19 December 2001
Transcript: U.S. Official says NATO Adapting to Deal with Terrorism
(Dec. 18, Brussels: background briefing at NATO Defense Ministerial)
(3720)
NATO is looking at how to adapt its capabilities to deal with the
terrorist threat and "asymmetric" threats such as cyberwarfare,
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, a senior U.S.
defense official said in a background briefing at the NATO Defense
Ministerial in Brussels December 18.
These are threats that "NATO needs to put more emphasis on," the
official said, adding that the alliance also "needs to invest more
resources into defense, so that we're not caught...having to ramp up
spending when a conflict like this [anti-terrorism campaign]
unexpectedly occurs."
["Asymmetric" threats involve "the use of surprise in all its
operational and strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways
unplanned by the United States," according to the Institute for
National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University.]
Among the themes emerging at the defense ministers meeting was the
"tremendous NATO support for the United States and for its approach to
the war, particularly in Afghanistan," the officials said. There was
consensus that "things are not finished in Afghanistan. There's a lot
to do. In particular, the need to get al Qaeda, the al Qaeda
leadership."
The defense ministers recognized that "al Qaeda may try to get out of
[Afghanistan] and move into either neighboring countries or further
afield," the official said. "And then, obviously, one of the focuses
had to be on trying to stop that. But also recognizing that it may
well happen and that we'll have to deal with it."
Asked about possible NATO troop reductions in the Balkans, the
official stressed that the United States is not calling for a complete
withdrawal of forces, "but we do believe missions need to be modified
and, in some cases, scaled back."
"If NATO is going to be able to respond to crises in the future, and
if NATO publics are going to provide support to their governments to
respond to crises in the future, we're going to have to demonstrate
that we have a way of ending, in effect, our interventions," the
official said.
NATO will be looking at a range of options that go beyond force
reductions to the restructuring of how international forces are laid
out in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, he said.
Following is the Defense Department transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
Department of Defense
(Brussels, Belgium)
Dec. 18, 2001
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY A SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL AT NATO HEADQUARTERS,
BELGIUM
Senior Defense Official: I'll make a few comments about this morning's
activities and, I think, where the meetings are going. This is really
the first meeting -- formal meeting -- of the North Atlantic Council
defense ministers since September 11th. And it's the first time that
Secretary Rumsfeld has been back to NATO since September 11th. I think
the focus, not only for Secretary Rumsfeld but also clearly for all
the ministers here, is the subject of terrorism and the campaign
against terrorism.
A number of themes, I think, are emerging from the morning meeting.
One is tremendous NATO support for the United States and for its
approach to the war, particularly in Afghanistan. And I think
ministers are beginning to look ahead, but there was consensus around
the table that things are not finished in Afghanistan. There's a lot
to do. In particular, the need to get al Qaeda, the al Qaeda
leadership, was a main point that came out of the morning meetings.
In addition to looking ahead, sort of from the standpoint of the war,
NATO is collectively beginning to look ahead at how does NATO fashion
capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat in the future. NATO
realizes that it has to adapt itself to deal with these new threats.
And in addition, a more general point that NATO needs to invest more
resources into defense, so that we're not caught, in effect, having to
ramp up spending when a conflict like this unexpectedly occurs.
Finally, a final point would be simply, I think there was quite a bit
of discussion about the idea of asymmetric threats. That while there
still exist traditional military threats that NATO forces might have
to deal with -- and indeed NATO needs to overcome shortcomings in
certain things like mobility, for example -- dealing with asymmetric
threats, cyberwarfare, obviously the terrorist threat, cruise
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, those kinds of things --
ballistic missiles -- are areas that NATO needs to put more emphasis
on. So I think ministers had a really full discussion, a very
energetic discussion, in several sessions, and I'm looking forward to
the afternoon meetings.
Q: Was there any push, or discussion, or suggestion for developing
coordinated cells within the alliance to, say, work together on
cyberterrorism, work together on protecting -- instead of everyone
shooting off in different directions? You know, with different kinds
of technology? Is there going to be some concerted effort to do this?
In these different areas?
Senior Defense Official: I see what you're saying, yeah. I mean, I
think that what will come out of this meeting is that NATO authorities
here will develop some plans and some taskings on just those problems,
and that NATO will be looking at these, not only in the runup to the
next meeting in June, but also in the runup to the Prague meeting in
late fall. I think it's in November. Obviously, and I should say,
clearly there was a lot of discussion and I expect there will be more
discussion about enlargement this afternoon. So enlargement is still
-- looms large on the minds of -- (chuckles)
Unknown voice: Boo.
Senior Defense Official: Sorry. Well, you know -- on the minds of
ministers. But I think that, yeah, there will be some taskings and
things that will come out of this session.
Q: If I could jump ahead to the afternoon session, because I don't
think we're going to be seeing you between now and then -- a
discussion, a debate, a proposal to reduce forces in Bosnia by 6,000.
Is there really a sense that that is such a drain on the American
military that it prevents us from thoroughly carrying out the war on
terror?
Senior Defense Official: I don't think that we should look at it as a
drain on the American military. By the way, the proposal is not to
reduce American forces --
Unknown voice: (inaudible)
Senior Defense Official: Yeah, I just want to be clear for those who
may not be as clear, the proposal, as the president said, "In
together; out together." So our proposal is, in effect, to have a
reduction in overall presence by 6,000. Keeping -- yeah, a
proportional reduction.
And I think perhaps a better way to think about this is that if NATO
is going to be able to respond to crises in the future, and if NATO
publics are going to provide support to their governments to respond
to crises in the future, we're going to have to demonstrate that we
have a way of ending, in effect, our interventions. In ending, there
has to be a way that -- otherwise publics will lose confidence if
every time you get involved in something if you're stuck there for
sort of an unlimited period of time. You'll end up with a situation
where publics are not going to support the use of force.
So, in effect, this is not a, sort of, in opposition. We've done great
work in Bosnia. I think our view is that SFOR is a resounding success.
We're certainly not calling for a complete withdrawal of force from
there, but we do believe missions need to be modified and, in some
cases, scaled back. In some cases focused in other areas. For example,
terrorism. There was discussion today of about dealing with potential
terrorist activities in the Balkans. So I think the idea is not so
much to focus on the number -- although we think about a 6,000
decrease is justified by, in effect the success, the improvements on
the ground there.
I don't know if that puts it in context.
Q: A follow-up point. How does that 6,000 break down between U.S.
forces and other countries?
Senior Defense Official: Oh boy. I think, I'm not exactly sure. I can
get you that number. If you're looking for a number, I can get you a
rough number. But again, I don't know that -- it would be a rough
number because it wouldn't necessarily -- this is something we are
proposing to the alliance. It's something that ministers will --
Q: Does this come at a time when you do the normal force reviews?
Senior Defense Official: Yeah we're going to this through the normal
process. The aim is to sort of task the national military authorities
to look at this as one of a number of options for restructuring our
forces in the Balkans broadly and in Bosnia. So no, this is not being
done outside the normal processes.
Q: Is the discussion of enlargement being driven in any way by the
focus on terrorism and the need to shift long term planning to
asymmetric threats and terrorism? Is there a linkage between the two?
Senior Defense Official: Yeah, I haven't really seen a nexus between
the two. I think that other than perhaps in a sort of -- the broadest
sense, which is that one of the important goals of enlargement -- is
to bring these new democracies into a security system where they can
flourish, where they can feel secure, and in that way, we are helping
to develop societies that are less susceptible to terrorism. And maybe
in that broadest sense. But I don't think the two issues are closely
related.
Q: Are you going to change the DCI, the Defense Capabilities
Initiative, in regards to asymmetric warfare? Is that going to be
something formally presented?
Senior Defense Official: To my knowledge, it's not going to be
formally presented in this session. I think that what will come out of
our meetings will be some initiatives, perhaps not utilizing the DCI
since that's more focused on other kinds of capabilities. But there
will be some taskings on improving, for example, the alliance's
ability to respond to chemical and biological warfare threats and, you
know, consequence management. Those sorts of issues.
Q: That would be in addition to DCI? Or is this supplanting it?
Senior Defense Official: No. I don't think it's supplanting it. The
DCI was, by the way, discussed in a morning session, and one of the
things, I think is -- there is general, broad support for the DCI and,
in particular, I think some members argued strongly for the need for
-- I mean, the commitment to DCI is there. The commitment of resources
is not always there. So there was a lot of talk about the need to go
back and commit resources. And as you well know, the people sitting
around this table are the defense ministers. And you don't find very
many of them who are not interested in getting additional defense
resources, right? But the problem is having to go back and work it in
capitals. And so, and I know that this issue was also brought up at
the foreign ministers' meeting because, interestingly, the foreign
ministers often are the ones having to make decisions that commit
defense resources. And they can be surprised when they find out there
aren't the kinds of resources available to do the kinds of things that
they think need to be done.
Q: I just wanted to clarify one thing on the Bosnian proposal, the
Bosnian reduction proposal. Would that be to make those reductions by
2002 or to have a plan in place by 2002?
Senior Defense Official: The plan would be to task NATO military
authorities in the beginning of the year to do the analysis over the
spring, that could then be approved by ministers some time in probably
the June time frame, with the idea that the force reductions would be
taken in the next reduction cycle in the fall of 2002.
Q: By the end of the year?
Senior Defense Official: Yeah. Certainly by the end of the year. But
again I want to be clear that NATO's going to be looking at a whole
range of options that include not just force reductions, but
restructuring how the forces are laid out in all three areas --
Macedonia, KFOR and SFOR.
Q: Is there going to be a force reduction in Kosovo as part of that
overall restructuring?
Senior Defense Official: The particular American initiative that we're
talking about here is not. No. I think that if you conceive of a sort
of approach that might come out of this, that might be sort of a
Balkans-wide restructuring, that may end up just through the process
of rationalization, of bringing those forces down. So for example, if
you could use force in one area to respond to problems in another, you
may not have to keep forces in both areas.
Q: So you might do a rapid reaction force in Kosovo as a force that
could be used as a rapid reaction force if there were a problem --
Senior Defense Official: I don't know if that's going to be a specific
proposal but that's the idea, yes.
Q: Since 6,000 is one-third of what's in SFOR, of the total of 18,000,
can we expect one-third of the U.S. 3,100 to be reduced? Are we
talking approximately thousand?
Senior Defense Official: I think approximately 1,000. I did say I
would get a more specific number and I'll be happy to do that.
Q: So when you said that the ministers this morning were looking
forward this morning to the future, agreeing that it's not ending in
Afghanistan and looking to the future, what was being talked about
there? What were the issues that were coming out? The possible
concerns?
Senior Defense Official: I think there is a general recognition that
-- and some specific discussion about -- the fact that al Qaeda is not
located just in Afghanistan. Number two, there was a concern expressed
by a number of ministers that one of the outgrowths of the activity in
Afghanistan is that al Qaeda may try to get out of the country and
move into either neighboring countries or further afield. And then,
obviously, one of the focuses had to be on trying to stop that. But
also recognizing that it may well happen and that we'll have to deal
with it.
Q: Just stipulating the areas that you'll have to deal with.
Senior Defense Official: Yeah, right. So that was really the main
focus in terms of the conflict. And then the other aspect of it was
the one I spoke of at length.
Q: What would happen if that happened? If they were able to disburse
and destabilize other areas. Was there any consensus on that?
Senior Defense Official: I don't think there was. I think it was more
a concern that was raised about the fact that we should not -- we
should try to not let it happen, number one. And number two, I think
there was a general view that al Qaeda, the al Qaeda networks, outside
of Afghanistan need to be dealt with. But there were no specific
action plans or anything like that discussed.
Q: But given the fact that going after terrorism may now involve going
after Iraq, for example, which would be a much bigger military task
than Afghanistan, was there any sentiment or vocal commitment,
military commitment by these nations to the idea, "If you need a lot
of our troops, you'll get them?" Do you see what I mean? As opposed to
--
Senior Defense Official: I'm cautious of any sentence that includes
the word Iraq. (laughter) So let's take the word out of that sentence.
Q: Suppose you had a much larger task toward some state that supports
terrorism. Is there sentiment among these countries to provide the
extra forces that would be needed?
Senior Defense Official: Well, it's really hard to talk about it and,
I said I'm not going to talk about Iraq and I'm not going to talk
about it in general terms. So how are you going to talk about it?
I think I saw very strong support in the room for what the United
States is doing. One of the things that many ministers did was talk
about the way that their countries were supporting the campaign and,
in some cases, offering additional aid as needed. There was very much
a sense that not -- as Secretary Rumsfeld has said before, this is
going to be a -- there are going to be multiple coalitions here. And I
think there was a sense in the room that people that-- there would be
other places and other possible uses of either individual military
force from NATO countries or NATO acting as NATO. But there wasn't a
specific commitment one way or another. The ministers weren't really
discussing that. Those kinds of things tend to be worked at a much
lower level in the alliance.
Q: What you got, very forward leaning?
Senior Defense Official: Oh, absolutely. I'm hesitating because I
don't want to put words in somebody's mouth but I really think the
support was so great that if we needed additional capabilities, I'm
sure there would be countries that would provide them.
Q: There was no sentiment in the sense that Afghanistan should be it?
That we shouldn't go beyond Afghanistan?
Senior Defense Official: No.
Q: The secretary's morning statement to the Nuclear Planning Group
talks about the need to adapt and transform America's strategic
forces. What does that mean?
Senior Defense Official: Number one, as we bring down the force over
the next decade, we are going to be reliant on a smaller number of
weapons, a smaller number of types of weapons. And there's going to
have to be some investment in our infrastructure to support that. That
infrastructure investment is also important because it provides us
with the ability to respond to unexpected threats - changes in the
threat -- that we may not be able to foresee now. And it also acts I
think as a dissuasive component. So one of the ways that we're
thinking about this from a transformational standpoint is that the
infrastructure is actually part of the dissuasive component of the
force, whereas in the past you tended to think about, "Well, what
forces do you bring to the table today right now."
Well, your forces that are immediately capable are important. But
we're also thinking that our infrastructure maintaining that
infrastructure is an important part of our dissuasive capabilities.
Q: This language means a new generation of warheads or what? I
understand the words you're saying but I don't understand the
implication.
Senior Defense Official: No, it doesn't necessarily mean a new
generation of warheads. I think what it means is the ability to
repair, respond, if the United States has to develop new kinds of
capabilities, the infrastructure will be there to do it. The talent,
the physical plant, those kinds of things.
I think that the top priority is the talent. One of the absolutely
most difficult things to do when you are drawing down capabilities --
and this is true with conventional forces, not just true with nuclear
forces -- is maintaining the resident expertise. These are highly
complicated, niche technical areas and unless people are involved in
interesting science, as they say, they tend to migrate into things
where they can be better fulfilled, better paid, whatever.
But I also want to say that balancing that, is the need to recognize
that in dealing with asymmetric threats and in dealing with what may
be undeterrables, we have to have a broader panoply of capabilities.
So in addition to our nuclear forces, we would put -- in terms of
strategic capabilities -- we would include advanced conventional
forces. So some investment in longer range strike capabilities of a
conventional nature and missile defenses. Because we cannot expect, as
we did during the cold war, that deterrence will be as reliable as we
think it was. We weren't that sure it was reliable then, but we at
least understood we had a single enemy, a single opponent. We spent a
lot of energy understanding that opponent. That opponent is gone. We
now have the potential for multiple different opponents, and ones that
we don't expect.
September 11th really underscored this. Who would have thought we'd
have been in Afghanistan fighting against the Taliban on September
10th?
Q: Did anyone voice concern, or opposition to the withdrawal from the
ABM treaty?
Senior Defense Official: No. No.
Q: Is there anything else that the United States would like from the
NATO alliance to assist it in its war on terrorism besides the things
you mentioned, the force reduction and the general transformation? Is
there anything else the U.S. is looking for or would this be really
it?
Senior Defense Official: The U.S. works with individual NATO countries
and makes requests all the time for force capabilities and other means
of support. Principal among them is intelligence, things like that.
And so, I think that's kind of an ongoing process, but it's not one
that is really dealt with at the ministerial level. In effect, it's
sort of a natural and automatic thing. If you've been down to CENTCOM,
you know that most of the countries represented here have liaison
officers down at CENTCOM. That's the kind of hand in glove sort of
cooperation that we have with our --
Q: Is it more on an individual basis than rather with our NATO allies?
Senior Defense Official: With our NATO allies. That was the first
point. The second point is I think that NATO -- there's nothing -- the
ministers did not discuss specific things that we might ask of NATO.
But I think that there is an ongoing effort to sort of look at
additional ways in which NATO can provide NATO capabilities, whether
they be naval or air defense type capabilities and that sort of thing.
But there's nothing that came out of the meetings this morning.
Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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