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Military

06 December 2001

Transcript: Defense Department Briefing, December 6, 2001

(Afghanistan: military operations, negotiations over Kandahar,
disposition of Mullah Omar, protection for humanitarian operations)
(6400)
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed December 6 at the
Pentagon.
Following is the transcript:
(begin transcript)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL UPDATE
BRIEFERS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD,
GENERAL PETER PACE, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PENTAGON BRIEFING ROOM
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
11:15 A.M. EST -- THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2001
(Slides and videos shown in this briefing are on the Web at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/g011206-D-6570C.html)
Rumsfeld: Good morning. I'd like to recognize the brave service of
those soldiers that were killed and wounded in Afghanistan yesterday.
Our condolences go to their families and their loved ones. These men
were engaged in a noble and important cause, and their families have
every right to be proud, as we all are, of their commitment and their
sacrifice.
The circumstances surrounding the incident are, as you know, under
investigation. We'll have more to say about that as we learn more.
We're moving forward to take this fight to the terrorists.
I understand there is concern about the access that was afforded
journalists in the vicinity of the incident. We are mindful of the
sensitivities of families back home who may not know that an incident
has occurred, and we prefer that they not learn about something like
that until they have been advised by the department. We do remain
committed to the principle that the media should have access to both
the good and the bad in this effort. The people on the ground, in the
Marine Corps, have acknowledged -- or correction -- in the service
have acknowledged that they have not handled the matter perfectly, and
they're in the process of reviewing their procedures.
The deaths do underscore the nature of what we're doing. This is a war
that began because we were attacked on September 11th. Every day,
American troops are placing their lives on the line in the defense of
the country.
Tomorrow is the 60th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, a surprise attack
that killed more than 2,000 Americans. A terrible surprise attack on
September 11th killed even more Americans. It is certainly right to
recall the lessons of Pearl Harbor as we fight the war against terror.
In both cases, it wasn't that we were not expecting threats -- indeed,
we were -- but that we may not have been paying sufficient attention
to what then seemed improbable. We now know that the improbable can
happen, and has.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with increasing range
and power in the hands of multiple potential adversaries means that
now, in the coming years, we face new threats from new forms of
terrorism, to satchel bombs, cyber-attacks, cruise missiles, ballistic
missiles.
The threats are real, and the lethality is multiples of what we have
previously experienced. We remain firmly committed to transforming our
military so that we as a country are able to meet the challenges of
this new century.
General Pace.
Pace: Thank you, sir. Good morning. Along with the secretary, I'd like
to also express for all of us in uniform our condolences to the
families of the three service members who were killed in action in
Afghanistan, and also to the families of the 17 who were wounded -- 20
who were wounded, 17 of whom were evacuated and are currently
receiving medical treatment, and the three who were wounded who were
able to stay in Afghanistan. Also, to the families of the five Afghan
soldiers who were killed and to the 19 of those soldiers who were
medically evacuated to U.S. ships and are receiving treatment there.
We did have yesterday approximately 85 aircraft conducting strike
operations. I have three videos for you. The first is a video on a
compound where Taliban troops were believed to have been holed up.
Q: What day is this?
Pace: This is 4 December.
Q: And where?
Pace: In Kandahar.
(Videos shown.)
Pace: That was a JDAM munition delivered by an F-16.
The second video, also in the Kandahar area, an F-18 delivering a
laser-guided bomb on an al Qaeda troops facility. And the third is a
series of weapons delivered on what was believed to be an al Qaeda
leadership compound.
Q: All in Kandahar?
Pace: All Kandahar.
Q: On Tuesday, sir?
Pace: On 4th of December. Go ahead.
Q: Do you have any idea what or who? What leadership or who was in
that compound at the --
Pace: We do not know the results. We just had confirmation through
several sources, intel sources that there were -- that third video was
of a al Qaeda leadership compound.
Rumsfeld: Charlie.
Q: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that Omar and the Taliban
leadership have agreed to surrender Kandahar with the understanding
that Omar would remain in the control of opposition forces. Number
one, have you any confirmation of that, or are such negotiations
moving faster? And would you be willing to accept Omar remaining under
control of the opposition if he surrenders? Taliban.
Rumsfeld: The -- I have seen any number of reports on this subject
over the past 48 hours, and they are continuing to be reported.
There is no question what the position of the United States of America
is, and that is that we have as our principal objectives seeing that
we deal effectively with the senior al Qaeda leadership and the
Taliban leadership, and that we -- the remaining al Qaeda fighters do
not leave the country and go off to conduct additional terrorist
attacks on other nations, including the United States, and that
Afghanistan not be a nation that harbors terrorists.
We have expressed very forcefully to all of the so-called opposition
leaders, who have been opposing the Taliban, what our principal goals
are and what are views are, and we have -- at least at this moment, I
have not seen or heard anything that would suggest that anyone is
negotiating something that would be contrary to what our interests
are.
Q: So you're saying  -- 
Rumsfeld: It is not to say it could not happen, but I -- at least at
this moment, our message has been delivered very clearly.
Q: So you're saying, as you've said before, that you wouldn't accept
any other circumstance except that Omar be turned over to the United
States?
Rumsfeld: I -- I guess I'm saying what I said. And it means that the
United States does, in fact, have as its intention seeing that we have
stopped all of the senior leadership and the al Qaeda and that the
country is not a haven for terrorists.
Is it conceivable that some formulation could evolve that would
satisfy that and not be consistent with what you said? I don't know. I
haven't thought of what it might be. But certainly, you can be certain
that the people -- the opposition forces in and around Kandahar, where
it is believed Omar is, are fully aware of our very strong view on
this. And our cooperation and assistance with those people would
clearly take a turn south if something were to be done with respect to
the senior people in that situation that was inconsistent with what
I've said.
Q: Sir, can you give us an idea what you mean by  -- 
Q: Mr. Secretary, it might not be inconsistent, but with all due
respect, sir, it seems now you're putting a little wiggle room in what
you have been saying as late as a few days ago.
Rumsfeld: I don't mean to be.
Q: All right. But then we need -- I need to press you on this; Charlie
tried. There are reports out of the region now that a deal has
actually been cut; that Omar will be allowed to live within his area
there on the Pashtun, and live in so-called "dignity."
That does not mean, then, if we go along with the deal, that he would
be turned over to you. Would you accept that kind of a situation?
Rumsfeld: If you're asking would an arrangement with Omar where he
could, quote, "live in dignity" in the Kandahar area or some place in
Afghanistan be consistent with what I have said, the answer is, no, it
would not be consistent with what I have said.
Q: Could I ask you to define, if you don't mind, what you mean -- some
idea of what you mean by the relationship would, quote, certainly go
south?
Rumsfeld: Well, we obviously have a lot of things we have been doing
to assist the opposition forces, and we are continuing to, and the
president has indicated plans to be helpful to the country. And to the
extent our goals are frustrated and opposed, obviously, we would
prefer to work with other people, who would not oppose our goals. And
so it shouldn't be complicated. I'm not suggesting that that is even
going to happen. I've seen these reports. I've not seen anything that
is authoritative that suggests that those reports are correct. Indeed,
I have every reason to believe that -- at least I don't know of
anything that's taking place that's inconsistent with our interests.
Q: Well, sir, if I could follow up, Commander Karzai, among others,
has described the agreement -- emerging agreement that was just
mentioned a moment ago, publicly now has described it. Are you
suggesting the possibility that the United States participation in the
financial help rebuilding Afghanistan might, in fact, not occur, or
reduced if in fact these conditions are not met?
Rumsfeld: What I am saying is, our goals have been very clear. They
have been publicly expressed. They have been privately expressed to
the opposition leaders. There is no ambiguity about them. And, while
you may have heard reports and seen reports in the press, I am saying
that I have not seen authoritative reports that suggest that -- at
least thus far -- that something is taking place that would be
inconsistent with our interests.
Yes?
Q: What about the activity of U.S. bombing? For example, there are now
beginning to be calls for a cease-fire so that some of this can be
implemented. Can you give us some sense of your willingness to either
slow, pause or stop the bombing in Kandahar to let this process
proceed? What would be your conditions for doing so?
Rumsfeld: Well, first of all, there is nothing that I know of that has
happened that is sufficiently mature that it would alter our general
approach that has been taking place, and that has been to continue to
put pressure on Kandahar, to be supportive of the forces that are
opposing Kandahar, and to see that Kandahar is not reinforced, and to
see that people who ought not to escape do not escape, and to
encourage surrender.
To the extent that requires bombing, that's what we do. And to the
extent it requires interdiction, that's what we do. So we have -- we
do not have any pauses in effect at the moment.
The support to opposition forces has, throughout the country from the
very beginning, been premised on the fact that the opposition forces
were doing something. To the extent the opposition forces stop for
some reason, whatever the reason may be, obviously you're not
providing bombing support to those opposition forces at that moment.
However, in other parts of the country, we certainly are. And I can't
speak to whether we are at this very second, with respect to Kandahar.
Q: One would certainly expect there to come a time, if you're going to
have some sort of negotiated agreement, which appears to have a Friday
deadline in its current form, that the United States in Kandahar and
around Kandahar would have to pause or stop the bombing to allow this
to happen, as long as you are supportive of what this agreement is.
And you seem to be, at least in principle, supportive of the direction
that these talks are going.
Rumsfeld: Well, I'm not. I just don't know where these talks are
going, and I think there's been a lot of speculation in the press and
there have been a lot of musings by a lot of people. We've not been
musing. And I am not happy or unhappy. I am from Missouri on this one.
I want to see what happens. (Laughter.) And I like to deal with a
little more factual material than speculation and press reports, and
therefore, I am without an opinion and will remain without one until
we get something substantively.
Q: Mr. Secretary, has the U.S. government in these talks with the
opposition leaders, specifically Hamid Karzai -- has the U.S.
government received any assurances from Karzai that in whatever deal
may ultimately be struck, that Taliban leader Mullah Omar will not be
granted amnesty nor freedom?
Rumsfeld: I don't think want to characterize the private conversations
that have been taking place between the various opposition leaders and
our folks. But they -- there's no confusion on anyone's part on these
issues.
Q: And if I could follow up, since just yesterday Hamid Karzai was
named interim prime minister for Afghanistan, if he in fact decides to
strike a deal, wouldn't it be difficult for the U.S. to oppose that
deal with whomever he strikes it and under what conditions, because
after all, he's now recognized as the interim leader of Afghanistan?
Rumsfeld: I could fashion a thousand hypothetical situations that you
could ask, and then I would be asked to try to say how would we react
in the event this conceivably happened. It hasn't happened.
I don't believe it will happen. If it does happen, I suppose, as Adlai
Stevens said, "We'll jump off that bridge when we get to it."
(Laughter.)
Do I think it will happen? No. So  -- 
Q: You don't think there will be a negotiated end to the situation --
Rumsfeld: I don't not think there will be a negotiated end to the
situation that's unacceptable to the United States.
Q: Oh, that's unacceptable. Okay. That's  -- 
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: When you do achieve your goal, however you get to it in Kandahar,
but once you've achieved your goal in Kandahar, could you describe how
that advances the final -- the next push in the northeastern part of
Afghanistan? You've then narrowed it down to one area; would that be
correct?
Rumsfeld: No, I don't think it would be. If you look about the country
and the map of the country, there are still pockets of Taliban and al
Qaeda fighters in non-trivial numbers that exist in that country. They
are not necessarily in cities. Indeed, they tend to be out -- the
visible ones tend to be out of cities. That remains a problem for
security in that country, and it's not over.
Second, there is no question but that there are considerable areas
where there are not opposition forces or U.S. forces, and one needs to
be aware of the dangers that those areas can pose in terms of people
moving in or out of the country. So I would think it would be
premature to suggest that once Kandahar surrenders that, therefore, we
kind of relax and say, "Well, that takes care of that," because it
doesn't. There are still a lot of senior al Qaeda and senior Taliban
people left. We went in there to root out the terrorists, to find them
where they are. Our job has got a long way to go, and anything that
gets in the way of us completing that job would be most unfortunate.
Q: Doesn't that, though, give you some additional ability to
concentrate more on one main area, being the White Mountains area?
Rumsfeld: Every time you successfully deal with one piece of the
puzzle, obviously you're able to focus a bit more on the remaining
pieces of the puzzle. But -- yes, Jamie?
Q: Secretary Rumsfeld, can you give us -- or maybe even General Pace
-- can you give us any idea of what's happening --
Rumsfeld: What do you mean "even General Pace"? (Laughter.)
(To the general) You don't have to take that from him!
Q: If for some reason, this were to fall out of your area of expertise
-- (laughter) -- (inaudible) -- the general. Can both of you --
(laughter) -- give us an idea of what's going on in the Tora Bora cave
complex?
Is there any part of that which is now in opposition control? Can you
give us any idea of what's happening in that part of the country,
where the U.S. is assisting some of the local villagers or fighters
there?
Rumsfeld: You want to go ahead?
Pace: Sure, I'll give it a shot. Thank you.
In the Tora Bora cave complex, just like everywhere else that we've
assisted the opposition groups in Afghanistan, we have begun to
provide support to the opposition groups that are moving through the
valleys in the Tora Bora complex. As you know, up until this time,
until just recently, we haven't been, in fact, attacking the caves
from the air. Now, as the opposition groups move their troops through
that complex, we're able to provide them the air support that they can
help direct, because they're able to see the caves that are active,
they can see the caves that are not, and we're able to provide much
more direct support for them.
So it's unfolding in the Tora Bora area as it has in Kunduz, as it did
in Mazar-e Sharif, as it continues to in Kandahar.
Q: General, you said the opposition forces are actually moving through
some of the caves -- they're actually going through the cave
complexes, seeing what's there. Can you give us any idea of do they
control part of the complex or anything like that?
Pace: They have moved up the Tora Bora Valley in that cave complex
area. As is the battlefield elsewhere, it's very fluid, but they have,
in fact, been directing their ground attacks against facilities, and
we've been assisting them with our air support.
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you think that's where bin Laden is?
Rumsfeld: (Chuckles.) Goodness gracious.
Q: (Off mike) -- the barnyard?
Rumsfeld: Where's the barnyard? (Laughter.)
I see literally dozens and dozens and dozens of pieces of intelligence
every day. And if you took all of those scraps and looked at them, the
first conclusion you would reach is that they don't agree. And
therefore, one can't know with precision until the chase around the
yard is over. And --
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, in the past, you've said you want to take senior
Taliban and al Qaeda leaders into custody. I'd like to clarify --
Rumsfeld: I don't know that that word would be right. We are
interested in seeing that they be punished and that they stop doing
what they have been doing. And they have done some perfectly terrible
things on this earth. And -- and -- "custody" has a legal implication.
If I said that, I probably shouldn't.
I would like to see us take control or know that the control is in the
hands of people who will handle the conclusion in a way similar to
what we would do. Now, how that might be, I don't know.
For example, it may be that you could find, for example, a senior al
Qaeda leader who was a national of some country, obviously, other than
Afghanistan. And it may be that there's already paper out on that
individual in another country, and it may be that that country would
like to have that person, and it may be that the opposition forces
and/or the U.S. had control over that person's person for a period.
And to the extent that it made sense to have that individual end up
going to another country -- his country of origin, say, for the sake
of argument -- that might make sense.
I think it's a mistake to think that there's only one way that these
things might be handled. We're dealing with Afghans and non- Afghans.
We're dealing with countries that have sponsored terrorists and
countries that are against terrorists. And I think that what's going
to -- what you have to do is to get what you can get, chase them down,
find them, look at them, perform a sort on them, and then make
judgments about how they best ought to be handled so that terrorism
stops.
Q: What's your preferred solution for Mullah Omar?
Rumsfeld: I'm not going to get into an answer with respect to one
individual. Obviously, he has been the principal person who has been
harboring the al Qaeda network in that country. He does not deserve
the Medal of Freedom.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that there might be a deal, a surrender
deal for Kandahar that would be acceptable to the U.S., or that you
thought that.
Rumsfeld: Okay. Anywhere people can surrender. That's what we've been
trying to get them to do.
Q: Right.
Rumsfeld: Stop fighting. Surrender.
Q: Could we clarify what would be acceptable to the U.S. in the
Kandahar situation?
Rumsfeld: Surrender.
Q: And as far as Omar?
Rumsfeld: I don't know quite what the question is, but  -- 
Q: Well, what are you going to do with him?
Rumsfeld: Take  -- 
Q: You say he's not allowed to live with dignity. He's not allowed in
the city of Kandahar. What are you going to do with him?
Rumsfeld: It depends on the situation, but presumably what would
happen is that individuals who fit the categories that I've described
and the ones the president has described and the one the secretary of
State has described -- what we would do is, depending on who they are
and what their situation is, make a judgment as to how they should be
dealt with. And there are a host of options and opportunities and
possibilities.
Now, does it make sense to immediately start performing that sort
before we have them? I think not.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm very sorry, but I am really confused.
Rumsfeld: Don't be sorry.
Q: I am really, really confused here.
Q: Yeah.
Rumsfeld: Don't be. (Laughter.) We will help you. We are here to help
you.
Q: Well, then, good. Explain. Because I am genuinely confused. It
seems to me since September 11th, this administration has repeatedly
said it wants Omar and bin Laden brought to justice or justice brought
to them.
Rumsfeld: Exactly.
That's where we are.
Q: All right. What does that mean today? Because you have opened the
door to something other than American justice being brought to this
situation, do you today still want Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden in
American hands?
Rumsfeld: We want exactly what you said -- that we want either to
bring justice to them or bring them to justice. And as I have said,
there are a variety of different ways that that can occur, and it will
depend on the individual, and it will depend on whether or not we get
them, and when we get them and what the circumstances are. And all I
can say is that there are a whole set of questions, depending on
nationality, depending on circumstance, and those issues will be
resolved.
But we want control over -- we want these people to be dealt with in
the manner that I've characterized.
Q: But sir, non-hypothetical, Omar and bin Laden -- is there any
solution, non-hypothetical, other than U.S. justice?
Rumsfeld: Is there any conceivable situation where -- gosh, I am so --
I try to not rule things out, because I know I can't look around all
the corners. Is --
Q: Or a bullet in the head, or U.S. justice  -- 
Rumsfeld: Well, no, I wasn't thinking of that. Now, now. (Subdued
laughter.)
Q: It's a solution, through, right?
Rumsfeld: If I said that there is another alternative to that, and yet
I couldn't say what it might be, then I would feel that you would be
-- feel unfulfilled again and -- (laughter) -- and that would bother
me deeply. (Laughter continues.)
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you agree, though  -- 
Rumsfeld: But I would not rule it out.
Pardon me?
Q: You're not ruling that out. So is that not a change in U.S.  -- 
Rumsfeld: I just can't imagine what it is.
Q: Is that not a change in U.S. policy?
Rumsfeld: No, not at all.
Yes?
Q: There is one new development which is not hypothetical, and that's
that Afghanistan now has a designated provisional government with Mr.
Karzai designated as its head. To what extent does that fact constrain
the United States more today -- leave the United States more
constrained today than it was previously?
Rumsfeld: I guess time will tell. It's not clear to me that it
necessarily will. My impression is that the people in Bonn who have
been fashioning this interim solution have views that are not terribly
dissimilar to ours. I don't think they've been enamored of having the
al Qaeda in their country. I don't think they've been enamored of the
Taliban leadership. I don't think they like having their country be a
haven for terrorists. I think that they -- our goals are probably not
inconsistent. If you dropped a plumb line through all of those folks
from Bonn and said, "Gee, what's the aggregation of their thinking," I
would think that it is reasonably proximate to ours.
Q: But the United States will presumably recognize this government and
will then -- you need to defer to their sovereign rights.
Rumsfeld: There certainly would come a time when that would be the
case.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you said repeatedly, and with good reason, that the
Taliban repeatedly lie, that they're not to be believed. To what
degree does that factor into your skepticism now about any promises
that they may make at this stage about a surrender?
Rumsfeld: Well -- (chuckles) -- I guess, you know, if you're dealing
with folks like that, you'd want to watch them pretty careful. They've
had a pattern of saying things that aren't so. And the folks who
surrendered up in Mazar surrendered with hand grenades and weapons on
them, and blew up people and killed people. I think anyone dealing
with those folks would want to be pretty careful.
Q: Is that, then, a great concern, as we hear these reports that
starting tomorrow, they're supposed to start surrendering all of their
arms, that that's something to be watched?
Rumsfeld: I would think that anyone dealing with anyone surrendering
would want to make darn sure that they are unarmed, or put their lives
at risk and the lives of other people at risk for their
inattentiveness.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Just a second.
Yes?
Q: The relief groups in the north are complaining that the aid is not
getting to the people that need it, and one of the reasons is the lack
of a security force up there. Reportedly, General Franks has said he
doesn't want a security force in the region until the military
situation is under control. Is that still the case? Or is now the time
to get some sort of a force up there to help the aid?
Rumsfeld: First of all, it's true that there are humanitarian needs
that are not being met in the country, and it tends to be not because
a shortage of things -- food, medicine, clothing -- but because of
distribution out from central points. So there is a sizable amount of
humanitarian assistance getting in the country. But it is clearly not
because of the dangers in the country it's not moving out as rapidly
as one would hope to the needy people, unless they happen to be nearby
these centers.
The people on the ground are doing, in many cases, the best they can.
They're trying to provide a stable, security situation. There are
criminals, there is disorder, there has been war, there are pockets of
Taliban, there are pockets of al Qaeda, there are people coming in
from other countries on occasion and making mischief.
Now, is it possible in one fell swoop to create a stable, peaceful
situation where all good things can happen and distribution can take
place in a safe, hospitable environment? I think not.
It's going to take a little bit of time.
The people on the ground have -- correction, the people in Bonn, if
I'm not mistaken, indicated that they would prefer to have a security
force of some kind in Kabul. They have not opined, to my knowledge, on
security forces elsewhere. Therefore, the opposition forces, the
forces that have control of whatever pieces of real estate they have
control over, will be the ones that will provide that security.
I'm told -- but I've been told this before -- that there is at least a
possibility that the bridge will be open in a period -- a relatively
short period of time to Uzbekistan, that more flow will continue. As
the airports get fixed, they also will serve as hubs. And as the
pockets of Taliban get eliminated, one would think that the
distribution could improve.
I do not think that the idea of security forces covering that entire
country is probably a good idea. It is not for me to say whether it's
a good idea, however. It's pretty clear that the opposition forces
don't think it's a clear (sic) idea, and it's also pretty clear that
the group that met in Bonn don't think it's a good idea, because all
they considered was the idea of a force in Kabul.
Now, do I think it's going to get better every day? Yes, I do. And
let's hope it does before the winter gets --
Q: Will the United States have to press those opposition groups to
allow some sort of a security force in, or just wait for them to make
-- (off mike)?
Rumsfeld: Well, I think what the United States has to keep trying to
do is to keep encouraging them to provide the kind of stable
situation. And they're doing it. They're moving after some of those
Taliban pockets from time to time, and we're helpful from time to
time. And we are encouraging everyone to see that the kind of
humanitarian assistance that is so badly needed in that country in
fact gets in.
Q: From a practical standpoint, if a number of al Qaeda or Taliban
leaders and soldiers start surrendering in the next day or two, what
can the U.S. do to stop them from dispersing throughout the country?
You've got a thousand Marines and Special Ops teams spread around the
nation. Would you have to surge more troops in quickly? Or
practically, what would you have to do?
Rumsfeld: Well, we don't have enough troops on the ground to control
the country, so we have to control it indirectly and attempt to affect
it indirectly by working with the opposition forces. And that's what
we do. Every day, they're in close discussion with the U.S. soldiers
and with various other people on the ground embedded in their units
and operating under directions from General Tom Franks, that we're
aware of what those guidance are and what our preferences are. And it
frequently results in a discussion, and then a -- often understandings
as to what will take place next. That is what happens.
Let's now disaggregate those folks. Let's say that there's -- there's
Afghan Taliban below the senior level. Those folks very likely are
going to drift back into the community unless -- as they're
interrogated and looked at, people are going to try to sift and sort
and say here's some bad ones, and these folks are just going to go off
into the mountains or off into their villages. Then the senior ones,
that you're going to have to keep your eyes on. And how that would be
done, I don't know.
It could be any number of ways.
Third, with respect to al Qaeda of all levels, you don't want them
milling around the country, and you don't want them leaving the
country, because they're just going to go out and kill people in some
other country. So they need to be stopped. And clearly, with respect
to the senior people, they're going to get a great deal of attention.
Q: The foreign fighters you're most concerned about, how will you --
just
Rumsfeld: You may have to impound them.
Q: How would the U.S. do that, though, with the limited force you have
there?
Rumsfeld: Well, you'd probably use the opposition forces and encourage
them to do it and provide a proper place for them to imprison them and
hold them for appropriate periods and -- so sorts can be made and
then, ultimately, disposition can be made of them.
Q: Encourage them, but you can't direct them  -- 
Rumsfeld: No. I mean, this is an unusual situation. People are looking
for us -- you know, it's the old glass box at the -- at the gas
station, where you're using those little things trying to pick up the
prize, and you can't find it. (Laughter.) It's -- and it's all these
arms are going down in there, and so you keep dropping it and picking
it up again and moving it, but -- some of you are probably too young
to remember those -- those glass boxes, but -- (laughter) --
Q: General Pace? General Pace?
Rumsfeld: -- but they used to have them at all the gas stations when I
was a kid. (Laughter.)
Q: Mr. Secretary and General Pace, could I ask, are there U.S. Special
Operations teams working with opposition troops in the mountains and
around the caves around Jalalabad to call in airstrikes or otherwise?
Pace: There are Special Forces teams working with most of the major
opposition groups, and there are Special Forces working with the
opposition who are working the cave complex.
Q: Quick follow-up if I may, General. Can you describe for us the
so-called "cave buster" weapon now that's being used or being dropped
by strike aircraft, how it differs from the "bunker buster"?
Pace: To my mind, there is no difference. What you have -- what you
have is 500-pound, 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound bombs that are being
very precisely guided into the caves, into the openings. So if you
want to call that a "cave buster" or a "bunker buster," that's what
you can call it, but it's a 2,000-pound bomb.
Q: Mr. Secretary, does Mullah Omar qualify as one of those who could
be brought before a U.S. military tribunal?
Rumsfeld: That decision is a presidential decision as to who, what
categories and what specific individuals might or might not fit within
the military order that he sent me with respect to military
commissions.
Q: And what would your recommendation be?
Rumsfeld: I will receive warm bodies; I will not probably be making
recommendations to the president as to who he should send me so that I
can receive them.
Q: Sir  -- 
Q: General  -- 
Q: Mr. Secretary  -- 
Rumsfeld: We're going to take two questions. You're number one.
Q: Mr. Secretary, were you -- sir, were you surprised when you came to
know that there were thousands of non-Afghanis who were fighting
against the United States in Afghanistan, especially from the allies
like Pakistan, because Pakistan sent some airplanes to rescue them?
Rumsfeld: Well, first of all, with respect to the last comment, I do
not know that you're correct. I have had no evidence that suggests
you're correct either that there have been airplanes rescuing people
or that had there been airplanes, that Pakistan had done it. So I
would assume that I'm right. (Subdued laughter.)
Pace: I would, too.
Rumsfeld: Until you have better information, I would assume that.
Now with respect to whether or not I was surprised, the answer is no.
We have known that you have a country with porous borders, where
tribes and people have moved back and forth across those borders since
the beginning of time. They have, they are today, and I am assured
they will in the future. So it ought not to be any surprise at all
that there are non-Afghans in Afghanistan. We knew this. That's what
al Qaeda is. It's a group of foreigners. And they're -- they are there
doing things that I think are enormously harmful to a peaceful and
stable world.
And the last question is  -- 
Q: I think that there should be another question after me, because
this is very tiny. Can you give us -- (laughter) -- it's sort of a
half-question -- some sense of the numbers of Special Forces that are
around Tora Bora and also tell us if you're replacing the Special
Forces that were hurt on Wednesday and then I --
Rumsfeld: We are replacing -- we are replacing the people that were
killed and wounded and --
Q: (Off mike.)
Rumsfeld: We move people around. Sometimes the numbers go up. Sometime
the numbers go down. But we clearly have every reason to have those
people there. They were doing a great job, and they have been
replaced.
Q: Are the numbers of folks at Tora Bora modest? Vulgar?
Rumsfeld: Well  -- 
Q: Sufficient.
Rumsfeld: What was the second word?
Q: Vulgar -- (off mike). Right? (Laughter.)
Pace: Sufficient.
Rumsfeld: There is -- I like that; they're sufficient.
Q: Oh!
Rumsfeld: That's good. Thank you.
Q: (Off mike) -- for a whole question?
(Cross talk.)
Q: When will you stop calling the opposition forces "opposition" and
call them "government forces" --
Rumsfeld: Maybe when they have a government. Hey, that's a good point.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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