THE UNDOING OF MILOSEVIC
THE UNDOING OF MILOSEVIC. The following is a program prepared for use by RFE/RL broadcasters based on a "Washington Post" article entitled "How Milosevic Lost His Grip," which appeared on 14 October. The collapse of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's government was long in coming but sudden in the end. What caused his 13-year presidency to finally fall? Reporters R. Jeffrey Smith and Peter Finn of the "Washington Post" talked to more than 30 well-placed people in the opposition and former government. They concluded it was a combination of factors, rather than any single event, that brought Milosevic down. The two journalists argue that Milosevic's undoing was not simply a result of a "spontaneous revolt of an inflamed people." They pinpoint other factors that they say ultimately left Milosevic isolated and his power broken. The reporters paint a picture of Milosevic as a man who imagined himself invincible and infallible. When confronted with negatives about his rule, he denied facts and blamed others. Zoran Lilic, a former vice president of Milosevic's Socialist Party, warned Milosevic in July that his position was "very bad" and that an election would be risky. Milosevic is said to have replied that those fears were not supported by any argument. Lilic resigned from the party out of frustration. Lilic's warning proved prophetic. Milosevic was soundly defeated by challenger Vojislav Kostunica in the presidential vote on September 24. It was an election Milosevic himself had called. Smith and Finn also write that Milosevic demanded blind loyalty. Anyone with news he did not like or did not want to hear was unwelcome. Radoman Bozovic, a former head of one of the country's biggest companies, said he went to see Milosevic in May and that everyone was telling the former president that the country had enough oil and other essential commodities. After Bozovic told Milosevic this was not true, Bozovic was not invited back for more discussions. Ahead of the election, opinion polls showed that Kostunica was far ahead. But advisers told Milosevic the polls were "Western-financed distortions." They instead painted a rosy picture of Yugoslavia's economic recovery and reconstruction of roads, bridges and factories damaged by NATO bombings last year. In a 12 September campaign speech, Milosevic opened a new power plant at the Iron Gates as if it were a symbol of victory itself: "[This plant] represents an answer to violence and injustice, represents a manifestation of the civilization and superiority of one nation that does not allow itself to be defeated." Milosevic refused to see the progress of his opponents or the decline in his own status. He thought the election would solidify his power -- and that if he did not win, he could steal victory. Barring that, he thought the police and army would use force to keep him in power. Smith and Finn write that he was wrong on all counts. In a speech just one day ahead of the election, Milosevic -- ironically, in hindsight -- said the vote would "clarify" the political situation: "I am expecting this election will bring good to our country and our people. I'm expecting the political scene will be clarified. It will prepare the ground for long-term stability and even faster economic development." But it wasn't just Milosevic's own blindness. Smith and Finn say Serbia's traditionally fractured opposition can take credit for finally coming together behind Kostunica. Part of that credit goes to the Otpor (Resistance) student movement. Otpor activist Ivan Marovic, earlier this year, said his group's role was to focus the opposition's attention on challenging Milosevic -- not each other: "In the course of the last 10 years, [the opposition] proved to be very inefficient, partly because [there] was not [a good] atmosphere for political parties but also because they were quarrelling among themselves. They were making their internal problems a priority, and the disputes that exist between the political parties were more important to them than disputes they [had] with Milosevic. So this brought much disappointment, and that's why people probably supported resistance movements more than opposition parties." The opposition's superior organization paid off when, after the vote, the election commission falsely declared Kostunica had not won an outright victory and that a run-off would be held. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia quickly organized protests and strikes that grew to involve the entire country. They also organized their own secret force of 1,000 armed military veterans to use if necessary. Amateur boxers were recruited to push aside police roadblocks. Student activists observed military barracks and monitored police radio transmissions. Smith and Finn quote Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic as saying the protests and strikes were aimed not at Milosevic but at convincing the police and the army that the people were united behind Kostunica. For days before the rally, Djindjic says, opposition leaders urged the army and police not to use force. On 5 October, hundreds of thousands of people converged on Belgrade, and thousands more protested throughout the country. In almost every case, the police stood aside and offered no real resistance. The shouts and heckles of the protesters in Belgrade were aimed squarely at winning over police on the street: "You are protecting [Milosevic]! Shame on you! Let's go, brothers -- come here, come [police] commander, come commander. Nobody will hurt you." Kostunica addressed the crowd that evening. It was clear to everyone the people were united: "Belgrade is Serbia today! [Crowd sings Kostunica's name]. Our big beautiful Serbia arose in order that one man, Slobodan Milosevic, should leave! [Crowd roars.]" Smith and Finn say it was ultimately the decision of the army and police not to intervene that proved Milosevic's final undoing. Momcilo Perisic, an opposition leader and former army chief of staff, says Milosevic eventually demanded that the police and army shoot protesters who stormed key buildings. Milosevic was also ready to use rockets and bombs. But each time Milosevic ordered the police to put tanks on the street, or to use tear gas or seize broadcast centers, they refused. When a mob attacked Milosevic's party headquarters in Belgrade, police did not respond, and those inside had to leave by a back door. Perisic says this is the first time Milosevic realized how long he had been "living an illusion." Perisic says Milosevic "was in shock" when his orders were refused. Then on 6 October, Kostunica agreed to a secret meeting with Milosevic at one of the former president's villas. It was a fearful occasion and not clear what Milosevic would do. But when General Nebojsa Pavkovic, a long-time ally of Milosevic, came to fetch Kostunica to take him to the meeting, the general brought with him a powerful document: a written statement that the army recognized Kostunica's victory. Kostunica formally had the army's backing. Smith and Finn write that, nevertheless, getting Milosevic to admit defeat was difficult. Milosevic was defiant at the start of the discussion, saying Kostunica had still not won more than half of the presidential vote. Kostunica then informed Milosevic that the constitutional court had earlier that day reversed itself and certified Kostunica as the winner of the September election. Milosevic replied: "I have not received that information" -- and then quickly conceded. (Wendy Schwartz)
Copyright (c) 2000. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
http://www.rferl.org
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