28 February 2002
U.S., Iraqi Opposition Discuss Broad-based Conference
(Boucher comments on Israeli-Palestinian strife, Saudi proposal)
(5010)
The U.S. government is holding discussions with the Iraqi National
Congress about a proposal to build a radio transmitter for
broadcasting inside Iraq and about organizing a broad-based conference
of Iraqi opposition organizations, State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher said.
Speaking at his regular press briefing in Washington February 28,
Boucher said the United States is open to the concept of broadcasting
into Iraq from inside Iran or from Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq,
but added that no decision has been reached.
He said the United States supports a broad-based conference that would
be inclusive of all Iraqi opposition organizations, including military
and political figures.
"I think the purpose of getting together the Iraqi opposition is to
help marshal the support, look at ideas, demonstrate that there are
Iraqis who want a different future for their country, and make clear
that these people come from a variety of backgrounds, a variety of
ethnic groups, a variety of experiences, and to have them be able to
compare notes and look at what kind of activities can further the goal
of eventually changing the regime in Baghdad," Boucher said.
Commenting on the Israeli military incursion into the Palestinian
refugee camps at Balata and Jenin, Boucher said the United States
respects Israel's right to self-defense and has continued to call on
the Palestinian Authority to make maximum efforts to stop violence and
terror.
At the same time, Boucher said, Israel needs to show utmost restraint
to avoid harm to civilians and take steps to facilitate Palestinian
security efforts and to create a positive environment for making
progress toward peace.
Boucher said Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
William Burns has traveled to Saudi Arabia and held talks with Crown
Prince Abdullah about his idea for full normalization of relations
between Israel and Arab countries in the context of a negotiated
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Boucher called the
Crown Prince's idea "a significant positive step."
Burns's talks with Crown Prince Abdullah also dealt with regional and
bilateral developments and Vice President Dick Cheney's trip to the
region in March.
Commenting on the Bush administration's view of solving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Boucher said political vision and an end
to violence both are necessary to make progress toward peace.
Following are excerpts from Boucher's February 28 briefing with his
comments about issues in the Middle East:
(begin excerpt)
QUESTION: What do you hear about the U.S. being prepared to finance
radio transmitters, either in northern Iraq or in Iran?
MR. BOUCHER: Let me bring you up to date with the situation there. We
have been in discussions for some time with the Iraqi National
Congress regarding a proposal to build a radio transmitter in the
region for broadcasting inside Iraq. Though we are open to the concept
of broadcasting from inside Iran or from Kurdish-controlled areas of
Iraq, no decisions have been made on this as yet.
Given our long record of cooperation with the Kurdish Democratic Party
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, we believe that their input is
important on any proposal to broadcast from Kurdish-controlled areas.
QUESTION: What about the long-running cooperation between the two
Kurdish parties? Do you care to comment on that?
MR. BOUCHER: Nothing new on that. As you know, it has been an issue of
concern to us -- the cooperation, or sometimes lack thereof. But we
have kept in touch with both of these major parties up there. We have
at times been out there. I think you'll remember the trip by Ryan
Crocker last fall to keep in touch with them, also to work with them
on their own cooperation, to encourage them to cooperate with each
other. I don't think the state of their particular cooperation is
determinant in this matter, but they do need to be heard from as far
as their control of the areas.
QUESTION: I guess I wasn't very clear. I meant in terms of what you
guys are doing with the -- trying to get them to cooperate more. Is
any of that related to this?
MR. BOUCHER: No. As I said, I don't think their cooperation is
determinant in whether a transmitter goes up up there. But certainly
both of them need to have input because, by and large, they control
the areas.
QUESTION: And you are seeking such input?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not sure if we are or if the INC is, frankly.
QUESTION: Would it not also need UN approval if you were to go ahead
with this plan?
MR. BOUCHER: Not that I'm aware of. Oh, you mean like to transfer
equipment into Iraq?
QUESTION: If it were to -- I'm sorry, I missed the beginning. But,
yeah, exactly.
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, there might be something. It would depend on the
state of the list and things like that at the moment that it was done.
I don't think we're at that point yet.
.....
QUESTION: I haven't had time to analyze this, but looking at what the
Secretary said in the interview he gave yesterday on inspections, do
you think that partial inspections are better than no inspections?
Inside Iraq, weapons inspections?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what you mean by "partial inspections." We
think that Iraq should comply with its obligations, and, as the
Secretary said, Iraq should allow full and unfettered inspections, as
it's required to do under the UN.
QUESTION: Can you -- still on Iraq but not on the sanctions -- explain
what the U.S. role is in helping to organize, or whatever it is that
you're doing with the INC conferences --
MR. BOUCHER: Conferences of military officers?
QUESTION: Exactly.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
QUESTION: What is the U.S. role for that?
MR. BOUCHER: Here's where we are on this. We have had discussions with
the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition groups on the idea of
a conference of former Iraqi military officers. We do support and
encourage the idea of a broad-based conference that would be inclusive
of all Iraqi opposition organizations.
We note the Iraqi National Congress has now announced its intention to
go forward with organizing such a conference. We have to point out
there are indeed some practical difficulties with holding a conference
in the United States -- I think their announcement said Washington --
especially the issue of visas for participants on refugee status in
other countries.
So we understand they'll keep working on this. They may be in touch,
as we understand it, with the Pentagon on logistics and facilities,
and we'll have to see if something is worked out by them in terms of
organizing that proposal.
But I would say also in this vein, in the near future the Department
of State plans to support a broad-based conference that would be
attended by a wide variety of Iraqi émigré organizations, including
both military and political figures. We have made no decisions yet on
timing or venue, but we would expect to work on organization of the
conference with a nongovernmental organization in another location.
Just to make clear, we believe that such conferences are important,
that the meetings with the Iraqi opposition are important,
particularly broad-based ones. It's useful to have multiple
conferences, if that can be arranged.
QUESTION: But these are two separate things, as far as you --
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, these are two separate things at this point.
QUESTION: And so does that mean that you're not prepared to support
their conference of military people? Or you will, but you think there
might be problems with it?
MR. BOUCHER: We've said it's a good idea. We said there are
difficulties doing this in the United States. I think in fact they are
in touch with the Pentagon about some of the arrangements. You might
have to check over there.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, you mentioned one problem might be with visas.
Is the State Department not prepared to facilitate the issuance of
visas to people to come to this conference?
MR. BOUCHER: We are prepared to facilitate the issuance of visas to
people who qualify, but there is always the question about people,
depending on travel documents and status overseas, if they're in some
other country on refugee documents, it might not be easy to let them
in here. And so a lot of these people, it might be difficult for us to
do that.
QUESTION: Well, have you suggested an alternative venue?
MR. BOUCHER: Not for that particular conference. I suppose the INC is
probably considering the question because we have put to them that
there are these complications with the proposal that they had talked
about. When we look at the kind of conference that we were organizing
with an NGO, we had looked at doing that outside the United States.
QUESTION: How much money?
MR. BOUCHER: Don't have any specific money, timing or venue yet.
QUESTION: Is that visa problem the only practical difficulty on this?
MR. BOUCHER: I suppose there's travel and other sort of practical
difficulties, but this is the one that we've already pointed out to
them, shall we say.
QUESTION: I didn't quite understand the difficulty. Is it that these
people, as refugees, once they come into the United States, they could
stay indefinitely? Is that what you're --
MR. BOUCHER: Making sure that doesn't happen is one of the chief
criteria for issuance of a visa. But there are also questions of
travel documents and such things. We've pointed out it's very
complicated for us to issue visas to some of these people. We might
not be able to for certain people who might want to attend this
conference; and therefore, in planning conferences, we have looked at
doing it with a nongovernmental organization overseas, for example.
QUESTION: What is (inaudible) purpose of --
MR. BOUCHER: I think the purpose of getting together the Iraqi
opposition is to help marshal the support, look at ideas, demonstrate
that there are Iraqis who want a different future for their country;
and make clear that these people come from a variety of backgrounds, a
variety of ethnic groups, a variety of experiences; and to have them
be able to compare notes and look at what kind of activities can
further the goal of eventually changing the regime in Baghdad.
....
QUESTION: Were these always going to be two different conferences, or
was it just sort of recently when the INC started going ahead with
announcements on this that the State Department decided the interests
of this faction didn't coincide with their interests in this meeting?
MR. BOUCHER: This is sort of the evolution of a discussion. The
original idea of having such a conference involving military officers,
I think was probably put forward by the INC. We thought it was a good
one. But as we looked at what is the best way to organize it, host it,
locations, who ought to do it, how do you get the best possible
broad-based attendance, we felt it was important to obviously let the
INC do what they can, but also to think that we might as well have a
broader conference held by an NGO somewhere. And that sort of evolved
into two separate tracks. That's fine. The more the opposition gets
together, the more useful it is.
QUESTION: You mean broad in terms of not being just military oriented
people invited, or broad in terms of topics that would be discussed?
MR. BOUCHER: Broad in terms of military and political figures, and
probably broad in terms of the kind of people or the number of people,
number of different people who would be able to attend, because you
wouldn't have some of the constraints or difficulties that might apply
to a conference hosted in the US.
QUESTION: How do you feel about the INC announcing this slightly
prematurely and saying that it had your approval?
MR. BOUCHER: As I said, we've endorsed the idea of having conferences
with Iraqi military figures. They announced that they wanted to
organize one. As we've said, these are useful things to have. If there
end up being two conferences in different places, different times,
that's good.
QUESTION: But you said this is an evolution of a discussion. Do you
see the INC putting out information that kind of forces your hand on
the evolution of where the discussion is going?
MR. BOUCHER: They can announce. If they want to hold a conference,
they can announce it.
QUESTION: Richard, I'm sorry, can I follow up? Would you be prepared
to support their idea of the conference with any kind of money, or
you're only interested in --
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I don't have anything on our funding of
that conference. But as I said, I do understand they've been in touch
with the Pentagon, and they may have been able to work something with
them.
QUESTION: That's just for their military-only one?
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, for their military only.
QUESTION: Okay. So, at this point, you are prepared to say that you
are prepared to support the second, your idea, with money, as well as
logistics?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes, that would be something that we would help fund and
organize --
QUESTION: Okay, but if --
MR. BOUCHER: We would help fund and organize, but look for an NGO who
might want to actually implement it.
QUESTION: Right, but right now, if they want money for their military
conference --
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I don't think we ourselves have committed
any money to the first one, because they've been talking to the
Pentagon about it.
QUESTION: So the Pentagon would have to give them money for that? Not
you?
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, there's different ways of doing these things, and
this happens to be the route that they've discussed.
QUESTION: On the military incursion by Israel into the Palestinians'
refugee camps in Balata and Jenin has resurrected images of Sabra and
Shatila in many people's minds in the Middle East. What is your
position on the new trend of going into refugee camps?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, we do have a situation today, and I'll talk about
it. But to go back to the overall principles that we come at this
from, first of all, we respect Israel's right to self-defense. There's
no question about that. We have continued to call on Chairman Arafat
and the Palestinian Authority to undertake maximum efforts to confront
violence and terror. We have also said it's important that the Israeli
Government take steps that both facilitate Palestinian efforts on
security and help promote a more positive environment on the ground.
We do believe it's extremely important that every possible effort be
made to avoid harm to civilians. The United States is concerned about
the present situation on the ground, especially in the Balata refugee
camp near Nablus. We have been in touch with the Israeli Government to
urge that utmost restraint be exercised in order to avoid harm to the
civilian population.
At the same time, we are pleased that the two sides met on Tuesday for
a trilateral security meeting, and that they met bilaterally in a
meeting in Gaza today. This kind of cooperation is extremely
important, and the parties' commitment to continue that cooperation is
a very positive step, one that will help both sides confront the
violence and terror, and we strongly urge them to continue that
cooperation.
QUESTION: Richard, can you elaborate a little bit about the US's
concern about Israel apropos the refugee camp? Are you concerned? I
can think of lots of possibilities: that it be provocative; that it
will set off a tit-for-tat; or that maybe the questioner is right,
that you think maybe they'll act violently against the people there.
What is the concern?
MR. BOUCHER: The concern, as I said, is that every effort be made to
avoid harm to civilians. These are very heavily populated areas. We
understand that Israel needs to take steps to provide for its own
security, but, at the same time, they need to avoid harm to civilians,
particularly in areas like this. They need to exercise restraint and
they need to look to create an environment that is conducive to
further steps towards peace.
QUESTION: Richard, I have seen a report that the Secretary spoke to
Prime Minister Sharon and told him that his forces shouldn't stay in
Balata and Jenin for long. Is that correct? And did he call and what
did he say?
MR. BOUCHER: The Secretary spoke to Prime Minister Sharon this
morning. He also talked to the UN Secretary General this morning about
the situation in the Middle East. When he spoke to Prime Minister
Sharon this morning, they talked about the need for continuing steps
to stop the violence; stressed the importance of continuing security
cooperation, as I just did; talked a little bit about the Saudi
Arabian ideas. But this situation in the refugee camp hadn't really
developed extensively at that moment -- it was early this morning --
so our getting in touch with the Israeli Government was subsequent to
that, as the situation developed further.
QUESTION: Are you saying that they have had subsequent --
MR. BOUCHER: Subsequent phone calls so that -- no. The U.S. contact --
our Embassy in Israel has been in touch with the Israeli Government on
this message of utmost restraint that I mentioned. It wasn't in the
phone call this morning because the situation hadn't developed then.
QUESTION: And did the Embassy say to the Israelis that they hoped they
wouldn't stay very long in the camp?
MR. BOUCHER: We have always said that any incursions shouldn't be made
permanent or lengthy.
QUESTION: So, yes?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know specifically if those words were used.
That's always been our position. I think the Israelis understand that.
QUESTION: What can you tell us about Bill Burns' trip to Saudi Arabia,
his sudden trip there?
MR. BOUCHER: Bill Burns is -- I'm not sure if he's in Saudi Arabia or
if he's already on his way back. He went out to Saudi Arabia to talk
with Crown Prince Abdullah. As you know, we've been keeping in touch
with the Saudis on this idea of theirs about full normalization in the
context of a negotiated settlement. We've said we think it's a
significant and positive step, not only the content but also the fact
that it was made. We wanted to keep in touch with them.
Assistant Secretary Burns had some discussions earlier this week with
the national security advisor to the Crown Prince, and he went out to
talk directly with the Crown Prince about this, about regional
developments, about bilateral relationships, and also in context of
preparing for Vice President Cheney's trip. So he went out, had some
quick meetings, and is probably on his way back.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. BOUCHER: I think yesterday.
QUESTION: Richard, one assumes that Mr. Burns asked the Crown Prince
for some more details of his vision, including, for example, his
vision on flexibility on borders, on refugees and so on. Did he get
any answers on these subjects, and what were they?
MR. BOUCHER: Don't know. The meetings will just have concluded not
very long ago. And again, it's not going to be for us to provide more
details. I think if the Saudis want to do that, then it would be up to
them.
QUESTION: The Saudis seem to be saying it's not up to them; they're
not in the zoning business, as they said; that they've laid down a
vision and it's up to the parties to negotiate, to pick up on it. But
they also say it's consistent with your two aces -- you know, your two
vehicles, the Tenet cease-fire and the Mitchell Report. So, really, I
wonder if --
MR. BOUCHER: I think they must have read my briefing a bit more
closely than some of you did. That's what we've said as well.
QUESTION: Well, they actually talked to some -- no, no, there seemed
to be --
MR. BOUCHER: That they've laid out a vision, which we think is
important both for what it is and for the fact they did it; that it's
consistent with the vision that President Bush and Secretary Powell
laid out last fall; that we think it's an important part of the
process to make clear what's down the road. But we've also said the
parties need to negotiate all these issues.
QUESTION: Yeah -- no, but -- all right, it's hard to -- it's a hard
hair to split, whether you're going there to show that you appreciate
the gesture, or you're really working on details. I suspect there are
no details in the Saudi plan to work on, but you like what they've
said and you want to make sure that it sinks in.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think it's completely the one or the other. There
has been a lot of support for the basic ideas. We want to hear it
directly, talk directly to the Crown Prince, hear it from him, see if
he has more to say. We all recognize -- they recognize -- we do, and I
think people in the region recognize as well, this is about what lies
down the road, but you still need to go down the road. You need to go
down the road of stopping violence and restoring trust and getting to
negotiation, and that these big issues need to be negotiated.
QUESTION: Richard, can you explain what the thinking was behind
sending him out there at such short notice and for such a short time?
I mean, this is an administration, at least in this building, where
the head of this building has said often that telephone calls are just
as good as meeting in person, and that in fact the --
MR. BOUCHER: No, he hasn't.
QUESTION: Yes, he has. And, in fact, the --
MR. BOUCHER: The battle of the transcripts.
QUESTION: In fact, the President and the Secretary have both spoken in
person to Crown Prince Abdullah about this. Why the face-to-face
visit?
MR. BOUCHER: As I said, there are a number of subjects that we want to
discuss, a number of subjects that Mr. Burns wanted to discuss in his
trip, including this idea, but also regional issues, bilateral issues,
and preparations for the Vice President's trip. He thought it was
useful to sit down face to face with the Crown Prince and have a
somewhat longer discussion than one might have on the telephone.
QUESTION: It now seems that the Saudis can officially announce this
plan in the next coming Arab summit in Lebanon, and the presence of
Arafat in such a case will be very vital. Are you going to do anything
to assure that Arafat can break the siege and leave and attend the
summit?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new on that one way or the other at
this point.
....
QUESTION: A couple hours ago, your colleague over at the White House
appears to have put his foot in his mouth, at least from what he's
saying now, for the last 20 minutes, been trying to go back on that.
He said earlier at the gaggle at the White House that an attempt to
push the parties beyond where they were willing to go led to
expectations that were raised to such a high level that it turned into
violence. He was referring, of course, to the efforts last year, I
believe at -- well, I know, at Camp David, between the Israelis and
the Palestinians.
Given that you were actually there and an integral part of Camp David,
and the previous administration, Richard, I'm wondering what you would
like to say about Mr. Fleischer's comments, or if you're content to
let him stew in his own juices, as he's doing -- or was doing as we
came in here?
MR. BOUCHER: Phil? (Laughter.)
You've put me in an untenable position. I either have to turn my back
on Ari Fleischer, or I have to get into some long discussion that I
don't think is merited. Because I read Ari's comments this morning. I
have no problem with them, based on my experience, based on what we
have said previously in this building. To the extent that people over
there want to hear more, I'm sure Ari has been glad to provide it for
the last 20 minutes, and probably going on a half hour now.
But, at the same time, I didn't find anything surprising in his
remarks. We read the transcript this morning. There has always been
this question about do you need political vision in negotiations in
order to stop the violence, or do you need to stop the violence in
order to have political vision and negotiations? And that was the
subject that came up.
We've always said you need both. And our actions, our policy, have
always included both, laying out -- as the President did, the
Secretary did, and others have -- the kind of vision of what's down
the road, but also saying we're not going to get there until we stop
the violence, give people back their lives, rebuild some modicum of
trust to get the parties back to negotiations.
And so I'll leave the historians to write the exact relationship
between these factors over the last couple of years. But to the extent
that question is being discussed in these questions, I think the
answer is what we've actually done is to make sure that there is both
the vision of the political negotiation, but also the real steps to
give people better lives, to rebuild some trust, and get to those
negotiations.
QUESTION: Richard, you laid the two -- not that they're exactly black
and white alternatives, but there are two strategies, two tactics. I
don't think there's any question that the Clinton Administration
accused -- when there was violence, they called those folks "enemies
of peace" and they went full-blast on the theory the only way you deal
with violence is to provide some incentives for people to stop
fighting, serious incentives, like major incentives. And this
administration's approach seems to be you've got to get the violence
down before you can jump in and start jumping around the Middle East
and getting it to show diplomacy, and using the President of the
United States. You see, you're doing both.
Isn't that contrast evident, that they went for political before
ending violence, and you're going for ending violence before providing
a framework?
MR. BOUCHER: As I think I said and Ari discussed, that there are
various aspects of this, but I don't really think this kind of
theoretical discussion gets us anywhere. It's neither the one nor the
other.
QUESTION: Why does Arafat seem to think that you're not pushing hard
enough in support of the initiative? What can you say to him? He wants
you to come out stronger in support of the Saudi initiative, so to
speak.
MR. BOUCHER: We have said what we have said. We have been quite clear
that we think this is a significant and positive step. But we have
been as clear that it's not the answer to all the questions, and that
a maximum effort by Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority is
still required to get to those elements that can be negotiated, to get
to those elements that can be resolved, and can only be resolved by
negotiation. The issue at hand is stopping the violence. That remains
the issue.
QUESTION: Can I ask you one detail on this?
MR. BOUCHER: Sure.
QUESTION: All right. The Saudi proposal, which encompasses the U.S.
approach, does say don't wait ten days, don't wait for a period of
calm. This is particularly apropos today because of what's been said
at the White House and here.
Is the administration's view still that, for one thing, that's what
the Israeli Government would like, a period of calm? And is it the
administration's view there has to be some -- I know you don't want to
count days -- but some reasonable period of time where there's calm
before you can move ahead with Mitchell, or hope to move ahead?
MR. BOUCHER: The administration has made clear since the Mitchell
Committee came up with its recommendations -- and I think the
Secretary repeated it in his interview with a newspaper yesterday --
that you need to reduce the violence to get down this path, that the
Mitchell Report says you've got to stop the violence and get on with
these other things. That was the point of the Tenet recommendations
was to l
ook at the specific steps that can be taken to reduce the violence.
So, yes, you need to reduce the violence to get down that path. That
path remains the important way to get back to talks based on the UN
resolutions and the principles that have to be negotiated.
QUESTION: Would the Saudi proposal in any way -- or is the State
Department considering making the Saudi proposal part of a broader,
kind of revamped peace initiative at this point that would involve the
steps of implementing Mitchell and Tenet but, at the same time, maybe
including some of the ideas that are talked about by Crown Prince
Abdullah as a longer term part of it?
MR. BOUCHER: I take it that's some kind of suggestion? I don't --
QUESTION: It's not a suggestion. I'm just -- I'm asking, is this
factoring into the peace -- to your peace planning?
MR. BOUCHER: It's factored into the vision. It's an Arab vision of
full normalization, and that's in the context of a negotiated
settlement on these key issues. That is sort of factored into the
whole equation. But it's not a peace plan. It's not a specific
proposal to end the violence. We still have to end the violence and
get back to a negotiation that's based on a little bit of confidence
and trust.
(end excerpts)
(end excerpt)
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