06 March 2002
UN Commander Tells Senate Panel U.S., ROK Ready for North Korea
(But North Korean forces remain a "formidable threat") (13,400)
The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is strong and able to resist
any North Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula, according to
General Thomas Schwartz, the commander in chief of the United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command, and the commander of United States
Forces Korea.
Nonetheless, he cautioned that the Pyongyang regime's military remains
"a formidable threat to the security of Northeast Asia."
The security situation on the Korean peninsula "remains dynamic and
the military threat has not been fundamentally reduced on the
peninsula or in the region," he said.
In prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee March
5, Schwartz, noted that in the past year North Korea has pulled back
from various confidence-building steps it had agreed to with South
Korea.
The United States has come to realize that North Korea "is either
unwilling or unable to significantly improve relations" with either
the Republic of Korea or the United States, Schwartz said.
Schwartz noted that while Pyongyang has said it will continue a
moratorium on missile launches until 2003, "it has not made a
commitment to extend beyond that time."
North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction, Schwartz told the
senators.
"A large number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our
military forces and the civilian population centers of South Korea and
Japan," he said.
Pyongyang "contributes to the instability in the Middle East and South
Asia through its aggressive sales of arms, missiles, and technological
expertise," said Schwartz.
"Missile sales and the transfer of missile technology to Iran, Syria,
Libya, Iraq and Pakistan especially trouble us. The possibility that
North Korea could transfer nuclear technology to extremist regimes is
real and is one of our greatest concerns," Schwartz said.
America's presence in the region, Schwartz told lawmakers, "provides
the military security in Northeast Asia that encourages economic
growth and political stability."
While the United States has made great strides in its ability to
rapidly project power, Schwartz said, "there is no substitute for some
degree of forward presence when faced with limited warning times, an
unpredictable foe, and the tyranny of distances."
Following is the text of General Schwartz's prepared testimony for the
Senate Armed Services Committee:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ
COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE 107TH CONGRESS SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
U S F K U S F K
5 MARCH 2002
Chairman Levin, Senator Warner and distinguished committee members, I
am honored to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United Nations
Command, Republic of Korea -United States Combined Forces Command
(CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK). We want to
first express our deep gratitude to the United States Senate for the
consistent support you have provided our forces over the years. During
the last year several members of the Senate spent time visiting the
men and women of United States Forces Korea (USFK). From this
committee, Senator Bunning, Senator Nelson, and Senator Sessions
honored us with a visit last year. They experienced the culture of
this critical region, saw the area's urbanization and economic growth
and were able to discuss current issues with the Korean people. They
talked with American troops about their sense of mission and readiness
to fight, monitored their morale, and mentally noted the incredible
sacrifices they make every day. They had the opportunity to see for
themselves the "good, bad and ugly" living and working conditions in
Korea and to visit with many of our service members and families. The
more than 37,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Department of
Defense civilians of USFK benefit from your commitment, which enables
us to accomplish our vital mission, the defense of Korea.
We welcome this opportunity to present a brief update on the current
security situation. We are grateful to report today that the ROK-U.S.
security alliance remains strong. Our alliance continues to be one of
the greatest enjoyed by the U.S., and remains essential to the peace
and security of Northeast Asia. This great alliance is effectively
deterring North Korean aggression today, and if called upon, will
successfully defeat a North Korean attack. The tragedy and subsequent
challenges of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon have actually strengthened our cohesion, as the Korean
government works with us to combat terrorism on a global level. We
stand ready to support the War on Terrorism, and to continue close
coordination on many issues. Our efforts will continue to ensure
security and contribute toward regional stability. Northeast Asia
demonstrates enormous economic potential, but it is a region with a
long history of conflict and strife.
Today we will key on the following topics: 1) Northeast Asia, A
Critical Region for America, 2) Korean Peninsula Overview, 3) North
Korean Overview and Strategy, 4) ROK-U.S. Alliance, 5) Vision for the
Future, and 6) Command Priorities. Throughout this statement, we will
identify key requirements and areas that merit continued attention and
the full application of available resources. On behalf of all the
service members of USFK, I want to thank you for all Congress has done
to improve and enhance the successful mission accomplishment of this
command. Your efforts have advanced the national interests of our
great nation and promoted peace throughout the region.
I. NORTHEAST ASIA -A CRITICAL REGION FOR AMERICA
Northeast Asia is 2nd only to the Americas in economic impact to the
U.S. It is a geographic crossroads, a place of historic conflict and
an area of great hope for the future. The physical presence of U.S.
ground, air, and naval forces in Korea and Japan contribute
significantly to U.S. interests and to those of our Northeast Asian
allies, friends and partners. These contributions will endure well
into the future. U.S. presence provides the military security in
Northeast Asia that encourages economic growth and political
stability. The U.S. has made great strides in our ability to rapidly
project power, but there is no substitute for some degree of forward
presence when faced with limited warning times, an unpredictable foe,
and the tyranny of distances. Physical U.S. presence brings peace of
mind to the democratic nations of the region, and provides tangible
deterrence. Our presence also provides the access and influence
necessary for defending the Republic of Korea today and responding to
regional threats in the future.
This security is directly responsible for much of the economic
vitality and political stability in the region. Physical presence has
fostered the rapid expansion of the mutually reinforcing elements of
democratization and market economies. The U.S. commitment in Northeast
Asia provides the confidence necessary for foreign investment to flow
into the region. The results are staggering. In the course of a single
generation, the countries of Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore have risen respectively to numbers 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 in
total trade with the U.S. China ($4,800 billion), Japan ($2,950
billion), Korea ($626 billion), Russia ($620 billion) and Taiwan ($357
billion) rank as the 2nd , 3rd , 13th , 14th and 17th largest
economies in the world when measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
purchasing power.
This U.S. presence is a force for stability and prosperity that
diminishes the need for costly arms races and successfully deters
aggression in an area with a history of regional wars, revolutions and
memories of violent colonization.
For over two millennia, the Korean peninsula has sat astride a
geographic fault line where civilizations and cultures clash. The
interests and influence of the four great powers --U.S., China, Russia
and Japan, converge on the Korean Peninsula. Ancient cultural
animosities remain a dynamic political force. China is striving for an
increased regional leadership role through economic development and
military modernization. Russia seeks to increase its regional
influence and power. Japan is accelerating the evolution of its
security role internationally, as well as in the region. Throughout
history, great powers have clashed on the Korea peninsula. As a
result, the Korean peninsula has witnessed over 30 major wars in its
history. Today, the current demarcation line between North and South
Korea remains the most heavily armed in the world.
Northeast Asia is currently the world's most dynamic region as the
figure below illustrates. Five of the world's six largest militaries
(China, U.S., Russia, North Korea, and South Korea) and four
nuclear-capable powers converge on the Korean peninsula. Northeast
Asia's military forces are primarily ground-focused and lack precision
weapons. Conflict would result in tremendous devastation, property
destruction and loss of life. In this geo-political landscape, the
presence of U.S. forces supports peace and stability to the region.
Northeast Asia is truly a critical region for the U.S. and the world.
II. KOREAN PENINSULA OVERVIEW
Optimism over the pace of North-South reconciliation efforts following
the June 2000 summit meeting between ROK President Kim Dae-jung and
Chairman Kim Chong-il, the dictator of North Korea, has been tempered
by a year of progress and then followed by year of slowdown in
peninsular dialogue.
Chairman Kim Chong-il has yet to follow through on his promised visit
to South Korea. North Korea unilaterally cut off most Inter-Korean
contacts in March 2001 and has elected to not sign an agreement to
de-mine a portion of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that would pave the
way for a North-South transportation corridor. Ministerial talks
resumed in September, but planned family re-unions were abruptly
cancelled in October by North Korea. The sixth Ministerial Talks ended
with limited measurable results in November 2001. No further talks are
planned at this time. Unfortunately, we have come to realize that
North Korea is either unwilling or unable to significantly improve
relations with the ROK or U.S. The security situation remains dynamic
and the military threat has not been fundamentally reduced on the
peninsula or in the region. The North Korean military continues to
remain a formidable threat to the security of Northeast Asia. North
Korea remains on the U.S. State Department's list of "Nations that
Sponsor Terrorism." On January 29th , our president stated our "goal
is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or
our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these
regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But, we know
their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens." Despite
attempts by the South Korean government, North Korea has shunned all
attempts to discuss substantive military confidence building measures
to reduce tensions. As reported in numerous press accounts, Pyongyang
views these confidence-building measures as "premature" and continues
to castigate the U.S. administration's policies as being too
aggressive.
North Korea initially responded to the events of 9-11 with "deep
regret" and some condemnation of the acts. In addition, Pyongyang
publicly rejected terrorism and the support of terrorist
organizations, and signed two anti-terrorism treaties and announced
plans to sign five more. However, Pyongyang criticized the American
military actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Although North Korea
did welcome the new Afghanistan government, North Korea has responded
negatively toward President Bush's recent state of the Union address
in recent writings and public broadcasts. Although we welcome and hope
for more direct North-South dialogue and reconciliation, we watch with
caution as the military threat from North Korea continues to remain
high, both in conventional capability and weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea continues to divert a large percentage of its national
resources toward military expansion and modernization, and maintains
approximately 70% of its forces within 90 miles of the DMZ.
In 2002, we expect North Korea to continue diplomatic outreach
strategies designed to garner much needed economic aid and assistance.
However, in 2003, three critical events will influence the
political-military affairs on the Peninsula. First, changes in
regional politics will take place with elections in the ROK. Secondly,
pressure will intensify on the DPRK to start cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), so as to avoid unacceptable
delays in the delivery of essential nuclear components necessary to
build two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea. And third,
while North Korea has said it will continue a moratorium on missile
launches until 2003, it has not made a commitment to extend beyond
that time. These three events form a potential nexus for increased
tension on the Peninsula. These key events are centered around the
United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections
of reprocessing facilities in the north, which must occur prior to
delivery of key components for the light water reactors. We will watch
these events carefully. Failure to allow a timely completion of IAEA
inspections into the history of the North Korean nuclear program could
jeopardize existing agreements.
III. NORTH KOREAN OVERVIEW AND STRATEGY
North Korea continues to pose a dangerous threat to the stability and
security on the Korean Peninsula, the region, and, increasingly, the
world. They remain a dangerous adversary with regional operational
reach and global proliferation impact. The Kim Chong-il Regime
continues to maintain a large, capable, and forward deployed military
-making the area between Seoul and Pyongyang the most militarized
place on earth. Korea remains a place where U.S. Forces could almost
instantaneously become engaged in a high intensity war involving
significant ground, air, and naval forces. Such a war would cause loss
of life numbering in the hundreds of thousands and cause billions of
dollars in property destruction. The military capabilities and
policies of North Korea have remained fundamentally unchanged since my
testimony last year.
Political Environment: Kim Chong-il is firmly in control and, with the
support of the military and his leadership circle, he establishes all
policies for North Korea. We were optimistic throughout last year that
the June 2000 summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-il would lead
to improved North-South relations. In the months that followed the
June Summit, the North and South held several Ministerial and
sub-Ministerial discussions as well as three small-scale family
reunions. In early 2001, the North for its own reasons broke off
discussions with the South. President Kim's administration, with U.S.
support, has continued to pursue dialogue with the North, and has
taken a number of steps to encourage the North to return to the table.
As President Bush has noted, we are disappointed that the North has
yet to react favorably.
On June 6, 2001, President Bush stated our willingness to undertake
serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including
improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable
constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile
exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. This
position has been restated repeatedly by Secretaries Powell, Rumsfeld
and others.
Over the years, North Korea has established diplomatic relations with
150 countries. This past year, North Korea focused its efforts on
establishing diplomatic relations outside the Northeast Asia region,
particularly in Europe where it established relations with 13 of the
15 members of the European Union. Kim Chong-il visited China and
Russia in part to counter-balance the South's growing relationship and
influence with the North's historical benefactors, but also to garner
much needed economic assistance and political support. This increased
diplomacy allows them to enlarge their donor base for aid while
expanding their growing illicit trade activities.
The North Korean diplomatic outreach, in many ways, undermines the
international legitimacy of the regime. Ambassador after ambassador
who have visited North Korea tell me about the dismal and almost
surreal conditions that exist there. Authoritarian controls strictly
censure all facets of information into the country. The more North
Korea engages other countries, the more the world learns about North
Korea and they see for themselves the reality of life for the people
that live under the Kim family regime.
Economic Environment: North Korea remains incapable of feeding its
population or providing for its basic energy needs. Their
infrastructure continues to deteriorate and they are unable to reverse
their current economic situation through improved industrial
production. Consequently, they depend on others, predominately the
U.S., the ROK, Japan, and China to meet their food and fuel needs. The
North maintains a policy that ensures the military gets first priority
on national resources. The policy allows the Korean People's Army
(KPA) to operate a parallel military economy in which weapons,
missiles, and drugs are produced for sale. Profits from those sales
accrue directly to the military. Additionally, Kim Chong-il continues
to provide luxury items such as cars, housing, and food to supportive
senior leaders to ensure their loyalty. We see no potential change in
this policy that is clearly designed to support the military and
ruling elite at the expense of the North Korean people.
Accurately assessing the size and condition of the North Korean
economy is difficult at best.
North Korea continues to treat most economic data as a state secret
and much of its economy is supported by foreign aid and illicit
activities. Consequently, economic assessments of the North Korean
economy remain nothing more than educated guesses. Based on current
and projected conditions in North Korea, we expect no significant
economic change in 2002. North Korea will continue to require and
receive outside aid for survival.
Role of Military: The Korean People's Army (KPA) is by far the
dominant presence in the country. It is the one instrument of power
that enables North Korea to extract aid from its neighbors in the
region. The KPA ensures regime survival by controlling the internal
situation and deterring external threats. The military also plays a
major role in the economy. The armed forces are North Korea's largest
employer, purchaser and consumer. It provides the regime with a
substantial portion of its hard currency through weapons sales and
illicit activities.
Conventional Forces: The KPA is the fifth largest active duty military
force in the world, numbering over 1.17 million personnel. The ground
force is the world's third largest, numbering almost one million
soldiers. An estimated six million reserves support the active duty
force. The North Korean air force has over 1,700 aircraft. The navy
has more than 800 ships, including the largest submarine fleet in the
world. The North fields a total artillery force of over 12,000
systems, including 500 long-range systems, deployed over the past
decade, with the ability to strike Seoul from their current location.
About 70 per cent of the North Korean Army is deployed south of
Pyongyang and those forces are capable of conducting an attack with
very limited tactical warning. However, an attack scenario appears
unlikely at this time because North Korea clearly knows that its
regime would ultimately be destroyed as a result of any attack.
Asymmetrical Forces: The North's leadership has developed substantial
capabilities in ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and
weapons of mass destruction. The North's asymmetric forces are
dangerous, receive a large portion of the military budget, and are
well trained. Methodical improvements continue in each area.
Because the North's ballistic missile program provides such powerful
diplomatic and political leverage, the North's ballistic missile
program remains a top priority. Over the past two years, North Korea
has upheld its self-imposed moratorium on flight-testing long-range
missiles, but has not halted research and development. They continue
to refine their missile capabilities by continued testing of rocket
engines and other components. Kim Chong-il stated to President Putin
that the current missile flight-testing moratorium will remain in
place at least until 2003. However, they continue to export missiles
and missile technology throughout the world. Their ballistic missile
inventory includes over 500 SCUDs of various types that can threaten
the entire peninsula. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range
No Dong missiles capable of striking Japan and our U.S. bases there.
Pyongyang is also developing multi-stage missiles capable of striking
the continental United States. They have tested the 2,000-kilometer
range Taepo Dong 1 missile and continue significant work on the 5,000
plus kilometer Taepo Dong 2 missile.
North Korea's special operations forces (SOF) are the largest in the
world. They consist of over 100,000 personnel and constitute a
significant force multiplier. We consider them a tough, dedicated, and
profoundly loyal force. They undergo year-round training to develop
and maintain their skills. During wartime, these forces would attack
from the ground, air and sea against both our forward and rear areas.
The North will concentrate SOF against our critical war fighting nodes
and seek to prevent rapid force and sortie generation by U.S. and ROK
forces.
North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction. A large number
of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military forces and
the civilian population centers of South Korea and Japan. We assess
that North Korea has very large chemical stockpiles and is
self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first
generation chemical agents. Additionally, North Korea has the
capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare
agents. They can deploy missiles with chemical warheads and
potentially have the ability to weaponize biological agents for
missile delivery.
We continue to be concerned with North Korea's potential nuclear
threat. Though in January 2002, North Korea allowed the IAEA to visit
an isotope facility, North Korea still refuses to comply with nuclear
non-proliferation protocols. If North Korea will not allow inspections
of their nuclear facilities, the international community cannot verify
that they have in fact stopped their nuclear weapons development
program. Current assessments indicate that North Korea may have
produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear
weapons.
Proliferation: North Korea contributes to the instability in the
Middle East and South Asia through its aggressive sales of arms,
missiles, and technological expertise. Missile sales and the transfer
of missile technology to Iran, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Pakistan
especially trouble us. The possibility that North Korea could transfer
nuclear technology to extremist regimes is real and is one of our
greatest concerns.
Illicit Activities: North Korea engages in a variety of other
state-sponsored illicit activities to include counterfeiting of U.S.
currency, money laundering, the production and sale of illegal drugs,
trading in endangered species, and smuggling. In many cases, these
illicit deals are sponsored by the military, with the cash profits
returning to military hands.
Force Improvements: North Korea cannot afford to significantly
modernize its aging conventional force. They continue to produce
limited numbers of replacement systems and depend on China and Russia
to provide equipment and spare parts. North Korea continues to
modernize systems that can marginalize specific U.S. military
strengths. North Korea is adaptive. They study our actions, most
recently in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in order to develop tactics
and techniques aimed at offsetting our technological advantage. They
concentrate their efforts against U.S. surveillance, precision
munitions and force generation capability. They continue to improve
their command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) systems,
harden and bury their facilities, improve lines of communication,
disperse forces, and improve camouflage, concealment, and deception
(CC&D) measures. The result of these efforts has been to increase the
survivability of North Korean combat power, and to complicate our
ability to generate the forces and sorties required to defeat a North
Korean attack.
North Korean force improvements are indicative of their continued
policy to maintain a large, capable and effective military.
Unfortunately, many people view the North Korean military from a cold
war or conventional perspective and mistakenly assess them to be
incapable of challenging the ROK-U.S. alliance. Such people become
blind to the continuing threat posed by North Korea. The North Korean
military is evolving in ways that make them a threat into the 21st
Century. They constantly study how we fight and develop capabilities
that leverage their strengths against our weaknesses. They are
adaptive and are methodically improving their military capabilities.
They can conduct operations that span the spectrum from smuggling,
kidnapping and assassination, to conventional combat. They are clearly
the type of current and future threat that is described in the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
As a result of their specific actions, North Korea continues to pose a
dangerous and complex threat to the peninsula and the WMD and missile
programs constitute a growing threat to the region and the world. The
Kim Regime seems unwilling or unable to change its stated intent,
goals, and policies.
Consequently, they will continue to use the threat of military action
to gain concessions, mostly in the form of economic aid from
neighboring countries in the region and the United States. It is our
opinion that North Korea's infrastructure will continue to degrade and
that the regime will require outside aid to meet basic food and fuel
requirements. Despite the extreme hardships on its people, the Kim
regime will continue to support the elite and the military at the
expense of the general population. Kim Chong-il will remain in power
and the North Korean government will likely not experience an economic
driven collapse in 2002. Although an attack on the ROK would cause
many casualties and great destruction, CFC would rapidly defeat North
Korean forces.
IV. ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and United States of
America remains the best in the world. It is an alliance built on
honor, respect, a common set of values and a commitment to the defense
of the freedom of South Korea. Our power, might and daily readiness
are unmatched. Unquestionably, our South Korean partners are
professional war fighters. They can mobilize over 4.5 million service
members and can bring 54 divisions to the fight. Our combined war
fighting assets after full mobilization include over 1,500 strike
aircraft that can launch over 2,000 daily sorties, over 1,000 rotary
aircraft, more than 5,000 tracked vehicles, 3,000 tanks and over 250
combat ships to include four or more carrier battle groups. If
necessary, this unequalled combined combat power and might will
decisively defeat a North Korean attack and destroy its military and
the Kim regime. It is this real and overmatching power that
strengthens our deterrence mission and ultimately provides regional
security.
Our continuing cooperation and understanding is a success story in
many ways. This success has been institutionalized in our Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1953, the Status of Forces Agreement of 1966, the
annually conducted Security Consultative Meetings that have been held
since 1968 and Military Committee Meetings that have been held since
1978. The Republic of Korea has actively supported American
non-proliferation efforts and joined the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) in 2001.
The ROK expects to resume chemical weapons destruction by the spring
of 2002 and hopes to achieve a four to five percent destruction this
year and 45 percent destruction within two to three years. Three
alliance areas deserve particular note: Impact of 9-11, Wartime
Fighting Readiness, and an update on the Special Measures Agreement
and Defense Burdensharing.
Impact of 9-11: The public condemnation of the terrorist acts against
the U.S. was led by President Kim Dae-jung, who pledged support in the
spirit of the Mutual Defense Treaty. He was quick to pledge support
even greater than the ROK provided during Desert Storm. The outpouring
of sympathy from the Korean people and military was phenomenal, as was
their commitment to the security and safety of U.S. troops. The ROK
immediately moved to match words with deeds, sharing intelligence,
increasing force protection measures and planning support packages for
multi-theater use for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).
We believe the events of 11 September will prove to be a seminal event
in the history of the ROK-U.S. alliance. As we speak to you today, ROK
forces are leading a UN mission, providing force protection for U.S.
interests on the peninsula, and supporting OEF on a global scale. The
ROK sent liaison officers to both PACOM and CENTCOM and quickly
learned how the War on Terrorism would be prosecuted. They have worked
hard to learn lessons about how to support freedom's effort on both a
regional and global scale. ROK forces are standing shoulder to
shoulder with U.S. forces from Tampa to Kyrgyzstan and from CENTCOM to
PACOM. They have accomplished this while increasing their UN support
and taking command of the UN mission in Cyprus. This is an incredibly
strong alliance! In addition to their efforts on the Korean peninsula,
our allies have sent forces in support of OEF.
The ROK Navy has been supporting OEF since 18 December 2001, with one
Landing Ship Transport (LST). Utilizing over 170 personnel, they have
delivered construction materials for runway repairs to coalition
facilities at Diego Garcia and are assisting with search efforts
regarding the downed B-1 bomber.
The ROK Air Force continues to support U.S. global efforts with four
C-130s conducting transportation operations between Guam and Wake
Island with support as far west of Diego Garcia. Furthermore, the ROK
has provided a Mobile Field Hospital since February. This team of 130
personnel has provided medical care in the vicinity of Afghanistan in
support of coalition efforts in OEF. Overall, the ROK has committed
over 470 personnel, high value equipment, and significant force
structure to support OEF objectives. The ROK support for the U.S. led
coalition against terrorism has been comprehensive from humanitarian
aid to global deployments of medical personnel, navy ships and air
force units. We believe this type of support is key to a greater
global and regional perspective for the Republic of Korea and will
assist their evolving role as a regional leader.
The Republic of Korea, along with Japan, will co-host the 2002 World
Cup Soccer Games between 31 May and 30 June. Teams from thirty-two
nations will participate. An estimated five million visitors are
expected to attend these events. This is the largest sporting event in
the world and is of enormous importance to the Republic of Korea,
Japan and all of Northeast Asia. This is the first time the World Cup
has been held in Asia and the first time it has been co-hosted by two
nations. In the wake of the September 11 th attacks against the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the world is looking to the Republic of
Korea and Japan for assurance that they can provide a secure and
stable setting for the World Cup Games. Unfortunately, the World Cup
could also provide a lucrative terrorist target. The Republic of Korea
has prepared extensively to ensure the utmost safety and security of
athletes, officials and visitors, but is seeking the benefit of U.S.
support and experience from our lessons learned.
The ROK JCS has formally requested U.S. military support to the ROK
for 2002 World Cup Games. We will work with ROK JCS to respond to
their request in order to strengthen an already unshakable alliance
and demonstrate U.S. resolve to prevent further acts of terrorism or
aggression. The U.S. Forces Korea staff continues to work the details
of our support to the World Cup Games closely with the ROK JCS Staff.
We have found this coordination effort to be another opportunity to
leverage the strength of this great alliance. As the Secretary of
Defense told me--this command and the nation pledges its assistance to
our ROK allies. Together, we will ensure that these games are safe!
Wartime Fighting Readiness: Combined Forces Command (CFC) is ready to
fight and win tonight. We are making great strides in our capabilities
and readiness. In this section, we will briefly discuss three topics:
1) Exercise and Training, 2) Force Protection Initiatives, and
continued 3) Modernization efforts by ourselves and the ROK.
1) Exercise and Training Programs - The primary component of our war
fighting readiness and bedrock of this great ROK-U.S. alliance is the
CFC Exercise and Training Program. Both the content and timing of
these combined and joint exercises successfully posture this command
to deter, defend and decisively win any military engagement. However,
because of the proximity of the threat, the complexity of this theater
and the high turnover of both ROK and U.S. military personnel, we must
conduct robust theater level exercises annually to maintain combat
readiness. Each exercise is unique and focused on essential components
of the combined war fight. The Exercise and Training Program is a
critical pillar in our theater engagement strategy, I cannot stress
this enough. We must fully resource this program. That being said, I
regret to report that any loss or reduction of dollars to support
these exercises will weaken readiness and deterrence, hamper our
combined forces training and put at risk our ability to fight and win.
The exercise support we receive from the U.S. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is invaluable.
The combination of the increased cost of strategic lift with a
flat-line strategic lift budget has eroded our exercise strategic lift
capability. We must address this by some means. Simply put, we are
bringing fewer personnel to train for a higher cost than ever before.
It would be unwise to let this trend continue over the Future Years
Defense Plan (FYDP).
We have made significant changes in our exercise program over the last
year. The linkage of the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and
Integration (RSOI) exercise and the Foal Eagle (FE) exercise is a
monumental step for this alliance. We have not sacrificed realism nor
readiness--we've enhanced it.
We have not reduced our exercise tempo--we've made a giant step
forward in quality training. We monitor everything we do in combat
readiness training carefully because these exercises are not
hypothetical. These training events exercise the real "go-to-war"
plans. Korea remains one of the only theaters in the world where real
war plans form the basis of our exercise program.
We are working equally hard to improve our training capability. The
training environment, for U.S. forces stationed in Korea, is best
described as a "Tornado in a Closet." Our 93% personnel turnover rate,
as well as constraints with land to train on, provides significant
challenges. Personnel and units can, and do, train to standard, but it
requires intense, detailed, and creative planning and management on
the part of our leadership to make this happen. Our commanders accept
these challenges, and become innovative in their approaches to provide
better and more realistic training environments for their Soldiers,
Airmen, Sailors and Marines. We are creatively maximizing our Joint
Use Ranges using mobile target sets that synchronize our efforts with
ROK forces. We have several initiatives aimed at improving our urban
training capability and we have a strategic roadmap aimed at improving
key training areas such as Rodriguez Range for joint and live fire
training. The FY 03 President's Budget restored the Korea Battle
Simulation Center to full funding; we must now address the remaining
requirement of $3.0 million for training and instrumentation. We will
continue to develop our range capabilities to ensure readiness now and
for the future.
2) Force Protection - The events of September 11 have caused us to
re-evaluate every aspect of our force protection program. The most
significant lesson learned was that a high number of personnel must be
committed to maintaining an increased force protection posture. At
increased force protection levels, 20 percent of our force is
committed. The environment in Korea presents several unique challenges
for the protection of our members. Although we assess the terrorist
threat in Korea to be generally low, our vulnerability to such an
attack remains high. While we have taken significant steps to improve
our security posture, many of the solutions require long-term
programmatic changes, which cannot wait for a specific threat to
appear.
Our force protection challenges here in Korea are centered on the
following systemic issues: lack of standoff and our off-post personnel
and activities. Compounding these challenges is the impact of the one
-year tour on the majority of service members.
Our most difficult and "resource intensive" challenge is the lack of
standoff. Urban encroachment at our facilities, and the lack of
available real estate for force protection requirements contribute to
this vulnerability. As a result, our installations will have virtually
no early warning of a hostile action, whether by vehicle or a
personnel infiltration. This challenge is intensified by the fact that
USFK has 85 manned installations, many quite small, spread across the
theater. We have organized these installations into 12 "base
clusters", which operate as our major "hubs". While not ideal, since
many of these bases lack the ability to plan or respond to terrorism,
this is the best balance of our manpower and resources. However, many
of these base clusters still lack resources necessary for basic force
protection. Large portions of our personnel reside in off-post
lodging. Because of the lack of on-base housing, many of our service
members, civilians and family members must live in the local civilian
community, with little security.
Our challenges are numerous. We have several initiatives underway to
improve our force protection posture. On-going initiatives, which we
will describe in detail later, will reduce the number of installations
and eliminate many of the smaller facilities. This will have multiple
payoffs for force protection: eliminating our smallest and most
difficult to defend installations, thus reducing the manpower burden
of defending them; creating standoff at our enduring installations;
and allowing us to position our security and terrorist incident
response forces for maximum benefit. USFK is also a test bed for the
use of Biometrics for our access control systems. This technology has
DoD wide application; it allows central management of who is
authorized on our bases, and also dramatically reduces the risk of
counterfeit ID Cards and passes. Starting last year, we began
aggressively exercising our security systems through the use of Red
Teams and terrorist incident response exercises. These initiatives are
part of our on going force protection strategy review.
We have developed a force protection strategy that addresses immediate
concerns as well as long-term requirements. We brought in a team to
assist our base clusters in updating their antiterrorism plans,
identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation procedures and determining
resource requirements. The next phase is to address the physical
security shortfalls at our "enduring" installations. This will involve
placing perimeter intrusion detection and monitoring systems at our
major bases to partially compensate for the lack of standoff.
Additionally, we will restructure our access gates to more easily
support increased security postures. Currently this posture requires
large manpower commitments and creates major difficulties in
maintaining base operations. The final phase will be to fully
integrate force protection as we consolidate our forces on enduring
installations. During the execution of this consolidation and base
re-alignment, we plan to carefully balance the location our security
forces and incident response forces.
In addition, as part of our force protection review, we concluded an
anthrax policy study, which consolidated requirements and re-evaluated
our posture versus chemical and biological terrorism. The events of
September 11 were a call to re-evaluate all threats and the damage
they can do. We re-energized a vigorous education program to ensure
our USFK personnel and their families are aware of current threats and
appropriate preventive and deterrent measures. We have coordinated our
efforts with the ROK Ministry of National Defense to ensure that both
we and the ROK are prepared to meet this threat. We will continue to
make force protection our top priority.
3) Modernization Efforts - The ROK continues to develop defense policy
changes. They are committed to a post-unification presence for the
U.S. and an enhanced regional role for the ROK. The ROK has begun a
subtle but definite shift in their security focus from a
unidirectional North Korean view to a multidirectional Northeast Asian
and world-view. Indicative of this shift is their interest in
coalition support for the "war on terrorism" and their shift in
defense spending away from an infantry-heavy army and to transform
into a high-tech, agile, information age military. As a result, the
ROK Ministry of National Defense has supported budget shifts that now
favor more development and growth in air and naval forces. Together
with regional diplomatic and world economic activity, this military
shift indicates a ROK desire to increase their role in East Asian
security and world stability.
The ROK paper entitled Defense Outlays Preparing For The Future 2001,
published by the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), emphasizes
aggressive modernization goals for South Korean forces based on the
near-term North Korea threat and an uncertain regional security
environment. United States Forces Korea wholeheartedly supports these
efforts. South Korean force modernization improvements continue in
many key areas through indigenous production, co-production, direct
commercial sales and procurement through Foreign Military Sales. The
ROK armed forces continue to demonstrate a very strong preference for
U.S. military equipment. South Korean military purchases from the U.S.
as a percentage of total foreign procurement has ranged from 59.2
percent to 98.9 percent in the last ten years. The decade average is
78.6 percent.
Last year South Korea addressed counter-fire shortfalls by fielding
indigenously produced K-9 155mm self-propelled artillery systems.
Significant automated shooter-to-sensor challenges remain, but the K-9
fielding coupled with this year's procurement of a second battalion of
U.S. multiple launched rocket systems (MLRS) and the purchase of the
Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A (ATACMS) set the stage for an
improved counter-fire capability, which was previously addressed as a
serious shortfall.
The events of 9-11 have alerted the world to the dangers of terrorism.
In Korea, MND is reviewing the possibility of a new Anti-terrorism
command to develop force protection policy and apply it to current and
potential regional threats. Additionally, the current chemical,
biological and radiological defense command will be reinforced,
reorganized, and placed under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff for
Homeland Defense in preparation for the World Cup and Asian Games in
2002.
All of Northeast Asia is currently experiencing a slowing of the
economic growth that was projected earlier in 2001. In the ROK, this
economic downturn has forced purchase delays of major weapon systems
that were planned for 2002 -including the future fighter, the Patriot
(SAM-X) missile system, an airborne warning and control system
(AWACS), and cancellation of attack helicopter modernization
initiatives. The military remains committed to improving South Korea's
military capabilities as the economy improves. South Korea plans to
sign a contract to procure 40 future fighters in 2002.
Negotiations on the purchase of two Patriot Battalions for the
2002-2004 time period are ongoing. In addition, the ROK plans to
initiate negotiations to procure three Aegis type destroyers. When
procured, these acquisitions will significantly address South Korea's
air defense problems. The ROK Navy also plans to procure eight
additional P-3C anti-sub/anti-surface aircraft from the U.S. and
completely refurbish them. It is essential that these systems be
interoperable with U.S. systems. This will ensure that military might
can be brought to bear quickly and decisively as required. Not only
will these systems improve today's ROK-U.S. combat power, they will
also contribute to future regional security in Northeast Asia.
Three areas remain where the Republic of Korea must acquire
capabilities to support our combined combat readiness: 1) Command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
interoperability; 2) Chemical and biological defense capabilities; and
3) Preferred munitions necessary for the early stages of the war plan.
USFK is working closely with the ROK on C4I interoperability. As a
result of the September 11 terrorist attack, the ROK is also placing
more emphasis on chemical and biological detection. While the ROK has
procured preferred munitions, more are needed. To accomplish this we
must maintain close coordination as we analyze, research, develop and
test the best systems for our combined alliance. We are working hard
to ensure that both U.S. and ROK modernization and transformation
progress is synchronized and complimentary. A cornerstone of this is
the on-going OSD/ MND Future Study of the Alliance. In 2001, we
completed the Joint Study of the Alliance analyzing the future role of
USFK in the next 20 years. The study addressed Confidence Building
Measures that potentially could be implemented in efforts reduce
military tensions in support of Korean reconciliation.
This year we are studying both ROK and U.S. increasing regional roles
and our combined modernization efforts.
A key element of our U.S. modernization efforts would be to acquire an
Army Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in Korea to replace one
existing brigade. This will provide the maneuverability and combat
power necessary to operate in the mountainous and increasingly
urbanized terrain of Korea. The ICBT will add a new component in
USFK's deterrence capability to counter a North Korean threat or
provocation. It will also prepare us to refocus the Army's forward
deployed forces in Korea for a regional role. The IBCT provides a
rapidly deployable ground force to complement Air Force Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Forces, and Navy Amphibious
Ready Groups and Carrier Battle Groups as U.S. Forces Korea's role
transitions to regional security.
USFK must continue to improve our support capability to insure our
wartime fighting readiness.
Headquarters accounts continue to be squeezed and our UNC/CFC/USFK/
8th US Army Command Headquarters Support and Air Force Base Support
account is no exception. We need our full requirements recognized if
we are to repair critical infrastructure, replace aged systems and
train our combined team.
Defense Burden-sharing and Special Measures Agreement Update: The
current ROK Defense Ministry continues its long-standing reputation of
support. It demonstrates daily a commitment to honoring its host
nation responsibility for defense cost sharing. The military budget
for the Republic of Korea (CY 2002), recently passed the National
Assembly is $12.5 billion (16.3 trillion won). ROK defense spending,
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, will increase to 2.8% for
2002, which remains below the 3.0% minimum level identified in the ROK
modernization plan. If this trend continues this could reduce their
ability to modernize.
The 2001 Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common
Defense identifies four burden-sharing categories -Multinational
Military Activities, Defense Spending as percentage of Gross Domestic
Product, Foreign Assistance and Cost Sharing. Of those four
categories, South Korea met the Congressional goal in two, namely
Multinational Military Activities and Foreign Assistance. However, at
a defense budget of 2.7% GDP in 2000, the ROK did not match the U.S.
defense budget of 3% GDP. The ROK has contributed soldiers to UN
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since 1993. The ROK continues to
maintain a peacekeeping battalion on in East Timor. It provides
military observers to India/Pakistan, Georgia and the Western Sahara
for a total contribution in 2001 of 474 soldiers. Also, it is worthy
to note that the first ROK general officer was selected to command a
UN PKO. Lieutenant General Hwang, Jin-ha (a former military attaché to
the U.S.) will command the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus in 2002.
The ROK met the Foreign Assistance goals in 2001. In the cost-sharing
category, although significant progress has been made, the Republic of
Korea has not yet offset 75% of U.S. stationing costs. The U.S. and
ROK Special Measures Agreement (SMA 99-01) outlines the cost-sharing
contributions of both nations. Contributions are made in both cash and
in-kind support--71% of the program is in cash and the remaining 29%
is in-kind. In accordance with the SMA Implementation Agreement (IA),
USFK and the ROK MND jointly calculated and agreed the SMA
contribution for 2001 is roughly $425 million dollars.
This contribution reflects an 8% growth adjustment from the 2000
contribution.
This year, the Koreans agreed to a new Special Measures Agreement for
2002-2004 (SMA 02-04) pledging $490 million dollars for 2002, an
increase of 15% from the $425 million in 2001. The Koreans have
steadily increased their share of non-personnel stationing costs
rising from 36% in the 2001 burden-sharing report to 41 in the 2002
report. Their contributions over the next three years will push them
over 50%. The total contribution rose 15%, the biggest single increase
in SMA in 8 years. In addition, 2003-2004 contributions will be
increased by 8.8% plus inflation protection in the form of Gross
Domestic Product Deflator as determined by the Korean National
Statistics Office. The 2002-2004 SMA demonstrates the "real and
meaningful growth" we are seeking for USFK Non-Personnel Stationing
Costs.
V. VISION FOR THE FUTURE
As President Bush has said, "Power is defined by mobility and
swiftness, influence is measured in information, safety is gained in
stealth, and force is projected on the long-arc of precision guided
weapons. This revolution perfectly matches the skills of our country,
our people and the superiority of our technology. The best way to keep
the peace is to redefine war on our terms." I would add that our
strength is also measured in our personnel readiness and the values we
teach to our military forces. The real lesson learned in Afghanistan
is that our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are the best quality
force in the world. In Korea, we want to blend our strengths with that
of a great ally who is determined to improve their capabilities and
whose courage and loyalty is unmatched. We are faced with a two-fold
challenge to modernize and move to a capabilities-based force while
ensuring that our near term readiness is unmatched and that we are
ready to fight and win tonight.
We must modernize our forces, improve our capabilities and fix
long-term problems with a comprehensive plan. Our strategy to
modernize and transform is based on our ability to build a
capabilities-based organization and enhanced warfighting structure
centered on key hubs. The key to this organizational change is the
transition to organizational hubs as part of our Korean Master Plan
for 2010. The picture below illustrates this plan. A great example of
our future capability is our proposed Northeast Asia Regional
Simulation Center (centered at our C2 hub). We are on a path to have a
"Center of Excellence" capability for Joint and Combined simulations
and exercises by 2008. This will become the cornerstone for merging
ROK/ US doctrine in the near term. It has the inherent growth
potential to provide a multi-lateral focus as both USFK's and the
ROK's power projection capability evolves to meet the future. The
simulation center also provides the means to work difficult coalition
integration issues as we build a more effective combined doctrine.
The key feature of our strategic facilities vision is the Land
Partnership Plan (LPP), which will allow us to move from 85 scattered
bases into the centralized hubs I have described above. We will divest
ourselves from 41 major bases to 20 enduring installations. This will
improve near-term readiness, enhance force protection, reduce
stationing costs, reduce our footprint and return valuable land to the
second most densely populated country in the world.
The LPP is our vision for the future and it has now been incorporated
into the Overseas Basing Requirements Study. It gives us a
comprehensive approach to ensure that USFK is the best manager of
precious Korean land. We are happy to report significant progress from
last year.
Our combined efforts with the ROK have produced an agreement which we
are confident will be ratified by the ROK National Assembly. This
long-term effort is fully funded and will require no additional
support from Congress, however, it is fully dependent on stable MILCON
funding. The picture below [not available] illustrates this plan.
LPP seeks to improve the combined forces readiness posture, enhance
public safety, stop training range encroachment, improve force
protection and advance quality of life for U.S. forces. This
initiative will also reconfigure and protect training areas and
consolidate our forces around enduring installations. LPP potentially
returns about 32,000 acres of valuable commercial and agricultural
land to South Korea. This will provide a long-term cost savings for
USFK by allowing the command to invest in and sustain our reduced
infrastructure at the enduring installations. In exchange, the command
seeks the acquisition of about 612 acres of additional land adjacent
to enduring U.S. installations where we plan to relocate units and
activities. The ROK will also grant USFK joint use of its own military
training areas on a very efficient limited time-share basis. This will
enable us to improve training and preserve readiness.
Installations returned to the ROK will be transferred in accordance
with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and current DoD guidance.
The plan does not add any requirement for USFK to meet stricter
environmental standards than those already required under the current
DoD policy or the SOFA.
However, being good stewards of the environment in our host country is
critical to our mission and the alliance. We urge you to support LPP,
which we feel is a key to positioning USFK forces to meet security
requirements well into the future. It will provide "irreversible
momentum" to our efforts to fix significant command problems brought
on by years of neglect. We expect to have a signed agreement by 15
March 2002.
The Congressional funding that you provided last year has been of
enormous help, and we are extremely grateful for your demonstrated
concern. Change is in the air, and on-going construction on USFK
installations is a common site today. Family housing improvements,
barracks renovations, workplace upgrades and new utilities are
currently being developed. Our vision is beginning to be realized in
USFK. But in order to ensure that our "first-class military" is
provided with "first-rate facilities," it is important to sustain this
encouraging progress. Continued investment- your investment- is
critical to provide the force protection and basic quality of life
each service member deserves. Your involvement will enhance our
military readiness and preserve and protect the environment of our
South Korean ally, while providing enhanced regional stability.
VI. COMMAND PRIORITIES I would now like to discuss the status of
programs and areas in which we have resource allocation concerns. My
intent is to discuss possible problem areas as they now appear.
However, these program areas and their associated funding levels may
change as a result of the strategy and defense review, which will
guide future decisions on military spending. For FY 2002, the
President's Budget includes funding to cover our most pressing
priorities. I ask that you consider my comments in that light.
Achieving our vision and accomplishing our missions requires us to
prioritize scarce resources. Our command priorities are 1) Command,
Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Functionality, 2) Precision Engagement, 3)
Support toward Reconciliation Efforts, and 4) Improve Quality of Life.
1) C4I Functionality -United States Forces in Korea are working very
hard toward achieving the vision articulated in the Department of
Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review --to attain and maintain the
asymmetric advantage afforded with network-centric warfare systems. We
are in the process of modernizing these systems, and with your help,
we will maximize our technological lead to ensure victory on the
battlefield.
The Korean theater poses special problems in attaining and sustaining
information superiority.
The destructive effects resulting from the lethality of modern weapons
compressed into such a small geographical area overwhelm the
imagination. It not only increases the potential for high casualties
and collateral damage, but due to exposed and vulnerable C4I
facilities and infrastructure, may significantly affect our ability to
command and control forces and execute the war plan. It is this
reality that sets Korea apart from all other theaters. It mandates
Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) that is survivable,
interoperable, and secure in a joint and combined environment.
We have developed a strategy to address both our short-term needs and
our long-range requirements. This strategy is made up of three
objectives: 1.) Developing a theater-wide C4I vision that supports the
operational needs of the operator while facilitating process change;
2.) Aligning and institutionalizing the Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) with operational requirements to resource and sustain the
vision; and 3.) Fielding C4I capabilities that support current
readiness and enhance our ability to "fight tonight." We have made
tremendous progress in each of these areas. The power of information
and information technology is the catalyst for several comprehensive
changes we are making to our command and control structure as well as
operational concepts and warfighting processes.
Common Operational Understanding (COU) is the organizing mechanism for
this transformation.
COU is a process that transforms situational awareness into
knowledge-based decisions. It ensures U.S. and ROK field commanders
dispersed throughout the theater not only have the same view of the
common operating picture (COP), but have the same level of
understanding on what the COP means.
This consensus can best be achieved with C4I functionality that
provides real-time, interactive collaboration capabilities. In an
environment where the fleeting nature of targets compresses the
planning, decision and execution cycle from days and hours, to minutes
and seconds, achieving COU is paramount to success, and in more direct
terms, is the essence of decision superiority.
Survivable theater intelligence systems are a critical part of the
common operating picture and essential to successful combat
operations. We want to express our deep gratitude for the funding
support you have provided to our C4I infrastructure with regard to the
intelligence automation and communications segment, called the Pacific
Command Automated Data Processing Server Site Korea (PASS-K). Our
current intelligence funding level is addressed in this year's Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) is adequately funded through the General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).
This stable funding is essential to ensure that the planned
enhancements necessary to maintain information dominance in
collaboration with national and theater systems become a reality.
The progress we have achieved with your help, with programs such as
PASS-K, is a success story, but taking full advantage of the emerging
technologies has been a constant challenge for this command due to
years of C4ISR funding shortfalls. In the past, un-funded C4I
requirements have had a significant impact on our ability to maintain
an adequate infrastructure needed to support the increased bandwidth,
network redundancy, and the modern decision and collaboration tools
required by my unit commanders. This has forced local units to divert
money from other operations and maintenance accounts in order to
maintain our C4ISR capability. We have the technical expertise in
place to fully utilize these technologies but have lacked the
acquisition authority and consistent funding stream to fully put these
technologies to work. Such funding would help sustain our C2 systems,
as well as the progress we made in areas such as C4 infrastructure and
information assurance. More importantly, it provides some momentum as
we look toward the additional plus-ups provided in the fiscal year
2003-2007 budget.
However, the C4I funding provided to Korea over the next five years
with implementation of Program Budget Decision 725 is absolutely
critical to addressing our shortfalls. This new funding, starting with
$67 million in FY 03, will not only allow us to make up the lost
ground that occurred over the years, but will serve to facilitate the
advances we need to implement our vision. I strongly urge your
continued support of this funding increase over the duration of the
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Failure to achieve this will result
in a serious risk to our ability to execute existing warplans.
2) Precision Engagement - Precision Guided Munitions, or PGMs, are a
critical enabler for our Korean warfighting strategy. These
state-of-the-art munitions are an important part of what we need to be
ready to win decisively. Since North Korea continues to shelter forces
in underground facilities and hardened bunkers, we must be able to
overcome these defenses with key penetrating weapons. The complexities
of Korean climate drive up our need for Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM) weapons--our fight demands their accuracy in any kind of
weather. We are studying the lessons from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
to apply in our theater. Just like Afghanistan and Kosovo, precision
strike is needed to avoid collateral damage on the highly populated
Korean peninsula. On the other hand, unlike Afghanistan, we face an
adversary with thousands of mechanized targets and prepared
defenses-one who has been preparing to fight us as a modernized force
for the past 50 years. Worldwide, readily available stocks of
precision-guided munitions are mandatory for our "war fight" and our
inventories that have been diminished by Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
must be replenished quickly. Since Desert Storm, the American public
has become accustomed to watching video clips on the nightly news
where enemy vehicles or bunkers, seen targeted in cross hairs,
instantly erupt in explosions. That capability does not come cheap,
but the cost to not pursue PGMs is higher. When we fall back to "dumb
bombs" to destroy enemy targets, historical examples illustrate that
the final total cost is actually higher. Many more "dumb bombs" are
required to destroy the same target that one PGM has a high
probability of hitting.
Additionally, we increase the risk of collateral damage and civilian
casualties. PGMs must be addressed by both the ROK and the U.S. We
need a solid inventory readily available on the peninsula.
3) Support Reconciliation Efforts - Although there has been no formal
change in ROK defense policy towards the North Korean threat, early
last year it was obvious that a perception of peace had emerged within
the South Korean public. However, recent failures in talks have once
again led to a change in how the ROK public regards the reality of a
heavily armed North Korea. The ROK government has historically given
much in terms of economic aid and assistance to North Korea, in the
hope of developing better, more peaceful relations. All talks have now
stalled, and no tension reduction measures of any sort have been
agreed to or employed. Even the execution of planned family reunions
between family members in North and South Korea, have now been
postponed indefinitely The United Nations Command (UNC) will continue
to fully support President Kim Dae-jung's reconciliation process and
the development of a road/ rail transportation corridor through the
Demilitarized Zone. President Kim Dae-jung has termed this railroad,
spanning Asia and Europe, as the new "Iron Silk Road." As the vision
of the Korean railroad begins to take shape, Korea could benefit
immensely from its central geographic location. The promise of
opportunity and economic commerce that these lines could generate is
substantial. Any development of this Inter-Korean railroad, and the
security implications involved, will be a significant source of
careful planning, negotiation and bilateral inter-agency coordination.
However, the transportation corridor is fully complete on the South
side, while on the North side we see no progress whatsoever.
The 1953 Armistice Agreement authorizes the Commander In Chief, United
Nations Command (CINC UNC) jurisdiction authority over the Southern
portion of the Demilitarized Zone. To facilitate work on the
transportation corridor, acting as the CINC UNC, I have delegated
administrative oversight to the South Korean Ministry of Defense.
Close cooperation between United Nations Command and the South Korean
Ministry of National Defense has guaranteed a powerful defense is
active and in place, and will continue to ensure sufficient levels of
security in the DMZ during de-mining, corridor construction and future
operation. As we work closely with North Korea over issues concerning
access and commerce in this corridor, we will continue to insist that
all actions, and all confidence-building measures (CBMs) are both
reciprocal and transparent. I am proud to report that our year-long
Confidence Building Measures study has strengthened our alliance and
has produced verifiable options to reduce tension if North Korea will
only take the same steps. This is exactly the type of armistice issue
that the UNC seeks to resolve carefully with all our UNC allies and
coalition partners.
4) Improve Quality of Life -As stated in President Bush's statement A
Blueprint for New Beginnings "..., we cannot honor our servicemen and
women and yet allow substandard housing levels to endure." The Korean
peninsula faces significant shortfalls in both family housing and
barracks and has identified substandard living and working conditions
in most areas. Our facilities are old -32 percent of all buildings in
the command are between 25 and 50 years old and 32 percent are
classified as temporary buildings. The investment philosophy of "50
years of presence in Korea... one year at a time," without a
continuous and sustained commitment, has taken a severe toll on our
housing, infrastructure, and morale.
Our goal is a quality of life that is comparable to other overseas
assignments. We want to make a tour of duty in Korea an "assignment of
choice" by providing the best quality of life possible. A Korea
assignment today involves some of the poorest living and working
conditions of any permanent change of station (PCS) assignment in the
military. According to current studies, "Army assignment experts
report that Korea is their only problematic assignment location for
both officers and enlisted personnel ... the Army must nominate many
enlisted members to fill a single vacancy in Korea... the Army must
contact several officers in order to fill one officer vacancy in
Korea." While no confirmation data was provided by the Air Force,
"assignment policy experts opined that Korea and Turkey are the least
desirable locations in their overseas assignment inventory." We must
improve both the housing and barracks living conditions for our
personnel and their families to reach our "assignment of choice" and
"quality of life" goals. We appreciate Congress's assistance in
helping improve the grim conditions regarding housing throughout this
command. Yet over 95% of the currently assigned and accompanied
service members and their families live in inadequate and substandard
quarters. Furthermore, over 50% of the unaccompanied service members
in U.S. Forces Korea live in inadequate quarters.
Overcrowded facilities force us to billet many unaccompanied personnel
outside our installations in dense urban areas, creating force
protection concerns and imposing a high financial burden on them from
out-of- pocket living expenses. Investment in USFK facilities has
declined as a result of constrained defense budgets and competing
requirements. Now we see growth in the backlog of work necessary to
maintain the readiness edge we established in past years. We must
balance overseas funding among the priorities of people, readiness,
modernization and infrastructure. Because of past funding shortfalls,
we are at a breaking point. We cannot continue to mortgage this aspect
of our force readiness without significant long-term effects.
Accordingly, we are finalizing a budget that will meet this challenge.
Meanwhile, the expectations of our commanders, our people and our
families remain high as they urge us to balance direct mission support
and quality-of-life efforts in the face of aging infrastructure and
very constrained budgets.
We recognize that quality-of-life and readiness also extends into the
workplace environment.
Deteriorating work facilities impair readiness, reduce the efficiency
of uniformed and civilian workers and lowers retention rates of highly
qualified and otherwise motivated people. Our Sustainment, Restoration
and Modernization (SRM) funding levels have only allowed us to provide
day-to-day critical maintenance of our work facilities and
infrastructure and does not allow us to address our SRM backlog.
To illustrate the hardship this causes, let's look at an airman whose
job is to maintain an F-15 engine, a soldier maintaining an Apache
attack helicopter and a mechanic fixing a fighting vehicle. They may
work in a hangar where the roof leaks or they may repair vehicles in
the freezing cold. In these conditions they are often distracted from
fixing the F-15 engine, the Apache helicopter or the fighting vehicle.
This has both a quality-of-life implication as well as a readiness
impact. When our service members are distracted from accomplishing
their primary mission, our readiness suffers. Our Soldiers and Airmen
see this as quality-of-life issue, and they are frustrated that they
have to spend an increasing amount of time on non-productive efforts.
They assume that their leaders do not care! The Department of Defense
spends millions of dollars training these young men and women to work
on sophisticated equipment, yet they are required to work many
non-productive hours tending to their run-down workplaces. I think
we're losing the battle to maintain the high standards our people have
come to expect. Aging facilities are more costly to maintain.
Continued disrepair exacerbates an already serious problem and impacts
readiness, especially when coupled with a high operational tempo and
harsh conditions, such as we experience daily in Korea.
With the high operational tempo and the increasing number of married
members, we recognize an integral link between family readiness and
total force readiness. A key element of our quality of life initiative
is our goal to provide safe, adequate housing for our personnel and
their families. We firmly believe providing quality accommodations
improves our members' quality of life, increases their satisfaction
with military service and ultimately leads to increased readiness and
retention. Indeed, Korea's uniqueness as a yearlong unaccompanied tour
has been purchased at a great price. We provide government owned and
leased housing for only 1,979 personnel -less than 10 percent of our
married service members serving in Korea -compared to more than 70
percent in Europe and Japan.
Our goal is to increase the command-sponsored rate for Korea and to
house at least 25 percent of our married military members and their
families by 2010. This initiative will require additional resources
and support. If we were to address this shortfall, and meet this
increased demand for housing with traditional military construction
alone, it would cost the U.S. taxpayer $900 million. Under our
comprehensive LPP, utilizing Host Nation Funded Construction and cost
savings achieved with base consolidation, we can cut this cost in
half. In order to obtain the remaining capital investment required, we
plan to use existing build-to-lease authority, and leverage the Korean
private sector to obtain an additional 2,000 units. If we can get help
to raise the existing statutory per/ unit cost limitation from $25,000
to $35,000 per/ unit for overseas leased family housing, we will
develop these 2,000 units at no additional cost to the U.S. taxpayer!
With your help, we will realize our vision for improving the housing
situation in Korea, and we will minimize the financial burden on the
U.S. Congress.
We will also improve the quality of our existing housing in FY 03 by
continuing our phased renovation and conversion of housing units
located in Hannam Village in Seoul. We began last year with your
support and the results have been outstanding. The enthusiasm of the
occupants over these improvements is spreading across the Korean
peninsula. They see first hand our efforts to make a difference.
Unaccompanied Housing Improvements also remain a critical priority.
Our objective is to provide enlisted service members with quality
housing by the Department of Defense mandated date of 2008. We have
two long-range planning tools to guide our investments: The Air Force
Dormitory Master Plan and Army Barracks Upgrade and Buyout Plan. These
planning tools have and will continue to guide us in providing quality
living conditions for our unaccompanied service members allowing us to
use our limited funds where they are needed the most and at the same
time keeping our good units good. On-going renovations will continue
to ensure we provide quality living facilities, however based on our
plans we still short of our total requirement. The current upgrade
plans do not cover senior enlisted soldiers.
Adequate housing for unaccompanied senior enlisted soldiers (E7 -E9)
and officers is urgently needed as well. Unlike CONUS Army units, all
Second Infantry Division soldiers, including senior enlisted and
officers, are required to live on post. Eighth Army's shortfall for
senior enlisted and officers housing is 3,100 quarters for E7 -E9 and
2,800 for officers. Adequate housing for these service-members has
been neglected for too long. We urgently need to continue our efforts
and Congress can help to support this responsibility by funding the
$81 million MILCON requirement beginning in FY 03.
Infrastructure Maintenance and Repair is required immediately. Funding
increases in MILCON for infrastructure upgrades have helped USFK to
improve conditions not only in our barracks and dormitories, but also
in other traditional quality-of-life facilities such as physical
fitness centers. We greatly appreciate your support. However, we still
have a lot of work to do. The master plans mentioned earlier,
addressing family housing, barracks and dormitories, respectively,
have been extremely valuable tools in helping to focus and guide our
actions. Accordingly, we have just added to our arsenal a Physical
Fitness Center Master Plan and a Maintenance Facility Master Plan.
Together, these plans guide us towards wise investments in our most
urgent quality of life requirements. We need to replace or upgrade 52
maintenance facilities and 17 physical fitness centers. To begin
buying out this requirement in FY03, we intend to use $21 million from
the Host Nation Funded Construction program for the maintenance
facilities. To correct other quality of life and infrastructure
deficiencies, we need to further address military construction. The
funding Congress provided in FY02 will enable us improve
infrastructure, facilities and barracks across the peninsula. We will
continue this effort by applying the remaining $171 million of Host
Nation Funded Construction money against this improvement effort.
As part of this comprehensive plan, USFK must demonstrate its
unwavering commitment to protecting the health of Korean and U.S.
personnel, while preserving the environment everyday. USFK continues
to wrestle with environmental protection and problem mitigation
programs given the age and poor condition of our infrastructure. The
number of environmental incidents is on the rise in the past year due
to failed infrastructure and lack of maintenance. Our most immediate
environmental concern is with the command's aging underground storage
and heating oil tanks. The cost to remove and replace these tanks will
be $133 million dollars, but it will be spread over several years.
Although we have a solid, attainable, and comprehensive Self-Help Plan
to make service in Korea an assignment of choice for our service
members, it will take ten or more years to complete. In the interim,
we must provide fair incentives to those who serve in the inadequate
working and living conditions to close the quality of life gap that
exists today between military service in Korea and service in either
the continental United States or other overseas locations. To do this,
we ask that you increase the pay and allowances of military members
that serve in the Republic of Korea. We have an essential requirement
to recruit and retain skilled military personnel. We need to continue
the effort to adequately compensate our people for their service.
Unlike most American businesses, we financially penalize our military
members for Korean service. While our service members are motivated by
much more than money, pay and morale are nonetheless linked. Service
members want and deserve equal pay for substantially equal work under
the same general conditions. In addition to an average cost of $3,000
to $5,000 of out-of-pocket "hidden 2 nd household" expenses for a one
year unaccompanied tour in Korea, our forces see a basic pay inequity
between their deployment here and equally harsh, but shorter tours to
southwest Asia and the Balkans. For example, an Army Sergeant (E5)
serving only a six-month tour in Bosnia receives approximately $500
per month more than an E5 in Korea who is separated from his family
for twelve months. The difference results from tax relief and separate
rations benefits received by those who faithfully serve in the Balkans
-entitlements that do not now apply to a typical Korean tour of duty.
We need your help to level the playing field by providing compensation
such as a Balkans or Kuwaiti tour provides.
CONCLUSION -The Road Ahead The ROK-U.S. Alliance is built on the
principle of Katchi-Kapshida -"We Go Together!" Simply put, we have
fought a war and kept the peace for over fifty years as a combined
team. As we prepare for the future, both USFK and the ROK military are
reviewing their modernization plans and transforming our militaries
into a capabilities-based force. We are looking at new organizational
structures that will increase our effectiveness, improve our combined
doctrine and take advantage of new equipment. As we modernize
together, we must identify complimentary capabilities that support
regional security and one that helps both the American and Korean
militaries to focus critical resources on the most cost effective
capability.
Despite the unprecedented June 2000 summit between North and South
Korea, there is still no "peace dividend." This posture statement
reflects our efforts to optimize USFK's presence in the most efficient
manner to meet both current and future missions. For many years, our
funding requirement statements have merely reflected OMA incremental
increases over a baseline. Candidly, as a result, we have looked at
Korea "one year at a time." The result is that we still have
substandard living and working conditions for our service members that
are having an adverse effect on the readiness and a significant impact
on long-term retention. As a commander, I am ashamed of how I ask our
service members to live and work.
In conclusion, we would like to leave you with six thoughts: First, we
want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the American people
is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank you for all you
have done. However, we must also ensure that our resolve is consistent
and visible so that North Korea, or any other potential adversary,
cannot misinterpret it. We urge committee members to come to Korea and
see first-hand the importance of the American military presence and
the strength and vitality of the United States -Republic of Korea
alliance.
Second, the North Korean military continues to adapt its
non-conventional threat and conduct large-scale training exercises in
spite of severe economic problems and a perception of a thawing
relationship between North and South Korea. North Korea's continued
growth in military capability and their implied intent amounts to a
continued significant threat. Now, more than ever, the strength of the
Republic of Korea -United States alliance, built on a foundation of
teamwork and combined training, provides both nations with a powerful
deterrent as well as the readiness to fight and win. The North Korean
threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia will not fundamentally
diminish until the North engages in tangible military confidence
building measures that are reciprocal and transparent.
Third, now and in the future, the U.S. and Northeast Asian nations
cannot secure their interests and economic prosperity without credible
air/ land/ sea forces in Korea. Presence is essential to security,
commitment to long-standing friends, and access into the region. As
the only presence on the mainland of East Asia, U.S. forces in Korea
will likely play a vital role in the future peace and stability of the
region. The U.S. forces in Korea require a continued investment in
basic readiness and quality of life, even if our role shifts from
North Korea to a regional focus.
Fourth, achieving our vision and accomplishing our missions requires
us to prioritize scarce resources. For U.S. Forces serving in Korea,
the number one command priority remains improving C4I functionality.
We urgently need your help in order to achieve the information age
advantage that network-centric warfare systems will provide. Secondly,
we need a solid inventory of readily available precision-guided
munitions on the peninsula. Lastly, now and in the future, if we are
to sustain our Combat Readiness it must be balanced and tempered with
a quality-of-life that is commensurate with other duty locations
throughout the world. A First Class Military requires First Rate
Facilities. As the only presence on the mainland of East Asia, U.S.
forces in Korea will likely play a vital role in the future peace and
stability of the region. The U.S. forces in Korea require critical
investment in basic readiness and quality-of-life now. The Land
Partnership Plan, that we hope to have ratified by both governments by
15 March, 2002, will put us on the proper course to improve the
Quality-of-Life for U.S. Forces in Korea and their families.
Fifth, this is the third year of commemorations recognizing the
significance of the 50 th Anniversary of the Korean War, viewed by
many of our veterans as the "forgotten war." We are committed to
honoring the brave veterans, living and dead, and hope you can join us
in Korea for these commemorations to remember their sacrifice.
Finally, you can be justifiably proud of all the exceptional things
the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Defense Department
civilians continue to do with great spirit and conviction. They remain
our most valuable asset. They sacrifice for our nation every day. This
is why we remain so firm that we owe all those who faithfully serve
proper resources for training, an adequate quality of life, and a
quality infrastructure. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share
our thoughts with you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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