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Military

09 November 2001

Transcript: Paul Wolfowitz on Afghanistan Campaign and Ramadan

(Deputy defense secretary says allies will be sensitive) (4330)
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in response to interview
questions about continuing the military campaign in Afghanistan during
Ramadan, said "we're going to be sensitive to the fact that Ramadan is
the holiest month on the Muslim calendar and we will have that in
mind."
Wolfowitz emphasized in his comments November 9 that the allied
anti-terror campaign is just beginning, and that it is "against not
just al Qaeda in Afghanistan ... but against a whole network of global
terrorism which showed its ugly face on September 11th."
Following is a transcript of the interview, conducted jointly by
Associated Press Radio, the Voice of America, National Public Radio
and the British Broadcasting Corporation:
(begin transcript)
NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
November 9, 2001
(Interview with Associated Press Radio, Voice of America, National
Public Radio and the British Broadcasting Corp.)
Q: Do you want to make a statement first?
Wolfowitz: I guess I would say I think it can't be emphasized enough
that we are really just at the beginning of what the president and
everyone else has made clear is going to be a long campaign against
not just al Qaeda in Afghanistan and not just al Qaeda but against a
whole network of global terrorism which showed its ugly face on
September 11th.
And if someone had, from this department, had gone up to the Congress
in June and testified that we needed billions of dollars in order to
sustain operations, military operations in Central Asia, and oh by the
way in addition we needed billions of dollars because at the same time
we would have to devote some 50 percent of our airborne surveillance
assets to maintaining continuous combat air patrols over the United
States, we would have been accused of manufacturing threats in order
to justify our expenditures, and yet those are exactly the things
we're doing today. I think it's a demonstration of how difficult it is
to foresee the future in this business and how important it is to be
prepared and have a wide range of capabilities.
Q: Would you like to also address the coming of Ramadan and the
continual problem with the Muslim world seeing this as a war against
them, and particularly, no matter how many times Secretary Rumsfeld
says this is a war against terrorism not Muslims, that particularly as
the holiday approaches they see this as a war against their religion.
Wolfowitz: I think there are certainly problems because there are
people including Osama bin Laden himself quite prominently who are
trying to manipulate this and say this is a war of Islam against the
rest of the world. In fact he seemed to define it as Islam against the
United Nations. He can't seem to find anyone who's not his enemy. And
there are certain people with whom that has appeal, and we have to
work very hard to combat that view.
One of the difficulties we have, and it's classic in wars against
totalitarian regimes, is that for a certain amount of time they
control some of the news coming out of places they control. So I think
when we achieve our objectives in Afghanistan and people are able to
see clearly what the record of the Taliban regime is, I imagine it's
going to look a lot like Europe after the Nazis or Eastern Europe
after the Soviet Union. When people are free to talk I think the
story's going to come out our way and very clearly.
I was Ambassador to Indonesia, which has more Muslims than any other
country in the world, and I know there is some confusion in Indonesia,
and there obviously will be when we are involved in a bombing campaign
in any country in the world, but there's no confusion about the
attitudes of Indonesians towards terrorism and towards the kind of
horror that we saw on September 11th.
So I think in the long run we're going to win that battle.
As far as Ramadan goes, it is a particularly holy time of the year for
Muslims, but if we had a chance to capture bin Laden or some of his
senior operatives it wouldn't matter to me whether it was Christmas or
Hanukkah or Ramadan, we have to do it. At the same time, because we
are in a battle for people's minds as well, we're going to -- we are
conscious of that. I think a very important example is the extreme
care we go to avoid hitting mosques. We know that the Taliban and al
Qaeda take advantage of that, just as other people in earlier wars
have taken advantage of that. But that's one of those things it's
important enough for us to avoid hitting religious sites to let them
have that advantage.
Q: Let me follow up on the Ramadan. It is coming up now and there had
been some discussion that perhaps General Franks might concentrate if
there is continual military action in the north, as opposed to in the
south where there's greater concern about Pakistani Muslims. What is
going to be happening for Ramadan?
Wolfowitz: We're not going to write a blueprint for Ramadan. We know
that Ramadan is a special time. I think it's a time to concentrate
even more than we do anyway, which is a lot, on things like
humanitarian operations. But let's also remember that the people are
suffering up north because of Taliban oppression, because of Taliban
cutting off humanitarian assistance, that those people suffering and
dying are Muslims, and I don't think stopping the war and leaving them
under Taliban oppression for an extra month is doing any favor to
Muslims anywhere.
Q: Is that what the secretary was getting at yesterday? Because all
along since the beginning of the bombing campaign we've heard him and
the chairman refer to a measured approach. We're following our own
time line. Suddenly yesterday the secretary said, warned against
prolonging the campaign. That's the first time I'd ever heard him use
that word. Is there some sudden urgency that we're trying to deal with
now in Afghanistan?
Wolfowitz: I don't think so. Wasn't it the secretary who said, when he
was questioned about months versus years he said that gives me 23
months?
Look, we're going to do this at the pace that makes sense for us, for
achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan, and for achieving
our strategic objectives beyond Afghanistan. And I think patience is
one of the watchwords here. We will do what we need to do, we'll do
whatever we need to do at the time we need to do it, but I think the
focus of our strategy now clearly is on enlisting as many Afghans as
possible on our side to do their work and in the process help us
achieve our objectives. And the more we can get to that result the
better off we'll be in the long term.
It's not a matter of a reluctance or unwillingness to use American
forces. I think the Secretary has said we have all options on the
table. But the point is, as other people have learned in the past,
Afghanistan is not a country that's particularly friendly to
foreigners and we don't want to become the next bunch of foreigners
that have problems after they've achieved some initial success.
So the key to achieving our objectives here is enlisting Afghans north
and south and everywhere in what I think is their fight against the
Taliban, their fight against a foreign terrorist presence.
Q: If I could jump onto that, one of the only means that we know about
to get that, to win over sort of Afghan minds has involved radio
broadcasts from the Commando Solo flights and leaflet drops.
Is there any sense you have of the effectiveness that that is having
in achieving that goal?
Wolfowitz: We're not very free to take public opinion polls in
Afghanistan, as you know, so it's hard to measure those things.
I think we're pretty confident that we're the only ones doing the
broadcasting now, that we've been able to take them off the air. That
is a good thing.
I would say it's just too early to tell. But one has to recognize also
that the best information campaign in the world is also going to be
influenced by facts on the ground. I think as the opponents of Taliban
begin to make more progress you will begin to see more people
beginning to get off the fence and move over to the side that we want
them to be on. That's another reason why this takes time and takes
some patience.
Q: Mr. Secretary, can I pick up on the Ramadan issue? We know that you
and your colleagues have said there's no question of a pause in the
terrorist campaign and I understand that. We understand you can't say
what you're going to do in advance. But are you nevertheless open to
some sort of gesture? We noticed for example that you did not bomb on
the first Friday of the campaign. Is it still possible, bearing in
mind enormous sensitivity in the Muslim world, that something might be
possible, can you give us a hint that you might be --
Wolfowitz: I think we've made it clear we're going to be sensitive to
the fact that Ramadan is the holiest month on the Muslim calendar and
we will have that in mind. We're not going to write a blueprint for
the Taliban or al Qaeda or the people that we're after to say oh, now
you not only know that mosques are safe but these other sanctuaries
are sanctuaries you can operate in. But we will be sensitive.
Q: So you don't rule out some sort of gesture.
Wolfowitz: We haven't ruled anything out.
Q: One way to -- As you said earlier, one thing you can do in Ramadan
is concentrate on humanitarian operations. How important is it to the
U.S. military campaign that Mazar-e Sharif be liberated and soon?
Wolfowitz: Look, it will be very valuable when Mazar can be liberated
and the land bridge from Uzbekistan can be opened. And it's important
for many reasons and humanitarian assistance is one of the reasons.
If you look at a map of where people are suffering and starving in
Afghanistan it is exactly those areas that are not under Taliban
control. In other words, the Taliban lets food go to the areas they
control and they stop food from going to places that they don't, and
they are the cause of the huge humanitarian disaster. This was true
before October 7th and it's even more true now.
So the more we can open up access for humanitarian assistance from
outside areas of Taliban control the sooner we can end what is a real
humanitarian problem. And there is some urgency to it because of the
onset of winter. But again, we'll have to adjust our humanitarian
operations to the pace of what takes place on the ground, and we will
continue dropping food from the air as long as that's the best means
of getting it there.
Q: You mentioned the importance of enlisting Afghans in the U.S.
cause. Should they not move quickly enough in order to establish the
conditions for humanitarian operations in the north, for example, do
you have to then look at the reality that maybe you can't depend on
them to carry out your campaign?
Wolfowitz: If you're pushing for a timetable, I'm not  -- 
Q: (inaudible)
Wolfowitz: We don't have a timetable. We really assess the situation
literally on a daily basis. And you can only form judgments about
what's taking place on a weekly or monthly basis. This is a situation
that shifts and goes up and down, back and forth, it's in the nature
of this kind of warfare. I think any judgments that one's going to
make you have to make after following things over a period of time.
We're not on a fixed timetable here. I think other than, as we've
observed already, winter is a difficult time from a humanitarian point
of view, and if the situation on the ground doesn't move favorably
then there are other things we can do including increasing the level
of air drops. We've already been able to increase that partly thanks
to having more people on the ground with Northern Alliance forces so
that we know where to drop food and supplies.
Q: But even if you're not on a fixed timetable, you certainly have a
campaign plan.
Wolfowitz: Not in the sense that we had a campaign plan for the
liberation of Kuwait where you could pretty much map it out from start
to finish and it pretty much went according to plan. It went a little
faster than planned, but it was the plan.
This is a plan that looks to develop opportunities as those
opportunities develop, looks at how you can exploit those
opportunities, then obviously has in mind that if opportunities don't
develop then you may have to do other things to force them open.
But the objective in Afghanistan remains from the beginning, the
primary objective is to get rid of al Qaeda, to end Afghanistan as a
sanctuary for terrorist operations. That means clearly ending the
Taliban regime. But within that even on the political side there's
enormous latitude as to what is a final acceptable outcome, and that's
important.
The Russians had a plan for Afghanistan which was to impose the
communist regime on the country. We don't have that kind of plan or
that kind of objective. We just want to end Afghanistan as a base for
terrorist operations. It's very different.
Q: Mr. Secretary, may I pick up on the campaign plan, and the
interesting thing you said was that you assess this on a daily basis,
that there are more and more rumblings of people who are criticizing
it as being too timid and they don't actually see a plan, and to have
it sound like there isn't really a plan would add fuel to that
criticism.
How would you answer those critics?
Wolfowitz: Let's be clear what the plan is and it isn't. It's not a
plan, as I said, in the sense of the liberation of Kuwait where we
actually had time-phased objectives for the air campaign, what we
would do in the first week and the second week, and there wasn't much
we had to look for in the way of the Iraqi reaction. It pretty much
went according to plan.
The plan here is one that rests on developing opposition inside
Afghanistan to the Taliban and assisting that opposition to achieve
its objectives which in turn will help us achieve our objectives. That
is the plan. And it is a plan that, to repeat it, it looks for
opportunities, it looks for creating opportunities, it looks for
exploiting opportunities, and that means you have to on a daily basis
assess where those are, where the level of effort should be increased,
where maybe it should be shifted. That's what I mean. It's a strategy
rather than a blueprint.
Q: And what would you say to those who are saying well, where's the
progress? We don't see much -- how would you assess how things are
going according to the --
Wolfowitz: I think the only way you can assess something like this is
when it's over. And there really is -- a lot becomes clear when you
finally achieve your objectives and we aren't there yet. We know that.
The -- sorry, I lost my train of thought.
Q: On how things are going, how you're assessing the situation of how
it's going according to the daily changing plan.
Q: You can only assess it when it's over.
Wolfowitz: You can only assess it when it's over, but I think what we
see is a steady progress in terms of the kinds of things we're trying
to do. Steady progress in terms of particularly getting Americans in
with Northern Alliance forces so that we can make our air campaign and
our air drops more effective in linking up with them.
And it's in the nature of this kind of warfare, it's in the nature of
how Afghans fight that you're not going to get clear results in a
short period of time. But I think eventually, and I do believe this,
we will see eventually a very clear turn in the battle here.
Q: Mr. Secretary, one of the questions I've been meaning to ask you
since the beginning, since 9/11, is that you frequently have been
portrayed in reports as being the "hawk" in the administration who
wants to pursue this campaign almost immediately beyond the borders of
Afghanistan and particularly to target Iraq. Would you set the record
straight on these presentations?
Wolfowitz: Look, I don't get into -- let me put it this way.
We've had, I think we've had some very, very good and very robust
discussions about what is the best strategy here, what are the best
tactics. I've known for a couple of years that this is a president who
really relishes, cultivates, debate and argument among his advisors,
and we've had some very robust debates.
He's also a president who is very clear about his willingness to make
decisions. At some point -- there is no way you can do everything all
at once. We're talking about a very broad campaign over a significant
period of time and there has to be strategic priorities, and only one
person can set them. We've seen, I will say the spectacle in the past,
unfortunately, in this government and other governments where
governments seem to be pursuing two contradictory policies at once and
that's a guarantee that you have no policy at all.
So I think what we have here is a very strong team with a terrific
leader and as the president said, this is a broad campaign. It starts
in Afghanistan but it doesn't end in Afghanistan. And the goal really
is to free the United States and to free the civilized world from this
terrible menace of global terrorism.
Q: Mr. Secretary, we ask you about progress and you can't give any
concrete signs of progress. You said there's no firm fixed plan such
as there was in the war in the Gulf. Other people, particularly in the
region, are really worried that this is a directionless war, this is
one that it's just an expression of American anger, perhaps, in
response to what happened on September the 11th. How do you answer
that?
Wolfowitz: Well that is, if I can say, that is ridiculous. If you want
a direction, the direction is very clear. The direction is to
encourage the Northern Alliance to recapture northern Afghanistan from
Taliban impression; the direction is to encourage opposition in the
Pushtun south against the Taliban to get rid of the Taliban regime,
and to have a regime in Afghanistan that reflects the will of the
Afghan people, not the will of the United States, but puts an end to
Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism. That is the direction.
Now how fast Northern Alliance is progressing towards those goals, how
fast opposition is developing in the south is something that is
difficult to read on a daily basis and difficult to predict. I think
we're making progress.
We always have options to accelerate that progress and we always look
at ways to do it. I would say one measure of progress has been clearly
an improvement in our ability to deliver support to the Northern
Alliance. Is that reflected on the battlefield? Yes, I think it is.
But could it be -- can you have reverses on the battlefield in the
North tomorrow? Of course you can. It's a fluid situation. But the
direction of what we're trying to achieve is absolutely clear and no
one should say that this is just somehow purposeless bombing to
satisfy some American urge for revenge. It is very purposeful and the
purpose is very clearly to root out the al Qaeda in Afghanistan and to
Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism.
Q: We were being told by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff about cavalry charges by the Northern Alliance. At what stage do
you conclude that they're not strong enough to achieve the objectives
you set them and you need a really serious American presence on the
ground?
Wolfowitz: We haven't ruled out any options but I think they're making
progress and one of the things you can also do is to give them the
kind of supplies and equipment that move them beyond the very
difficult state they were in when we first made contact with them.
That process is underway even as we speak.
Q: There's a lot of criticism coming up now that you seem to have been
too slow in pursuing your objectives, too slow getting the special
forces on the ground, too slow to target Taliban front lines. How do
you respond to that?
Wolfowitz: You know, we are just barely, we aren't even two months
since the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and we are
just barely one month since the start of this campaign.
Two months after the invasion of Kuwait, which was a much easier
problem to tackle, we were just beginning to review General
Schwarzkopf's first plans for the liberation of Kuwait. October 7th,
less than a month after the attack on the World Trade Center, we were
engaged in a major military campaign halfway around the world in
places which, as I said at the beginning, you would have laughed at us
if we said we had to prepare to fight in Afghanistan and base forces
in Uzbekistan.
It's really quite remarkable, I think. It's testimony to our rather
amazing American capability, and I think it's testimony to terrific
work on the part of General Franks and all the people under his
command that they are doing this, and they are doing this flying
sorties out of places where it's a ten hour round trip to deliver
bombs on target and they keep this up day after day after day.
I think it is quite a feat and I think people would be impressed by
it.
Q: Just about Iraq, you spoke of a deadly combination of support for
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction the other day. Is that a
hint that you think the anthrax might have come from Iraq?
Wolfowitz: No. It's just saying that terrorists who have weapons of
mass destruction are a particularly dangerous form of terrorism and we
see a suggestion that that's out there.
Q: You have several times in this interview described U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan as one of supporting the opposition, both in the North and
the South. And yet General Pace just a couple of days ago said, for
example, that U.S. advisors on the ground do not second guess rebel
commanders, do not offer advice unless they're invited to offer
advice.
Given the importance of this war, how can the United States depend on
someone else to fight it for us?
Wolfowitz: Look, I think if you go back through history some of the
most successful campaigns we've fought are ones where we've had good
allies helping us and people fighting for their objectives when their
objectives were our objectives. That is what you want to achieve.
It doesn't mean, by the way, that we don't have some fairly specific
advice probably bordering on instructions in certain occasions. But at
the same time it's a basic principle of good command I think to
delegate responsibility down to as low a level as possible because
it's at that level that people really have a feel for the battlefield
and some commander, some general sitting in Tampa, Florida, is not
likely to understand the nature of the campaign from Mazar-e Sharif as
well as an Afghan commander who'd been fighting over that terrain for
years.
So I think that's what General Pace meant, but we have some, we
certainly have strategic advice that we can pass on. We certainly have
specific knowledge of how they best make use of the capabilities that
we have to offer them. And quite frankly, we also have very specific
guidance to them that we think if they don't want to repeat some of
the disastrous mistakes they have made in the past that they had
better be very careful about how they treat civilian populations when
they do liberate territories.
Q: Isn't there a difference between supporting an Army and depending
on them?
Wolfowitz: Yes, there clearly is a difference, and at the end of the
day we're not going to depend critically on anyone. We will do what we
need to do. We will do what it takes.
The United States has never been attacked in the way that we were on
September 11th, and people who have underestimated us in the past have
learned what the United States is capable of doing. We have the
resources, we have the will, and we'll take care of the problem. But
it is much, much better for us and for everybody else if we can find a
way to do it where our objectives are in common with the objectives of
other people rather than having to impose everything by our will.
Thank you all.
Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary
Wolfowitz: Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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