03 October 2001
Text: State Dept. Official Sees Heightened Efforts on Nuclear Security
(Stratford outlines IAEA role to congressional panel) (2850)
The Bush administration is considering whether to shift priorities in
U.S. support of the International Atomic Energy Agency so as to
enhance the IAEA's efforts toward improving the security of nuclear
materials and facilities, a State Department nonproliferation official
says.
Richard Stratford, acting deputy assistant secretary of state for
nonproliferation, told the House Committee on International Relations'
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights October 3
that the review is being conducted in response to the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington targets September 11.
"With our support and the support of its other member states, there is
much the IAEA can do within its mandate to help in the fight against
the scourge of terrorism," Stratford told the panel.
Stratford's testimony outlined the IAEA's role in physical protection
of nuclear material and facilities, prevention of illicit trafficking
in nuclear material, developing safeguards against diversion of
nuclear materials from peaceful programs to weapons, and promoting the
safety of nuclear facilities.
Following is the prepared text of Stratford's opening statement to the
subcommittee:
(begin text)
The Role of the IAEA in Safeguarding Against Acts of Terrorism
Statement of
Richard J. K. Stratford
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Nonproliferation
Subcommittee on International Operations & Human Rights
House Committee on international Relations
October 3, 2001
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the activities of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protecting against
acts of terrorism. In the wake of the tragic events of September 11,
the international community is looking to strengthen all activities
that enhance our protection against terrorist attacks. Many nations
recognize that the IAEA has an important role to play in this area.
The IAEA's special expertise lies in dealing with nuclear and other
radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities.
During the IAEA's annual meeting of Member States, which concluded on
September 21, the Director General of the IAEA said that the
international community cannot be complacent. It must increase its
efforts in countering terrorism and in combating illicit trafficking
or smuggling of nuclear materials. IAEA Member States agreed there is
an urgent need to examine the IAEA's work in these and related areas.
This effort has already begun, with particular attention to nuclear
material and facility security, nuclear facility safety, and improved
management of radioactive sources. Careful consideration is also being
given to expanding and improving current activities or possibly
initiating new activities to respond to the threat of nuclear
terrorism.
Concern regarding terrorism is factored into several IAEA programs,
These include four broad categories: (1) promoting physical security
and protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and other radioactive
materials; (2) inhibiting the smuggling of nuclear material; (3)
safeguarding nuclear material against diversion to nuclear weapons;
and (4) promoting nuclear safety.
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities
The security and physical protection of nuclear material refers to the
need to ensure that nuclear material within a State's jurisdiction is
consistently and reliably used and stored safely and securely, and
that nuclear material and nuclear facilities within a State's
jurisdiction are protected from sabotage. This is primarily a national
responsibility. However, the IAEA provides important assistance to
States in several ways. To improve the effectiveness of physical
protection worldwide, the IAEA provides assistance to national regimes
at both the nuclear facility and state levels.
The IAEA has published internationally accepted recommendations for
the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities,
and provides assistance to its members in improving their legal and
regulatory frameworks governing the physical security of nuclear and
other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities. A cornerstone of
the IAEA's work in this area is its publication of international
recommendations in "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities," also known as INFCIRC/225. First issued in 1972
and updated periodically to reflect the best in contemporary practice,
INFCIRC/225 is now in its 4th revision. While not legally binding on
States, the recommendations in INFCIRC/225 provide expert guidance
concerning the objectives and elements of a national system of
physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They
address how to assign nuclear activities to physical protection
categories as well as the requirements for physical protection of
nuclear material in use and storage. They also address protecting
nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage and the requirements for
physical protection of nuclear material in transit.
A second key document is the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material. This Convention was negotiated under IAEA auspices
in the late 1970s and entered into force in 1987. It establishes
specific obligations on States Parties for the physical protection of
nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in international transport
and storage incidental to such transport. The Convention obligates its
parties to make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of
physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material
and promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical
protection information. The Convention also obligates States Parties
to cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear
material. It requires States to establish as criminal offenses the
misuse and threats of misuse of nuclear materials to harm the public
and to prosecute or extradite for prosecution those accused of
committing such offenses.
At the time the Convention was negotiated, some countries were
unwilling to agree to requirements concerning domestic physical
protection, in spite of strong arguments by the United States and
other governments. Since 1998, we have urged consideration of
expanding the scope of the Convention. In particular, we seek to
extend the Convention to cover the physical protection of nuclear
material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage and
transport and for physical protection to prevent sabotage of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
Thanks to the efforts of Director General ElBaradei, experts from IAEA
Members States have been considering how the Convention might be
amended. In May 2001, they provided their recommendations to the
Director General, who will convene an open-ended drafting group of
legal and technical experts in December 2001 to prepare a Convention
revision proposal based on those recommendations. International
concern over the increase in illicit trafficking in nuclear material
in the early 1990s has created a more receptive climate for amending
the Convention. The horrific events of September 11 have imparted an
even greater sense of urgency. If the revision effort succeeds, it
would significantly strengthen international norms in this area.
In addition to facilitating the establishment of standards of physical
protection and acting as a depositary for the Physical Protection
Convention, the IAEA supports training to assist its members in
establishing and maintaining effective national systems of physical
protection. My colleague from the Department of Energy will give you
more details about the work of the IAEA in this area and U.S. support
to those programs.
We have worked with the IAEA for several years on a small program to
deal with the problem of "orphan sources." Orphan sources are
radioactive sources used in many different ways, including medical,
industrial, research, or non-weapons military applications. They have
either never been subject to regulatory control or have fallen out of
this control because they have been misplaced, lost, or stolen. Since
the demise of the Soviet Union, substantial numbers of radioactive
sources and other radioactive materials have been misplaced and/or
improperly stored in NIS countries. These sources and materials are
not usable in making a nuclear explosive, but their radioactivity can
raise serious human health and safety concerns. The Administration is
reviewing the IAEA efforts to encourage Member States to find and
secure orphan sources, with the possibility of building on the
existing IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources.
Prevention of Illicit Trafficking
Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material became a major
international concern during the early 1990s, following sharp rises in
the number of confirmed cases. Since 1993, States have reported to the
IAEA 11 trafficking cases involving highly enriched uranium, four of
which were in quantities of a kilogram or more. States have reported
12 cases involving plutonium, one with almost 300 grams. The other
cases involved much smaller quantities. While the total quantities
involved to date are insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive
device, the fact that there are any such materials in illicit commerce
requires prompt and effective action.
Illicit trafficking is complex in nature, involving many different
types of materials, facilities, individuals, groups and States.
Combating illicit trafficking effectively involves numerous State
authorities, including those with responsibility for law enforcement,
security, and responding to radiological emergencies. It also requires
coordination with such international organizations as the World
Customs organization and Interpol.
In 1994, IAEA Members States called on the Agency to "take all
necessary measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear
material." This call emphasized that national governments and
authorities must take the main responsibility for preventing illicit
trafficking, but it also asked the IAEA to intensify its support to
States in combating illicit trafficking. In response, the IAEA
increased its activities in this area in coordination with other
cognizant authorities. One primary area in which IAEA assistance has
been of great benefit is in tracking trafficking information and
coordinating access to this information for Member States and other
international organizations.
Since 1992, the IAEA has tracked cases of illicit trafficking in
nuclear material and analyzed them for patterns and trends. In 1995,
the IAEA created an illicit Trafficking Database Program, inviting all
its members to participate. Today there are sixty-nine participants.
These States account for a very large part of the global nuclear
industry, covering uranium yellowcake production, conversion, fuel
fabrication, power and research reactors, enrichment, reprocessing,
waste and various nuclear research installations. Participating States
submit details regarding each illicit trafficking case, using an
Incident Notification Form to ensure reporting in sufficient detail
and with sufficient uniformity for trend and pattern analyses.
The United States has been a strong supporter of the Illicit
Trafficking Database Program, particularly with respect to the design
of the database and analysis of the cases. Currently, a U.S. expert at
IAEA headquarters is providing full-time support to the program.
In addition to information provided by participant States, the IAEA
also cooperates with other international organizations on illicit
trafficking matters, including on relevant databases and information
exchange. The IAEA works closely with other international
organizations with responsibilities or interest in combating illicit
trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. A Memorandum
of Understanding serves as the basis for the IAEA's coordination with
the World Customs Organization. An Inter-Agency Coordination Committee
on the illicit Cross-Border Movements of Nuclear Materials and Other
Radioactive Sources meets on an annual basis to exchange information
and plan joint activities. An agreement is being prepared with
Interpol that would permit information sharing with the IAEA.
To provide assistance to its members, the IAEA has initiated a
program, together with the World Customs Organization and Interpol, to
train law enforcement officers in detection and response to illicit
trafficking. In response to States' requests, the IAEA is also
implementing a research program to promote the development of improved
detection and response methodologies and technologies.
In May 2001, the IAEA, the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and
the European Police Office organized an international conference
entitled: "Measures to Detect, Intercept, and Respond to the Illicit
Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources." The Conference was
hosted by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in Stockholm. It was
attended by governmental officials and facility operators from around
the world. During the Conference, there was a broad exchange of
information on technical systems and programs focused on reducing
illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and the associated
proliferation threat and radiation risk.
Safeguards
One of the IAEA's primary responsibilities -- safeguards -- is
verifying that States do not divert nuclear materials in peaceful
programs for use in nuclear weapons or any other unauthorized purpose.
While IAEA safeguards activities are not the focus of this hearing,
they do play an important supporting role in reducing the risk that
terrorists could acquire nuclear material without detection.
Non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enter into comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment
of their obligations not to divert any nuclear material under their
control to nuclear explosive purposes. The IAEA also performs
inspections in the five recognized nuclear weapons States and in
non-NPT-signatory countries such as India and Pakistan, but they are
not comprehensive in nature.
The application of IAEA safeguards in NPT non-nuclear weapon States
requires that the State establish a national system for accounting and
inspection of all nuclear material under the control of the State. The
State is required to provide a domestic system to account accurately
for all nuclear material within its borders and to conduct periodic
inventories that are verified by IAEA inspectors. The system is not
designed to prevent theft or diversion -- that is the role of physical
protection -- but to deter such an action by facilitating early
detection. This system can help a State account for all its nuclear
material and to serve as a "burglar alarm" against a terrorist. A
well-designed system will also help to pinpoint the origin of missing
material, identify individuals that had access to it, and facilitate
recovery of the material. IAEA safeguards can also help to deter a
State from colluding with terrorists by diverting nuclear material
from the State's national program to terrorist use.
Until the Persian Gulf War, States insisted that IAEA safeguards be
applied solely to nuclear material "declared" by a State to the IAEA.
IAEA inspectors were limited to conducting safeguards inspections in
locations previously agreed to by a State and the Agency. Following
the Gulf War, revelations of Iraq's covert nuclear activities led to
concerted efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
Over the past decade, the United States has led these efforts to
expand the scope of safeguards to allow the IAEA to detect
"undeclared" or secret nuclear activities. A variety of new safeguards
measures and techniques have been developed. To provide the necessary
legal basis for a State to accept new safeguards measures, a new legal
document known as the "Model Additional Protocol" has been negotiated.
States party to NPT safeguards agreements are now beginning to accept
this new approach by negotiating their own Protocols based on the
Model agreement. Once widely implemented, these protocols will
substantially increase the information available to the IAEA regarding
States' nuclear activities and provide expanded access for the IAEA to
States' nuclear programs. The Administration, with the support of
Congress, will exert its efforts to encourage widespread acceptance of
this Additional Protocol and to ensure that other steps are taken as
necessary to strengthen the safeguards system.
Nuclear Facility Safety
The IAEA plays an essential role in addressing nuclear safety at
nuclear facilities worldwide. This is accomplished by the development
of safety standards, the facilitation of technical meetings, and the
provision of education, training and safety services. In addition, the
Agency acts as a depositary for several international conventions
related to the safety of nuclear installations including the
Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management.
These Agency programs help to ensure that nuclear facilities are less
vulnerable to terrorist activities. One of the most valuable services
offered by the Agency includes safety reviews provided under IAEA
direction at the request of Member States. These reviews are performed
by teams of experts who assess national programs according to a
variety of Agency safety standards.
Closing Remarks
There are an impressive number of IAEA programs that are particularly
important in protecting nuclear material and facilities against acts
of terrorism. These include developing and promulgating international
standards and guidelines related to nuclear safety and physical
protection, providing training and assembling teams of experts at the
request of Member States to assess their national programs, and
developing the standards that, if followed, will make nuclear
facilities less vulnerable to sabotage. The IAEA's work with other
organizations to combat illicit trafficking is of key importance in
forestalling nuclear terrorism, as is the role of international
safeguards in fostering nuclear security.
In the wake of the tragedy on September 11, we are all seeking to
strengthen ways to counter and eradicate terrorism. As part of this
effort, the Administration will be reviewing U.S. support of IAEA
activities to determine whether our priorities should be revised to
enhance the IAEA's efforts related to the security of nuclear
materials and facilities. The IAEA is an organization known
internationally for its competence and effectiveness. With our support
and the support of its other Member States, there is much the IAEA can
do within its mandate to help in the fight against the scourge of
terrorism.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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