07 December 2001
Transcript: U.S. Plans to Open Mission in Kabul by December 22
(Haass, Dobbins praise outpouring of support for reconstruction)
(6065)
Ambassador James Dobbins announced that the United States is working
to open a diplomatic mission in Kabul before December 22, the date the
new interim authority assumes power in Afghanistan.
"We are working to put our mission in a state at which people can stay
overnight, rather than just drop in for the day. And when we do, we
will staff a diplomatic facility in Kabul, and I expect that to be
open and operating before the 22nd," said Dobbins, who is the U.S.
Special Representative to the Afghan Opposition.
Dobbins and Richard Haass, the director of policy planning and U.S.
coordinator for the future of Afghanistan, briefed reporters at the
State Department in Washington, December 7.
Ambassador Dobbins added that there were "no political conditions" to
the U.S. reestablishing its first diplomatic presence in Afghanistan
since 1989.
Haass said the tremendous outpouring of international support showed
that the reconstruction of Afghanistan would not be "hamstrung" by any
lack of resources or absence of commitment. He also expected the U.S.
to play a "leading role" in the recovery and reconstruction efforts.
"What we are hearing are very positive signals, that essentially
Americans want to help and people from other countries want to help,"
said Haass.
Haass also said the goal of eliminating drug trafficking in
Afghanistan was a "cardinal priority" and second only to that of
eradicating terrorism. Haass explained that long-term measures needed
to be taken.
"That means such things such as alternative economic development to
give farmers a choice and a viable alternative to the production of
poppy. It also is going to mean working with the interim authority on
whatever sorts of policing or border controls are necessary to make
sure that any poppy that might be produced cannot leave the country,"
said Haass.
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
December 7, 2001
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY RICHARD HAASS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AND
US COORDINATOR FOR THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN,
AND AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS,
US SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION
December 7, 2001
Washington, D.C.
1:43 P.M. EST
MR. REEKER: That was a nice, quick break. Welcome back, ladies and
gentlemen. And, as advertised, we are very pleased to have with us two
officials. I don't think I have to do any further introduction of
Ambassador Richard Haass and Ambassador James Dobbins, to discuss with
you Afghanistan, the talks and the process in Bonn and then the next
steps forward.
So we are on a fairly short timetable. We will have short remarks from
both ambassadors and then turn to your questions. Thanks.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: We will keep our remarks on Sesame Street to a
minimum, since it has been covered so well.
You all know our aims in Afghanistan, to rid the country of terrorism,
to get rid of al-Qaida and the Taliban leadership. We also want to
bring about an Afghanistan which does not produce or export poppy. We
also want to help create an Afghanistan to work with Afghans to help
bring about the kind of country where the more than five million
refugees can return home, where the unknown number of the internally
displaced can return home.
Toward that end, we have had a five-part policy. One, obviously, the
military, secondly the humanitarian, thirdly the political/diplomatic,
fourthly questions of economic reconstruction and, fifthly, the
question of security arrangements. We will leave the military
briefings to the Pentagon for obvious reasons. We were not planning
today to speak about the humanitarian, which is largely handled by AID
and others.
Also on the security side, let me just say that I spoke about it
yesterday when I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. All those questions remain under active review here in the
administration, so we are not going to have anything more to say on
that than I was able to speak about yesterday.
We thought the bulk of what we could most usefully address without
telling you what questions obviously you are free to ask, would be on
the political/diplomatic front. Ambassador Dobbins is obviously just
back from Bonn, and also on the questions of reconstruction. On the
reconstruction front just briefly, we have had one meeting of senior
officials here in Washington co-chaired by the United States and
Japan. The next major event in this process will be in Brussels in
approximately two weeks when senior officials will once again convene.
And all of this is meant to lead the way to Japan in January, when you
will have a meeting convened by the four co-chairs of the steering
group, the United States, the European Union, Japan and Saudi Arabia.
And we will be glad, again, to discuss any aspects of the economic
reconstruction process as best we can.
With that, let me ask Jim to speak.
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: The one question that I get most often is why do
we think we can succeed this time in putting together a broadly based
regime in Afghanistan and begin a process of peaceful reconstruction
when the international community has failed so often in the past? And,
more recently, why do I think that we actually did succeed in Bonn,
where previous meetings have failed so often in the past? And I think
there are four basic reasons why we have succeeded so far and why the
prospects are better for continuing than they have been in the past.
One is a much greater level of American engagement. The second, and to
some degree it's a function of the first, is that all of Afghanistan's
neighbors and the countries that have traditionally played the great
game with Afghanistan and in Afghanistan are all for the first time,
at least in several decades, pushing the Afghans together rather than
pulling them apart. The third reason is that because of the attention
that has been focused on Afghanistan in the last couple of months,
there is a massive amount of reconstruction assistance potentially
available which has not been available in those dimensions before,
which is on offer but only if the Afghans are able to come together to
create a broadly based government that can partner with the
international community in Afghanistan's reconstruction. And finally,
after 20 years of civil war, there is an immense yearning for peace in
Afghanistan. And that translated, I think, into pressure on all of the
delegates in the conference in Bonn, all of whom were receiving
numerous phone calls from Afghanistan throughout the conference to
settle, to resolve their differences, to compromise and to come to a
positive conclusion.
I think that if I had to isolate just a single one of those, it would
be the degree to which the international community, Afghanistan's
neighbors and the countries that have traditionally had a role in
Afghanistan have been working together toward a common vision of
Afghanistan. And this was sort of epitomized to me in the concluding
real negotiating session of this meeting, which took place about 3:00
in the morning on the morning of the actual signature. That is, about
six hours before Chancellor Schroeder arrived. And there was still an
important open issue.
The Northern Alliance delegation was insisting that it needed 20 of
the 28 ministries if it was going to satisfy each of its constituent
elements. And Brahimi, the UN negotiator, was insisting that there be
a better balance between Northern Alliance and other delegations. He
called on all of the international observers who were actually awake
at the time, which consisted of the Russian, the American, the German,
the Indian and the Iranian representatives. And we spent an
hour-and-a-half, sort of seriatim, arguing the case with the United
Front, the Northern Alliance representative there, until we were able
to come to an agreement, which was embodied in the text that was
signed six hours later.
There were lots of other meetings with different constellations of
countries. But the fact that all of those countries, which
traditionally have had very divergent policies on Afghanistan, sat
around the table and argued from a common viewpoint, I think, was
decisive in the result.
QUESTION: One for each. Richard, on your goals, you didn't mention
capturing let alone killing Usama bin Laden. Does that mean you have
resigned yourself you are not going to get that? And Jim -- is he in
Pakistan? Where is he?
And, Jim, you make the point the US has had great influence, turned
the coin around. And you see accounts saying we can't run Afghanistan
after all. That's why you're beginning to get them -- hearing them say
things other than the things we want to see happen. Like you hear
consideration of amnesty, you hear Omar may not be it town. You're
beginning to hear, let him off the hook. We're getting Bush one
revisited as Bush two, but it's the Afghans' fault, maybe.
Could you do one, would you please do two? We're told we have limited
time. I figure we've got about four-and-half minutes and then we're
going to watch you guys on the tube tonight, probably. Go ahead.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: Thank you, Barry.
When I made clear that our first goal is the prosecution of the war,
until we eliminate the al-Qaida in its entirety as well as the Taliban
leadership, that obviously includes the persona of Usama bin Laden.
And as the President has said on numerous times, you know, again
either justice will be brought to him or he will be brought to
justice. But his persona, it goes beyond him, but he, himself, is
still a very important war aim of the coalition.
QUESTION: Do you know where he is, by any chance?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: We've got all sorts of, you know, fragments of
information. I would say, to the best of our knowledge, he remains
within Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Would you say the same for Mullah Omar?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: I think, again, the Taliban leadership is again part
of the war aims of the coalition, and obviously Mullah Omar is very
much a central part of the Taliban leadership.
QUESTION: So far (inaudible) between US influence and Afghan --
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: The Bonn agreement commits the new interim
administration of Afghanistan to cooperate with the international
community in the fight against terrorism and in the fight against
drugs. We are not going to run Afghanistan. We can't, and we have no
intention of running Afghanistan. What we are going to do is try to
foster an international environment which is conducive to the Afghans
running Afghanistan peacefully and in a broadly based fashion.
QUESTION: Yesterday, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
you offered some rare praise for the Iranian role, in saying that what
they did was constructive. I'm wondering -- you weren't there,
Ambassador Dobbins was. So can you elaborate -- I'm not suggesting
that you're not in the loop, but -- (laughter) -- but is what you were
talking about, just as your little group of international browbeaters
who went in and got the Northern Alliance to relent, is that the kind
of thing that Ambassador Haass was talking about yesterday, in terms
of what the Iranians were doing behind the scenes? And if -- can you
expand on that?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Yes, I think there were a number of occasions like
that. Another instance in which a number of countries weighed in was
when President Rabbani was raising doubts about his willingness to go
along with the process as a whole, and put forward a series of
essentially killer amendments that would have changed the outcome to
such a degree that it simply couldn't have been arranged in Bonn.
And a number of countries, in addition to the United States, made
direct approaches to President Rabbani, called him on the telephone,
sent their ambassadors in, otherwise made demarches urging the
importance of coming to a conclusion in Bonn that was
self-implementing, that wouldn't require yet another meeting like Bonn
in order to do it, and in particular, in completing the process of
naming an interim administration.
And I think the intervention of countries like Germany, who -- Fischer
called; the United States, we called him; Iran; Russia -- was decisive
in that -- was an important factor. I think he was also getting calls
from faction leaders within the Northern Alliance saying the same
thing.
QUESTION: But what was (inaudible) specific to Iran?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Well, I've just named two points. How many more do
you want?
QUESTION: Well, but that's --
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: I mean, they weighed in with Rabbani, and they
weighed in at the end.
QUESTION: But those things -- well, those are things in which they
joined others in doing. Was there anything they did by themselves that
you are aware of that --
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: The whole point of the exercise was that everybody
join ultimately in bringing about the same result.
QUESTION: So in other words, their being -- part of what you mean when
they say they played a very constructive role was that they joined in
with the rest, instead of staying on the outside, and helped to push?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Yes.
QUESTION: How unhappy is Pakistan with the dominance of the Northern
Alliance in the government? And I don't mean to be presumptuous, but
why aren't you there already in Kabul? We seem to be the last folks
in.
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Well, I've been -- I was in Afghanistan a week and
a half ago. The Pakistanis are less unhappy than they were a couple of
weeks ago, I think. I think they recognize that this is progress, that
there was a call, which they very much wanted, for an international
security force for Kabul. There is a broadly-based government with a
southern Pashtun leader which will be taking office in about 12 days.
And we are working to put our mission in a state at which people can
stay overnight, rather than just drop in for the day. And when we do,
we will staff a diplomatic facility in Kabul, and I expect that to be
open and operating before the 22nd, when this new government takes
office.
QUESTION: This is kind of a technical question, but who is going --
who is now the recognized head of state in Afghanistan? And as a
related question, what becomes of Rabbani at this point?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: We have not recognized the government that
President Rabbani heads.
QUESTION: Right.
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: So the question would be "recognized by whom." If
it is recognized by the United Nations, or by other countries, like
Russia, Turkey, the UK, et cetera, it would be President Rabbani at
the moment. And that on the 22nd of this month, there will be the
inauguration of a new interim administration, which will function as a
government. We very much hope that President Rabbani will take part in
that ceremony.
QUESTION: Well, (inaudible) is the head of state then at that point?
Or will you recognize him as the head of state?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: The way the agreement reads, the interim
administration, which is 30 people, will represent the Afghan state in
all of its manifestations, and Karzai will be the senior person in
that structure. But they stayed away specifically from titles like
"head of state" or "prime minister" to emphasize the interim nature of
this arrangement.
QUESTION: Could I ask -- Mr. Karzai, it seems unclear from some of the
things he has said how he feels about the future of Mullah Omar. You
said one of the subjects of the briefing is reconstruction assistance.
Have you perhaps made it clear to him or to others in the new group of
Afghans who will be running the country that US reconstruction
assistance is in any way dependent on Mullah Omar being not allowed to
live out his life in dignity and peace in Afghanistan?
0AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: It hasn't been necessary to do that. I understand
that Karzai has issued a statement today which is pretty
straightforward.
QUESTION: Your understanding is that he wants Mullah Omar to be a
prisoner?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Brought to justice, right.
QUESTION: Just after you reached your agreement, parties to it began
expressing reservations. And there are three or four possibly, but
certainly one stands out and that is Dostum. What are you doing to try
to bring him back on board? Did something go on in the negotiations
where you might have given too much to the Tajiks because of Rabbani's
antics? This is one claim. Or can you just explain why this falling
out?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: I wouldn't call it a falling out. What you've got
is a coalition government. Anybody who has had experiences with, for
instance, formation of a coalition government in Italy or Belgium or
other countries know that all the parties that form the coalition
don't end up equally happy. And some of them complain afterwards.
Nobody has walked away from this agreement or said they are walking
away from this agreement. And, at this stage, we hope that they won't.
We would expect that the countries who have traditionally maintained a
relationship with Dostum, which recently include us but has included
historically countries like Uzbekistan, Turkey, Iran and Russia, will
also, as they did at the conference, make clear how important it is
that this agreement be implemented. And we are reasonably optimistic
that those kinds of approaches will be effective.
But that's not to say -- I mean, I told you how we had, in order to
get an overall balance, to argue the Northern Alliance down. And there
is no doubt that various elements within that coalition feel that they
should have had more seats and are voicing their unhappiness.
QUESTION: He said he was boycotting the new government.
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: He said a number of things and he said some things
since he said that. I did not interpret that to mean that the Uzbeks
whom he nominated for the government do not intend to participate. I
anticipate that they will participate.
He did not seek a position in the government and therefore I'm not
sure what the content of that statement is.
QUESTION: Dr. Haass, can you give us more details about the
reconstruction efforts, details and numbers and figures and who is
taking part, et cetera?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: The answer is I can't. Not because I know and can't
tell you but simply it's premature. In order to do a serious estimate
of reconstruction, you've got to obviously begin with a fairly
detailed needs assessment. One is being conducted right now in
basically a three-part UN development program, working with the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. That's got to be put together and
refined. You also have to obviously talk to the Afghans about it, as
well as to the international community and the potential donors.
That has to all come together. We think we'll know enough. We will
have at least a preliminary needs assessment done by the time of the
convening of the meeting in Japan sometime in January. This, though,
will continue to be refined as we go down the road. The result is that
the numbers that you're seeing bandied about, so many billions of
dollars over so many years, are just that. They're very soft numbers.
You've also got to factor in such things as absorption capacity. You
are starting from an economy that has been ravaged, that did not have
a particularly high base even before the last 20 years. Needless to
say, the consequence of the last 20 years has been awful. There are
questions then of sequencing. There are questions of priorities. And
all of this has to be worked out.
Again, Afghans from inside, the Afghan Diaspora, the interim authority
is going to have people who are going to be working with the
international reconstruction effort. So we are just simply not down to
that level of detail. What, though, I think you are seeing is
something Ambassador Dobbins referred to and one of the reasons he's
optimistic, is a tremendous outpouring in principle of support. So I
really don't think we are going to be hamstrung here by a lack of
resources or a lack of commitment. I actually do think the commitment
will be there.
And I would also add, on our side and the contacts people in the
Administration have had with the Congress, again, what we are hearing
are very positive signals, that essentially Americans want to help and
people from other countries want to help. So I really don't think that
a lack of resources or a lack of staying power is going to in any way
be an issue here.
QUESTION: As far as Afghan Radio is concerned, Mullah Omar may have
already fled Kandahar and Mr. Karzai knew before he fled. And, number
two, we have interviewed almost 1,000 Afghanis here in the United
States. What they are asking is how much role Pakistan will play in
the new government because, in the past, Afghanistan did not receive
much aid which was sent through Pakistan. And now also they are not
receiving much.
So they are blaming Pakistan for the problems in Afghanistan. So they
are hoping no terrorism in Afghanistan from Taliban and no more
problems from Pakistan in the future.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: I know nothing about your first question. On the
question of Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan, as Ambassador
Dobbins suggested, the Pakistanis have played an active and, I would
argue, a constructive role in the various fora leading up to Bonn as
well as in Bonn itself. Clearly though, in the future, this sort of
cooperation is going to have to last. At the end of the day, you need
cooperation. For Afghanistan to succeed, you need both insider
cooperation, the Afghans themselves, as well as cooperation on the
outside, above all the neighboring countries. And Pakistan is, for all
sorts of reasons, one of the most prominent.
I would also imagine that Pakistan would play a role in the
reconstruction effort. An awful lot of procurement is going to have to
take place. You are going to need certain sorts of assistance from the
neighboring countries. And I would say that Pakistan would participate
in that and benefit from it.
I think one of the important things in the Bonn agreement is a
specific reference to the effect that it's important that this new
government of Afghanistan have positive, peaceful, constructive
relations with its neighbors. And obviously Pakistan is one of them.
QUESTION: Are there any safeguards to ensure that the foreign
elements, al-Qaida and others, those who are from outside, will not
leave Afghanistan and go to other areas like Kashmir or Chechnya or
Sinkiang or any of these places? What safeguards will be in place?
Secondly, on reconstruction, can you elaborate on what kind of
Afghanistan are you thinking of? Are you thinking of a modern state,
just like any other? Obviously, it will be a long time before that
happens.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: On the first question, the biggest -- to use your
word -- safeguard against al-Qaida terrorists or the Taliban
leadership leaving Afghanistan is the coalition military effort. The
purpose is not to allow these people to leave. It is to, one way or
another, bring these people to justice. We have also been working with
the Afghans themselves to cut off major routes. And the United States
has been in contact with all the neighbors of Afghanistan to close off
the borders. So we are making a concerted effort. To put it bluntly,
we do not want the problem of al-Qaida exported anywhere else.
The focus has been on Afghanistan for obvious reasons. But the
President has made it clear from day one that this is a global effort
against terrorism. So in no way do we want to see this problem
exported or shifted anywhere else.
We realize there are lots of al-Qaida cells elsewhere in the United
States, working with others in the international community. We will
deal with them. But clearly we do not in any way want to exacerbate
the non-Afghan dimension of this problem. We want to take care of what
we can inside Afghanistan.
In terms of the goals of reconstruction, it is too soon to be talking
about exactly what level Afghanistan can be brought to. Or, to put it
another way, what level the international community can help Afghans
bring their own country to. No one here is looking for perfection. We
are trying to be realistic. On the other hand, things are beginning
from an awfully low baseline. And you've got to say the upside
potential is enormous.
And to essentially, you know, bring five million refugees back home,
to allow the internally displaced to go home, to allow the people to
live relatively normal lives free of civil war, hopefully the climate
will cooperate a little bit because the drought has been a
contributing factor. If you have positive governance rather than the
sort of governance you've had from the Taliban, obviously that's an
added benefit. If you have billions of dollars of resources coming in
from the international community, that's an added benefit. If talented
Afghans who have been exiled out of choice and necessity come home,
that is an added benefit. So I think when you add up, you know, the
clear likelihood of changing conditions, human resources and capital
resources, it suggests that Afghanistan, its next 20 years, have the
potential to be markedly better than the last 20 years.
QUESTION: Since the Bonn agreement limited the multinational force to
Kabul and its environs, what is to prevent a return to drug
trafficking by the warlords?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Well, the Bonn agreement calls for a request in
international security force in the first instance for Kabul, and
defers the question about whether there should be a request for
assistance beyond that to the interim administration. But it does it
in a way which suggests this isn't quite an active possibility. I
mean, the language doesn't exclude it; it simply doesn't make a
judgment on it.
But I don't know that that answers your question. It just clarifies
your premise.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: On the question of drug production, I would say, as
I said, eradicating poppy production is one of the principal goals;
indeed, I would suggest in some ways it is second only to eradicating
terrorism. This is something that is important to Afghanistan, but
also to the neighborhood and indeed to the entire world, given the
large source of supply which has traditionally come out of that
country.
This is going to be one of the cardinal priorities - if that is not a
mixed metaphor -- one of the priorities of reconstruction. That means
such things such as alternative economic development to give farmers a
choice and a viable alternative to the production of poppy. It also is
going to mean working with the interim authority on whatever sorts of
policing or border controls are necessary to make sure that any poppy
that might be produced cannot leave the country.
So this is going to be a priority, not just for the near term, but for
the long term.
QUESTION: When are you going back to Kabul, and what kinds of
conditions have to be met before the US mission opens in the capital?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: I'll be going back next week. They are very
simple. I mean, the explosive ordnance disposal team has to go in and
make sure that there isn't unexpended ordnance in the area. We need to
secure the perimeter; that is, you need to make sure people then don't
come into it. And you need to assure that there's places -- there are
few rooms that are habitable so that the staff can work and live
there.
It's very simple stuff like that. So it's bringing in space heaters
and water purification and generators, or making sure that the ones
that are there are operating, in some cases; a few vehicles so that
you can circulate. And it's those kind of basic things. There's no
political conditions. We have made a decision to open a diplomatic
office in Kabul as soon as we can.
QUESTION: Next week, at the beginning of the week, you're waiting for
the Secretary to come back from his trip, or do you know --
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Well, partially it depends on some of these other
things, and I can't give you a simple answer, when all those things
will be in place. But they will be in place by the 22nd, I hope.
QUESTION: A question for Ambassador Haass. Yesterday, you said that
you expected other countries to bear the bulk of the cost of
reconstruction. I think this might have come as rather a surprise to
some of these other countries, who apparently assumed that this was
really your baby, and you should look after it. What are you going to
tell them when you explain to them that you don't want to pay?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: First, we have never said we don't want to pay. We
expect to be generous; we expect to be active contributors in this
effort.
Second of all, you must be talking to other governments than I have
had the opportunity to speak with, because I have not heard from
anyone those sorts of concerns. We have made clear that we are taking
a leadership position in the reconstruction effort. Again, we are one
of the co-chairs of the steering group; we convened the first meeting
here in the Department of State.
Until the overall scale of the effort is clear, it is hard to say
exactly what the United States is going to do, but I would simply
remind you, the United States has been the largest provider of
humanitarian help to Afghanistan. This was the case before September
11th; it's the case after September 11th. What we look forward to is
transitioning.
The goal in some way is to be able to reduce humanitarian aid, not
because in any way we're stingy and ungenerous, but we hope that the
humanitarian needs begin to go down. And as they subside, it will
allow the United States and the rest of the international community to
essentially transition along this continuum, from humanitarian help to
relief to recovery and to long-term reconstruction.
And just as the United States has played a leading role in the
humanitarian phase, I would expect we will play a leading role in the
other phases of the recovery and reconstruction effort. But, again,
traditionally in any sort of international enterprise, the United
States provides a degree or a portion of the help. And given that we
have taken such an enormous role in the coalition effort up till now,
it seems to me only right and reasonable that other countries, that
for whatever set of reasons, weren't able to take a large role there,
would take a large role.
So I would expect the European Union and the Saudis and others in the
Arab and Islamic world, clearly the Japanese, are all prepared to more
than do their share. Just as we will.
QUESTION: Thank you. My question might have been answered already, but
I will ask the question anyway. If --
AMBASSADOR HAASS: An auspicious beginning. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: If the new government in Afghanistan grants freedom to
Mohammad Omar, what can the United States do about it?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: Well, again, it is based upon a hypothetical, and
that simply is not going to take place. Mullah Omar has committed all
sorts of crimes against the Afghan people. The Afghan people above all
are well aware of that. And we have talked about it with them, with
the Afghan leadership, and it is clear to me that he will be brought
to justice. And I believe, I am confident, in a way that's acceptable
both to the United States, and to the Afghans themselves.
QUESTION: Associated Press of Pakistan. Mr. Haass, I was a bit late,
so I'm not sure you have already covered this. But in case you
haven't, how soon do you expect a peacekeeping force to be assembled
and deployed in Afghanistan?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: Well, again, at the outset, I basically said we
didn't have anything much more to say about security arrangements than
I was able to speak about yesterday, only because these issues are
very much under debate within the -- not debate -- but under
consideration within the US Government. But as you know, the plan is
to get the interim authority, the interim administration up by
December 22nd, and I would think that an international security force
will be in place by that time.
QUESTION: Ambassador Dobbins, you mentioned that before the US puts
its mission back in Kabul, that there is going to be a team that goes
in to make sure there's no unexploded ordnance in the area. As far as
the plans, the reconstruction plans -- maybe both of you can answer
this, or either one -- what is the plan for clearing Afghanistan not
only of the unexploded ordnance from our campaign, but also the land
mines that have been there for so long? I mean, I understand it is an
extremely expensive process, but it is obviously extremely important
if we are going to reconstruct that country.
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: Actually, even before this, the latest conflict,
there was a fairly substantial demining effort under way in
Afghanistan to try to clear up the mines from previous conflicts. And
once the security situation permits, that will be resumed and
significantly expanded, I would expect.
QUESTION: In the past few days, we haven't heard much about the
Russian contingent already in Afghanistan for various purposes. Would
you be able to say what they are doing and whether this contingent
would become part of the international peacekeeping or security force
when it comes into being?
AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: The Russians have informed us, and I think we have
no reason to doubt the accuracy of what they have said, that they have
deployed an element of what we would call our civil emergency, or FEMA
office, which in their system is a military function, to Afghanistan
to provide for emergency reconstruction. And that that is the unit
that was deployed, and the equipment is associated with that unit.
I don't think that the Russians, or any of Afghanistan's neighbors,
anticipate participating in peacekeeping. Certainly none of them have
volunteered, and I think most of them anticipate that the volunteers
would come from elsewhere.
MR. REEKER: This will have to be the last one.
QUESTION: If you achieve your military goals as you define them, and
then Afghanistan still breaks down into factional fighting, how strong
an obligation do you think the United States would have to go back in
to try to force them back? I mean, what would you consider your
obligation then?
AMBASSADOR HAASS: It's premised on a hypothetical, which we simply
don't think is the most likely outcome, as Ambassador Dobbins said. I
think there has been some learning of lessons. And I would simply
challenge the premise that Afghanistan is going to break down, to use
your word, into that kind of warlordism, or that kind of
dysfunctionality. I think there is a very good chance that it won't.
But again, our principal concerns here with the coalition are the
prosecution of the war. We want to do everything possible to give
Afghans a chance to essentially get their society and their economy up
and running, and this will ultimately be a challenge principally for
the Afghans themselves, for the interim authority, and after the
emergency loya jirga, for the transitional administration, and
ultimately for the resulting government. That Afghans themselves are
going to have the principal responsibility for making their society
viable, for making their political system work, for making their
economy productive.
MR. REEKER: Thank you very much.
AMBASSADOR HAASS: Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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