Military

DATE=03/29/02

TYPE=INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

TITLE=Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor on Middle East affairs to the State Department from 1985 to 1990

NUMBER=3-111

BYLINE=TOM CROSBY

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

INTERNET=

/// Editors: This interview is available in Dalet under SOD/English News Now Interviews in the folder for today or yesterday ///

/// UPDATE with latest CN on Israel-Palestinians ///

HOST: Abraham Sofaer was a legal advisor on Middle East affairs to the State Department from 1985 to 1990, and his experience makes him skeptical that another cease-fire will work. He tells News Now's Tom Crosby that he believes both sides should begin the process with some incremental, but significant steps -- something that would show both parties are prepared to make practical adjustments.

MR. SOFAER: Not just an opening up of borders so workers can go back to work, but something that's parallel, that has something in it for both sides, and something, preferably, that has some long-term significance, even though, in itself, it might be relatively insignificant. For example, closing a settlement that Israel concedes is illegal, something of that sort. I just think that something practical needs to be done to make the parties feel that they can still actually agree to do something and implement it and move in a direction that is positive.

MR. CROSBY: Now, against this backdrop, we have had the Arab League Summit meeting in Beirut give its endorsement to a Saudi proposal for a peace plan. Should we make anything of this?

MR. SOFAER: Yes, we should consider that a practical and important signal from the Saudis and the rest of the Arab world that supports the Saudi plan that they are prepared not to act as spoilers, as they have been acting, and that they are going to take a more positive attitude toward the peace process. And that, in particular, when negotiations reach the stage of dealing with religious sites and other very, very difficult questions, they will be there to help the parties reach a resolution rather than sitting on the sidelines, waiting to shoot down whatever the parties come up with.

MR. CROSBY: This Arab proposal differs substantially, doesn't it, from earlier proposals that were made?

MR. SOFAER: Oh, sure. This proposal, in its general outline, is workable as a basis for negotiations. It is not workable as an end result. The '67 lines are going to have to be modified, but everyone knows that. And if you don't press the Saudi plan into a peace plan -- the peace plan has to be negotiated between the parties. The Saudi plan is really like a declaration of saying, look, this overall resolution should be acceptable to the Arab world so Israel can normalize its relations and expect to have a normal country which is not going to be subject to these kinds of attacks and which will be integrated into the Middle East. That's what the Saudi plan is all about. And, obviously, with it comes the notion that the Saudis will actually play a more useful role in the whole process.

MR. CROSBY: But in reality, and historically speaking, the Arab world hasn't always been of one mind. Do you think they are truly of one mind as regards this plan?

MR. SOFAER: Oh, definitely not. Definitely not. But, up to now, most of the Arab world, other than the states that have made peace with Israel, have been of one mind -- and that is a very negative mind. So it's good to have the Saudis out there, advocating something positive and having the Arab League, which is most of the other Arab states, supporting it.

MR. CROSBY: Do you see, though, Ariel Sharon going along with the idea of withdrawing, in any degree, from territory occupied in the 1967 War?

MR. SOFAER: Yes, I do, at some point. I would try to bring about some practical adjustments early on, by using Sharon's ideas. With Sharon, I've been advocating this since he came into office. But it's very regrettable that the U.S. did not take a very positive and, I think one might even say, aggressive role in trying to get Sharon to do some of the positive things he said he was prepared to do very early on, before this Intifada really escalated. I think some things might have been doable that could have created a much better atmosphere.

Sharon realizes that the Palestinians live a much worse life than the Israelis. And he realizes that one thing above all they need is the ability to move around, have a commercial and social relationship among each other, and that they can't do that without having some kind of a road or some kind of access from all these different heavily populated areas without Israeli roadblocks in the way. And Sharon had indicated that he understood that and that he was willing to work toward that.

I think it is unfortunate that everyone was focused on the overall peace plans, which are totally unworkable at this stage, and instead of trying to implement some of these limited proposals that Sharon put on the table which would have put the peace process, I believe, back on track, we let it stand and our negotiators even continually try to find overall formulas to return to Taba-style negotiations or Camp David-style negotiations. And that is utterly futile, just as futile as getting cease-fires.

HOST: Abraham Sofaer, a former legal advisor on Mideast affairs to the State Department.

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