04 October 2001
Text: Wolfowitz Warns of Further Terrorist Attacks Ahead
(Defense official testifies before Senate Armed Services) (5480)
The terrorist attacks of September 11 have provided "a window into our
future" -- a future in which "adversaries will strike at our people
and our territory in previously unimaginable ways," Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz says.
Wolfowitz provided his assessment in a statement prepared for delivery
October 4 at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing nominally
called to delve into the Quadrennial Defense Review report issued by
the Defense Department four days earlier.
In fact, both Wolfowitz's opening remarks, and virtually all of the
questioning by senators, were colored by the reality of the suicide
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near
Washington, and so revolved around issues of terrorist threats and
homeland defense.
Indeed, the hearing was abbreviated to just an hour as an indirect
result of the September 11 attacks, as Wolfowitz had to leave to fill
in for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, now on a mission in the
Middle East.
Excusing Wolfowitz and his fellow witness, Air Force Lt. Gen. Bruce
Carlson of the Joint Staff, Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl
Levin (Democrat, Michigan) said the panel "will continue this hearing
in the near future."
In his prepared statement, which he submitted for the record,
Wolfowitz said the recent strikes portend a future "in which our
cities are among the battlefields and our people are among the
targets" and in which "new strategies and capabilities are needed to
ensure peace and security" as "more and more adversaries will possess
the capability to bring war to the American homeland."
Future adversaries, he warned, "may employ even bolder forms of
terrorism," possibly including "cyber attacks, advanced conventional
weapons, ballistic missiles, Cruise missiles, and nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons of mass destruction to strike at our people and
our way of life."
Urging heightened efforts to prepare for these possibilities,
Wolfowitz observed, "Our adversaries have now shown their willingness
to slaughter thousands of innocent civilians in a devastating strike.
If they had the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do
any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?"
Defense planners must be ready for surprises, Wolfowitz said.
"Military history is full of surprises. Indeed, surprise happens so
often that it's surprising we're still surprised by it," he declared.
Wolfowitz noted in his statement that, while the Quadrennial Defense
Review was largely completed before September 11, its emphasis remains
appropriate to the new situation. That emphasis, he said, is on
"establishing homeland defense as the top department priority, ...
preparing for uncertainty and surprise, ... contending with asymmetric
threats, ... developing new concepts of deterrence, ... replacing a
threat-based strategy with a capabilities-based strategy, and
balancing deliberately the four different dimensions of risk."
He explained that the capabilities-based strategy he advocated
"focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically
who the adversary might be or where a war might occur."
Expanding on what he termed the four dimensions of risk, he said that
"in addition to the operational risks associated with our ability to
execute war plans, the department must also take into account force
management, institutional, and future challenges risks in determining
how to allocate resources."
Following is the text of Wolfowitz's prepared statement.
(begin text)
Prepared Testimony: "Building a Military for the 21st Century"
To the Senate Armed Services Committee
By Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
October 4, 2001
I. INTRODUCTION
It has now been three weeks since the strikes against the Pentagon and
the World Trade Towers. Words cannot describe the horror of what the
entire world witnessed that day.
In the wake of these terrible assaults, our initial horror has given
way to a mixture of intense sadness, quiet anger, and resolute
determination: We will deal decisively with the terrorist network that
is responsible for this horror -- and those who aid and abet their
barbaric assaults on all civilized people of all religions everywhere
in the world.
But as we prepare for the battles ahead, we must recognize that these
strikes were not just an act of war -- they were a window into our
future:
A future where new enemies visit violence on us in startling ways;
A future in which our cities are among the battlefields and our people
are among the targets;
A future in which more and more adversaries will possess the
capability to bring war to the American homeland;
A future where the old methods of deterrence are no longer sufficient
-- and new strategies and capabilities are needed to ensure peace and
security.
These attacks were an assault on our people and our way of life; but
they were also a wake-up call -- one that we ignore at our peril.
We therefore have two missions before us today:
First, to prepare for a war that is already upon us -- to break the
network of terrorist states and terrorist organizations responsible
for these acts, and cripple their ability to threaten our people with
further violence.
And second, to prepare for the future -- to transform our Armed Forces
so they can defend America and her allies against the many different
and dangerous threats we will face in the 21" Century, to ensure that
we can deal with the surprise of the next decade and the decade to
come.
Both of these missions are critical and urgent:
What is at stake in the first is our lives and our way of life;
What is at stake in the second is the lives and the futures of our
children and grandchildren.
II. THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The American people breathed a sigh of relief when the Cold War ended
a decade ago.
They looked around and saw we were a superpower with no obvious
adversary capable of destroying us.
They saw democracy spreading across the globe.
They saw a powerful economic expansion creating unprecedented
prosperity.
And there was a temptation to believe that this favorable circumstance
was a permanent condition.
On September 11th, America learned that it was not.
The September 11th attacks have awakened us to a fundamental reality
the 21st Century security environment will be different from the one
we faced in the 20th Century -- but just as dangerous.
To ensure our safety and freedom in the decades ahead, we need to
understand the change that has taken place -- and the lessons it holds
for our future.
Lesson 1: Surprise is Back.
Military history is full of surprises. Indeed, surprise happens so
often that it's surprising we're still surprised by it. We ought to
expect it.
Yet during the Cold War, our security environment had an appearance of
predictability. We knew our adversary -- an expansionist empire, with
forces ready to march across Europe, surrogate armies seeking to
overthrow our allies and install puppet regimes around the world, and
a massive nuclear arsenal pointed at U.S. cities.
We understood this threat -- and developed an effective strategy to
deter and eventually to defeat it.
In the 20 Century, the threat is not nearly as clear. Until a few
weeks ago, many questioned whether there are even any threats anymore,
even though a vast array of dangerous military capabilities are
spreading into the hands of multiple potential adversaries -- many of
whom hate America and our allies and friends, wish to harm our people,
and are not afraid to strike U.S. territory in previously unimaginable
ways.
The September 11th strikes caught us by surprise. We must prepare
ourselves for the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again.
One scholar of Pearl Harbor said that the reason we surprised then was
because of "a poverty of expectations -- a routine obsession with a
few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely." It has been a
recurring problem through military history.
As we have painfully learned in recent weeks, the likely dangers of
this new century will be quite different from the seemingly familiar
dangers of the past century. Threats that were previously considered
"improbable" may in fact become the likely threats of the future.
Until three weeks ago, an attack like the one we suffered September
11th seemed unimaginable to most Americans. If we ignore other
emerging and seemingly unimaginable threats, the consequences for our
people and our way of life might be even more horrible.
We must constantly strive to perfect our intelligence, but we must
also realize that there is no such thing as perfect intelligence --
there will always be gaps in our intelligence. Adapting to surprise --
adapting quickly and decisively --must therefore be a condition of
planning.
We must not take the lesson from September 11th that terrorism is the
new, predictable threat of the 21st Century -- to do so could be a
terrible mistake and leave us exposed to different challenges in the
next decade.
Therefore we face the enormously demanding task of fighting an
extraordinarily difficult kind of war and at the same time preparing
for the future.
The next challenge we face may not be a terrorist attack at all, but
something entirely different -- it might even be a return to the past
with nation states invading their neighbors.
Future adversaries may employ even bolder forms of terrorism. These
could include cyber attacks, advanced conventional weapons, ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons of mass destruction to strike at our people and our way of
life.
The element of surprise -- and the reality of little or no warning --
must be understood as a critical feature of the security environment
America faces -- and one we must factor into our defense planning for
the decades ahead.
Lesson 2: The Era of Invulnerability is Over.
The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers were the first
assaults on U.S. territory since World War II -- and the first attack
on our capital by a foreign enemy since the War of 1812.
It is no accident that no adversary has struck our capital for 189
years. For most of our history, the United States has been blessed
with the security advantage of excellent geography -- a continental
nation with friendly neighbors and two vast ocean buffers.
To get to U.S. territory, an adversary first had to get past our Armed
Forces, who protected our shores by land, sea and air.
The arrival of the atomic age changed that. During the Cold War we
faced, for the first time, an adversary capable of visiting
destruction on our cities and our people in a matter of minutes.
The end of the Cold War did not restore our previous invulnerability
-- to the contrary, as the recent attacks on Washington and New York
demonstrate, we are witnessing a dramatic expansion of the deadly zone
of conflict to our population centers. War used to be something that
took place on foreign soil. No longer.
This threat will only grow worse in the coming years. Here is why:
The information revolution that is fueling the world economy is also
putting dangerous technologies into the hands of multiple adversaries,
many of whom despise our nation and wish to harm our people.
Along with the globalization that is creating interdependence among
the world's free economies, there is a parallel globalization of
terror, in which rogue states and terrorist organizations share
information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials and know --
how.
This technology will allow new adversaries to get past our Armed
Forces and strike our territory without having to confront and defeat
them.
As technology proliferates, with each passing year our enemies will
possess an increasing capability to bring war to the American
homeland.
What this means is that, in the 21st Century, we can no longer count
on conflicts remaining contained within their region of origin far
from our shores. It means that future wars may well include a home
front.
Lesson 3: Our Adversary Has Changed.
In addition to the spread of more powerful weapons, we will also face
new adversaries in the decades ahead -- with different motivations and
different capabilities.
Some may simply seek regional hegemony, and see the U.S. as a
roadblock to their ambitions.
Others may be motivated by hatred of America, and the traditions of
freedom and religious toleration we represent.
Our new adversaries may be, in some cases, more dangerous than those
we faced in the past.
They may not possess the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads capable
of ending life on earth that the Soviet Union did -- but they may be
more likely to use the increasingly powerful weapons in their
possession.
Their decision-making is not subject to the same constraints that
earlier adversaries faced. Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Kim
Jong Il answer to no one. They can use the capabilities at their
disposal without consultation or constraint -- and have demonstrated a
willingness to do so.
They may be less likely to be discouraged by traditional deterrence.
The threat of massive U.S. retaliation certainly did not stop the
September 11th assault on the Pentagon or the World Trade Towers. We
cannot be certain it will stop other adversaries.
What this means is we need a new approach to deterrence for the 21st
Century. What worked against the Soviet threat, may not work against
the threats we face in the decades ahead.
We are now facing enemies that are increasingly capable -- and willing
-- to bring war to the American homeland. We must find new ways to
deter them.
Lesson 4: Their Objectives Are the Same as Tyrants of the Past
The terrorist movements and totalitarian regimes of the world have a
variety of motives and goals. But the same thing unites our enemies
today, as it did in the past: a desire to see America driven into
retreat and isolation.
Usama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il and other such tyrants
all want to see America out of critical regions of the world,
constrained from coming to the aid of friends and allies, and unable
to project power in the defense of our interests and ideals.
By holding our people hostage to terror and fear, their intention is
for America to be intimidated into withdrawal and inaction -- leaving
them free to impose their will on their peoples and neighbors
unmolested by America's military might.
This is why terrorist states harbor terrorist movements like al-Qaeda
-- these groups serve their ends.
That is why our challenge today is greater than winning the war
against terrorism.
Today's terrorist threat is a precursor of even greater threats to
come.
It is no coincidence that the states harboring, financing and
otherwise assisting terrorists, are also in many cases the same states
that are aggressively working to acquire nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them.
They have learned from the Gulf War that challenging American forces
head-on doesn't work -- so they have turned increasingly to developing
asymmetric capabilities.
Along with WMD and other capabilities to threaten our homeland, they
are developing new advanced conventional capabilities -- "access
denial" weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet diesel subs,
advanced sea-mines, air defense systems and radars.
All of these capabilities serve their common objective of keeping
America out of their regions and unable to project force in the
defense of freedom.
This threat is as great as any we faced during the Cold War Peace and
freedom in the 21st Century depend on our ability to counter it at all
levels.
We must defeat the terrorist network responsible for the September
11th assaults.
But just as importantly, we need to prepare now for the emerging
threats we will face in the next decade and beyond.
Each of these tasks by themselves is an enormous challenge, but we
have the challenge of doing both at the same time.
III. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
For the past several months, the senior civilian and military leaders
of the Defense Department have been working to examine the emerging
threats we will face in the coming decades -- and develop a new
defense strategy to meet them.
The result of those efforts is the Quadrennial Defense Review, which
was sent to Congress on September 30th.
The QDR was largely completed before September 11th. Yet, in important
ways, these attacks confirm the strategic direction and planning
principles that resulted from this review, particularly its emphasis:
On establishing homeland defense as the top Department priority;
On preparing for uncertainty and surprise;
On contending with asymmetric threats;
On developing new concepts of deterrence;
On replacing a threat-based strategy with a capabilities-based
strategy; and, Balancing deliberately the four different dimensions of
risk.
The attack on the United States on September 11th will require us to
move forward more rapidly in these directions -- even while we are
engaged in the campaign against terrorism.
On September 11th, new dangers arrived sooner than expected. With the
pace of technological change today, we must expect that other new
dangers could emerge just as quickly and with just as little notice --
in the future as well.
To meet the challenges over the horizon, we must transform our Armed
Forces more rapidly, more creatively, and even more radically than we
had previously planned.
As we do so, we must recognize another fact: it is in the nature of
surprise that the surprise of the next decade is likely to be
something entirely different from the surprise we just experienced.
It is a fact of life that countries frequently prepare to fight the
last war. We spent much of the 1990s planning to re-fight the Gulf
War. As we think ahead to the year 2010 and beyond, we should not
assume that the war we will fight then will resemble the one we are
preparing to fight today.
So as we prosecute this war against terrorism today, we must at the
same time begin developing the force that will fight and win the wars
of the future.
That is goal set for us by the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Capabilities-based Approach
The strategy outlined in the QDR is built around four key goals that
will guide the development of U.S. forces and capabilities, their
deployment and use:
Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of
purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that
could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;
Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to
swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on
an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.
We cannot and will not know precisely where and when America's
interests will be threatened, or when, or even how America, its
friends and allies will come under attack.
To meet this reality and the key strategic goals and, we need to shift
the basis of defense planning from a "threat-based" model that has
dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" model for the
future.
This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might
fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where a
war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large
conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must
identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who
will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve
their objectives.
Such an approach would examine our vulnerabilities, and develop new
capabilities and new strategies to defend ourselves.
As we have painfully learned, our open borders and open societies make
it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they
live and work.
We know that our dependence on space satellites and computer
information networks make those networks attractive targets for new
forms of attack.
We know that the ease with which potential adversaries can acquire
advanced conventional weapons will present us with new challenges in
conventional war and force projection.
And we know that our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles
creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the
development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction, will give future adversaries the ability to hold our
populations hostage to terror and blackmail.
Future adversaries will likely develop new means with which to exploit
these vulnerabilities and threaten the United States.
We must develop defenses against known and emerging threats -- and
develop new approaches for detecting new threats.
Some we can identify today with confidence-ballistic and cruise
missiles; nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction; weapons of mass disruption such as information warfare
and attacks on critical information systems, capabilities to attack
and cripple our space assets. Still others may be a surprise.
Adopting a capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the
nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops
new areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to
adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new
circumstances, while experimenting with the development of new
military capabilities. In short, it requires the transformation of
U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America's
asymmetric advantages well into the future.
21st Century Deterrence
To contend with surprise and the challenge of asymmetric threats, we
also need a new approach to deterrence.
The threats we face in the 21st Century will be multifaceted -- our
deterrence strategy must be as well. Just as we intend to build
"layered defenses" to deal with missile threats at different stages,
we also need a strategy of "layered deterrence" in which we develop a
mix of capabilities -- both offensive and defensive -- which can
dissuade and deter a variety of emerging threats at different stages.
We must dissuade potential adversaries from developing dangerous
capabilities in the first place -- by developing and deploying U.S.
capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete.
For example, America's overwhelming naval power discourages potential
adversaries from investing in building competing navies to threaten
freedom of the seas because, in the end, they would spend a fortune
and not accomplish their strategic objectives.
In the same way, we must develop a broad range of new capabilities
that, by their very existence, dissuade and discourage potential
adversaries from investing in other hostile capabilities.
For example, effective space defenses could discourage adversaries
from developing new capabilities to threaten our critical assets in
space. Effective missile defense could similarly discourage potential
adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles that threaten U.S.
and allied population centers.
At the same time, we also need to strengthen the capability to deter
future adversaries from aggression and coercion, by increasing the
capability of our forward-deployed forces and global striking power to
respond rapidly to threats.
And we must maintain the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose
severe penalties for aggression in critical regions. To do this, we
will need forces and capabilities that give the President an even
wider range of military options.
Implementing such a multi-layered deterrence strategy requires that we
improve our intelligence capabilities, our capability for
long-distance force projection, and our capability to integrate our
joint forces, and that we maintain a credible offensive nuclear
deterrent.
It also requires a transformation of our forces.
Transformation
Transformation is about more than our technology; it is about
innovative concepts of operating and configuring our forces,
adjustments in how we train and base our people and materiel, and how
we conduct business day to day.
The goal of transformation is to maintain a substantial advantage over
any potential adversaries in key areas such as information warfare,
power projection, space and intelligence.
A transformed force must be able to:
Protect critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad,
allies, and friends) and defeat NBC weapons and means of delivery;
Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant "access-denial"
environments;
Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective
information operations;
Provide persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement with
high-volume precision strike, through a combination of complimentary
air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets
at various ranges, and in all weather and terrain;
Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems and
supporting infrastructure; and
Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop
effective joint operational capabilities.
If we can do this, we can reduce our own chances of being surprised,
and increase our ability to create our own surprises, if we choose. A
stealthy F-117 over Baghdad is one example of the nexus of
intelligence, technology and planning-they didn't know we were there
until the bombs started to explode. We must enhance our ability to
create such surprises in the future, although how we do so may require
fundamental shifts in the systems we use.
As we do so, our ability to conduct effective joint operations becomes
even more critical than before. Successful future operations will
require a flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control
architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain and
protect American forces across the battlefield.
The Department will examine options for creating standing joint task
forces that will develop new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric
military advantages, and will aim at achieving more rapid and more
effective military responses.
We will identify the capabilities U.S. military forces will need to
deter or defeat adversaries likely to rely on surprise, deception and
asymmetric warfare. We will emphasize developing new concepts of
operations to address challenges posed by mobile targets and weapons
of mass destruction; integrating long-range strike aircraft with
troops on the ground; and putting key intelligence into the hands of
decision makers and warfighters far more quickly than in past
engagements.
New Force Sizing Construct
If we are to contribute to peace and security, we must also determine
how U.S. forces should best be sized and arranged to meet the
challenges of the new century.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has relied on a formula
known as the "two Major Theater War" approach to size our forces. As
the civilian and military leaders of the Department reviewed this
approach, we concluded that it had several shortcomings:
It did not specifically address the full range of threats to the U.S.
homeland.
It did not account for demands placed on our forces by small-scale
contingencies.
It placed excessive emphasis on preparations for decisively defeating
adversaries after war broke out, rather than bolstering capabilities
and forces to deter adversaries from challenging the U.S. in the first
instance, and
It over-optimized U.S. forces for two specific regional conflicts, at
the expense of preparations for other contingencies and future
challenges.
In the QDR, we are proposing a new, more comprehensive approach. U.S.
forces will maintain the capability to:
Defend the American homeland.
Deter conflicts in four critical areas of the world, by demonstrating
the ability to defeat enemy attacks, and do so far more swiftly than
in the past or even today.
Defeat aggressors in overlapping timeframes in any two of those four
areas.
At the direction of the President, decisively defeat one of these two
adversaries to include invading and occupying enemy territory.
Decisively impose our will on any one aggressor of our choosing.
Conduct a limited number of contingencies short of war in peacetime
without excessive stress on our men and women in uniform.
The approach we are proposing will give the U.S. sufficient forces to
prevail in two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Where it differs from
the previous sizing construct is that in one conflict, we will have
sufficient force to occupy the adversary's capital and replace the
regime, while in the other, our forces will be sufficient to prevail
over enemy forces and repel an act of aggression -- much as we did in
the Persian Gulf War-but without marching on, and occupying the
capital.
Since neither aggressor would know in which conflict the President
might choose to occupy a capital -- and where we might choose to
simply repel and defeat an act of aggression -- the prospect of a
total defeat would remain as a strong deterrent.
But because the U.S. will not require a second occupation force, this
approach will free up resources for other critical priorities.
This shift is not simply a matter of cost savings. Even with the
current consensus for increased defense spending, we still should not
waste the taxpayers' dollars to prepare for wars we will not fight in
the 21st Century. The goal is to permit us to better balance near-term
risks with the long-term challenges of preparing for the new kinds of
war we may fight, and new adversaries we may face, in 2010 and beyond.
The Four Dimensions of Risk
The Quadrennial Defense Review has also identified a new approach to
assessing and managing risk.
In recent years, the Department has defined risk narrowly in terms of
war plans, without sufficient emphasis on other dimensions of risk --
to people, modernization and transformation.
After the end of the Cold War, the size of the force was reduced by
some 40%. But at the same time, our men and women in uniform were
asked to take on more and more new missions -- that did not fall
within the two major theater war construct.
This put enormous stress on our Armed Forces. They saluted smartly,
and did their best. But to accomplish the new missions they were
assigned, while at the same time being prepared to meet the
requirements of the two-war approach, they put off investments in
critical areas. This exacerbated the effect of the mismatch between
strategy and resources.
The effect was to crowd out critical investments in modernization,
maintenance, infrastructure, and procurement of new ships, aircraft
and armored vehicles; in the transformational R&D necessary to field
new 21st Century capabilities; in personnel funds for pay, housing,
and healthcare -- while our forces were deployed all across the globe.
It is important, as we try to close the gap between strategy and
resources that we invest the new resources in a balanced way to
address the different dimensions of risk.
We intend to change this. Henceforth, in addition to the operational
risks associated with our ability to execute war plans, the Department
must also take into account the force management, institutional and
future challenges risks in determining how to allocate resources.
Resources
Finally, the loss of life and damage to our economy from the attack of
September 11, 2001 should give us a new perspective on the question of
what this country can afford for its defense.
Last week in Brussels, I told our allies that this assault is a wakeup
call for us all about the importance of investing adequately and
providing for security.
To think we can't afford what we need to deter the adversaries of
tomorrow and underpin our prosperity, and by extension, peace and
stability around the globe, is simply wrong. These costs do not begin
to compare with the cost in dollars and human lives if we fail to do
so.
Secretary Rumsfeld has often talked about the situation in 1950, when
General Omar Bradley urged President Truman to spend at least $18
billion on defense. The Joint Chiefs gave an even higher estimate at
$23 billion, and the services' estimate was higher still at $30
billion. But the President and Congress said we couldn't afford that
much$15 billion was as much as we could afford.
Six months later, we were suddenly in a war in Korea, and we could
afford $48
billion just fine.
Today, sadly, we're experiencing what Yogi Berra called "deja' vu all
over again."
The U.S. Armed Forces underpin our nation's prosperity and way of
life. We don't get our "peace dividend" by short-changing them. We get
it from the peace, security and prosperity they make possible.
This nation can afford to spend what is needed to deter the
adversaries of tomorrow and for underpin our prosperity.
IV. CONCLUSION
If we are to preserve our ability to defend freedom in the 21S`
Century, we must prepare now for a world in which future adversaries
will strike at our people and our territory in previously unimaginable
ways.
We must take the assaults in New York and Washington as a warning to
the even more unfathomable dangers that lay ahead.
Our adversaries have now shown their willingness to slaughter
thousands of innocent civilians in a devastating strike. If they had
the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do any of us
believe they would hesitate to do so?
What a tragedy it would be if we let our preparations for the future
be numbered among the casualties of September 11th.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
