26 March 2002
Wolfowitz Says Muslim Allies Key to Fighting al Qaeda
(Pentagon official discusses Indonesia, Philippines) (3490)
Reaching out to allies in the Muslim world is a key part of fighting
the al Qaeda terrorist organization, according to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz.
In a March 21 telephone interview with two reporters from the New York
Times, Wolfowitz said it was probable that Indonesia, with the world's
largest Muslim population, is a target of recruitment by the al Qaeda
terrorist organization, but he expressed confidence that the coalition
against terrorism has "a great ally not only in the government of
Indonesia but in most of the people of Indonesia."
A key part of the U.S. strategy against al Qaeda is to "reach out as
much as we can to our many allies in the Muslim world, and there are
probably close to 200 million of those in Indonesia," he said.
The Defense Department official contrasted U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism in the Philippines with efforts in Indonesia, stressing the
different circumstances in the two nations.
"The huge difference between the Philippines and Indonesia is in the
Philippines there are known locations like Basilan Island where known
terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda are operating and where the
Philippines armed forces have great difficult getting at them,"
Wolfowitz said.
"There is no comparable problem" in Indonesia, he continued.
Wolfowitz described the situation in Indonesia as similar to that
found in "most of those 60 countries where al Qaeda has a presence
including the United States and many if not most European countries."
Al Qaeda's presence in Indonesia is "much more" a law enforcement
challenge than a military one, he said, noting that there are no plans
to introduce U.S. troops into Indonesia in the fight against
terrorism.
"Quite frankly I can't conceive of the circumstances in which that
would be called for," the Defense Department official said.
At the same time, the Bush administration has been working with
Congress "to find ways" to work with the Indonesia military that will
encourage reforms in that institution, he said.
Wolfowitz said that the United States has to find ways to "encourage
reform in the Indonesian military rather than seem to turn a blind eye
to some of the past problems."
While Jakarta's military has been criticized for abuses, Wolfowitz
noted, "it's also a critical national institution in that country."
"The more we can deal with them and have influence with them the more
I think it helps our overall relationship and therefore obviously does
have some application to the dealing with terrorism," he said.
Following is the Department of Defense transcript of the event:
(begin transcript)
NEWS TRANSCRIPT
from the United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
Thursday, March 21, 2002
(Telephone Interview with Tom Shanker and David Sanger, of the New
York Times)
Q: Before we start we're hoping to do this on the record as we discuss
Indonesia, knowing it's a great interest of yours and of ours as well.
If you feel the need to go on background we can certainly do that, but
is on the record. Okay with you?
Wolfowitz: On the record is fine, and we're actually taping it on our
end. We have to disclose that.
Q: That's perfectly fine.
Q: If you feel like there's something we need to know that you can't
attribute, feel free. We would rather have truth than quotes.
(Laughter)
Q: But so clearly Indonesia is an interesting scenario as the Pentagon
and the Administration view the next step in the war on global terror,
its links to al Qaeda, the indigenous terrorism there. We were just
curious if you could discuss that and really what the plans are as you
move into the next stage.
Wolfowitz: I'm happy to. Let me start by setting some context because
I've been struck that even highly educated people in this city, even
with all of the focus on relations of the Muslim world that has
developed since September 11th, are surprised when you tell them that
Indonesia has the largest population of any country in the Muslim
world.
Q: They weren't reading us, Paul.
Wolfowitz: They weren't reading you.
Well, I was about to actually throw a big bouquet in the direction of
the New York Times. You had a fantastic piece on Saturday about this
remarkable man who I've known for a long time, Nurcholish Madjid, who
is one of the leading Muslim figures in Indonesia. He is so prominent
that he was actually, they talked about drafting him for President
back after Suharto fell.
Q: I remember that.
Wolfowitz: One of the quotes in your article a week ago, I guess, it
was from Jakarta, has him saying that the major religions in the world
have more in common than differences. "We all come from the same
fountain of wisdom, God."
That is the polar opposite of the criminals that we've been going
after who are claiming to act in the name of Islam and it is the
overwhelming view of most Indonesians. I mean a variation on that.
Most Indonesian Muslims, not to mention the many other religions that
are represented in that country.
I think it's terribly important for Americans to understand that
context because coming to it all of a sudden after September 11th and
hearing the word Muslim and hearing the word terrorist, people really
jump to some rather crazy conclusions. I think we have a great ally
not only in the government of Indonesia but in most of the people of
Indonesia and I think it's a key part of our overall strategy as I
have said a number of times, is to reach out as much as we can to our
many allies in the Muslim world, and there are probably close to 200
million of those in Indonesia.
Q: The President when he had his press conference about a week ago I
asked him a question that basically said we have a category of people
who have been very helpful on terrorism and in some cases have invited
the U.S. in to help, and you would put the Philippines obviously in
that category and Georgia and others.
Then you have a grayer area of people who have been allies but clearly
have not yet invited us in and I think Indonesia would be in that. Now
he didn't go down the road of following Indonesia very far, and I can
understand why in a press conference he might not want to. But there
is this sort of disconnect that you have a very active operation in
the Philippines where we have been invited in, but as people talk to
you about where the cells are that people are concerned about you hear
more about Indonesia.
So I'm wondering whether the Philippine model or some other model is
what you have in mind.
Wolfowitz: First of all just to say quickly, the Filipinos have, as
you said, invited us in. They have welcomed our assistance to their
forces in training and it's not a trivial difference --
Q: No, I understand.
Wolfowitz: We're not talking Philippines here.
Q: Right.
Wolfowitz: The huge difference between the Philippines and Indonesia
is in the Philippines there are known locations like Basilan Island
where known terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda are operating and
where the Philippines armed forces have great difficult getting at
them. There is no comparable problem in Indonesia.
The Indonesian problem is much more to be analogized to the situation
of most of those 60 countries where al Qaeda has a presence including
the United States and many if not most European countries, where if
they had that kind of -- If you knew where they were it wouldn't be a
militarily difficult proposition to go after them. It's much more --
really a law enforcement challenge. That's really the context in which
most of our discussions with the Indonesians are taking place. In fact
on the counterterrorism subject all of those things are being done
through law enforcement types of channels.
Bob Mueller, the head of the FBI, was just in Indonesia last week I
believe and had some pretty complementary things to say about the
level of cooperation we're getting from them.
So I think it's a very important difference. The Philippines is one of
those countries that has places where they need to be more militarily
effective if they're going to go after terrorists. It's not a military
problem in Indonesia.
Q: So the congressional restraints on mil-to-mil ties, Mr. Secretary,
to you do not represent a hindrance to helping Indonesia combat
terrorism?
(Line dropped)
Wolfowitz: Give me the question again, I think I got it all, but --
Q: Sure. As you describe the problem in Indonesia as being one that's
basically law enforcement, I was just wondering whether you think that
congressional restraints on mil-to-mil ties with Indonesia are in any
way a hindrance to pursuing Administration objectives on the terror
war there.
Wolfowitz: We're working quite closely with Congress and consulting
quite closely, and the concerns that the Congress has are concerns
that we share, and frankly they're concerns to some extent, maybe more
than some extent, are concerns in Indonesia about some of the abuses
of the past.
But I think we also have been trying, working with the Congress to
find ways to work forward with the Indonesia military in a context
that we believe strongly that they need to reform. But it's also a
critical national institution in that country and the more we can deal
with them and have influence with them the more I think it helps our
overall relationship and therefore obviously does have some
application to the dealing with terrorism.
The trick is to find ways to move forward that encourage reform in the
Indonesian military rather than seem to turn a blind eye to some of
the past problems, but at the same time I think we've seen in the case
of Pakistan for example that it doesn't really do any good for any of
our objectives -- whether it's human rights or counterterrorism if we
cut ourselves off nearly completely from the military authorities,
especially in countries where the military still has a significant
role to play.
Q: Sure. But just to ask another question straightforward, there's
been so much speculation about asking whether American troops can go
there or considering an invitation. Are there any plans right now to
send American troops to Indonesia?
Wolfowitz: No there aren't, and quite frankly I can't conceive of the
circumstances in which that would be called for.
There are two major sensitivities that we are acutely aware of. One
are the ones that are alluded to in your reference to Congress and
it's not just congressional concerns, as I said, it's the basic need
for military reform. But the other is a deep sense of national pride
and independence on the part of the Indonesians, and if we want their
cooperation and their cooperation is essential to success, we can't
look like we're interfering in their internal affairs. As I said at
the beginning, they don't -- Pardon?
Q: At times they haven't even wanted military humanitarian aid.
Wolfowitz: I think that's an example of the distancing that has taken
place because of some of the problems of the past has made it -- I
think in normal circumstances we could easily get back to where
humanitarian assistance would be welcomed, but we've got to get a
better basis, a better relationship before we can get to there.
In many ways in the past they've shown a considerable level of
confidence. They have the capability, I think, to deal with their own
problems.
Q: How much of this is a concern about the sensitivities of the
Indonesian military and how much is it a concern about not undermining
Megawati herself, who --
Wolfowitz: When I say concern about not appearing to interfere in
their internal affairs, I certainly mean not giving any cause for that
very small element that really does represent extreme Islam a chance
to characterize what's taking place here as a war of the United States
against Islam or even worse, a war of the United States against
Indonesia. It is emphatically neither, and we have made it clear over
and over again, it's neither. I think what Megawati and her government
have to be able to do is to make it clear that whatever actions they
are taking, they're taking in pursuit of Indonesia's interests, not
because the United States is pressuring them to do something on our
behalf against Islam and we are not.
Q: What have you learned from the arrests that happened in the
Philippines of these three Indonesians, one of whom seemed to be a
member or a treasurer of Amien Rais's Islamic party. But they seem to
be, some of them may have had some explosive equipment, but they seem
to be part of this Singapore-Indonesia-Malaysia cell that you've been
concerned with.
Wolfowitz: I think it's one of the things that's raised the level of
concern in Indonesia about the possible recruiting that al Qaeda may
be doing there, and it isn't surprising in a country with 200 million
Muslims that al Qaeda might find some recruits. I mean they found some
in the United Kingdom, as I recall.
And I think the reaction in Indonesia has been a very healthy one of
being quite concerned that their own people have gotten involved in
these sorts of movements. But again, it's very misleading to suggest
that this is a widespread problem or one where we're not getting, I
think, a pretty good level of cooperation.
Q: It's been suggested to me that until September 11th happened we
didn't even know about this main Islam Jemaah group that, certainly I
didn't know about it but I didn't know whether you folks did, but the
most extremist of these groups that we seem most concerned about
didn't seem to show up on anybody's radar until September 11th.
Wolfowitz: You know we're learning an awful lot since September 11th,
all over the world about all kinds of things.
Q: Were you aware of them before then?
Wolfowitz: I was not and I don't know that we as a government were. I
know that we, for example, learned things in Afghanistan that helped
lead us to the cell in Singapore and I think that in turn has
developed a lot of the knowledge that we have.
Again, it's a very good opportunity to repeat that the problem here
isn't one of having military capability to go after people, which is
the problem in some remote areas of the Philippines. The problem is,
as in Germany or the United States, finding who these people are and
where they're located, and once you do that then it's a matter of
arresting them.
And we've had, by the way, in at least one significant case that I
know of, great cooperation from the Indonesian authorities in locating
and arresting and rendering one particularly dangerous person to his
home country.
Q: Who was that?
Wolfowitz: I think there's good reason not to get into too many
details. But it comes to my mind that we've had, I think, significant
cooperation where we've had specific cases to --
Q: But it was not an arrest in Indonesia, it was an arrest elsewhere.
Wolfowitz: No, it was a non-Indonesian whom they arrested and
deported.
Q: And this is since 9-11?
Wolfowitz: Oh, yeah.
Q: Is there any evidence that al Qaeda fleeing Afghanistan are making
their way toward Indonesia because of its islands and archipelago and
places to hide?
Wolfowitz: I am not aware of any evidence that that is taking place.
There is a lot that we don't know about how these people are sneaking
out and where they're sneaking to. But to the extent that we are
getting indications of where they're going or what routes they're
taking or names like Iran and Yemen and even Pakistan and sometimes
the Caucuses pop up, I have yet to see even a fragmentary report that
suggests Indonesia as a terribly safe location for them at this time.
It's very easy, and I think it's worth repeating. Because Indonesia is
predominantly Muslim -- and by the way you have to say it that way
because it's not a country that has any state religion. Islam is not
the state religion and tolerance is enshrined in their constitution.
But because it's predominantly Muslim it's very easy for even the
slightest thing that's said on the subject to get amplified in ways
that are kind of inflammatory.
Q: So when you say there was really no consideration and you can't
imagine there would be consideration given the political concerns
you've mentioned and the concern that you can't, an individual place
to get at, could we fairly say from that you folks have pretty much
taken off the table doing a Philippines kind of consulting/training
operations of the military type with the Indonesians?
Wolfowitz: You know I get in trouble here because we never take
options off the table, but I can tell you there is no such option on
the table, and I have trouble conceiving of how that would make sense.
I can think of all the ways in which it would be counterproductive --
Q: That could blow up on you.
Wolfowitz: Yeah, and I can't see where it's necessary.
What would be useful, and I don't want to mislead you here. What would
be useful, what we are exploring mostly internally and in consultation
with the Congress is ways to modestly move forward in our
military-to-military contacts with Indonesia to help them be more
efficient, to help them undertake some of the reforms they need to
undertake and to give us more contact with this enormously influential
institution.
Q: Would this be the plan of doing the limited contacts on
counterterrorism and on counternarcotics?
Wolfowitz: Or maybe even on more modest things like humanitarian
relief. I mean there are hundreds of thousands of internally displaced
people in Indonesia. It's a big problem for that country. It's largely
a civil problem, but if there are things that we can help train their
military to do that help deal with the humanitarian aspects of that
problem, for example, I would think that would be on the table.
But because of where we started from and because of their
sensitivities we're really moving very carefully.
Q: We'd be remiss if we had you on the telephone and we did not ask
you an Iraq question. I know how eager you are --
Wolfowitz: -- run out of time. (Laughter)
Q: One quick one.
Cheney is now back. He got the predictable public response, and I
thought you said that you thought that privately he might have gotten
a somewhat different message. Then Condi has said to us a couple of
times recently that if there was going to be an inspection regime
moved the next step it would have to be so incredibly intrusive
because you've had them out for three years. She said she couldn't
even imagine what its scale would be. All of which leads us to ask
you, with Cheney back, what's the logical next step now? Is it
inspection? Is it elsewhere?
Wolfowitz: I'd say the logical next step is to sit down with him and
get a very thorough account of what he thinks he's heard and how he
evaluates it, and really I also wouldn't want people to think that he
went there solely to talk about that issue. He went there really to
talk about a very wide range of issues and he didn't go there with a
specific American proposal that we were trying to get people to sign
up to.
There are a lot of aspects to Iraq policy. There's the whole issue as
you alluded to in that reference to Condi about weapons of mass
destruction. There are issues about how we can encourage the
democratic opposition against pretty fearsome odds there. There are
issues about how we manage sanctions and those controls. So I think
all of those -- We look at that stuff on almost a weekly basis and
it's all in the framework of what the President said in his State of
the Union message which is we have a serious problem here and we
haven't decided all the full strategy for dealing with it but it's not
something we can put off for another ten years.
Q: Thank you so much for your time today.
Q: Thanks a lot.
Wolfowitz: Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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