03 October 2001
Title: DEA Administrator Testifies on Taliban and Drug Trafficking
(Hutchison says Taliban has institutionalized drug trade)(4040)
The head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Asa
Hutchinson, said October 3 that drug trafficking is the primary source
of income for Afghanistan and its ruling Taliban militia.
Hutchinson said Afghanistan produced more than 70 percent of the
world's supply of illicit opium in 2000, with most of that output
being shipped to Europe.
He said that DEA intelligence-gathering confirms a relationship
between the Taliban and suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden and the al
Qaeda terrorist organization. "The relationship between the Taliban
and bin Laden is believed to have flourished in large part due to the
Taliban's substantial reliance on the opium trade as a source of
organizational revenue. While the activities of the two entities do
not always follow the same trajectory, we know that drugs and terror
frequently share the common ground of geography, money and violence."
Hutchinson's testimony came at a congressional committee hearing on
the connection between drug trafficking and international terrorist
organizations. While the connections between these two activities have
been a mounting concern for international law enforcement
organizations in recent years, the issue has taken on greater
significance in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on
the United States.
Hutchinson said the Taliban, which controls 90 percent of Afghan
territory, has institutionalized its involvement in the drug trade
through taxation of opium poppy production. The ruling militia group
issued a decree last year banning poppy cultivation, but Hutchinson
said opium availability has not declined and the price has increased.
He deduces from these trends that the Taliban is controlling a hoarded
supply of opium in order to drive up the price while it acts at the
same time to respond to international pressure to crack down on the
illicit drug trade.
Following is Hutchinson's testimony as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Remarks by Asa Hutchinson
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Regarding "Drug Trade and the Terror Network"
October 3, 2001
Note: This is prepared text and may not reflect changes in actual
delivery
Executive Summary
DEA employs a global approach to attacking drug organizations that
fuel the terror network. In 2000, Afghanistan produced 70 percent of
the world's opium supply and 80 percent of the opiate products
destined for Europe. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the
terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a tracker-driven
economy that lacks even a recognized national government.
DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between
Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin
Laden. Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden
is involved in the drug trade, the sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is
based on the Taliban's support for the drug trade, which is a primary
source of income in Afghanistan. Credible DEA source information
indicates ties between the Taliban and the drug trade. The Taliban
directly taxes and derives financial benefits from the opium trade.
They even provide receipts for their collected drug revenues.
In 2001, Afghanistan produced approximately 74 metric tons of opium, a
substantial reduction from the 3, 656 metric tons produced in 2000.
Despite this significant decrease and the Taliban's claims of lab
destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability, and no
increase in the price of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States
and European consumer countries. This indicates that significant
amounts of opiates still remain available. According to the United
Nations, up to 60% of Afghanistan's opium crop is stored for future
sales. Since the Taliban's opium ban of July 2000, the kilogram price
of opium has skyrocketed from US 844 to over US 8400. This price
increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not
resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the
Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which
they exercise nearly total control.
DEA will continue to aggressively identify and build cases against
drug trafficking organizations contributing to global terrorism. In
doing so, we will limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their
destructive goods as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on
humanity and the rule of law.
Chairman Souder and Ranking Member Cummings, it is a pleasure for me
to appear before you and the other members of this Subcommittee for
the first time in my capacity as the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). I know that all of DEA deeply
appreciates this Subcommittee's leadership and support in our fight
against international drug trafficking, and I look forward to
continuing our very successful and productive relationship.
I appear before you today to testify on the connection between
international drug trafficking and terrorism. As the tragic events in
New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. so horrifyingly
demonstrate, terrorist violence is indeed a threat to the very
national security of the United States. Accordingly, the degree to
which profits from the drug trade are directed to finance terrorist
activities, as well as the extent to which both types of organizations
rely upon the same money laundering and smuggling facilitators or
systems, is of paramount concern to the DEA.
DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug trafficking
organizations that operate around the world, supplying drugs to
American communities, employing thousands of individuals to transport
and distribute drugs. Some of these groups have never hesitated to use
violence and terror to advance their interests, all to the detriment
of law-abiding citizens. We see in these groups today a merger of
international organized crime, drugs, and terror. While DEA does not
specifically target terrorists, per se, we can and will target and
track down drug traffickers involved in terrorist acts, wherever in
the world we can find them.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA aims to gather evidence sufficient to
arrest, indict, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign
posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of
course within the structures of the U.S. legal system, in cooperation
with our host nation police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be
usable in a court of law, and it must withstand intense scrutiny at
every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my
testimony will be limited to presenting DEA's view from a law
enforcement perspective of the threats resulting from drug trafficking
and terrorism. DEA's interest in terrorism and insurgencies is based
on three considerations: National Security, Force Protection, and
Foreign Intelligence.
-- National Security -- DEA views information on potential acts of
terrorism directed against United States interests as a matter of the
highest importance for national security and will naturally share any
such information with the appropriate officials and agencies. Clearly,
international criminal organizations smuggling drugs into the United
States pose a threat to national security. International drug
trafficking that threatens to undermine governments friendly to the
United States, or countries that have strategic interest to the United
States, is also a matter of national security concern.
-- Force Protection -- DEA's need to protect our own personnel, both
domestically and abroad, is crucial to the successful implementation
of DEA operations. In particular, DEA must be constantly vigilant for
any developing situations that could lead to threats to DEA operations
or personnel, or to our foreign counterparts with whom we conduct
combined operations. DEA's interest in force protection from potential
terrorists or guerilla action is most acutely focused on those
instances when we are participating in operations against concrete,
specific counterdrug targets. We do not participate in operations
designed to exert control over a general area unless there is a
specific counterdrug focus.
-- Foreign Intelligence -- DEA maintains 400 personnel in 56 countries
to support its worldwide investigations and cooperative efforts. As a
law enforcement agency, DEA does not have a counter-terrorism or
counter-insurgency mission. However, when DEA does acquire relevant
information from its active drug investigations and drug intelligence
collection programs, we share that information with the appropriate
U.S. agencies -- ones that do have counter-terrorism responsibilities.
DEA passes specific threat information on to the FBI in domestic cases
and to the foreign intelligence community in overseas cases.
Given our mission responsibilities, DEA remains fully engaged in
participating, with the rest of the U.S. Government, in understanding
the connection between drugs and terrorism. DEA brings useful
information to the table for the use of other agencies, and benefits
from the expertise of our counterparts.
The recent attacks perpetrated on our Nation graphically illustrate
the need to starve the financial base of every terrorist organization
and deprive them of the drug proceeds that might otherwise be used to
fund acts of terror. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the
terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a trafficker-driven
economy that lacks even a recognized national government.
Sadly, the profits of the drug trade help fund this chaos and
perpetuate human suffering. The cells of terrorists are dispersed
beyond the geographic boundaries of Afghanistan, much in the same
manner as other international narcotics syndicates. Accordingly, DEA's
approach to both the drug trade and the terror network must be equally
global in scope.
Afghanistan, The Taliban, and Osama bin Ladin
The DEA has not maintained a presence in Afghanistan since January
1980, when the office was closed for security reasons as a result of
the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Following the withdrawal of
Soviet troops 10 years later, civil strife has ensued in Afghanistan.
Consequently, DEA covers Afghanistan from its two offices in Pakistan:
The Islamabad Country Office and the Peshawar Resident Office. In
addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the DEA Islamabad Country Office
also includes in its area of responsibility Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between
Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin
Laden. The al Qaida organization, which is recognized as a terrorist
entity by the U.S. Department of State, is openly led by Bin Laden.
Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is
involved in the drug trade, the relationship between the Taliban and
Bin Laden is believed to have flourished in large part due to the
Taliban's substantial reliance on the opium trade as a source of
organizational revenue. While the activities of the two entities do
not always follow the same trajectory, we know that drugs and terror
frequently share the common ground of geography, money, and violence.
In this respect, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on
the existence of the Taliban's support for the drug trade. This
connection defines the deadly, symbiotic relationship between the
illicit drug trade and international terrorism.
The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the
cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis
products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world's supply
of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced
in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Due to the warfare-induced
decimation of the country's economic infrastructure, narcotics are the
primary source of income in Afghanistan, a country dependent on
agricultural production where opium is the most profitable cash crop.
As the country is landlocked, drug traffickers must rely on land
routes to move morphine base and heroin out of the country. Opiates
are consumed regionally, as well as smuggled to consumers in the west.
It is estimated that 80 percent of opiate products in Europe originate
in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
but the Taliban does not implement the country's international
obligations.
The Taliban is not recognized as the national government in
Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of
the country. In addition, intelligence indicates that corruption is
widespread within the Taliban, and among the senior leadership. Even
if the current political attitude in Afghanistan should change, little
or no enforcement activity can be expected in the future, since the
Taliban authorities lack the political will to interdict and
investigate.
The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group enforcing a rigid social
code, now controls roughly over 90 percent of Afghanistan, while a
loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern
Alliance) maintains control of portions of northeast and central
Afghanistan.
DEA possesses credible source information indicating ties between the
drug trade and the Taliban. Current indicators suggest that the
Taliban derives a significant amount of income from the opiate trade.
Acting as the defacto government of Afghanistan, the Taliban taxes all
aspects of the opium trade. DEA intelligence reveals that taxation is
institutionalized, but not standardized. It is even institutionalized
to the point that the Taliban provides receipts for collected
revenues. While the current tax rate for cultivated opium appears to
be ten percent, processing and transportation of the product is
sporadic and taxed at varying rates.
According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001,
Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685
hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant
decrease from the 3,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510
hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.
The Taliban reportedly banned the cultivation of cannabis in October
1996, and in late 1997, banned opium poppy cultivation. In 1999, the
Taliban decreed that opium poppy cultivation would be reduced by
one-third in 1999-2000. However, as illustrated by the chart above,
there have been steady increases in opium production between 1996 and
2000. The Taliban did report that opium poppies were destroyed in
Qandahar and Helmand Provinces. This eradication effort was apparently
in response to an agreement with the United Nations Drug Control
Program (UNDCP), which agreed to fund alternative development projects
on the condition that cultivation be reduced in Qandahar. In fact,
there was a 50 percent reduction in the three UNDCP target districts
in Qandahar, but there was not a one-third reduction overall, as
promised by the Taliban.
Taliban officials claim to have destroyed a large number of heroin
processing labs in Nangarhar Province in the spring of 1999. However,
reports suggest that heroin processing continues in Nangarhar.
Laboratories are located throughout Afghanistan, with a significant
number of conversion laboratories located in Helmand Province. Taliban
officials also reportedly destroyed two heroin conversion laboratories
in Helmand Province in October 2000.
On July 28, 2000, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, recognizing the
importance of world opinion, issued a decree banning future opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The decree states that the Taliban
will eradicate any poppy cultivation found in the 2001 growing season
in areas under their control. Reportedly, this ban applies to any
territory seized from the Northern Alliance. In February 2001, the
UNDCP declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and
that the 2001 crop was expected to be negligible. This marks the first
real effort by the Taliban to reduce opium production. According to
press reports dated August 31, 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar
extended the opium poppy cultivation ban for another year, to the
2001-2002 growing season.
The Empty Promises of the Taliban:
Despite the Taliban's claims of opium eradication and lab destruction,
DEA has seen no decrease in the amount of Southwest Asian Heroin
availability and no increase in prices in the United States and
European consumer countries. This suggests that significant amounts of
opiates remain available. According to UNDCP reporting, up to 60% of
each year's opium crop has traditionally been stored for future sale,
suggesting that significant amounts of opium are still available.
Prior to the imposed ban in July 2000, the price of a kilo of opium
was US $44. Until recently, prices of opium ranged from US $350 to
$400 per kilo. The price increase, which was limited to the immediate
region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a
means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a
commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.
The Taliban maintains effective control of nearly all of the opium
poppy growing areas in the country, even though they are not
internationally recognized as the official Government of Afghanistan,
and do not control the entire country. Islamic law (Shari'a) has been
imposed in territory controlled by the Taliban, and local Shari'a
courts have been established throughout the country. In 1997, the
Taliban re-activated the State High Commission for Drug Control, which
was originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim
government. Prior to the UNDCP reports indicating that implementation
of the 2000-2001 opium poppy cultivation ban has been effective and
the release of the U.S. Government estimate indicating a dramatic
reduction in opium production, the Taliban made only token gestures
toward anti-drug law enforcement. As a result, Afghanistan, under the
Taliban, has during the past decade emerged as a vital hub of the
Southwest Asian illicit drug trade.
Heroin Processing:
Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white
heroin, or one of three grades of brown heroin, depending on the order
received. Large processing labs are located in southern Afghanistan.
Smaller laboratories are located in other areas of Afghanistan,
including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing
laboratories were located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP). These laboratories appear to have relocated
to Afghanistan, both to be closer to the source of opium and to avoid
law enforcement actions by the Government of Pakistan.
Heroin is trafficked to worldwide destinations by many routes.
Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smuggling routes based on political
and weather-related events. Reports of heroin shipments north from
Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased.
Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium and heroin
shipments, although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and
storage location rather than a final destination. While some of the
heroin is used in Russia, some also transits Russia to other consumer
markets. Heroin transits India en route to international markets.
Heroin also continues to be trafficked from Afghanistan through
Pakistan. Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistan's international
airports. Heroin is also smuggled by sea on vessels leaving the port
city of Karachi, Pakistan. Heroin produced in Afghanistan continues to
be trafficked to the United States, although generally in small
quantities.
Morphine Base:
Morphine base is usually produced for traffickers based in Turkey. The
morphine base is then shipped to Turkey, where it is converted to
heroin prior to shipment to European and North American markets. The
primary market for Afghan morphine base is traffickers based in
Turkey. Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and
Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey.
Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base are also sent by sea from
Pakistan's Makran Coast. Routes north through the Central Asia
Republics, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey are also
used.
Cannabis:
Cannabis, or marijuana, grows wild and is also cultivated in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a major producer of cannabis, much of
which is processed into hashish. According to INTERPOL, Afghanistan
and Pakistan together produce about 1000 MT of cannabis resin each
year, with Afghanistan producing the bulk of the product.
Hashish:
Hashish originating in Afghanistan is trafficked throughout the
region, as well as to international markets. Although the bulk of the
hashish intended for international markets is routed through Pakistan
and Central Asia and sent by sea, train or truck, hashish has also
been smuggled in air freight in the past.
Precursor Chemicals:
Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals. Acetic
anhydride (AA), which is the most commonly used acetylating agent in
heroin processing, is smuggled primarily from Pakistan, India, the
Central Asian Republics, China, and Europe. For example, according to
the World Customs Organization, China seized 5,670 metric tons of AA
destined for Afghanistan in April 2000. The AA was reportedly found in
240 plastic boxes concealed in carpets.
Drug-Related Money Laundering:
As the unsophisticated banking system that previously existed in
Afghanistan has been damaged by years of war, money laundering
activity is completely unregulated. It is likely that the informal
banking system used extensively in the region, usually referred to as
the hawala or hundi system, is also used by drug traffickers. This
system is an underground, traditional, informal network that has been
used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia. This
system provides a confidential, convenient, efficient service at a low
cost in areas that are not served by traditional banking facilities.
The hawala or hundi system leaves no "paper trail" for investigators
to follow.
Prices:
The cost for raw opium, heroin, hashish and precursor chemicals have
traditionally been relatively low in Afghanistan. As stated earlier,
the initiation of the Taliban's opium cultivation ban in July 2000 has
prompted a nearly ten-fold increase in the kilogram price of opium.
The price of heroin in Afghanistan also increased dramatically during
the same time period, from US $579 in July 2000 to $4564 in August
2001.
According to DEA sources, however, the regional price of a kilogram of
opium was as high as US $746 on September 11, 2001. In the wake of the
recent mass exodus from Afghanistan, opium wholesalers were reportedly
dumping their stocks of opium for as low as US $95 per kilogram,
apparently in anticipation of military intervention in the region.
Key Observations:
-- At this point, drug trafficking in the Golden Crescent appears to
be heavily dependent on the Taliban. Although they have reportedly now
banned opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban have long relied on drug
trafficking for financial support to prosecute the war in Afghanistan.
-- In order to gain international recognition as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan, the Taliban must make a convincing effort
to halt drug trafficking activities. Roadblocks to international
support for the Taliban remain even if the opium ban is proved
successful, due to concern about harsh treatment of women, human
rights abuses, and, of course, support for extremist organizations.
-- Opium production may resume if the Taliban believe that the
international response to their opium ban is inadequate, domestic
circumstances necessitate the need for additional revenues, or
domestic unrest against the poppy ban persuades the Taliban to relent
on eradication efforts.
-- Recent press accounts report that the Taliban has threatened to
lift the ban on opium cultivation in the event that Afghanistan is
subjected to military action by the United States.
Drug Traffickers and Terrorists: The Need for Perpetual Vigilance
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build
cases against the leaders of criminal groups involved in drug
trafficking and terrorism wherever they may be found. These criminals
have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from
positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than
their predecessors. As they have not refrained from using violence to
protect their interests, the partnership of the drug trade and the
terror network will necessitate our perpetual vigilance against the
threats that they present.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and
arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In
particular, we continue to work with our partners around the world to
improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling,
and to cut off drug money as a support for international terrorism.
The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the
drug lords who control their vast empires of crime that bring misery
to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and
convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms
commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the
United States to face American justice. Their assets and
infrastructure must be seized and forfeited. In doing so, we will
limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their destructive goods
as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of
law.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee
today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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