28 March 2002
Preparing NATO to Meet New Threats, by Richard L. Kugler
(Says terrorism, WMD present NATO with major challenges) (1960)
(This byliner by Richard Kugler was published in the electronic
journal, "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," on March 27. The article and
the entire journal can be found on the Internet at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/ijpe0302.htm. No
republication restrictions.)
PREPARING NATO TO MEET NEW THREATS: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
By Richard L. Kugler
(The author is a distinguished research professor in the Institute for
National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in
Washington.)
In dealing with the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), NATO is confronted with one of its biggest
challenges in many years, but an imperative opportunity, too. As the
events of September 11 and the ongoing war on terrorism show, the
challenge is to meet dangerous threats that are arising far outside
NATO's borders, but gravely menace the safety and security of both
North America and Europe. The opportunity is to reform NATO so that it
can better defend against these threats and defeat them. NATO has
begun pursuing this agenda, but thus far, critics portray its response
as shaky and incomplete. Whether NATO will react decisively remains to
be seen, but one thing can be said: Throughout its long history, NATO
has flourished as the world's best alliance of democracies because it
has always risen to the occasion and changed with the times. For the
good of all members, it needs to do so again.
The New Threats of a Globalizing World
Make no mistake, modern-day terrorism and WMD proliferation are
"Article 5 threats" in NATO's parlance. So-called "Article 4 threats"
are directed only against common interests outside NATO's borders:
ethnic warfare in the Balkans is a good example. By contrast, the new
threats are capable of violating NATO's borders and striking the
societies of all its members as well as their military forces: the
time-honored definition of Article 5 threats that activate NATO's
collective defense pledge. Unlike terrorism of the past, moreover, the
new threats are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage. The
terrorist strikes on the United States on September 11 killed over
3,000 innocent people from many countries -- more than the attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941. Future attacks are not only possible but seem
likely. Yet these threats seem small in comparison to the greater
damage that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons could inflict if
they are unleashed. Today the United States lives under siege. Can
Europe be far behind?
Why are these threats emerging? The direct answer is the evil
intentions of perpetrators who are willing to inflict massive
destruction on their victims, NATO members and other countries as
well. But the full reasons are wider and more deep-seated. The new
geopolitics is one reason: new forms of rivalry among nation-states
and political ideologies that transnational groups, such as
terrorists, are joining. Another cause is globalization, the
accelerating cross-border flow of trade, finances, technology, and
communications that is drawing once-distant regions closer together,
creating webs of interdependent ties. Earlier, globalization was seen
as uniformly positive because it offered to bring economic growth and
democracy to all corners of the world. But more recently,
globalization has emerged as hydra-headed, for it also strains regions
unprepared for the information era, modernization, and stiff
competition in global markets. Globalization is producing a bifurcated
world. Yes, it is making the already-prosperous democracies even
wealthier, while helping others make progress. But elsewhere, it is
nurturing venomous anti-western ideologies and deeply angry actors --
nihilistic terrorists and menacing countries bent on acquiring WMD
systems -- that are willing to lash out against the western
democracies and others that they blame for their fate.
These new threats are merging together in ways that reinforce each
other. They also are gaining access to the modern information systems
and technologies that allow them to inflict violence at very long
distances, from one continent to the next. Beyond this, these threats
are bringing further chaos and turmoil to the vast southern arc of
instability, stretching from the Middle East to the Asian littoral,
along which most of them reside. This trend is rapidly making NATO's
old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 obsolete. While the
new threats are arising in regions well outside Europe, they menace
NATO's strategic interests, its democratic values, and its physical
safety at the same time.
Crafting a Political and Strategic Response
As U.S. policy recognizes, the western democracies must mount a strong
political and strategic response to growing dangers that, if left
unchecked, could cause the early 21st century to go up in smoke.
Clearly, this response must aspire to bring better governance, market
economies, and modernizing societies to poverty-stricken regions along
the southern arc and elsewhere, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Just as
clearly, this response must also aspire to defeat the twin threats of
global terrorism and WMD proliferation. The United States and its
European allies must defend themselves against these serious threats.
In addition, these threats must first be quelled if long-term efforts
to bring progress to troubled regions are to succeed. In today's
world, the pursuit of security and progress must go hand-in-hand.
Indeed, the former is a precondition for the latter.
The United States will lead the response in the security arena, but it
cannot carry the weight alone, nor should it be expected to do so. As
Europe's premier security institution, NATO is the natural vehicle for
helping prepare Europe's contribution, organize it, and harmonize it
with U.S. efforts. In the aftermath of September 11, NATO rose to the
occasion by declaring global terrorism an Article 5 threat. It sent
AWACS aircraft to help defend the U.S. skies, assigned naval forces to
patrol the eastern Mediterranean, increased intelligence sharing,
initiated an inventory of national civil emergency resources, and
bolstered multilateral coordination of law-enforcement measures aimed
at rooting out terrorist cells. When U.S. forces launched combat
operations in Afghanistan, British forces joined them, and other
European countries offered to help. Later, several European countries,
including Germany and France, sent troops to lead multinational
peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and their special forces took part in
Operation Anaconda against lingering al-Qaida strongholds.
Now that the United States is widening the war on terrorism to other
regions and preparing to confront such WMD proliferators as Iraq, the
situation calls for the Europeans and NATO to launch additional
efforts in support. While the United States must not act unilaterally
when multilateralism is viable, the Europeans must not sit on the
sidelines, criticizing but not helping. Will they respond
constructively? Much depends upon Europe's leaders and a healthy
transatlantic dialogue. Because a debate is in progress across Europe,
critics have their doubts. Yet vigorous debate is nothing new for
NATO. In the past, debates have always been the forerunner of a
widespread consensus behind strong political and strategic responses
that met the requirements of difficult times, including during the
Cold War when the dangers were also great and the policy issues
equally thorny. Hopefully the past will be prologue.
The Agenda Ahead
NATO's strategic response needs to cover the full spectrum of policy
instruments: political, diplomatic, economic, and military. This
demanding agenda necessitates that even as NATO enlarges to welcome
new members and pursues a close dialogue with Russia, it cannot afford
to become a loose collective security pact that lacks military teeth
and strategic punch. In addition to bolstering homeland defenses on
both sides of the Atlantic, NATO must strengthen its capacity to
launch demanding security operations well outside Europe, for it will
not be able to cope with the new threats if it remains a
border-defense alliance. NATO should not become a "global alliance,"
but it does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisely in
other theaters.
A compelling case can be made that NATO should rewrite or amend its
current strategic concept, adopted in 1999, in order to establish a
consensus for new policies aimed at managing the new threats. Such a
consensus should neither ask the Europeans to support U.S. efforts in
rote ways nor give them a brake on assertive U.S.-led efforts.
Instead, it should establish a common framework for the United States
and Europe to act together in energetic, collaborative ways.
Harmonizing alternative views requires patient dialogue, but this
approach has worked in the past, and it can work again. The United
States and some European countries may not always agree on specific
actions, but their core interests and goals are compatible in ways
that normally will permit common perspectives.
NATO also must ensure that it continues to act as an alliance of
equals. As during the Cold War, its future efforts in specific areas
may be carried out by coalitions of the committed and able. Sometimes
these coalitions may act outside the NATO structure, with NATO in
support. But NATO should steer away from any "division of labor" that
divides the alliance into separate blocs. This judgment applies to
politics and diplomacy, but it especially holds true for military
operations. NATO should not expect the United States and Britain to
act as "bad cops," while other members act as "good cops" who pursue
peaceful reconciliation with adversaries. Nor should the United States
and Britain carry out the intense combat missions, while other NATO
members perform peacekeeping in the aftermath. Nor should the United
States perform high-tech bombing missions, while other members fight
on the ground. A seamless sharing of duties, coupled with a flexible
approach to the particulars, is best.
Finally, NATO and the Europeans must improve their military
capabilities for missions against the new threats. Today's European
militaries are larger and stronger than is commonly realized, with 2.4
million active-duty troops and $150 billion in defense spending. But
because they still focus on defending their borders, they lack the
capacity to project power to long distances, where the new threats
reside. In addition, they are in danger of falling further behind the
U.S. military as it transforms itself with new operational doctrines
and technologies, including modern information systems, sensors, and
munitions. If today's interoperability gap widens further, European
and U.S. forces might not be able to fight together even if Europe's
political leaders do not want to sit on the sidelines and watch.
While a crash defense buildup is not necessary, the Europeans need to
configure a portion of their forces for swift power projection and
high-tech strike operations with U.S. forces. To help guide this
effort, NATO could replace its ongoing "Defense Capabilities
Initiative" with a tighter-focused transformation effort aimed at
acquiring high-priority capabilities. Initially this effort might
create a small European "spearhead force": a fully networked force
composed of about 60,000 ground troops, plus several fighter wings
with smart munitions and naval combatants with cruise missiles. Such a
posture would be similar in size to the European Union's force for
Petersberg tasks, but its NATO mission would be to complement similar
spearhead forces that the new U.S. defense strategy is creating. If
the Europeans create such a force, their relevance to the new era will
grow faster than critics think possible.
Conclusion
The upcoming Prague Summit in November 2002 offers a forum for
launching a new era of NATO change and reform. Undeniably, pursuing
this weighty agenda will change NATO's strategic horizons and the
transatlantic relationship as well. But the new threats make this
agenda essential, for otherwise NATO will erode and its members will
be left endangered. This imperative defines both the challenge and the
opportunity ahead.
(Note: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S.
Government.)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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