28 February 2002
Feith Says NATO's Strength Today Was Honed Over 50 Years
(He says U.S. believes NATO should enlarge) (1880)
NATO's response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United
States illustrates how well the North Atlantic Alliance can adapt and
respond to unforeseen challenges, says a senior U.S. Defense
Department official.
"Less than 24 hours after the terrorists' attack against America, our
NATO allies invoked, for the first time in history, Article 5 -- the
collective defense provision of the 1949 NATO Treaty," said Douglas
Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, February 28 before a
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "Soon thereafter, NATO
took a series of steps to assist us in the war against terrorism," he
said.
Feith said the rapid response and the ensuing support given by the
19-member Alliance in the global war on terrorism should be
appreciated from the perspective of more than 50 years of joint
planning, training, and operations within the Alliance.
The committee is examining issues surrounding the future of the NATO
Alliance, and among the issues confronting the 53-year-old Alliance is
further expansion among other formerly eastern bloc nations.
The NATO Alliance meets in Prague in November -- the first summit of
the new millennium -- and the United States wants to accelerate NATO's
continuing transformation, he said.
But Feith said the United States recognizes that enlargement of NATO
is not free from risks and difficult judgments.
"People of experience and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the
Alliance excessively unwieldy," he said. "They do not want the
Alliance to dilute its military capabilities through expansion, and
they are concerned about NATO's relations with important neighbors.
They want to ensure that any enlargement will strengthen NATO's
ability to perform its essential defense mission."
Furthermore, Feith said, they want to ensure the commitment of new
members to the Alliance's principles. These are prudent cautionary
considerations, he said.
"We think NATO can enlarge -- indeed should," he said. "The aspirant
countries have made impressive contributions to NATO-led operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, seven of the nine NATO aspirants made
force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and eight of the nine
to NATO operations in Bosnia."
Additionally, Feith said these NATO aspirants have shown
much-appreciated solidarity with the United States through
contributions in anti-terrorist operations following September 11th.
Following is the text of Feith's prepared remarks:
(begin text)
STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. FEITH
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
FEBRUARY 28, 2002
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the Committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to discuss with you the future of NATO.
As happens from time to time, especially since the West's victory in
the Cold War, questions arise about NATO's relevance. Such questions
are useful. We shouldn't take large institutions for granted. It is
salutary to review the Alliance's rationale and examine its
institutions.
Today, we perform this review in light of the lessons of September
11th: lessons about key vulnerabilities of our country despite our
conventional military power; lessons about new types of threats;
lessons about the global nature of our military responsibilities;
lessons about surprise, unpredictability and the necessity for the
U.S. military to be adaptable and flexible; and, lessons about the
value of our community of allies and friends around the world.
In his statement to NATO defense ministers last June, Secretary
Rumsfeld listed terrorism first among the types of new threats facing
the Alliance. The others he mentioned were cyber-attack, high-tech
conventional weapons; and ballistic and cruise missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction. Three months later, on September 11th,
the first of these anticipated threats materialized with awful impact
in New York and Washington.
NATO and our NATO Allies responded to the September 11 attack quickly,
loyally and usefully. NATO showed it can adapt and respond to
unforeseen challenges.
Less than 24 hours after the terrorists' attack against America, our
NATO Allies invoked, for the first time in history, Article 5 -- the
collective defense provision of the 1949 NATO Treaty. Soon thereafter,
NATO took a series of steps to assist us in the war against terrorism.
For example, seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft are now patrolling U.S. skies, relieving us of a significant
burden and freeing up the U.S. AWACS fleet for important work abroad.
Individual NATO Allies and Partners are contributing to the war effort
and to the post-Taliban reconstruction and security effort in
Afghanistan. Some of the Allies' contributions have come through
formal Alliance structures and some outside those structures. All
those contributions, however, should be appreciated as the fruit of
more than 50 years of joint planning, training and operations within
the NATO Alliance.
NATO's core mission remains, as it should, the collective defense of
its members, as stated in Article 5. But NATO will continue to adapt
to deal with new threats and to capitalize on its strengths in the
current era. The Prague Summit - NATO's first in the new millennium --
is scheduled for November of this year. At that Summit, the United
States hopes to accelerate NATO's transformation, stressing three
themes: new members, new capabilities, and new relationships.
Enlargement
President Bush has reaffirmed the U.S. aspiration to promote a Europe
"whole and free." In Warsaw last June, he declared: "I believe in NATO
membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready
to share the responsibility that NATO brings ... As we plan the Prague
Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but
how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that enlargement of the Alliance is not an
exercise free of risks and difficult judgments. People of experience
and wisdom warn of the dangers of making the Alliance excessively
unwieldy. They do not want the Alliance to dilute its military
capabilities through expansion and they are concerned about NATO's
relations with important neighbors. They want to ensure that any
enlargement will strengthen NATO's ability to perform its essential
defense mission. They want to ensure that the commitment of new
members to the Alliance's principles and work will be enduring and
fulfillable.
These are prudent cautionary considerations and they are informing the
Administration's enlargement strategy. We think NATO can enlarge --
indeed should -- in ways that will serve the national security
interests of the United States and our current Allies. A Europe united
on the basis of democratic principles, the rule of law, respect for
individual rights and the other tenets of the Alliance will be better
able to resist and defeat terrorist threats and other threats. The
U.S. government believes that an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint
defense and operational planning, promotes interoperability, and
encourages realistic training exercises will be a more effective
partner in answering global security challenges.
The aspirant countries have made impressive contributions to NATO-led
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, seven of the nine NATO
aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and
eight of the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia: They have also shown
much-appreciated solidarity with the United States-through their
contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. They have conducted
themselves as we want our Allies to act. For operations in
Afghanistan, the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence,
over-flight rights, access to bases, and public diplomatic support.
As the Administration deliberates on specific candidacies, the Defense
Department will be assessing the state of the aspirants' military
structures, their implementation of defense reform, the readiness of
military units dedicated to NATO missions, and the military value the
aspirant countries can add to NATO.
Transformation
The transformation of NATO's capabilities can and should proceed
hand-in-hand with its enlargement. This may be the gravest challenge
for the Alliance in the coming years. NATO operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo exposed collective Alliance shortfalls in the capabilities most
relevant to modern warfare; they also exposed a disturbing -- and
growing -- capabilities gap between the United States and its Allies.
We heard encouraging rhetoric at the 1999 Washington Summit, but
by-and-large have seen meager results. The widening capabilities gap
not only weakens the Alliance's military potential, it could in time
erode NATO's political solidarity.
In our view, the Alliance needs to focus on a few priorities,
including: defending its forces and populations against weapons of
mass destruction; doing a better job of getting Allies' forces to the
fight; ensuring that Allied forces can communicate easily with one
another without fear of eavesdropping or jamming by their adversaries;
and improving Allies' contributions to modern, fast-paced, and more
precise combat operations.
We cannot transform NATO capabilities overnight, but we cannot afford
to settle for "business as usual." As we encourage Allies to spend
more on defense, it
is even more important that we get them to "spend smarter." The Joint
Strike Fighter Program is a model of cooperation and efficiency
involving the United States and several Allies.
New Relationships
A third goal for the Prague summit is strengthening NATO's
relationship with Russia and revitalizing its relations with other
Partners.
We are working hard with our Allies to enhance the NATO-Russia
relationship. The best way to proceed, we think, is to build a record
of success on practical projects that benefit everyone involved. We
believe that this effort can dissipate vestigial fears in Russia that
NATO threatens its security. We also think that fostering engagement
with Russia can induce further democratic, market and military reform
in that country and contribute to improved Russian relations with its
neighbors. In short, we view the NATO-Russia relationship as
complementary to our bilateral efforts to establish a new framework of
U.S.-Russia relations.
As we build this enhanced relationship, and as the Alliance and Russia
work together where we can, it is essential that NATO retain its
independent ability to decide and act on important security issues. We
are conscious of the importance of protecting Alliance solidarity and
effectiveness. The North Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus,
on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will
not have a veto over Alliance decisions. And NATO-Russia cooperation
will not be allowed to discourage or marginalize other Partners. We
are confident that we can respect these safeguards as we improve
NATO's ties to Russia.
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a NATO success story, having
produced practical cooperation between the Allies and 27 Partners from
Europe through Central Asia. We want to maintain and strengthen
Partnership programs beyond Prague, especially in ways that increase
the Partners' ability to operate with NATO forces in crisis response
operations. And we should not be surprised if, following invitations
to some number of aspirants at Prague, other Partners step forward to
declare interest in NATO membership.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, NATO has been a successful alliance,
perhaps the most successful alliance in history. This year, we have an
opportunity to enlarge and transform NATO to help ensure that future
generations of our Euro-Atlantic community -- the core of the
community of the world's democratic states -- are ready and able to
secure their freedom.
(end text)
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