THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt)
________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release October 17, 2000
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE SUMMIT
Hyatt Regency
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt
2:15 P.M. (L)
MR. CROWLEY: Good afternoon. We've obviously seen an
extraordinary period of intense negotiation by the President and our
Middle East peace team -- Secretary Albright, Sandy Berger, Dennis Ross,
Aaron Miller, Bruce Riedel, Rob Malley. You know, the President, in
essence, was on the ground for 28 hours, and during that period was --
except for a brief, about four-hour break this morning -- was fully
engaged for roughly 24 of those 28 hours. By my count, when you
consider the bilaterals, the trilaterals, the plenaries, the meetings,
he had more than 20 meetings during this 24-hour period of engagement to
help these parties begin to walk back from confrontation, back towards a
process of reconciliation.
Here to provide you a little bit of perspective behind the scenes
is one member of our Middle East peace team who's no stranger to any of
you. But for the purposes of this briefing, he will be a Senior
Administration Official.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm actually too tired to give
context, so I think I'm just going to answer questions.
Q Can you shed any light on the sequence with which this
agreement is going to be implemented? It was unclear to me whether
there are any quid pro quos, or whether this is all just going to happen
simultaneously.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me put it this way. There
clearly are a set of commitments that both sides have made, and there
are also understandings that we have. I think the most important thing
is that each of them has made a commitment, on the security questions,
to recreate the situation, to work to recreate the situation that
existed prior to the onset of this crisis.
So, in a sense, what you have is, each will be undertaking certain
kinds of steps to do that. And I think the best way to describe it is
that they will be operating on the basis of the commitments they've
made, and carrying them out on the basis that -- what I would describe
as good faith.
Q Can you tell us about the composition of the fact-finding
body? I'm not certain whether or not -- who names the members, and
who's actually on it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the key here is that up
until now, we did not have a formula on the fact-finding committee that
was agreed. That formula is now agreed. We will -- the President will
be the one who in the end is appointing, but he's going to do it by
working with the parties, and also by consulting with the Secretary
General. Because we had to first arrive at a formula that could be
agreed, we haven't yet focused on who will actually be put on it, but
that will obviously be something that we get to shortly.
Q Is there some deadline set for Arafat to issue this statement,
unequivocally renouncing -- calling for an end to violence? Does he
have to do it today, does he have to do it tomorrow?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well I think, if you look at the
statement, you'll see the word "immediate" is used, when it comes to
measures that both sides will be taking. Immediate from our standpoint
means soon.
Q To follow up on that, why didn't Arafat and Barak make a
statement there at the press conference?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, very frankly, the decision
was made to have the President do it. We are interested right now in
trying to do what we can to turn the corner and move in a more positive
direction. And frankly, we're still in a period that I think is
emotional, and we felt it was best to have the President be the one who
would speak.
Q Can I just follow up? Did Arafat and Barak refused to make a
statement?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, no, no, no. Frankly, it
was a decision that we made.
Q How did they make this -- literally, how did they make this
commitment? Did they sign anything? Did their aides sign anything?
Was it just by their presence at the press conference? And if they
didn't sign anything, why not? And is that a precedent in any way?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We were focused primarily on
reaching understandings, and doing it -- even though we were in the
setting that was here, we were mainly interested in doing it through a
bilateral process, meaning the President working with each of them --
and then also, obviously, discussing what was going on with some of the
other participants who were here.
What we were most concerned about was not so much the format, but
the reality. So getting the understandings was something that was very
important to us.
Q But they didn't sign a document?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We reached understandings on
a bilateral basis. They were understandings with us, commitments that
were made. And I think what's important is that it was done basically
in the three areas.
The President set three objectives when he came out here. One was
to do all we could to try to change the situation on the ground by
identifying the kinds of commitments and undertakings that could have
the best impact, the most likely impact, or the most likely to have an
impact. Second, to resolve this issue of the fact-finding committee,
because it had become a problem. And third was to begin to build the
bridge back to peacemaking, which meant resuming the peace process. And
that's why, in fact, we will have consultations with the two sides in
Washington within the next two weeks. And they will come at the same
time for those consultations with us.
Q Will this security panel, and the resumption of it, address
concerns from the Israelis that Arafat had to disarm his militia, and
fully arrest -- I mean, it's unclear how many of these Hamas agents are
still at large. Could you comment on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, are you talking about the
fact-finding committee, or are you talking about the security -- the
trilateral security?
Q No, not the fact-finding, I'm talking about the security --
yes, trilaterals.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the trilateral security
committee is going to deal with all the various commitments and
undertakings and responsibilities that each side has. And we're going
to be facilitating those discussions and those efforts.
If you look at what is outlined in the statement, there are a
series of things that both sides undertake to do. And I'm not going to
go into the details of what those are. Suffice it to say that if the
purpose is for each side to do all they can to recreate the situation
that existed prior to the onset of the crisis, then obviously you have
to get back to what was status quo ante. And the steps that they will
take, and what we will help facilitate in terms of their efforts, are
designed to do that.
Q Can you tell us when the agreements started to appear? We had
heard that yesterday the discussions were very, very tense, that there
couldn't be any agreement on the final document. So all of these
happened this morning?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I'll give you a little sense
of how it unfolded. Yesterday was really characterized by what I would
describe as a kind of parallel effort. On the one hand, the President
was meeting his counterparts. At the same time, there was a Foreign
Minister meeting. And also, a little later in the day, there were
security officials who were also meeting. So you kind of had three
levels operating at the same time.
The meetings that the President was having were designed to sort of
focus on the objectives that he had and he thought were important for
this meeting. And in the Foreign Minister meeting, there was an effort
to begin to see, all right, in light of those objectives -- which were
the ones that I think basically everybody shared -- what could be done
to reach understandings?
I think the report you got about the discussions being tense came
mostly out of what was the Foreign Ministers meeting, which was intense,
at times emotional. Because after all, we're emerging from a period of
the last two weeks that has been extraordinarily difficult, that has
frayed relationships -- certainly, I think, has raised questions on each
side about the other -- and as a result, each side was, in fact, airing
their views.
I think it's worth noting that when you're in any negotiation, but
especially a negotiation where you're operating in this kind of
environment, you also have to let sides ventilate. I mean, if you try
to suppress that, you'll actually delay the point where you get into
serious discussions. And I think it's fair to say that they did vent.
(Laughter.)
And yet at the same time, they helped to lay the basis for what was
going to emerge. Those discussions reached a point where they weren't
going to go any farther, and by late last night, the President sort of
picked up what had been done there, and went back to bilaterals.
He had a meeting -- I don't remember the precise times, other than
the fact that I had to work through all of this -- I think he had a
meeting with Chairman Arafat and President Mubarak together that went
from around 12:30 a.m. to around 2:00 a.m. in the morning, and then he
met Barak from about 2:00 a.m. until 4:00 a.m. in the morning, or 2:15
a.m. to about four in the morning. And those meetings turned a corner,
because I think the things that we could not overcome at the Foreign
Minister level the President was able to overcome in those meetings.
And then by this morning, by around 10:00 a.m., after he went through
another series of bilaterals, by about 10:00 a.m. this morning, we
basically knew we had the understandings in all three areas.
Q Could you explain -- on the security side, for example. Did
they put anything in writing, either in bilateral commitments to us, or
in some other kind of document?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically everything was done by
us in a verbal way, but I think it's fair to say that when we do these
things, obviously it's quite concrete. I think the security officials
had concrete discussions, and were also prepared to reach some
understandings with us.
Q How does this differ from what was agreed to in Paris, two
weeks ago?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it differs in the
following ways. One, there's a greater degree of specificity on the
specific steps that will be taken. I think one thing you have to
understand is, in Paris, we did not have security officials from both
sides, and here we did. And they had extensive discussions. So they
were able to deal in a much more practical way than was the case at
Paris, where the discussion was really much more general, and it was
sort of limited to giving a set of orders and setting up some
procedures. This was more -- this was really more precise, number one.
Number two, we focused on trying to reach an understanding in all
areas, meaning security, the fact finding, and the bridge for turning
back and resuming the political process.
Three, obviously, it was a summit, with the President, but not just
the President. We have a regional dimension here, which I think is very
important. I think one of the telling factors here -- I can tell you
that President Mubarak played a very, very constructive role here.
There is no question that he was extremely helpful in terms of
overcoming some of the differences, working with President Clinton to
overcome some of the differences at key moments. And King Abdullah as
well.
But I think what we saw here, with that regional presence, was also
that there was a real understanding that if you care about the future of
this region, you had to find a way to bring this to an end, or at least
begin to create the mechanisms, the steps, the vehicles to try to bring
it to an end, bring it under control, restore normal life. And if there
was one emotion that I think came through, and was really quite
striking, it was that concern -- and it was, I would even use the word
"that care." There was a real recognition, not to be able to do this
was to turn a corner in the wrong direction, was to turn a corner in a
way where the prisoners of the past, who believe in struggle, gain the
upper hand.
And I really think that was a kind of subtext of what was going on
here, and why there was such an effort to try to put in place the kinds
of vehicles that can lead us back to where we need to be in terms of
peacemaking. It's not going to be easy, because it's clearly difficult.
But nonetheless, I think that was, I found that -- personally, having
worked on this a long time, I found that rather striking.
Q Who is going to be coming from the Palestinian and Israeli
sides in two weeks? And was there any talk, during the talks, of this
sort of longer pause that some people feel is needed before you get back
to the real final status negotiations?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I can't tell you who's
going to be coming, because we left that up in the air at this moment --
although we set, as I said, a time frame within two weeks, number one.
Number two, what I can tell you was also pretty apparent, and I think
it's consistent with what I was just saying, about the concern, the care
about the region. What was pretty clear was, everyone participating --
but I would say especially, also, both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman
Arafat -- felt it was important to find a way back to peacemaking. That
was also something that was clear in the discussions more generally, but
it was also true with them, find a way back to peacemaking.
No illusions here about the difficulty. No illusions about the
environment that they're operating in, and understanding that you've got
to find -- this is not something that is like a light switch, where you
simply flip it, and then you're back to business as usual. But
nonetheless, a -- what I would say is a profound concern that the future
cannot be characterized by what we've seen the last two weeks, and that
as neighbors, they really do have to find a way to coexist, and
therefore you really have to find a way back to the political process,
and a readiness to come and consult with us about how best to do that.
Q What is the timetable for the Israeli pullback, and how does
that fit into the secrecy of the statements that are supposed to be
delivered, and so on?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not going to try to get
into the details. If you look at the statement, it talks about
immediate measures and steps, and I think that you'll see that things
will take place -- everything can't happen all at once, but I think
things will move fairly quickly.
Q How bad is the damage, in your mind, over the -- the last
three weeks have caused? It's one thing for the folks here to say
something, but how impassioned are the people on the streets? I mean,
how hard will that be?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there really are
deep wounds. I don't think there's any other way to describe it, but
there are deep wounds. There are question marks that didn't exist
before, or at least had seemingly disappeared from the scene. And I
think you -- we felt it, I think, in some of these meetings. I mean,
the sense of grievance on each side is very strongly felt.
But what also exists, what coexists with that, is this other
reality that there isn't an alternative. To think that the future will
be what we've seen the past two weeks is simply unacceptable, and that
you have to find a way to get back to what they were trying to do
before, in terms of making peace. But obviously it takes place in an
environment that is different, and I think you have to try to build a
bridge, as I've said, from where we are, to where we need to be.
Q You said the agreements are bilateral, between the two leaders
and the United States. Are the agreements identical in both cases, and
was there anything that anybody looked at to sign or initial, or
anything?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said is the understandings,
our understandings between us and them. They are not understandings
that are between them. They are understandings between us and them,
about the kinds of things -- about the kinds of things that they will
do. Obviously, each of them knows what the other has basically said.
In the security area, we facilitated discussions which also facilitate
cooperation there.
Q Again on the understandings. How is it that nothing seems to
have been put in writing? And isn't there a risk of something going
wrong as a result?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so, because we
went over very carefully everything with the sides. In fact, I
described -- we knew by about 10:00 a.m. this morning that we would have
understandings in all three areas. And in the end, before coming out,
the President met with the leaders together, to go through again -- to
be very precise over what were the understandings, and what it was he
would say.
Q Then why not sign them? I don't understand. Why not put a
signature to them?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?
Q Why not sign them on, you know, just --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Frankly, we felt once we had the
understandings, and we were very precise with them, we wanted to go
ahead. We want them to find ways to get moving right away. As I said
before, it's not the format that matters, it's what happens on the
ground that matters.
Q Is there a transcript of these discussions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A transcript?
Q Yes. Is there a written record of these agreements?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --
Q Of the verbal agreements?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, in every meeting, we
keep a record, and the people who are involved keep a record.
Q On the fact-finding commission, this agreeing, working with
the parties, consulting with the Secretary General. Does that give the
parties and the Secretary General effective veto power about -- over any
potential members? Or conclusions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the way I would describe
it -- you know, if this is going to be an American-led effort, obviously
when we focus on who should be on it, we want to take into account the
concerns of the parties. This is going to be an independent committee,
and I think both sides need to feel that its composition is a fair
composition. So I would describe it that way. We will obviously take
into account the kinds of concerns that they might have, and want to
ensure that each side feels that it's fair.
Q How will each side issue these statements calling for an end
to violence? Will the leaders make those statements? Will they be
written statements? Will they go on television? How will it be done?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would expect that we would
-- I mean, I can't tell you precisely when. We've used the word
immediate to describe what we think our measures and steps that should
be taken, I think as soon as possible. On that, we didn't spell out who
has to do it, just that it's important that it be done very, very
quickly.
Q Barak had said that unfortunately if there is violence, quote,
"we unfortunately know what to do." Given the fact that the U.S. seems
to be more involved now than it was before in this process, what will
the U.S. do if that happens?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, let's put this in
perspective. This works if the kinds of commitments and undertakings
each side has made are in fact carried out. What has happened here is
we have worked with them to create a vehicle that can help to transform
the reality on the ground. But in the end, they're the ones who will
have to do everything they can. We're there to facilitate their
discussions and their cooperation, but the ability to change things in
the end is in their hands.
Q If you go back to the status quo ante, then you have the
Hamas-niks in jail, but you have Tanzim with arms. Is there anything
specific? Does that mean that it was specifically stated that the PA
would make an effort to re-arrest the Hamas-niks, and that it was left
unsaid what would happen with the arms of the Tanzim?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into the
details, as I said. They made commitments to recreate the situation
that existed on the ground with regard to the status quo ante. And with
regard to obligations that exist as part of the whole interim agreement,
Wye-Sharm process, and committees that exist to see how obligations are
being fulfilled, that's something that will also be a part of the
ongoing effort between the two sides, and in terms of our efforts with
them.
MR. CROWLEY: Last question.
Q Does that mean that -- I just want to clarify what you were
saying about the word "immediate" for the Israeli pullback and the other
issues. Does that mean, when you say that you're not going to get into
details, that there aren't any specifics within the agreement?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I couldn't get the question.
Q Are there specific deadlines in the agreement that you're not
talking about? Or are there just no specifics in the agreement?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me put it this way. I think
the understandings that exist are very specific. But I'm not going to
get into any details.
Q Would you call these secret --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I would say, you know,
there's a question -- these are understandings that are designed to have
both sides carry out the kinds of practical steps that will change the
reality on the ground.
I think you have to look at this. This is not -- the purpose here
was not to forge an agreement, like we're negotiating an agreement whose
purpose is making peace. What was designed -- what we are focused on
here is, if you are going to change the realities on the ground, if
we're going to see the violence brought to an end, if we're going to see
normal life restored, there have to be very practical steps. And so
this was geared towards very practical steps and how each -- what those
steps might be and the kinds of understandings they might have with us
about how to do it.
Q Nobody got much sleep the last couple of days. To what extent
is that a factor in diplomacy like this?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, when I was a student,
SDS meant something different -- sleep deprivation syndrome.
I've done this for a long time. I've gone through these kinds of
negotiations where you work around the clock. This was at least,
fortunately, only a day, not 10 days or two weeks.
I think when you're involved in something like this, adrenaline
takes over and people get tired. But when you feel that what you're
doing is very important, it does wonders for concentrating the mind. I
wouldn't recommend it as a normal course of business, even though I
don't always subscribe to that.
MR. CROWLEY: Thank you very much.
END 2:41 P.M. (L)
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