05 November 2001
Transcript: Defense Department Briefing, November 5, 2001
(Operational update on the war in Afghanistan) (4410)
Deputy Pentagon Spokesman Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem briefed.
Following is a transcript:
(begin transcript)
United States Department of Defense
NEWS TRANSCRIPT
Presenter: Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, Joint Staff
Nov. 5, 2001
Enduring Freedom Operational Update -- Rear Adm. Stufflebeem
(Slides and videos shown in this briefing are on the Web at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/g011105-D-6570C.html )
Stufflebeem: Good afternoon, everyone.
Well, yesterday, as they've done throughout the weekend, coalition
efforts focused on supporting opposition group forces and preparing
the battlefield for future offensive actions by those forces;
continued to degrade and destroy al Qaeda and Taliban command and
control, particularly caves and tunnels; struck Taliban and foreign
forces where we found them; and continued humanitarian relief campaign
in support of the Afghan people.
Yesterday we struck in five planned target areas that included active
and suspected terrorist and Taliban cave and tunnel complexes; Taliban
military forces, and in particular, those engaged with or arrayed
against the opposition forces; and other emergent Taliban targets. We
used about 75 strike aircraft, which included about 60 from sea-based
platforms, about seven to 10 long-range bombers, and the remainder
were land-based tactical jets.
We also flew Commando Solo broadcast missions and conducted
humanitarian ration air drops from two C-17s who delivered more than
34,000 humanitarian daily ratios; and that brings our total now to
over 1,170,000.
Imagery today includes some overheads of a Kabul airfield and military
aircraft. This airfield is one of nine that we have struck to date in
the campaign. This supported fighter aircraft, helicopters and
transports, and also served as a military aircraft maintenance
facility. These images, which come from Wednesday, focus on two
maintenance hangars at the facility, seen here in a pre- and post-
strike environment. The maintenance hangars, as you see -- will see --
have been destroyed.
We continue to strike at Taliban infrastructure wherever possible to
wither away the Taliban's ability to regenerate, reequip and resupply
forces in the field as the demanding winter session -- season
approaches.
We have three video -- weapon-system videos from the weekend that
highlight coalition efforts to degrade Taliban forces facing the
Northern Alliance.
The first is an abbreviated clip from Saturday that shows that the
strike on the Taliban's Fifth Corps. It's an armored vehicle in a
position southwest of Mazar-e Sharif. As you can see, the vehicle was
destroyed.
The second clip shows a strike on Friday against Taliban troops in a
trench line north of Kabul. This Taliban troop position was set facing
a Northern Alliance opposition group.
The last video shows a B-52 strike -- this was on Friday -- again
against Taliban positions north of Kabul. This was filmed from an
accompanying coalition fighter. You can see the bomber and the bomb
load being dropped from the fighter's position and then the fighter
camera switching to the group for both a close-up and distant view of
the strike.
And with that, I'll take your questions. Charlie?
Q: Admiral, the three bases that you're looking at in Tajikistan, what
kind of shape generally are those bases in? And given the fact that
the large percentage of strike aircraft they're using are Navy jets,
carrier-based jets that need a lot of refueling, wouldn't these bases
in Tajikistan give you a good -- good base for land-based aircraft for
short strikes in northern Afghanistan?
Stufflebeem: I'll try to walk backwards through your questions.
Certainly airfields closer to Afghanistan would give us an advantage
in being able to generate sorties. That's, I think, an emphatic yes.
In terms of the airfields in Tajikistan, as the secretary has already
discussed, there is an assessment team in country to do just that, and
until they've reported out, I just don't have any idea what the
condition of those airfields are to be able to use. I think that when
the secretary gets back, he'll have more to report on things just like
that.
Q: But does the Pentagon hope to use those for ground-based strike
aircraft and -- or/and helicopters?
Stufflebeem: Well, we would hope to have a capability to get access to
Afghanistan from the North and the South, yes.
Q: Admiral, could you go beyond Tajikistan and walk us through the
other prospects, Pakistan, some additional bases, Kazakhstan, perhaps
Uzbekistan, and inside Afghanistan? What's the effort there?
Stufflebeem: To be honest, it's outside of my scope. I know the
secretary, who has visited there, will have more information about
specifically what either is being looked at or what could be
available. I just don't have the information on that, so I just plain
don't know.
Q: Are there survey teams, though, going to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,
looking at airfields there as well, military survey teams?
Stufflebeem: There are assessment teams that are going out to all of
the countries that have offered assistance. I just don't have those at
my fingertips. I just don't know. I'm really concentrating, of course,
my area of responsibility, of course, in operations, and that gets
into a future arena where, of course, our politicians are helping set
that up.
Q: Just so we understand, your focus here is to get land-based
tactical air closer to the battlefield. Is that the focus on the
surveying?
Stufflebeem: Closer access to Afghanistan -- and I'll speak
generically -- closer access to Afghanistan is good for a lot of
reasons; release -- or relief from requirements for a lot of tanking,
shorter times for response, faster abilities to turn aircraft around,
to do resupply missions, et cetera.
So there's a whole host of reasons why having airfields closer to
Afghanistan is good.
Q: Admiral, can you -- you spoke a moment ago about preparing the
battlefield for future operations. How far in the future? My question
really is, how imminent are these future operations, which, by
definition, would be ground operations?
Stufflebeem: The reference I made was specifically about enabling the
Northern Alliance operations. I'm hearing reports that they -- I think
a better way to characterize the answer is that I'm not sure when the
Northern Alliance would intend for an offensive in one place or
another. I have heard reports that they may be ready to move, but
until they do, I think that it's a bit supposition on our part.
Q: Well, to follow up -- to follow up; are these battlefields now
prepared for their movement? Has the job been done?
Stufflebeem: I don't know. I honestly don't know. The opposition field
commanders will have to determine -- and I'm sure are determining --
when they feel ready to move. We are helping to set those conditions
by prepping this battlefield and taking down Taliban resistance. I
don't know -- I just don't know how and when they'll feel ready to go.
Q: Can I do a follow-up on that, please, on this?
Although you and others from that podium have been saying that this is
a different kind of war and we should not equate it with previous
wars, it does seem that this heavy bombing of the Taliban forces north
of Kabul is a softening up in prelude to an offensive. And yet the
Taliban, as we're told, outnumbers the Northern Alliance about three
to one. Will -- and I guess this is the same kind of thing you said
you didn't know, but will the air campaign by itself allow the
Northern Alliance to have any kind of a successful offensive, or will
United States -- even though nobody admits it here -- have to put in
large quantities of ground troops to assist them?
Stufflebeem: Airstrikes on Taliban positions will help Northern
Alliance. To what degree, I think is really more a call for the
Northern Alliance to make an assessment of, more so than for us. It
would be incorrect for us to assume that after so many missions of
prepping that particular battlefield, that we would say, "It's ready
for you to go. You should be going now." They've got to make that
determination for themselves on the ground, and we are sure that they
will, and once they're comfortable, we will attempt to help them,
again, in any way that we can.
Now to get into the aspect of support from on the ground, that gets
into an area of future operations that we just don't want to go to.
Q: Admiral --
Stufflebeem: (Off mike) -- over here.
Q: But having said all of that, after almost a week of very heavy
bombing along the front lines, what's the Pentagon's assessment of the
damage you've caused to the Taliban military up there? How much of it
have you taken down? And what is your assessment of these reports that
we keep hearing about hundreds if not thousands of people crossing
into Afghanistan to join the fight with the Taliban?
Stufflebeem: Reports I've seen about forces crossing to reinforce the
Taliban haven't been as prolific as what you've just stated. Hundreds
of thousands or maybe hundreds --
Q: Hundreds, if not thousands.
Stufflebeem: If not thousands? I think that's a very hard number to
quantify, much of it coming from pro-Taliban forces. I don't think
that we just have the indicators that tell us that there is that much
reinforcement that's coming across to help the Taliban. So I'm -- I
would say that our assessment is, we're suspicious of those numbers.
Now the first part of your question --
Q: After a week or so of pounding the front lines --
Stufflebeem: Oh, right --
Q: -- what do you think you've accomplished in reality here?
Stufflebeem: Well, again, because this is enemy territory, it's very
difficult to get reliable information out. The Taliban broadcasts or
boasts from time to time of Americans that they may have killed, which
we know to be false, and they're not broadcasting the number of their
own forces that are lost, which we believe are substantial. And one of
the best indicators of that to me is not only what I see in reports
but what I see in the press as well. It's been a matter of days in
some areas where the Taliban have responded to opposition with fire.
My guess is that would be because they're either hunkered down and
aren't coming out, or they're not able to fire. So I think that that's
a very positive sign.
Q: Do you have any better fix on what you mean -- what is meant by
"substantial losses" on the part of the Taliban?
Stufflebeem: I can't quantify it in terms of numbers. I can quantify
it best by saying that if the Northern opposition is feeling
emboldened or ready to make moves, then that means that it has had the
intended effect.
Q: Admiral, a couple questions about caves, the cave issues. You've
come out over the last few days and talked specifically that we're
targeting caves and tunnels. Why the attacks on the caves? Is -- do
you have pretty good intelligence that many al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders are actually hunkered down in these various complexes around
the country, and they're the targets?
Stufflebeem: Well, it's more than just specific intelligence.
It's also a history of the region. The nation is famous, I suppose,
for the numbers of caves that have been carved out over the centuries.
They have a history of fighting in there. Our allies in this, to a
degree, the Russians, have also explained the kind of warfare that
they faced and that we're understanding, and there is in fact some
intelligence that they are using the caves and have used the caves.
So, yes, we do believe that they do use them. We use all-source
intelligence to try to refine where they're at, either as individuals
who may be there or as storage facilities. And when we feel
comfortable that we have a known facility or we suspect that it has
been used, then we strike it.
Q: Can I get a quick follow-up? You've expended a lot of ordnance on
these caves, both bunker-busters and 2,000-pounders. Is it the
Pentagon's view right now that you can do the job from the air, or
necessarily will you need to send in special ops teams to do selective
raids into the cave complexes themselves?
Stufflebeem: I'll reinforce what the chairman has said more than once.
We are going to use all of our capability to win this. There are very
few of us who believe that this will be won solely through air power.
So all elements of our coalition forces will at some time likely be
brought to bear.
Q: Against caves and tunnels?
Stufflebeem: Wherever we need to to root out al Qaeda and to take down
the Taliban.
Q: Admiral, to follow-up --
Q: General Myers and the secretary have talked about two missions for
U.S. special forces in Afghanistan right now, the first being
assistance for targeting and the other being coordinating resupply.
I'm talking about special forces already on the ground there. Could --
is there anything you could say about a possible third mission, and
that would be providing security for individual commanders who may be
starting -- in endangered position or maybe starting an insurgency of
some kind? I'm thinking for example, of Hamid Karzai. Is that --
providing security for somebody like that -- is that a possible third
mission for U.S. special forces on the ground right now?
Stufflebeem: That's a difficult question to answer from the
perspective of -- you're asking, do we have a capability to provide
security? Of course we do. Would that be an intended mission that
we'll do? I wouldn't want to hazard a guess or make a supposition of
that.
There just won't be any part of our capabilities that won't be
considered. How or when it might be utilized will be driven by many
factors, and so right now would be really just a guess, and so I'll
just say at a future operation --
Q: Well, was there such an effort in support of Karzai and over the
last few days when he got endangered?
Stufflebeem: I have to characterize it this way: what you see
happening in the north, and the support that's being provided to the
Northern Alliance, northern opposition groups, is something that has
been well established, well defined, for a number of years. It's not
quite so in the south, as we understand it. There are individuals whom
would try to put together what we -- at least, I have heard in one
occasion called a Southern Alliance. And we have an interest of
supporting all opposition groups or the individuals who could lead
that. But because of the differences of North and South Afghanistan --
the difference in access, the difference in a number of other factors
-- at the moment, I think that's best left invisible for the time
being.
Q: And so you can't confirm that the U.S. Special Operations went in
and rescued Karzai?
Stufflebeem: I cannot confirm that.
Q: Admiral, can we assume that parts of the border region of Pakistan
constitute sanctuaries for the enemy that will have to be dealt with
militarily at some point, either by U.S. forces or by Pakistani
forces? And I have follow-up.
Stufflebeem: Let me ask you to ask the question another way; I'm not
sure --
Q: Are border regions in Pakistan, of the kind that Barbara was
talking about, with people crossing over in hundreds or thousands, are
they, in effect, enemy sanctuaries that will have to be dealt with
militarily at some point in this campaign?
Stufflebeem: Well, I don't know. When you look at the region there,
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, certainly in the central
part of the country, is really a line that was drawn on a map by the
British some years ago. From the folks -- from the people who live in
this region, it's not nearly quite so plain. And on some maps, part of
that area is just considered a no man's land. So to describe a
definitive border and who may be straddling or living across that
border, to say that that might constitute an area of future military
action is -- it's just too hard for me to be able to say.
I think that at some time, at some point, it is possible that the
Pakistan government may, in fact, have to deal with the unrest in the
regions of the country, of which the border may be one.
Q: And a follow-up on what you were talking about earlier about what
you gain from closer geographical access with air bases: has the
absence of that led to large numbers of missed opportunities -- in
other words, lack of quick response time or turnaround time? Have you
found that a lot of targets that you wanted to hit you could not hit
frequently because of the difficulties of logistics, of the distances?
Stufflebeem: Right. No. Simply put, the answer is no. It's just that
it requires more support to be able to accomplish the same thing.
Q: Admiral Stufflebeem, are we dropping leaflets with a picture of
sketch of Mullah Omar's car in country?
Stufflebeem: I don't know. I'll take that question and find out and
get you an answer. [Answer: Yes.] I've seen leaflets. I think that you
have been offered some of the leaflets we have dropped. But I can't
say I've ever seen that one, so I'll just have to find out for you.
Q: Admiral, over the weekend, representatives of the Northern Alliance
asked more support from the United States, ammunition as well as
weapons, and a stronger offensive against the Taliban front line. At
what point do U.S. officials determine we've given enough support, the
time is right, and if the Northern Alliance says, "We're not yet
ready," at what point do we decide that we're going to go ahead either
with Special Forces or ground troops? Is there a threshold? Then I
have a follow-up.
Stufflebeem: There's not a threshold that would say continue or stop.
There's not a threshold that I'm aware of that would say withdraw our
support. I think that question at some point will be in General
Franks' mind and maybe the National Command Authority's, but we're
certainly not there yet. We're pleased with the responses that they
have offered, I guess, or have been able to take advantage of with the
support we have provided. We would intend to support them to meet
their objectives as long as we stay on our campaign objectives and
meet ours. That is foremost, that we are going to eradicate al Qaeda
from Afghanistan and we're going to take away the Taliban's ability to
support terrorists. And there isn't anything that's going to deter us
from that mission. So what we're doing now with the Northern Alliance
is mutually supportive. If there ever comes a time where that may not
be the case, it will have to be decided by the senior war-fighters.
Q: And to follow up, the secretary has said that this is a new type of
war that requires patience, and that it would take years, as opposed
to months, to accomplish. It seems as if the message to the allies in
his trip is that it will take months, not years, to accomplish. Does
this reflect any kind of change in the way that we measure the
progress, the timetable of this war, or is he simply referring
specifically to airstrikes and bombs and raids of that nature inside
of Afghanistan?
Stufflebeem: I think that's a fair question, but I'd ask you to ask
the secretary that tomorrow. I just -- I don't know exactly what he
said or the context of what it was in, so therefore, I don't know in
terms of a change of the time frame.
Q: Admiral, you talked about the United States soliciting advice from
the Russians about their experience in fighting in Afghanistan, in
reference to the cave complexes. Can you talk about the degree to
which we are -- the United States is speaking to veterans of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan about their experience, what kinds of
information the United States is obtaining or is interested in
obtaining? And how up the former Soviet chain of command are you
talking to?
Stufflebeem: The most honest answer is I don't really know. There are
have been books written about the environment. There are former Soviet
officials, or maybe Soviet -- former Soviet army personnel, who have
just come forward. We have maintained high-level contacts with Russia,
as you know, for quite a long time. And as this unfortunate war has
been thrust upon us, they have -- the Russians have been very helpful
to us. We have not been shy in asking for information, but at what
level and to what degree, I just honestly don't know.
Q: Can I just follow up? To your knowledge, are there former Soviet
military officers in Afghanistan now working with U.S. Special Forces?
And are there current Russian special forces in Afghanistan working
with American Special Forces?
Stufflebeem: I've not seen any reports that would tell me that either
former or current Russians in fact are in Afghanistan or are working
with the alliance.
Q: Admiral?
Q: Admiral, you can --
Stufflebeem: I've got time for two more questions.
Q: Okay. Admiral you can count on the ground the number of tanks, the
number of planes, the number of airstrips, command-and-control bunkers
that you hit in the war against the Taliban. But is there any evidence
that this air war is having any effect at all on Osama bin Laden and
al Qaeda, and if so, how can you determine that?
Stufflebeem: Probably only anecdotally. Al Qaeda is an elusive
organization. Their leadership are shadowy. They don't want to be
found. They want to survive. They want to use other humans as their
shields. Our sense is that they are very satisfied that the Taliban
are doing their fighting for them right now.
We have not seen active evidence that al Qaeda is active in
Afghanistan. We have taken away their ability to use their training
camps. We have taken away their known infrastructure. We are striking
at the caves that we have learned that they utilize or have utilized.
So we believe that we are chipping away at al Qaeda. And we know that
there are reports that would indicate forces who either are fighting
along side of or with the Taliban have been attrited. And at what
level of leadership, we don't know.
But I think it's fair to say that we know that they are not free to
operate in Afghanistan at this point because we are keeping up the
pressure throughout the country. That is one of the most significant
reasons why the secretary and the chairman have articulated that we
would not stand down during the month of Ramadan and give al Qaeda the
opportunity to regroup and to continue training.
Q: Admiral?
Q: Admiral?
Stufflebeem: One last question.
Q: I'm sorry, I have three questions. (Laughter.) But in fairness --
Stufflebeem: If you'll take them one at a time, I'll --
Q: -- I'll ask them one at a time.
Stufflebeem: Okay.
Q: First of all, over the weekend there was a U.S. military personnel
rescued from Afghanistan. Can you tell us anything about that
operation, how it was conducted? Anything at all about what happened
with that?
Stufflebeem: Well, I can tell you that it was an American Special
Forces member who was working with the Northern Alliance opposition
group. He became ill, needed to be extracted to receive medical
attention. I'm not aware of his medical problems, and it could have
been related to a number of things -- altitude sickness, et cetera.
A U.S. military Special Forces helicopter, with an escort, dispatched
to retrieve him. One of those helicopters had a hard landing in the
mountainous areas, due to icy conditions brought on probably by
freezing rain. That aircraft was subsequently destroyed by U.S. forces
to prevent it from falling in the hands of being used against us
later. That crew of that helicopter was rescued by another helicopter
that was along.
In a subsequent, separate U.S. Special Forces mission helicopter went
in to retrieve the ailing member that they originally were going to
get and brought him out safely.
Q: Second question: The Seymour Hersh article in the New Yorker, which
portrayed the October 20th raid as a disaster and portrayed the Delta
Force commandos as having to beat a hasty retreat and almost getting
killed -- can you comment at all on what -- your version of events or
how that squares with the version of events that you're aware of?
Stufflebeem: Well, the version that I'm aware of are from the reports
of those forces that were involved. And we don't have nor have I seen
any reports of heavy fighting. The reports characterize light
resistance and a planned extraction, as opposed to a hasty retreat. So
the reports I've seen just don't support that article's supposition.
Q: And my last question: the video you showed us today of the B-52
strikes, in which we saw the bombs along a trench line
-- was that to illustrate that today's carpet bombing is not as
indiscriminate as that in the past? Is the point you were trying to
make with that video? Or did you have an intention?
Stufflebeem: No, I think that this was just a different perspective.
We hadn't had a fighter aircraft film a B-52 from that perspective
before. In fact, I don't think we'd had a B-52 strike recorded from
another aircraft yet -- it had all been from the coverage that we see
from on the ground -- and that being the case, that it offered a
different visual perspective, and that was the only point of being
able to show it to you.
Q: Thank you, sir.
Q: Admiral, one last one, on numbers -- Admiral, just one last --
Stufflebeem: Thank you.
(end transcript)
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