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Pentagon Official Cites Need for Expanded U.S. Support for Colombia

(Says aid will give Colombians ability to battle terrorist groups)
(2720)
Expanded U.S. support for the Colombian government's efforts to battle
terrorism will give Colombian authorities the "wherewithal and
incentive" to combat terrorist organizations operating inside their
country, says Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs.
In April 10 congressional testimony, the Pentagon official said
President Bush has asked Congress for expanded U.S. support for a
unified campaign in Colombia against terrorism as well as narcotics
trafficking.
Such assistance, said Rodman, will help Colombia fight the terrorist
groups more effectively, not only in traditional coca-growing regions
such as Putumayo and Caqueta departments, but throughout Colombia.
Continuing to link U.S. aid to Colombia to a "narrow counter-narcotics
focus means that, by law, we must refrain from providing Colombia
certain kinds of military assistance and intelligence support that
could immediately strengthen the government's position throughout the
country," Rodman said.
Rodman said that although the terrorist organizations -- the United
Self-Defense Group of Colombia (AUC), the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) -- are not
considered terrorists with global reach, they threaten regional
stability and U.S. interests through transnational arms and drug
trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Together, these groups are
responsible for more than 90 percent of the terrorist incidents in the
Western Hemisphere, Rodman told the House Appropriations Committee's
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
U.S. policy in Colombia, Rodman said, "should augment traditional
counter-drug programs with programs to help Colombia enhance basic
security."
Responding to concerns about human rights abuses in Colombia, Rodman
said Colombian President Andres Pastrana has instituted "important
reforms." In addition, Rodman said the practices and procedures that
the U.S. government has put in place in Colombia "have also had an
impact." Human rights violations by the Colombian army have dropped
dramatically in recent years, he said.
Victory in Colombia can only be achieved, "and U.S. interests in
Colombia can best be served, once the government of Colombia asserts
effective sovereignty over its national territory," Rodman declared.
"It is time for the United States to reinforce its commitment to
Colombian democracy."
Following is the text of Rodman's prepared remarks:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF
PETER W. RODMAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS
10 April 2002
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee. I
want to associate myself with the testimony of my distinguished
colleague, Under Secretary of State Grossman. I am honored to provide
the Defense Department's perspective on threats to Colombian democracy
and the Bush Administration's proposed initiatives to assist the
Government of Colombia in addressing those threats.
Policy That Adapts to Changing Circumstances
The Administration has wrestled with developing a more effective
policy and strategy to address terrorism as well as narcotics
trafficking -- the twin challenges posed by C Colombia's illegal armed
groups.
Both the U.S. and Colombian governments recognize that the threat has
evolved and now requires new thinking and new programs. President
Pastrana's decision to terminate the FARC safehaven and this
Administration's request for new authority, as described by Ambassador
Grossman, reflect our shared assessment that terrorism and narcotics
trafficking are inextricably linked in Colombia today.
For the past decade, U.S. aid has focused almost exclusively on
counternarcotics. Although counterdrug programs remain pan important
part of the security equation in Colombia, our assistance has not yet
had a decisive impact on the political and security challenges that
continue to threaten both Colombian democracy and U.S. interests.
Therefore, President Bush has asked Congress for:
-- expanded authority for Colombia to use U.S.-provided support in its
unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist
activities; and
-- new authority in Fiscal Year 2003 that would provide assistance to
train and equip units to protect critical economic infrastructure.
These authorities will provide the Government of Colombia with the
flexibility and resources needed to combat violent and formidable
narcoterrorist threats to Colombia's national security. Over the past
several years, these groups have increased their involvement in
illicit drug operations. These drug revenues contribute to their war
chests and have enabled them to increase their terrorist activities,
placing further pressure on Colombia's democracy. This critical
assistance will allow the Colombian security forces to confront more
vigorously the increasing narcoterrorist attacks by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) and
dealt more effectively with the narcoterrorist paramilitary groups,
like the United Self Defense Group of Colombia (AUC).
These three groups -- the AUC, ELN, and FARC -- already are designated
under U.S. law as terrorist organizations. Although not considered
terrorists with global reach, they threaten regional stability and
U.S. interests through transnational arms and drug trafficking,
kidnapping, and extortion. Together, these groups are responsible for
more than 90 percent of the terrorist incidents in this hemisphere.
The changes in authorities described by Ambassador Grossman will help
Colombia fight these groups more effectively, not only in traditional
coca-growing regions such as Putumayo and Caqueta, but throughout
Colombia.
Beyond the toll in Colombian lives and treasure, these organizations
have kidnapped and murdered U.S. citizens with impunity and damaged
major U.S. commercial interests, such as oil pipelines. Accordingly,
the Administration's strategy is to provide the Colombian government
with the wherewithal and incentive to confront these groups throughout
the national territory, whether or riot individual units or combatants
are engaged directly in drug-related activities. This is because, as
we have learned, Colombia's major terrorist organizations both enable
the drug trade and arc financed in significant part by the revenues
drugs provide. Attempting to segregate drugs and terrorism into
distinct and severable threats is both politically unrealistic and
militarily futile. Colombia urgently needs to establish the rule of
law in its many regions that are presently ruled by lawless violence.
A crucial component in this objective is a stronger, more effective
security presence.
Today, the political/military situation in Colombia has reached a
stalemate. Taken together, the FARC, ELN and AUC effectively control
over 40% of Colombian territory. This stalemate works to the advantage
of those groups, whose acts of terror and narcotics trafficking
continue unabated even though the overall military contest remains
inconclusive. Hence, this situation compounds all of Colombia's
problems:
-- It delegitimates the democratic state.
-- It undercuts any real possibility of negotiation with the
guerrillas on better-than-surrender terms.
-- It places a ceiling on what can be accomplished with the
counternarcotics effort.
-- It creates a security vacuum that is filled in part by the rightist
paramilitaries. It is a vicious circle.
The Colombian State's weakness in many parts of the country leads many
citizens to believe that the paramilitary groups are more effective in
promoting security. In turn, these groups receive greater support and
legitimacy, making the state's ability to fill the vacuum even more
difficult.
-- The activities of the paramilitaries, of course, also undercut
political support for Colombia in the United States.
The United States cannot solve all of Colombia's problems with
increased levels of aid, and given Colombia's human and capital
resources, we need not do so. Currently, the government devotes
approximately 3.5% of GDP to combating the narcoterrorists. Colombia
must shoulder more of the burden by funding its security structure --
meaning both military and police -- at levels that axe more
appropriate for a wartime footing.
We are encouraged by President Pastrana's recent decision to increase
the force structure by 10,000 soldiers and provide an additional $110
million for military operations related to elimination of the FARC
safehaven. But current funding for security forces is simply
inadequate to meet the current threat, and Colombian forces are simply
too small arid poorly equipped to provide basic security to large
areas of the country. At the end of the conflict in El Salvador, the
military had 50 helicopters while Colombia, fifty times larger, has
only roughly four times as many. The Colombian military has roughly an
8:1 soldier advantage over the narcoterrorist, an inadequate ratio if
the military is to seize the initiative in the conflict.
The Colombian military's situation is partly due to the evolving
nature of the threat, partly due to a lag in the Colombian public's
learning curve, and partly due to lingering hope that numerous peace
proposals would be successful.
As Ambassador Grossman pointed out, after three years of FARC
duplicity at the negotiating table, on 20 February 2002 President
Pastrana eliminated the FARC safehaven. Frustrated at the FARC's lack
of good faith, the Colombian public appears to be gaining a more
realistic understanding of the security challenges their country
faces. But Colombia's difficulty in providing for its own security is
due in no small part to its inability to protect significant
revenue-producing infrastructure such as oil pipelines, which leads us
back to the imperative for expanded authorities that Ambassador
Grossman has described.
Effective Sovereignty and Basic Security
If U.S. aims in Colombia are cast solely in terns of reducing the
production and export of drugs to the United States, important aspects
of the violence there and the inability of the government to respond
effectively will be ignored. As a practical matter, we cannot view
Colombia as a country in which we either adhere to a counterdrug
program or slide unwittingly into a Vietnam-style counterinsurgency.
More realistically, we must pursue policies and fashion programs that
permit Colombia to meet the challenge of the narcoterrorists so that
U.S. forces are not called upon to do so. There is a strong moral and
strategic impetus behind this support for one of the United States'
oldest and most reliable hemispheric allies.
Virtually all experts concur that the problems of narcotrafficking and
guerrilla violence are intertwined. Both the United States anal the
Government of Colombia hold that reducing drug exports can serve
important political and security objectives by reducing drug-related
income available to illegal armed groups. Nevertheless, though
drug-related income is an important factor in sustaining insurgents
and paramilitaries, it is doubtful that even effective counternarcotic
operations in specific areas within Colombia can, on their own, be
decisive in disabling illegal armed groups or forcing them to
negotiate seriously for peace.
Continuing to link U.S. aid to Colombia to a narrow counternarcotics
focus means that, by law, we must refrain from providing Colombia
certain kinds of military assistance and intelligence support that
could immediately strengthen the government's position throughout the
country. Hundreds of attacks by the ELN and FARC have been directed at
electrical, natural gas and oil infrastructure. As Ambassador Grossman
has noted, the guerrillas' sabotage of oil pipelines alone has cost
the Government of Colombia lost revenue on the order of $500 million
per year. The pipeline was bombed 170 times in 2001, spilling 2.9
million barrels of oil -- eleven times the amount of the Exxon Valdez.
Yet U.S. training and equipment for dedicated protection of such
critical economic infrastructure are not permitted by policy or law.
The Administration has proposed to Congress $6 million in FY02 and $98
million in FY03 Foreign Military Finance funding to train and equip
vetted Colombian units to protect that country's most threatened piece
of critical economic infrastructure -- the first 170 kilometers of the
Cano-Limon oil pipeline. This segment is the most often attacked. U.S.
assistance and training will support two Colombian Army brigades,
National Police and Marines operating iii the area. These units
through ground and air mobility will be in a better position to
prevent and disrupt attacks on the pipeline and defend key facilities
and vulnerable points such as pumping stations. These units will also
send a message that the Colombian State is committed to defending its
economic infrastructure -- resources that provide sorely needed
employment and revenue -- from terrorist attacks.
Basic security throughout Colombia's national territory is the
essential but missing ingredient. The Pastrana administration's Plan
Colombia was an admirable start toward resolving Colombia's
interrelated problems, of which the security component is only one
part. But there can be no rule of law, economic development and new
job creation, strengthening of human rights or any other noble goals,
where there is no basic security.
Therefore, our policy in Colombia should augment traditional
counterdrug programs with programs to help Colombia enhance basic
security. A friendly democratic government in our hemisphere is
struggling to preserve its sovereign authority under assault from
extremists of both left and right. U.S. policy towards Colombia
requires a bipartisan consensus at home for a long-term strategy aimed
at strengthening Colombia's ability to enforce effective sovereignty,
and preserve democracy. The new and more explicit legal authorities
that the Administration is proposing are intended to serve these
goals.
Human Rights Concerns
The Administration is concerned, as are many Members of Congress,
about human rights in Colombia. President Pastrana has instituted
important reforms. The practices and procedures that the U.S.
government has put in place, often at the behest of concerned Members
of Congress, and the example set by the small number of our U.S.
troops training Colombian forces, have also had an impact.
Professionalism is, after all, what we teach. Human rights violations
attributed to the armed forces dropped by 95% during the period of
1993-1998, to fewer than three percent of the total reported abuses.
Armed forces cooperation with the civilian court system in prosecuting
human rights violations committed by military personnel has improved.
Over 600 officers and noncommissioned officers have been relieved of
duty under a 2000 Presidential decree that provides military
commanders a legal means for removing personnel suspected of human
rights violations and collusion with the paramilitaries. Officers have
been dismissed for collaboration with or tolerance of paramilitary
activities, while others face prosecution. The armed forces have
demonstrated aggressiveness recently in seeking out and attacking
paramilitary groups.
Indeed, as already stated, the problem of the paramilitaries is itself
partly a function of the vacuum left by the weakness of the national
government and the Colombian military. By bolstering the democratic
government and its effective assertion of national sovereignty, we
weaken the paramilitaries.
Colombians Must Make the Main Effort
Although a policy cast in terms of basic security should enhance
overall prospects for peace and for more effective counternarcotics,
neither goal is assured without a firm and enduring commitment by the
Colombian government and Colombian people to devote a greater share of
their own national resources to the effort. The key principle should
remain that the Colombian people tear the ultimate responsibility for
their own security and must demonstrate their national will through a
commitment of resources.
The Colombian military, by its own admission, is not optimally
structured or organized to execute sustained operations. The Colombian
military has greatly improved in many respects over the last several
years -- especially in the areas of tactical and operational
effectiveness, increased professionalism, human rights training and
awareness, and has realized a modest but sustained increase in force
structure. But the military continues to suffer from limited
resources, inadequate training practices, significant shortfalls in
intelligence and air mobility, and lack of joint planning anal
operations. They need to better coordinate operations among the
services and with the Colombian National Police. Adequate funding and
restructuring of the military are essential if Colombia is to have
continuing operational success against its national threats.
The adoption of Plan Colombia demonstrates that Colombia is moving
forward aggressively, exercising its political will to address, and
ultimately solve, domestic problems that have persisted for decades.
The U.S. has an enormous stake in the success of this plan.
Victory in Colombia can only come -- and U.S. interests in Colombia
can best be served -- once the Government of Colombia asserts
effective sovereignty over its national territory. It is time for the
United States to reinforce its commitment to Colombian democracy.
CONCLUSION
President Pastrana has asked for both international and U.S. support
to address an internal problem that has international dimensions --
fueled in part by our country's and the international demand for
cocaine. It is time to move forward, in partnership between the
Administration and Congress.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I again thank you for the
opportunity to discuss these issues with you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)