RFE/RL BALKAN REPORT, Vol. 4, No. 78, 20 October 2000
SHARING POWER WITH WAR CRIMINALS. The Serbian power-sharing agreement signed by supporters of the new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and the remnants of Milosevic's regime raises major moral questions as well as reasonable doubt about the future of democracy in Serbia (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 17 October 2000). Impoverished by wars and the effects of 13 years of nationalistic neo-communist rule, the country starts out on the road to democracy with the decision by the new leadership to share power with war criminals. Power-sharing not only creates a credibility question for President Kostunica and the 18 parties in his coalition: it is an approach that may have devastating consequences for the democratic process in Serbia. By entering a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Kostunica is in effect legitimizing Milosevic's organization in the eyes of the public and the international community. He is giving this party a chance to mutate into another form of post- totalitarian communist formation (with or without Milosevic) that will continue playing a destructive role in Serbian society. Why is Kostunica willing to do such a favor for his rivals, who forged the election results and ordered the use of force against Serbian protestors? Certainly not because he is a supporter of Milosevic. Kostunica is regarded as a constitutionalist, who believes in the rule of law and seeks legality in any governmental changes. He wants to prevent any unrest or bloodshed, and this is the likely reason for his cautiousness. Milosevic and his people obviously understand the new president's preferences and problems, and they will attempt to entangle him in a web of constitutional and legal obstacles. This is evident in the stress on the constitutional dependence of Serbia on pro-Milosevic politicians in forming the new Yugoslav cabinet, despite the fact that over 75 percent of the Montenegrins boycotted the elections. It is also evident in the demand of General Nebojsa Pavkovic that any changes in the army leadership should not be made on a political basis. But the question remains--who created these procedures? Two weeks ago it appeared that not only was Milosevic finished, but that his regime had come to an end. The protestors on the streets of Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia insisted on his arrest and stormed the parliament and other government buildings. In other words, they were denying authority not only to Milosevic, but to the entire Socialist edifice. The protesting crowds were much more radical than the opposition leadership and were ready to take responsibility in eliminating once and for all the power of Milosevic and his supporters (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 10 October 2000). But Kostunica failed to arrest Milosevic. He also repeated his previous refusal to turn Milosevic in to The Hague, which he has called "an American and not an international court." He then began making deals with Milosevic's close associates, some of whom are also indicted war criminals, such as Serbian President Milan Milutinovic. In fact, two weeks after the "revolution," Serbia is still the only country in the world to be led by a president who has been indicted by an international tribunal for war crimes--because nobody has overturned or challenged the authority of Milutinovic. In the meantime, Milosevic continues giving instructions to his party faithful on how to retain as much power as possible. And they appear to be managing this task quite successfully both on the Serbian and Yugoslav levels, despite some calls from within the SPS for Milosevic to quit as party leader. Some observers may argue that Kostunica's steps are only temporary measures aimed at a peaceful and smooth transition until the Serbian elections in December. Such observers might add that he has few alternative legal options, given the power relationships within the current Serbian parliament. However, one should not repeat the mistaken assumptions in many countries in the early 1990s that all the communist parties in Eastern Europe can truly become democratic players and contribute to society the way the Polish, Slovenian, or Hungarian ex-ruling parties did. After all, there are also communist parties that simply did not transform themselves into genuine builders of democracy. Moreover, ten years ago Eastern Europe had not yet experienced the wholesale criminalization of the economy and the political system that became a central feature of the Serbian regime. Kostunica evidently did not look closely at the experience of some of Serbia's neighbors. He failed to estimate how compromises with old communist establishments can become dangerous, even in cases where no war crimes are involved. When ten years ago the Bulgarian opposition agreed to participate in a round table with the Communist Party, the move was perceived as a great democratic achievement. Several years later, however, some of the opposition leaders admitted that it was one of the biggest mistakes of the democratic forces. First, it gave the Communists the status of a legitimate participant in the democratic process, even though the party had not come to terms with its own role in decades of terror, atrocities, political repression, and forced ethnic assimilation. Second, the round table agreements gave an impetus for the revitalization of the hundred year-old Bulgarian Communist Party, which included not only changing its name to "Socialist," but also propelling it to occupy the social democratic space in the political system and in public perceptions. Five months later, the Socialists defeated the democrats in the general elections and continued to rule the country. The other part of the "back to power" strategy of the Bulgarian Socialists consisted of carefully constructing mechanisms to divide the opposition and of undermining the credibility of opposition leaders. This led to a long period of Socialist domination in the parliament and a devastating economic catastrophe in 1997. However, on this occasion the opposition did not repeat its previous mistake: the united opposition leaders demanded the immediate resignation of the Socialist cabinet and parliament. They also formed an interim government on their own, even though mass protests supporting the opposition were threatened with a military crackdown. At a time when Kostunica has the full support of the army and the police, there is no credible reason for making deals with a party responsible for setting off four wars, for launching ethnic cleansing, and for creating a criminal environment throughout the region. Serbia's new leaders should not dismiss the fact that the guilt for the wars and war crimes lies not only with Milosevic and his cronies, but with the whole Socialist party apparatus and its allied parties, both on a national and local level. If Kostunica does not undertake a policy of "political cleansing," he risks either whitewashing the stains of the regime or helping others assign collective guilt to the Serbian people instead of to the country's real criminals. Moreover, Serbia faces the prospect of growing public frustration with economic conditions once the euphoria subsides. Clearly, the Socialists will seek to benefit from a potential public backlash and from splits within the DOS coalition in order to launch themselves back into positions of power, with or without Milosevic. The experiences of at least some of Serbia's neighbors should serve as lessons rather than as models. (Margarita Assenova. Her address is MBugajska@mindspring.com)
Copyright (c) 2000. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
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