25 September 2001Tighter Immigration Controls No Cure-All Against Terrorists
(Improvements needed at INS, State Department, Meissner says) (870) By Jane A. Morse Washington File Staff Writer Washington -- Tighter immigrations controls are no cure-all in protecting the United States against terrorists, says a former top official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). According to Doris Meissner, who served as INS commissioner from 1993 to 2000, more stringent immigration procedures are just one step of many that must be taken in the overall effort to keep terrorists from entering and operating in the United States. Meissner spoke September 24 at a special briefing on "Terrorism and Immigration: Our Borders, Security, and Liberties" at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a non-partisan, private, non-profit think tank based in Washington, D.C. "We are constantly faced with the dilemmas of how to approach the limits of globalization, especially where the movement of people is concerned," Meissner, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, said. According to Meissner, U.S. borders really begin with the U.S. consulates overseas. In the 1990's, she noted, the United States heavily invested in more effective controls in monitoring people seeking entry. "Lookout technology" in the form of databases containing the names of people with criminal records, including terrorists, was deployed to help screen out visa applicants who are potential security risks to the United States, she said. But that technology is only useful if the law enforcement agencies involved consistently enter timely, accurate information, Meissner said. "If you don't have a name in the system, obviously you can't screen a person out," she said. Because having information about terrorist organizations and their members is critical to make the technology useful, Meissner said, "so often in this discussion the circle comes back to human intelligence." Meissner added that all appropriate law enforcement officials should be allowed to access these databases. Another problem is verifying the identities of people entering the country, according to Meissner. Improved "biometric" technology using fingerprints and facial recognition will greatly improve the ability of officials to match individuals to the identities they claim when they are attempting to enter the United States, she said. Meissner noted that the issue of tracking people becomes much more controversial and complex when considering those who have already entered the United States on a temporary basis. "Interior enforcement" is more difficult, partly because the methodology and technology for doing it is outdated, she said. Tracking people who enter the United States via airports or seaports is much easier than tracking the thousands and thousands of individuals who enter via automobiles across land borders. Further complicating the matter is that there is no real political consensus for in-country tracking of individuals, she said. While issues of identifying and tracking foreign visitors are important, an even more critical component is staffing at the INS and the State Department, Meissner said. The issue of budgets and personnel cuts has been going on for a long time, Meissner said, "but there is nothing as good as good staff." "In the 1990s in particular, the agency that's been on a 'starvation diet' has been the State Department," she said. "The visa officer capability is sorely, sorely underfunded, given the kind of screening that is important to be able to do in a consulate," Meissner said. She also said the State Department needs to do some "rethinking about visa officers being only the most junior members of the Foreign Service, the least experienced of the career staff." The most promising near-term step to keeping out undesirable alien visitors, she said, "is more staff in consulates and ports of entry who are senior, experienced staff that are specifically dedicated to fraud and anti-fraud activities. There is a lot of work that can be done in developing information on trends (and) information exchanges with other countries." At the INS, she said, "there is this real anomaly of the inspectors at the ports of entry not being classified as law enforcement." INS inspectors should be classified as law enforcement, she stressed. This classification would make "a very big difference in terms of the professionalism of the work force and in the terms of the ability of those front-line people to work effectively with law enforcement such as the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the (other) security agencies," she said. Another critical issue is who should pay for technological improvements and increased personnel, according to Meissner. "There ought to be a combination of government investment in the infrastructure and the original design and fielding of major systems overhauls like this, and then perhaps some user-fee contributions as part of the ongoing transaction costs," Meissner said. None of her recommendations are terribly "flashy," she acknowledged, but they are the "guts" of what needs to be addressed in a high priority fashion. The U.S. immigration system "should not and cannot be the main response to the threat of terrorism," she said. Nonetheless, it is a critical ingredient. With properly applied improvements, Meissner said, the U.S. immigration system can maintain "a tradition of openness," preserve personal liberties, and safeguard the United States against dangerous visitors. (The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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