's governments should be judged by what they endorse at
that meeting. The signs are good, but there is much to do.
First, we must learn the lessons of September 11. No one anticipated
those monstrous acts of terrorism. Our job now is to do everything
possible to prevent future so-called asymmetric attacks by terrorist
or terrorist states. Armed forces are only one weapon in our armory.
But they can play an important part in raising the shadow of terror.
By invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO gave a warning to
terrorists that they had crossed an unacceptable threshold. We must
now back up that warning by ensuring that our forces have the evident
capability to strike at these terrorists and their sponsors. And we
must stop those who are proliferating the weapons of mass destruction
that pose the most serious risk.
Prevention is always better than cure. But prevention can never be
guaranteed. So we also need to maximize the contribution that our
forces can make to protecting themselves and our civilian populations.
There is no silver bullet to deal with the terrorist. What is needed
is a coherent spectrum of capabilities that together give us options
to deter, strike or defeat, depending on the circumstances. That is
what NATO is good at. We have unparalleled mechanisms for coordinating
military planning and bringing these plans to fruition.
During the Cold War, we had to respond to a massive and evolving
single threat on Europe's doorstep. Following the Cold War, we had to
transform our forces to undertake smaller but equally demanding
operations further from home.
Now we need to give new emphasis to such capabilities as special
forces, ground surveillance, chemical and biological defense, missile
defense, precision-guided munitions, strategic air transport and
air-to-air refueling.
For those of us used to heavy metal armies, it is an unfamiliar
shopping list. But in NATO, this latest military revolution is already
well under way.
Last night, President Bush and I discussed at length the common
threats facing Europe and North America. We agreed that weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery -- in the hands of either
rogue states or terrorists -- are among the most serious threats in
today's security environment.
NATO allies recognize these threats and are prepared to engage
constructively with the United States to address them. And President
Bush assured me of his intention to tackle these issues in cooperation
with America's permanent allies in NATO.
Anticipating your questions, let me just say that I won't speculate on
particular hypothetical scenarios in the case of Iraq.
However, I will say that the Alliance will continue to serve as a
forum for consultations on these issues -- as it did recently when
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage met the North Atlantic Council to
discuss Iraq and as it does regularly when Allied proliferation
experts meet to consider the WMD threat.
The process of military adaptation will come together in a package at
the Prague Summit. It will also include modernization of NATO's
command and decision-making machinery to ensure that we can deal
effectively and flexibly with the most demanding asymmetric threats.
And it will go beyond NATO's member to draw in the 27 partner
countries who are already working alongside us in the Balkans and in
the fight against terrorism.
Key to this is NATO's rapidly transforming relationship with Russia.
September 11 proved an extraordinary catalyst. For the first time
since 1945, it focused attention here, in Europe and in Moscow on what
we have in common. And it led, not to a temporary thaw, but to a real
sea change in attitudes on both sides.
We are not sacrificing NATO's coherence or effectiveness. Nor are we
turning a blind eye to those issues where we still have real
disagreements with Russia.
The initiative currently under negotiation in Brussels and Moscow is a
pragmatic recognition that genuine cooperation on terrorism and, I
hope, a range of other issues is to our mutual benefit. President
Putin has told me that he hopes our work will change the world for the
better. That would indeed be an unexpected but worthy epitaph to the
victims of New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.
I am confident that we will be working effectively with the Russians
in a new institutional format well before Prague. I am equally
confident that this relationship will neither derail nor be derailed
by the Alliance's second round of enlargement, which will be decided
at the Summit.
NATO will enlarge and be stronger for it. What I cannot say yet -- and
will not speak about until we meet in Prague -- is exactly how many
new members we will accept and which of the nine candidates countries
will receive invitations.
Enlargement sends a clear message to NATO's critics. We have a new
agenda. But we also remain committed to achieving our prior
objectives.
For me, an especially high priority is the continuing modernization of
NATO's military capabilities. This underpins everything that NATO
does. So I have been particularly brutal with European audiences about
the need to invest and spend more effectively.
Political statements on their own cut no ice with terrorists or
dictators. If Europe is to punch its weight as an ally of the United
States -- and in its own interests where Washington is not engaged --
it must complete the modernization of its armed forces. And do so
quickly. That will be a critical goal at Prague.
But let me make two points that Americans need to keep in mind where
assessing the performance of their European allies.
First, remember that most European countries are having to develop
modern, useable, deployable armed forces from scratch. During the Cold
War they needed large conscript armies to deter the Soviet Union.
These armies are no longer needed today. And unlike the United States,
most European countries had no tradition of operating beyond their
borders. Indeed countries like Germany were positively discouraged
from doing so.
European commitment in the Balkans and now in Afghanistan reflect a
major shift in thinking and capability. They need to do much better.
But give them credit for what they have already achieved.
Second, please recall that it is in U.S. interest to close the
capability gap. If the gap continues to grow, Washington will
eventually be faced with a choice between unilateral action and no
action. Because the interoperability fostered in NATO on which all
multinational military operations depend will become impossible.
What country would be prepared to commit its soldiers to operations in
Afghanistan, whether against Al-Qaida or to help bring stability to
Kabul, if they could not communicate with US bomber aircraft or their
headquarters?
So the United States must also work to close the capabilities gap.
Interoperability with NATO must be a key factor in procuring
communications equipment. Transatlantic defense industrial cooperation
must be encouraged and enhanced to improve interoperability at all
levels, while we work together to prevent technology leakage. And all
European efforts to improve their capabilities, whether in NATO or
under EU auspices, should be welcomed as a material contribution to
improved burden-sharing.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dean Acheson said in 1946, the year when both President Bush and I
entered this world, that "the really successful international
organizations are those that recognize and express underlying
realities". And he was right.
In facing long-term, strategic challenges, there can be no substitute
for long-term, strategic partners. Partners you can trust. Partners
who trust you. That is the underlying reality which the North Atlantic
Alliance has always been about.
Today, NATO remains what, in 1949, President Truman said it would be:
an organization which brings together the most successful democracies
in the world, to discuss security challenges, to coordinate their
positions on solving them, and to organize their military capabilities
to accomplish common missions to protect their common interests.
The Prague Summit will be an important moment for the transatlantic
relationship. It will be a time when leaders from North America and
Europe reaffirm their commitment to an Alliance that continues to
preserve the peace and security of its members after 53 strong years.
It will confirm NATO's role as an unique tool for building consensus,
both amongst Allies and with new partners. It will hone NATO's
capacity to deliver modern, effective multinational coalitions where
they are needed, under a NATO flag or otherwise.
And it will reinforce NATO's unique capacity to promote peace and
security right across the Euro-Atlantic area.
In confirming these "underlying realities", the Prague Summit will
prove Dean Acheson's wisdom, and Harry Truman's vision, by ensuring
NATO's continuing success at preserving the safety of future
generations.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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