22 March 2002
U.S. Must Stay The Course in Afghanistan, Biden Says
(U.S. cannot let Afghanistan slip back into chaos) (4260)
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee says the United
States must stick with the job of helping Afghanistan recover from
years of Taliban misrule by helping establish the security necessary
for civil society to emerge.
Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat of Delaware), in a March 21 speech to
the Senate, reported on his trip to Afghanistan earlier this year and
the security situation he found there.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman laid out a course of
action for the United States regarding that troubled country.
Although encouraging economic development, creating political
structures, and reestablishing medical and educational facilities are
important, Biden said, none of them are possible without "security on
the ground."
Calling the establishment of security "the central piece of the
puzzle," Biden said that if the United States can establish security,
"all else can follow -- and without it, nothing else can grow."
The Delaware Democrat said he agrees with the Bush administration
that, for the long-term, the Kabul government should provide for the
country's security with its own national army and police force.
But that is two years away, he said, while the interim security forces
will see their mandate expire in June of this year, unless it is
extended.
In Afghanistan, America has no choice but to stay the course, Biden
said.
"If Afghanistan returns to a state of lawlessness and disorder, two
things are pretty much certain to happen," Biden said.
"First, the Taliban, or some new and equally brutal group, will
establish control over all or part of the country, and they will
provide safe haven to any terrorists, drug-traffickers and violent
insurgents willing to pay their price," he said.
"Second, these terrorists will once again use Afghanistan as a base to
launch attacks on the United States to destabilize regimes all around
the world," he warned.
At the present time, Biden said, "Afghanistan is not-so-slowly falling
back into chaos," with the Kabul-based interim government of Hamid
Karzai exerting "very little control over most of the country."
Biden said the role of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) should be extended beyond Kabul "to several key sites
throughout the country."
Such an expansion of the area covered "would entail an increase in
troop strength from the current 5,000," Biden acknowledged. "Some
sources say 25,000 troops would be needed, others say the mission
could be accomplished with a more modest increase."
The ISAF's mandate, he continued, "must be extended for 2 years. This
would provide sufficient time for the creation of an indigenous Afghan
army and police force, and insure a smooth transition to the new
Afghan government."
In addition, the ISAF must be given "robust rules of engagement, and
all the equipment, airlift, and intelligence necessary to accomplish
its mission," Biden said.
"Let's make no mistake here -- the troops on the ground are not and
must not be blue-helmeted peacekeepers. These are, and must be,
peacemakers. We need rough, tough, combat-ready forces, with the
ability to take names and impose order," Biden said.
And behind the ISAF, Biden said, the United States "must be fully
engaged as the mission's guarantor of last resort."
Following is the text of Biden's March 21 speech on Afghanistan from
the Congressional Record:
(begin text)
STAYING THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR SECURITY
Senate
March 21, 2002
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, about 2 months ago I spent half a week in
the Afghan capital city of Kabul, and virtually every conversation I
had during my time there revolved around a single question: Would
America stay the course?
After all our successful military actions, after all our promises on
reconstruction, after all our commitments to prevent Afghanistan from
relapsing into chaos and warlordism, would we really have the stomach
to get the job done?
Whether I was talking to refugees living in bestial squalor, or to
Chairman Karzai in a palace where the electricity barely functioned;
Whether I was talking to NATO soldiers in the international security
force, to representatives of the U.N. and international humanitarian
groups, or to our own American servicemen and servicewomen so
valiantly risking their lives for a just cause; whoever I was talking
to, the questions remained basically the same: Would we have the
steadiness, determination, and commitment to remain engaged? Would we
demonstrate the leadership necessary to keep the international
coalition together? Would we maintain our resolve for the long haul,
once the immediate battles had been won and our nation's attention had
started to turn away from this remote and forbidding part of the
world?
I will tell you now what I told them then: We can, we must, and we
will.
Let me take a few minutes to explain what I mean, and how I see our
role in Afghanistan over months and, yes, the years to come. But
first, I suggest that we all remember just why we sent troops to
Afghanistan in the first place. I can sum it up in three syllables:
9-1-1.
Our rationale for entering the fray was very simple: Our Nation had
come under attack, the most horrific single attack we had ever
experienced in all our history, and the de facto rulers of Afghanistan
were actively sheltering the terrorists who orchestrated this deed. We
gave the Taliban every opportunity to surrender Usama bin Laden and
his band of thugs, but the Taliban chose instead to link themselves
ever more closely to al Qaeda.
The decision to go to war is never easy, but in this case it was
inevitable. The decision was made for us, as I and the rest of the
Members here were assembling for morning business on a Tuesday in
September.
Our troops have done a truly outstanding job fighting this war, as the
recent battle in Shahi-kot demonstrates, the Taliban and al Qaeda are
scattered and on the run.
But we always knew that this would be the easy part. As President
Bush, Secretary Powell, and Secretary Rumsfeld have correctly noted,
our war on terror will be a long one, and we can't expect our early
victories to be the final word.
Let's remember that in 1979, it took the Soviet forces no more than 10
days to establish control over every major population center in
Afghanistan. The really tough part, we knew from the beginning,
wouldn't be ousting the Taliban and al Qaeda -- the tough part would
be making sure that they stayed ousted.
That is why we have no choice but to stay the course. If Afghanistan
returns to a state of lawlessness and disorder, two things are pretty
much certain to happen.
First, the Taliban, or some new and equally brutal group, will
establish control over all or part of the country, and they will
provide safe haven to any terrorists, drug-traffickers and violent
insurgents willing to pay their price;
Second, these terrorists will once again use Afghanistan as a base to
launch attacks on the United States to destabilize regimes all around
the world.
If we don't do the job right, mark my words: U.S. troops will be right
back in Afghanistan a year or two down the line, only this time, we
will be doing the fighting all by ourselves.
Let us think about that for a moment. The victories we've seen over
the past 5 months have been American victories -- but they are not
only American victories. At every step along the way, we have relied
on our Afghan allies for the bulk of the troops on the ground.
Whether we're talking about battles for Kabul or Kandahar, for Mazar-e
Sharif or Tora Bora, the pattern has generally been hundreds of
American troops spearheading thousands of Afghan fighters.
This pattern is far from perfect -- as the porousness of our cordon at
Tora Bora and, most recently, Shahi-kot demonstrate, sometimes Afghan
troops are no substitute for U.S. infantrymen.
But without our Afghan allies, imperfect as they have sometimes been,
we would not have been able to achieve our impressive victories in
anything like the time-frame we have achieved them.
And that point is vital to our future strategy: As many people in
Kabul told me, from Chairman Karzai right on down to mud-on-the-boots
G.I.s patrolling the airbase at Bagram, we have only got one chance to
do it right.
As I was constantly reminded, the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan
abruptly in 1989, just as soon as our short-term objectives had been
met. If we do so again, I was told time after time, then we had better
not expect any Afghans to fight on our side when a new nest of
terrorists requires military action in the future.
The stakes, in short, could not be higher. Some people are of the
opinion that we can pull out relatively soon, that any future military
action would be as "easy" as the present one.
"We've got the most powerful military out there," they say, "we don't
need the help of unreliable Afghan and incompetent Europeans--we can
go it alone." To anyone who labors under this delusion, I say, take a
trip to Afghanistan.
Go there, talk to the people, have a look at the terrain. Anybody who
does, I suggest, will return firmly convinced that we must stay the
course. We have got to do the job right this time--because it may be
the last chance we get.
So what does "doing the job right" entail? There are several parts to
the equation -- economic reconstruction, building political
institutions, clearing minefields, creating the educational, medical,
and other infrastructure necessary for long-term self-sufficiency.
But none of these elements are possible without security on the
ground. That's the central piece of the puzzle. If we establish
security, all else can follow--and without it, nothing else can grow.
For the long term, according to the plans of the U.S. administration
and the U.N. organizers, Afghanistan's internal and external security
will be provided by a national army and police force.
This is the right way to go, and I fully support all the efforts
currently under way to create these institutions. But you can't create
them overnight. It takes time to recruit, train, equip, and solidify a
truly capable, professionalized force.
In Kabul I received an extensive briefing from Maj. Gen. McColl, the
British commander of the International Security force authorized by
the U.N. to maintain order in the capital.
Gen. McColl's planners has worked up a detailed strategy for creating
an Afghan army and taking at least the heavy weaponry away from local
warlords. Even to create a bare-bones force of a few brigades, he
found, would take up to 2 years.
So what happens in the meantime? What is happening right now? I am
afraid the answer isn't very encouraging. In the meantime -- right now
-- Afghanistan is not-so-slowly falling back into chaos.
The interim government of Hamid Karzai exerts very little control over
most of the country: In Herat, Gen. Ismail Khan rules as a
semi-independent baron -- and entertains emissaries from Iran, who are
anxious to expand their sphere of influence.
In Mazar-e Sharif, the brutal warlord Gen. Abdurrashid Dostum has
picked up where he left off when he was ousted by the Taliban--and his
record suggests that he will take his current duties as Deputy Defense
Minister no more seriously than his past promises to virtually every
party in the conflict.
In Kabul itself, Defense Minister Fahim maintains the fiction that his
own militia, basically the Northern Alliance troops, is serving as a
nonpartisan national army.
It is clear to all observers, however, that these soldiers owe their
allegiance to Fahim and various sub-commanders--and not to the
legally-constituted civil authority.
In the Pasthun areas, a wide array of local warlords play all sides
against every other -- accepting money and arms from the U.S. and the
Taliban alike, even attempting to use American air power to settle
their own petty feuds.
There have even been credible reports of various warlords falsely
identifying their local rivals as al Qaeda in order to call in
American airstrikes -- putting U.S. servicemen in harm's way to
advance their own sordid objectives.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan's predatory neighbors sit on the sidelines --
but not for long. Afghanistan's bloody civil war has long been fueled
by arms, money, and recruits drawn from the surrounding nations.
The neighboring meddlers include Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and
Russia, but a variety of other nations slightly further afield have
got into the game at one time or another. Each has attempted to
reshape Afghan politics for its own narrow interests--to the detriment
of the people, and the instability of the region.
All have basically kept their hands off while U.S. troops have ruled
the roost. But the moment the last troop transport takes off, expect
the jockeying to begin all over.
Ever had a neighbor who pops in to borrow a cup of sugar and invites
himself to dinner? Maybe a distant relative who stops by to say
"hello," and never seems to leave? Well, the Afghans know how it
feels.
They have had to suffer with unwelcome houseguests for thirty years.
And they know that as soon as the door is open -- as soon as the
American troops leave --all of these unsavory interlopers will come
flocking back.
So what's the solution? How do we -- together with the rest of the
world community -- provide Afghanistan with a year or two of breathing
room to let it build up a national army and police force of its own?
There are basically two possible paths.
Have American troops continue to serve as the de facto security force,
or get the international community to share our burden.
Fortunately, a mechanism exists to make this second option a reality
-- it's the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF for short,
and it can save us from the necessity of being Afghanistan's only
policeman.
Right now, ISAF is strictly limited by its U.N. mandate. Its 5,000
troops are confined to Kabul, and even there they have to tread
gingerly. The unit is currently under the command of the British, but
the Brits plan to transfer command as soon as April.
The entire mandate ends in June -- precisely when its continuing
presence is most needed to safeguard the Loya Jirga, or Great Council
to be convened as the next step in the process of political
rebuilding.
So here, in a nutshell, is what we have to do.
First, this international security force must be extended from Kabul
to several key sites throughout the country.
It should be expanded to Mazar, Kandahar, and perhaps other cities
such as Jalalabad or Gardez. Such an expansion would entail an
increase in troop strength from the current 5,000. Some sources say
25,000 troops would be needed, others say the mission could be
accomplished with a more modest increase.
I will not presume to venture an opinion on the precise number, I will
just say that we should make sure the military planners have as many
troops as they deem necessary to do the job right.
This expansion should not and will not interfere with ongoing U.S.
operations against Taliban and al-Quida remnants.
Currently, the ISAF commander is subordinate in theater to the U.S.
commander, and there has been no question of ISAF troops encroaching
on American operations. Quite the opposite--ISAF troops are a force
multiplier, and free up American assets that would otherwise have to
be used to guard and protect bases at transport hubs such as Bagram.
Second, the mandate of the international security force must be
extended for 2 years. This would provide sufficient time for the
creation of an indigenous Afghan army and police force, and insure a
smooth transition to the new Afghan government.
Third, the international security force must be given robust rules of
engagement, and all the equipment, airlift, and intelligence necessary
to accomplish its mission.
Let's make no mistake here--the troops on the ground are not and must
not be blue-helmeted peacekeepers. These are, and must be,
peacemakers. We need rough, tough, combat-ready forces, with the
ability to take names and impose order.
Fourth, the U.S. must be fully engaged as the mission's guarantor of
last resort. That does not necessarily mean we have send U.S. troops,
although we shouldn't rule it out off the bat.
What it does mean, however, is that we commit ourselves to insuring
the mission's success.
Maybe we can achieve this goal by providing airlift, intelligence,
funding, and diplomatic support.
Maybe we also have to provide the promise of troops extraction, air
combat assets, and the ultimate ace-in-the-hole of sending the cavalry
to the rescue if things get too hot.
But, one way or another, this is a goal we must achieve--not merely
for the sake of Afghanistan, but for the national security interest of
the United States.
When I go around the country talking about the need for a robust
security force, with the U.S. providing the ultimate guarantee of
success, I'm often asked whether that's an implicit call for the
participation of American ground troops. It is a fair question, but
it's putting the cart before the horse.
I would prefer it if we could accomplish our mission without deploying
a single U.S. soldier.
I would prefer it if other nations could do the job without our troops
on the ground. And maybe they can.
But my past experience, both in the Balkans and elsewhere, leads me to
doubt that this will be possible.
First, there aren't a whole lot of countries out there with the
military assets -- both human and technological -- necessary to get
the job done right.
Other countries may be able to provide the bulk of the force, but the
presence of even relatively small numbers of American troops can mean
the difference between success and failure.
Look at our battlefield results in Afghanistan--the military
effectiveness of our Afghan allies has been increased exponentially by
the presence of very small numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
These troops not only brought in the heavy artillery, by calling in
and targeting airstrikes, they stiffened the spine of the brave, but
often young, inexperienced, and poorly trained, Afghan fighters.
Second, and just as important, is the political side of the equation.
Without U.S. boots on the ground, the commitment of other nations
often starts to falter.
As Maj. Gen. McColl, the British commander of ISAF, said to me in
Kabul, ``Once you Americans pull your troops out of Afghanistan, how
long do you think my Parliament will authorize the deployment of
British soldiers?''
Let me be clear: I'm not advocating any specific deployment of
American troops. The specifics of any troop deployment is a decision
best left to the President, based on a military assessment of what is
needed to get the mission accomplished.
My point is merely that we have a mission to accomplish in
Afghanistan, and IF the deployment of American troops as part of an
international force is deemed necessary, we should certainly step up
to the plate.
Perhaps we'll be able to continue the status quo--to have U.S. troops
currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom serve as the de facto
back-up squad for ISAF troops.
Some voices decry using American troops as "policemen," and urge that
peace operations be left to other nations. But every big-city police
force needs a SWAT team to handle the real bad characters. Perhaps the
U.S. can serve as the SWAT team for an expanded U.N.-mandated security
force.
But we shouldn't be afraid to have our troops integrated to an
international force of peacemakers in Afghanistan. Our experience in
the Balkans shows that we can work with our NATO allies, and other
countries, to make such forces the instrument of U.S. policy.
And, as a survey of top brass recently released by the "Peace Through
Law Education Fund" argues, such operations can be a huge benefit to
American military and political objectives.
Not all of the generals quoted in the report will agree with all of
its recommendations, and the survey was undertaken prior to the
campaign in Afghanistan. The opinions expressed related to peace
operations in general, not to ISAF in particular.
But I think the most valuable part of the report is the wide selection
of direct quotes from some of our most respected military commanders.
I would like to share a few of these observations--all of them made by
American commanders with far more military expertise than I would ever
claim to possess.
Taken together, they make what I believe is a convincing case for
American leadership on -- and, if necessary, participation in -- a
significantly beefed-up international peacemaking force to be deployed
at various sites throughout Afghanistan.
On American involvement in multinational peace operations:
The nation that has the most influence...has to play a number of
roles. Peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace enforcement is one of those
roles. To walk away from those responsibilities, in my judgment, is to
invite questioning of your overall leadership character. As a result,
people will start to question you and your resolve for the principles
for which you stand.
Gen. James Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
If the United States doesn't participate, the United States can't lead
..... You can't ask other nations to take risks that you won't take
yourself.
Gen Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1997-2000).
In order for us to have influence, we must be engaged ..... If you're
not there on the ground ..... you are not able to really influence
what's happening on the ground.
Maj. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of a NATO multinational brigade
in Kosovo, 1999-2000.
Whether we like it or not, we're the big dog. If someone calls 911,
..... it's the United States of America that answers.
Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Fogelsong, Assistant to the Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff, 1997-1999.
I do not believe that any major humanitarian or peacekeeping effort
can be successful, long-term, without the support of the U.S.
Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, now Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then
CinC of South Com. On unit morale.
The re-enlistment numbers are far higher in units in Bosnia and Kosovo
than they are in units of the U.S. army overall.
Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
The re-enlistment rates in [US Army, Europe], which has been involved
to the greatest extent in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, are
the highest in the Army.
Gen. Montgomery Meigs, commander of NATO's force in Bosnia (SFOR),
1998-1999.
Gen. Jones, Lt. Gen. Fogelsong, & Adm. Dennis Blair say the same thing
for Marines, Air Force, and Navy.
Forget the baloney about people being upset about being down range
..... morale's higher than in garrison.
Gen. Meigs (Bosnia)
Troops that deploy to Bosnia and Kosovo and other operations like
that, have high morale ..... our troops are happiest, morale is
highest, when they are out in the world doing what they signed up to
do.
Gen. Tommy Franks, CinC of CentCom, now commander of the U.S. campaign
in Afghanistan.
On unit readiness and military training.
I feel very strongly that our operation, let's say in Kosovo, is a
very positive net effect for the following reasons. The training that
the young NCO and younger officer gets is far superior to what he or
she would be getting if they were in Germany--because they are dealing
with real world problems, 24 hours a day.... That's what being a troop
leader is all about. Their individual, small unit skills, squad level,
company, battalion -- it's far better training than what they get back
in garrison.
Gen. Joseph Ralston
The small unit leader's development in peace operations is phenomenal.
Gen. Meigs--The type of training that isn't available during peace
operations is brigade and division level training, but Gen. Ralston
notes that this large-scale training is given to troops on a
relatively infrequent basis--typically only once every year and a
half. He notes that when troops who have served in peace operations
are put back in the regular training cycle, they have no troubling
picking up where they left off.
The words of these American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines say
it far better than I can. The military and strategic objectives of the
United States are often best served by American troops participating
in multinational peace operations.
I am not saying we should send U.S. soldiers on such missions merely
for their training or diplomatic value. I AM saying that we should
recognize the pros as well as the cons of U.S. involvement in peace
operations.
Yes, there are dangers -- as President Bush has said, the war against
terror will be long, and there will be casualties in the months and
years ahead. But the dangers of abdication of our responsibilities is
far greater than the dangers of leadership.
We must stay the course in Afghanistan -- the whole world is watching.
Friends and enemies alike want to know whether we'll follow through in
Afghanistan, and if we fail to follow through here, how can we ever
convince them that we'll follow through in Yemen, the Philippines, or
Indonesia -- let alone in Iraq.
But that is the topic for another day.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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