Experts Warn of Transformation of Mideast Conflict
Crisis in the Middle East: Is Peace Still Possible Or Is War
Inevitable?
A Brookings Press Briefing Crisis in the Middle East:
Is Peace Still Possible Or Is War Inevitable?
October 13, 2000
Richard N. Haass: Good morning. Welcome to the Brookings Institution.
This morning's briefing will focus on events in the Middle East,
obviously, and by that I mean essentially more the diplomacy and the
violence involving Israel and the Palestinians. I'll also say a few
things about the attack, the terrorist attack on the U.S. destroyer
yesterday.
What we're going to do, though, first, is begin with my colleague,
Shibley Telhami. Professor Telhami has two hats. He holds the Sadat
Chair at the University of Maryland, and he's also a Nonresident
Senior Fellow here at the Brookings Institution. He is widely
published, widely quoted on all things dealing with the Middle East.
And he will begin speaking for a few minutes on the change in the
situation; where and why it is evolving the way it has, and what can
be done about it.
I will then speak for a few minutes, giving my perspective, in
particular, on American foreign policy; what it's been, what it should
be in the future. And then we will reserve the bulk of our time here
this morning to your questions and comments. Sir?
Shibley Telhami: Thank you. I'd like to make basically three points.
The first point is to describe the nature of the crisis that we now
face; the second is to make some conclusions about why we're in the
middle of this crisis; and three, to address the U.S. role in this
crisis.
First, I think it's fair to say that we're now facing what might be a
fundamental transformation in the conflict as we have known it over
half a century. I think it is-this is not just another cycle in
violence that needs to be stopped, I think there is a-what might be a
very dangerous transformation of the conflict.
I think what we have seen in the past half a century is this conflict
has been defined in nationalist political terms. This has been
certainly an Arab-Israeli conflict, but mostly a Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Certainly religion has always been an aspect of the
conflict, but the conflict has been defined by both Arabs and Israelis
as a nationalist conflict. The Zionist Movement defined itself as a
nationalist movement; it was highly secularized. The Palestinian
National Movement came into being as a secular national movement at a
time when you had secular Arab nationalism, and the religious groups
were seen to be the enemies. Political Islam was on the defensive in
the context of that conflict.
I think while it was always a very difficult conflict, because it
seemed like a zero-sum conflict because you're both fighting over the
same piece of land, it was, nonetheless, a manageable conflict because
you could deter states, you could negotiate with states; central
authorities are easily recognizable, and you knew what the limits
were. And in that sense, all of the American diplomacy and the
international diplomacy was based on the idea that the aim was to
reconcile two nationalist conflicts, to meet the basic aspirations of
two people. And in that sense, clearly, all of the negotiations, and
certainly the ones that took place at Camp David in July, were aimed
toward addressing the nationalist need of the Palestinians as a people
and the nationalist need of Jews as a people, and to find a compromise
to live on the same piece of territory to have two states side by
side.
Clearly, that was tough enough, and certainly, although we came close
to signing an agreement, it probably would have had trouble
nonetheless. But at least the conflict itself was clearly defined. And
I think one can argue, at least since the Gulf War, the U.S. and the
international community and some parties in the Middle East have
managed to in some way separate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from
broader Middle Eastern issues, from broader Arab-Israeli issues.
Well, what has happened in the past two weeks, I think, is we've
crossed a threshold which has perhaps led to a transformation of the
conflict. Today, I think, the conflict is much more than a nationalist
conflict, it is much more than a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is
certainly an Arab-Israeli conflict, but even worse, it might be a
Jewish-Muslim conflict. And I think this is troubling for two reasons:
one, obviously, the scope is different. You are talking then about a
conflict that knows no boundaries. You're talking about a conflict
that goes well beyond the confines of Israel and the Palestinian
territories. You're talking about involving other Arabs, other
Muslims, and perhaps other Jews as well. And so, as a consequence, the
scope alone is dangerous.
But the second reason may be even more difficult. And that is that
when we look at the nature of the conflict as it's evolving over the
past two weeks, if it is in fact becoming more of a religious
conflict, an ethnic conflict, then governments don't have as much
control. In essence, it becomes easier to mobilize at the social
level. The mosque becomes a political institution, public passions
become driving forces, and governments lose control. And in that sense
I think it becomes much harder, much harder, to deal with it. The fact
is, we've seen it for example spread into inside Israel between Arab
citizens and Jewish citizens of Israel on a scope that we had not
witnesses in the darkest days for the past half-a-century.
And so clearly there's been a fundamental transformation that we must
stop if we are to have any chance of reconciling the differences
between them, because nationalist's conflicts can be resolved;
religious conflicts cannot.
Let me say one other thing about why we're there. In one word, it's
Jerusalem. And I think some people may say this is a simplistic
answer. And in some ways, it is. There's been tremendous frustration
among Palestinians and among Israelis. They've been at it for a long
time. They came so close, they didn't get there. The situation on the
ground is difficult. There's pent-up frustration not only on Jerusalem
but also on every aspect of the conflict. And so clearly, the
explosion isn't just about Jerusalem.
But Jerusalem is the reason for the explosion. And I think it is
because Jerusalem, in my mind, and I think most people who study these
issues very carefully, is bigger than the issue of Palestine. It is
bigger than the issue of Israel. It mobilizes. And yes, a lot of
groups are going to exploit it for their own ends. Sure, that's what
happens. You might have an Islamist group whose aim is really to
topple Arafat or to do something else in the Arab world or to object
to the order that is out there. But the fact is, they can use it. And
that's why it was a mistake, I think, a huge mistake to unleash this
issue, to make it the only issue that needs to be negotiated and to
even break it down and focus on the issue of the Haram
ash-Sharif/Temple Mount.
Clearly, many of us, I think Richard and I stood here on the -- just a
couple of days before the Camp David negotiations started, and the one
thing we both agreed is it would be wrong to go for everything. And in
particular, I singled out Jerusalem as the issue that could not-that
if people expected that Arafat was going to be able to deliver on
that, he could not. One can argue, you know, maybe he should, he
would. I think the right assumption would have been to say he could
not, and therefore structure the negotiations in a way assuming that
that was the case rather than assuming that he was going to be able to
do it, and then when he doesn't, to then start recovering.
So I think that was a mistake, and I think it was in part driven by
Barak's belief and intent that he could do it. And the American team
went along with it. And I think that was a huge mistake that has
become a serious problem.
And I want to say a second reason as to why this happened to quickly
after Sharon's visit and then the violence that followed. Now, we can
argue one way or the other about whether it was really Sharon's visit
or not. I mean, I think you can make a very sound argument that we
were on borrowed time. Everybody knew the situation is tense. It could
explode at any moment. If it wasn't Sharon's visit, it could have been
a bombing in Tel Aviv or it could have been a settler attack
somewhere, sure. I mean, there's no question the situation was tense
and Jerusalem had become an issue.
But the fact is, we still had some time-people knew we were on
borrowed time. What you needed to do is try to prevent every little
episode, including Hamas' attacks, in the meanwhile, because if you
believed there was an agreement that was possible, you needed to wait
for those two, three weeks-it was a very short window. And you put
those-you put that agreement on the table and then you allow the
moderate at least to have something to fight for. You have an
agreement; you say, well, you know, we can hold onto this agreement,
and you could fight off those people who want to oppose.
Now the moderates don't have anything to fight for on either side. The
Israeli moderates say, look, we offered them all that much and they
rejected it; how could we defend? And the Palestinians say, well we
don't have an agreement, we've had only promises and how could we
defend? Neither side among the moderates is going to be able to fight
for anything and they're going to go on the defensive. So we have that
problem right now.
But a second element, I think, in this spread of this violence so
quickly, that cannot be underestimated is what I call the new media in
the Middle East; I mean, we have a new phenomenon. And you know, in
1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I think the media in the Middle East
was largely still controlled by the governments. You could filter a
lot of the information and you could aim it in a way that would affect
public opinion in ways that might suit governmental interests.
I think today we have a very different kind of media-the globalization
of the media-in ways that nobody could stop the spread of pictures,
the images, that we have seen. And I think cameras are everywhere. In
fact, in the Palestinian areas alone, there are over 50 little
television stations that are private, in every neighborhood of a big
city, aside from Palestinian TV. They are so cheap to have; you have
cameras, you have TV stations, equipment. It's very, very hard to
control information.
And it's not a surprise. If you look at the two images-or three images
that have had the most impact, they were television images. The one on
the Arab side was of the boy in his father's arms being shot. And if
you look at the media, you know, the very first week of that was
nothing but this issue and making whatever people wanted to interpret
that. The images mobilize. And the lynching of the Israeli soldiers
and the burning of the synagogue in Nablus, those things have had
tremendous impact, and they spread the passions very rapidly and it
makes it very difficult for governments to control.
I think this is a phenomenon that we now have to live with-governments
have to live with. But the bottom line is governments have less
control. It's not that they don't have control; they have less
control. I think they're still the dominant forces and I think-but the
price for them is higher. So to intervene makes it harder for them or
almost impossible to intervene the second time around. So they need
assurances that episodes don't repeat themselves because they cannot
reemploy the same leverage over and over again.
Let me come to the third point which is about the American role.
I do not fault the U.S. for holding the Camp David summit. I think
that was a wise thing to do, and I think had it not been done-we were
facing other deadlines that could have erupted into conflict, and
maybe on the same degree and perhaps even more. I think it's not-I
think the U.S. diplomacy had to do something and, you know, we may
have had this crisis earlier if we didn't. You can argue with whether
the aims were too ambitious, and on Jerusalem I think they were. I
have always believed that, I still believe that; I certainly believe
it more now. But that was the issue, I think, where there is a
disagreement.
But right now, I think it is fair to say that American diplomacy today
is facing no longer peacemaking between the Israelis and the
Palestinians. That was true two weeks ago; the aim was to get them to
agree. Today is no longer just to get them to agree; that's almost a
small piece of the problem. The U.S. today faces a major national
security crisis because if there is a full explosion, which is now
very possible, perhaps even probable, what is going to be at stake is
no longer just violence among Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs and
Muslims and so forth, which is bad enough, but very serious threats to
American interests in a way that is going to stress American relations
with the region in a way that is going to put pressures on American
assets globally. As we have seen, obviously, yesterday-we don't know
yet what was behind the bombing in Yemen; this is-this had to have
been planned way in advance, but clearly people have a lot of plans on
the shelf, ready to be exploited in moments of crisis.
And-but more importantly, I think it's the economy. It's oil, stupid.
I mean, ultimately, I think that prices of oil are likely to be pushed
up. We-the current increase is probably just a spike because of the
events. Ultimately, it's going to be a question of supply and demands.
Psychology matters. When you have instability, it matters. And
business people have to take into account risk.
But ultimately it's a question of supply and demand, and I think that
one can envision a number of scenarios, a number of realistic
scenarios, not far-fetched scenarios, that can lead into the reduction
in the oil supply before the winter. And that could become a serious
problem for the United States, so that the current crisis is no longer
about helping Israel and the Palestinians. It's no longer about having
a final status agreement. It is no longer about Clinton's legacy. It
is now about serious national security interests of the United States,
in a way that we haven't faced in a long time, and it has to be taken
that way.
In that environment, therefore, I do not think it is a wise thing for
us to now be calling people names and starting to assign blame. We
might have to do that at some point, because when conflict becomes
inevitable, you probably have to take sides, and you have to rally
public opinion to take sides. And the U.S. may have very strong views
on blaming, and they may be justified. But the point is, the U.S. is
the only one at the moment that can deliver some kind of an agreement
that would at least stop the violence. No one else can, for whatever
reason.
And the problem right now is there is a crisis of confidence between
the U.S. and the Palestinians. And we can argue about why the U.S.
doesn't trust Arafat. The U.S. does not trust his intentions. And
Arafat doesn't trust the U.S. and doesn't trust the U.S. intentions.
It makes it very, very hard for the U.S. to play a role in that
environment that is effective. There has to be-and the immediate task
is to restore that confidence. There has to be something done to
restore that confidence on both sides, or else they're both going to
lose on this issue. It's not a question of scoring points; it's a
question of protecting national security interests at this time, of
being effective diplomatically.
Even if you think that Arafat may in fact be wanting conflict, even if
that is a-I know that's a theory out there. I don't believe it. I
think that he's-it's not in his interest to have conflict. You can
argue about what he could have done or should have done, and I think
he could have done and should have done a lot. But the question of
it-I don't think his aim is to have conflict. He loses in conflict. He
loses-Hamas takes over. He loses control. He doesn't have an outcome.
It's over for him. He doesn't have a conflict scenario that's
workable, in my judgment.
But that aside, let's assume that that is a viable possibility, but we
don't know. We are very, very unsure about what he does. If we're
intervening diplomatically, we're assuming that there is a chance that
he might actually want an agreement. Otherwise, we can't even
intervene. We can't even have a diplomacy. To the extent that you make
an argument or you make a persuasive-you take a position which says
there is a chance that he might actually want a peace agreement, then
you have to, therefore, work with that, rather than begin with the
assumption that he's not going to have an agreement. And if you think
that an agreement is possible, then you have to begin with how to make
it possible for him to move forward. Rather than shaking the
confidence, you have to build the confidence. Rather than stress him
more domestically, to the extent that that is one of his constraints,
give him a little space to do so.
Now, how to do that, while at the same time addressing Barak's own
problems-and Barak is facing tremendous stress, and he's been-he is
clearly in a domestic mess as well as a bigger mess. And Israelis feel
under siege, as do the Palestinians. You have to, obviously, try to
balance that at the same time; it's very difficult. But nonetheless,
in my judgment, the only way to do it is to have-the first thing to do
is to have some kind of step to build the confidence with the
Palestinians.
I think that-the latest news I have is that there is a chance that a
summit might in fact take place in Egypt on Sunday, and that would be
good news. I think that would be a very good step to move forward. And
I think with it-it would be only one small step. I think it might be
possible for the president to now appoint an emissary, a personal
emissary, who is in charge of communicating with the Palestinians,
because I think the communications between Mr. Arafat and the
president are really trustworthy at the moment, from the point of view
of the two sides, when they're both talking to each other. You can't
have the president of the United States on the phone all the time with
a leader in the middle of a dragged-on negotiation. And this might be
something that the president is going to have to contemplate; someone
who would help the peace team put together a realistic proposal on
that end.
Let me end-I know I've been incredibly pessimistic, and I think it's
warranted. Those of you have come here to hear the briefings, I've
been one of the most optimistic people on this. But let me end up with
some things that lend themselves to optimism that we haven't been
watching. And I'll just say a couple of things about that.
First of all, today's news are not-so far, as far as I can tell, are
not too bad in terms of the level of violence, particularly after the
prayers. That itself is good, and the news about the conference itself
is hopefully good. But the bigger story, I think, is that there are a
lot of people out there-in fact, I would posit that there are
majorities of Palestinians and Israelis, Arabs and Jews within Israel,
who are sick and tired of this conflict and they don't want to see
this violence. They're threatened, they're scared, they don't know how
to move-they don't know what action to take. But I can tell you, in my
talking, constant being in contact with the region, that there are
dozens and dozens of communities that are coming together, of Arabs
and Jews, who are now trying to put rallies of peace to reject the
violence and to reject turning it into a religious and ethnic
conflict, and hopefully, their voices will increase if we give them
something to hope for.
Thanks a lot.
R. Haass: Thank you, Shibley.
I realize I neglected to introduce myself. I'm Richard Haass. I'm the
vice president, and director of Foreign Policy Studies here.
Let me begin with just one or two comments about the attack on the
U.S. ship, and then I'll turn to some of the same issues that Shibley
did. And as you will see, if I may characterize a former U.S.
presidential candidate, this morning you will get a choice, not an
echo.
First, though, with the tragic events of the attack on the Cole.
Unfortunately-it could come from any motive. I could imagine that
those behind this, it could have been existential terrorism, people
who just hate the United States for what we are or what we do. It
could have had something to do with the U.S. military or diplomatic
presence in that region. It could have been tied somehow to the peace
process and to events between Israel and the Palestinians, though
given the level of planning that was clearly involved, it's not
something that was put together hastily. It could have been carried
out by any one of numerous groups. It could have also had state
backing.
The key for the United States right now and the most important tool in
the game of terrorism, the most important tool is always intelligence
and, obviously, U.S. assets will be trained on this issue. If it turns
out there is no state backing that can be identified, U.S. options are
few. Most of these groups offer very poor targets to retaliate against
or to sanction. If there is state backing, however, the United States
has much larger decisions to make about whether, again, there is
military retaliation, sanctions, some combination of the two. But
again, until intelligence comes up with some hard information that
will stand scrutiny in the court of public international opinion, I
think American hands are essentially tied, other than to take the sort
of steps we are taking to try to limit the possibility of a repeat.
Let me talk about events between Israel and the Palestinians. Why are
we having the problems we're having? In my view, it has a lot to do
with the sense of let-down after Camp David; the pervasive sense that
negotiations were tried and failed and that, as a result, it was now
time, increasingly, to try other ways to realize one's political
ambitions-that is, through violence.
Now clearly, the Palestinian side was angered by the Sharon visit and
images of individuals being attacked, but I don't think that is where
the bulk of the responsibility lies. I do not think the bulk of the
responsibility lies in Israeli actions; indeed, had Mr. Sharon not
gone, I think some other match would have lit things off.
I would put the lion's share of the responsibility on the Palestinian
leadership, on both acts of comission and omission, both at the time
of Camp David and afterwards. I'm not suggesting, by the way, that Mr.
Arafat can control or stop all the violence and turn it off like a
spigot. I am not suggesting that. I accept the notion that some of the
violence is ground-up.
But Mr. Arafat has essentially neglected two things: One is his public
role as a delegitimizer of violence. Where are the statements that
make it clear that Palestinians using force are hurting the
Palestinian cause? I do not hear or see those statements. To the
contrary, one sees statements talking about marching to Jerusalem.
More generally, at Camp David, his unwillingness, I think, to
negotiate in good faith had a tremendous impact on the prospects for
diplomacy, something I will come back to. Secondly-in a moment.
In addition, I think Mr. Arafat could be criticized for not calling on
the Palestinian security forces to do their job, and those of you who
have spent time in the Palestinian areas know that it is not a perfect
democracy. It tends to be a fairly buttoned-down environment, and the
forces of the Palestinian Authority are quite strong and able to do
the bidding of the governing body there. They were essentially absent
and allowed things to get out of hand.
Today, there were reports that certain individuals had been arrested.
That's obviously welcome, but it's too little too late. So I think
that Mr. Arafat can be heavily faulted for, again, acts of both
omission and commission.
I also place some of the responsibility on the Arab world more
generally. Clearly, there has been a disappointing lack of any
rallying behind the peace process. Again, the silence is deafening.
Where are the voices in the Arab world for compromise and moderation?
I do not hear them or see them.
What about the United States? What about Camp David? Here, I would
essentially agree with the critique you just heard from Shibley, and I
think we've earned the right to make this critique. It's not simply
Monday-morning quarterbacking, but I think we were making it Sunday
morning also.
Camp David was flawed. It was flawed by being so ambitious, trying to
accomplish so much so soon without having prepared the way. I've
written a book about the concept of rightness. When situations aren't
right, it doesn't make a lot of sense for diplomats to plow ahead as
though all the preconditions were there. Instead, diplomats need to
invest their efforts to create conditions of rightness. And in this
case, it would have meant investing the time with Mr. Arafat, with the
Arab world to try to bring about a context in which ambitious
diplomacy had a much better chance of succeeding.
Failing that, if the administration believed that it was necessary to
convene Camp David urgently because of the fear that the Palestinians
were going to declare a state unilaterally and what that would lead
to, and that's was a legitimate concern, then they needed to scale
down the diplomacy. Diplomacy has to match the size of the
opportunity. It has to deal with the realities of the context. And
Camp David is a textbook example of diplomacy that was more ambitious
than the context would tolerate or support. And again, either we had
to do more to try to shape context, or we had to scale back the
ambition of the diplomacy. We didn't. We plowed ahead with ambitious
diplomacy in an unripe context, and it failed.
I think also the other criticism I would make of the administration is
the lack-not total, but the general lack of public diplomacy to
complement what we were doing privately. If the administration
concluded, and I think it would have been the correct conclusion, that
the center of the Arab world, the center of the Palestinian community
had not been made receptive to compromise, and that their own leaders
were not doing it, the United States should have done more to help
fill that gap. The United States ought to have been speaking out time
and time again to try to go over the heads of the leadership to make
the case for peace, to make the argument about why the course of
compromise was better than the course of either holding out or the
path of confrontation.
There's always a bias on the part of diplomats to think of diplomacy
that's something that has to happen privately and in secret. And
that's true for one level of diplomacy, for the specifics that are
being worked out in terms of compromise. But you've got to shape the
context. And when the local leaders themselves are unable, or more
likely unwilling, to shape the context, it was incumbent upon the
United States and others to help shape that context. And that is
where, again, I fault the administration. Again, an act of omission
more than an act of commission.
The results though are clear. What we have is mounting anger, but not
just anger and bitterness. I think it goes beyond that. I would say in
Israel right now, there's few if any doves left in Israel. And the
reason is two-fold. One is the sense that what was offered at Camp
David by Mr. Barak was by an order of magnitude the most forthcoming,
generous offer that any Israeli government had ever made, and it was
rejected.
And second of all, and here, Shibley again is correct, the impact of
those images. It is violence on a retail scale as well as a wholesale
scale, and the power of retail violence is that people can identify
with it. And these images have shocked people. So it's raised so what
we've seen in the last few week is not simply political questions
raised about whether the Palestinian leadership will ever be a willing
and able partner. But there's much more fundamental questions which
are not psychological as well as political. This has caused trauma on
the Israeli side. On the other side, also very strong reactions from
images, from the frustration. And it is hard for me to see how
essentially you go back to where you were.
The idea of trying to get back to Camp David, to try to get a final
status solution to the Middle East, I, for one, find it inconceivable
for not just the foreseeable future, but maybe beyond that. I just
can't see what would lead people to a position where they are willing
and able to make compromises in the future, in the foreseeable future,
that they were not willing to make this summer. On the Israeli side, I
do not see the survival of a government that is going to be in such a
position to do that. And on the Palestinian side, I don't see the
willingness of that leadership to do that, nor do I see that
leadership taking steps which, over time, would give them greater
capacity to compromise.
So the idea of trying to roll that large boulder back up the hill
towards a final status agreement, I would simply say is -- to say it's
questionable doesn't begin to say it.
What, then, can the United States do, given that there are obvious
limits to what any outsider can do, even what the world's most
powerful country could do. Well, I think there's three scenarios from
this point. And here is, perhaps, where Shibley and I disagree a bit
on the prescription.
One is essentially to do nothing. Sometimes standing there can be the
best strategy. In this case, I'm not so sure. I think if nothing is
done, sooner or later violence will begin to mount and there won't be
any sense of potentially positive purpose for people to look to or
events. Sooner or later you'll have unilateral actions that are taken
by one or the other sides; the other will retaliate in kind with
unilateral actions of its own; and you're more likely to have heavy
skirmishes. And unlike the previous intifada, this is not going to
simply be fought with stones; this is going to be much more
large-scale or medium-scale military confrontations. Needless to say,
that is an unattractive scenario or future.
What about a second approach, which is somewhat akin to what Shibley
would do, and essentially what it would recommend is going back to the
only path of successful peacemaking in the Middle East that we have
known, which is step-by-step-ism. When you think about it, for three
decades Middle Eastern diplomacy has been predicated on the notion of
gradualism; that the final status problems were simply too big, too
hard, and that what you had to do was gradually solve what you could,
and in the process, build up trust and build up momentum so that over
time you could tackle the bigger, tougher remaining issues. This was
the logic of the initial disengagement agreements after the '67, '73
wars; this was the logic of Madrid; this was the logic of, ultimately,
on the way to Camp David, the first Camp David; it was the logic of,
more recently, Oslo. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that
both sides now have disagreements with it.
On the Israeli side, it will be very hard to create support in Israel
for handing over tangible assets like territory, which has been at the
heart of step-by-stepism in exchange for promises of better
Palestinian behavior. I just think that's going to be an awfully tough
sale in Washington, given recent events and given the weakness of the
Barak government. On the Palestinian side, given that issues like
Jerusalem have come up so much to the fore, there's going to be
tremendous frustration with agreeing to a process that doesn't seem to
solve the fundamental issues. Indeed, if you recall, both sides
critiqued step-by-stepism late last spring, and that was part of the
reason that we went to the ambitious approach at Camp David, that
particularly in Israel, and many of Israel's friends in this country
weren't happy with what they saw as the one-sided exchange of Oslo
where Israel was giving up tangibles in exchange for promises.
Palestinians were frustrated with the slow pace of Oslo, and the
United States essentially gave into that.
So it's hard for me, again, to see how we go back to step-by-stepism,
as good as it, I think, served us for all those decades given that
critique and given intervening events.
Where does that leave us if ambition is not going to work, doing
nothing is not attractive, and if resurrecting gradualism may be
extremely difficult? Well, my only other alternative and the title I
will use for it is what I would call concerted unilateralism. And let
me try to explain it.
By this I mean that the two sides would try to informally or tacitly
orchestrate a series of unilateral moves in which they are not
surprised by what the other does, but, on the other hand, they do not
formally sign on to it. Or to put it another way, they try to
implement those areas that they had negotiated at Camp David. They try
to implement as many of them as they can without formally agreeing to
what the other side does. It is the equivalent, if I may use a
somewhat stretch analogy, to what is being considered in the arms
control area where the United States and Russia cannot agree on formal
arms control agreements. They signal each other. They communicate to
each other what it is they're going to do. They carry it out openly so
that the other side can monitor it. And you essentially agree tacitly
or informally to proceed down a certain path reciprocally. I can
imagine where Israelis and Palestinians could do this so you would
conceivably have a Palestinian state. You would have an Israel
annexing certain areas where settlements are very dense, where there
would be other understandings that would take place, but you would not
put the pressure on the political leadership of either side to
necessarily agree to this in a formal agreement.
Now, I'm not going to stand up here today and tell you that this will
be easy. I am not going to stand up here today and tell you that this
is ideal. It is neither easy nor ideal. But what I am simply trying to
do is suggest an alternative that seems to me to be worthy of
consideration given the either unattractiveness or the difficulty in
all the other alternatives that all the experts can imagine.
But that essentially is where we are. And if people don't like my
recommendation, that's fine. I also can critique it. I would simply
say that it is now incumbent upon people to think about we resurrect
some form of a diplomatic process. But I do not think we can simply
carry on as though Camp David and the subsequent events did not
happen. And I do not simply think we have the luxury of doing nothing
and watching the situation gradually deteriorate. And I realize I have
not spoken about the implications for this for the American election,
but since I was asked to, I will, and I will stop there.
I think if this situation essentially calms itself in the next couple
of days and if does calm itself on the ground, there's no more
terrorist attacks, the violence between Israel and the Palestinians
essentially goes down to a very low level, the oil price recovers the
several dollars it went up yesterday, I do not think this will have a
material effect on the American election. However, if the crisis
continues or builds, if oil prices stay high, if there's other
terrorist attacks, if violence becomes the norm between Israel and the
Palestinians, if it were to spread, if that scenario were to happen, I
do think it would have an impact on the American election. It is
always difficult making predictions, particularly when they are about
the future, if I may paraphrase Yogi Berra. But I would think that, on
balance, such a scenario, that darker scenario would probably work to
the disadvantage of Mr. Gore. I think it would for at least two
reasons. One would be that when polls are taken asking the American
people to make judgments about which party did they tend to have more
confidence in, on most domestic issues, it tends to be Democrats. On
foreign policy issues, it has traditionally tended to be Republicans.
Secondly and more fundamentally, I think if the price of oil stays
high, if the stock markets continue to reel in this country and around
the world, if there is a general sense that things are not peaceful
and prosperous, it is going to be harder for the de facto incumbent to
make the case to stick with the status quo and that you are
dramatically or demonstrably better off than you were in the past.
So I think if there's a brewing storm in the Middle East, it probably
weighs, in general, on the side of the ledger in favor of the American
people voting for change.
Let me leave it at that. And let me invite your questions. All I ask
is that you wait for the microphone, you identify yourselves and you
try to keep it fairly short, and Professor Telhami and I will do our
best to address them.
Question: [Off mic] -- McKenzie. I wanted to ask you, if the U.S. now
is in a position, as Shibley has said, where it's difficult to play
the role that it could have played even as far back as two weeks ago,
what role can other countries, be it the United Nations or European
countries, play at this time? And do they have a role to play?
And also, if you'd just comment on Egypt's role specifically?
S. Telhami: Well, actually, that's a good question, obviously, because
you could see the intensity of international diplomacy. Kofi Annan has
been there, and people were optimistic about what he can deliver, and
so forth. I think ultimately no one can play the same role as the U.S.
can play because of the objective levers that the U.S. has. It's not
just a matter of diplomacy. It's a matter of having the power to back
it up. Kofi Annan could be a nice man, perfectly trusted by both sides
and well meaning. But ultimately, he can't even deliver the U.N.,
right? He can't deliver the Security Council. And so the U.S. remains,
in my mind, the central player. Now, it might need help. And I think
what has happened, in fact, in the past two months since the collapse
of the Camp David negotiations, is that Egypt has played a significant
role. And I think, in fact, if you talk to American diplomats today,
they tell you that Egypt has played an extremely helpful role for the
U.S. since the collapse of the Camp David. I know there was criticism
early on. But in the past few months, Egypt has played a critical
role. And the reason for it is that Egypt has the trust of the
Palestinians. They can communicate with them. Mr. Mubarak is seen to
be perhaps the most influential man with Yasser Arafat. And Egypt has
coordinated most of its diplomacy with the U.S., and, clearly, it
consults with the Israelis.
So Egypt has had a very important role obviously in consultation with
the U.S., because the Egyptian role cannot succeed without the backing
of the U.S. And it wouldn't be a surprise if the next summit would be
in Egypt, obviously. The Egyptians are playing an extremely important
role in persuading Yasser Arafat to come to the summit, and that's
going to be critical. But the bottom line is I think no one else can
do it other than the U.S., and I think American interests are at
stake. Therefore, the U.S. must be playing a role not only to help the
parties, but to protect its own interests.
R. Haass: I would give a slightly different answer. I don't think
anybody can do it. And I'm much more aware at the moment of the limits
to U.S. influence than I am of the potential for it. We couldn't
persuade Mr. Arafat to compromise at Camp David in any meaningful way.
We've not been able to heavily influence events subsequently to that.
We couldn't prevent the attack on our ship. What this shows to me is,
quite graphically, that the difference in translating power into
influence. And we're the world's most powerful country, but hourly we
are seeing still messages or signs of the limits of our influence.
Secondly, I would give a less benign interpretation of Egyptian
foreign policy. I think Egypt's been a major disappointment in two
ways. One is the quality of its peace with Israel. If Egypt really
wanted to contribute to the peace process, it would warm up its peace
with Israel. It is something that it has systematically neglected to
do over the last several decades, and that has had a powerful effect
upon the Israel public. It's very hard to make the argument that peace
will ever be anything more than the most fundamental form of
non-belligerency. I think that has had a negative impact. And second,
again, I may be missing it. But I don't see Egyptian voices out there
speaking out over this new media in the Palestinian world, in the Arab
world, making the case for compromise, making the case for restraint,
essentially creating space for Yasser Arafat, if he were so inclined,
to be more forthcoming. Again, it's the acts of omission, which are
just as powerful as the acts of commission here.
S. Telhami: Well, may I just follow up on that. I mean, you know, I
agree with you on one very important point, which is the
people-to-people peace, I think the warming issue. And you made that
point also in your opening remarks that I think is an excellent point.
I think this is one that has been really underplayed, that, you know,
peace-making cannot only be between governments. You have to have a
component that reaches to the people involved, and we have to prepare
the psychology for it. It works not only in the Egyptian-Israeli
peace, but even in the relation between the U.S. and the region
itself. That, too, is an aspect that's missing.
But having said this, I think in the past few days, actually, and I've
been following the media pretty well, the Egyptian president has taken
a remarkably restraining position and a very effective position. He's
been out on the media criticizing those who are calling for war,
criticizing Yemen for making statements about having a property next
to Israel to-you know, to wage a war. He's actually been doing it in a
very humorous fashion that is populist. And I think you'd be surprised
to hear the sort of rhetoric he's employing in that.
Now, you know, is it too little too late? I don't know. But at this
point when passions are high, it's a very, very important thing. Now,
mind you, he's not just doing it for Israel or the Palestinians. I
mean there's no question that every government in the Middle East that
is friendly to the U.S. and to Israel at this time is stressed. These
kinds of movements that are being unleashed are scary to most of them.
And they have an interest in preventing them, because they're
ultimately going to pay a price themselves. And so you know, what
they're doing they're doing largely for survival.
R. Haass: Sir?
Question: Jay Hancock, Baltimore Sun. To what extent do both of you
think that the parties at Camp David II, particularly the Americans,
we seduced by the vision of what happened at Camp David I, that these
guys could go in without an agreement and this sort of magic happened,
and that they were crossing their fingers and expecting the same
thing, even though the parties and the issues were very different? R.
Haass: Do you want to take that?
S. Telhami: Yes, sure.
I think, clearly the model-obviously that's why I called it Camp David
2, being held in the same place. There was the lure of that. I think
they both understood that it's a different kind of conflict and it's a
more complex conflict. And to be fair to them they have both come a
long way. I mean, they have narrowed the gap tremendously. They were
within striking distance on most issues; I wouldn't say all issues,
but most issues, including some that seemed intractable, like
settlements, where they really reached a far-you know, reaching
agreement on security issues where, surprisingly, the gap between them
wasn't big at all.
I think the issue of Jerusalem was the one, I think, where they
overshot. I think if that had been taken out of the game they had a
very good chance to reach an agreement. I think that was really the
overshooting.
R. Haass: I think that I would tend, maybe, to be a little bit
harsher. I'm suffering from a cold which made me more negative than I
usually am. But I think there was some hubris there. I think there was
too much confidence that somehow if you got people around the table
and you worked them for several days or weeks that you would somehow
be able to bring them around. And I just think that we were
unrealistic in that expectation.
Question: Al Millikan, Washington Independent Writers. Do you see Bill
Clinton attempting to play a key role personally in the days ahead?
And if so, how do you see, particularly Israelis and Palestinians,
those in negotiation, and I guess more significantly now, as you say,
this expands religiously, Jews and Muslims. How trustworthy do they
see Bill Clinton in a role of broker or negotiator? And I'm wondering
too, just from a religious point of view, aside from the chance on the
street of God is great, how is this becoming more religious? Is the
Koran, the Torah, the Bible, is this a source that people are turning
to.
S. Telhami: Well, okay, let me start with the more complex question,
which is the second question about how is it turning into a religious
issue. Well first of all, the God is great is not a symbol of-this is
a saying that has nothing to do with mobilizing politics. I mean,
people chant it. It's just saying God is greater than any crisis that
we face, something along those lines. In and of itself it's not an
indicator of anything.
You have moderates chanting it, you have extremists chanting it. It
doesn't mean anything.
What I was referring to is more in terms of, number one, the
mobilizational aspect of it. When you are talking about-if you go, for
example, to the mosque, or Friday prayer, what is the Imam going to
speak about? The Imam is going to speak about this crisis to defend
Jerusalem, the holiest site for Islam. And it's incumbent upon most
Muslims to defend it. This becomes an incredible mobilizational
vehicle. And so you turn what is a social religious movement into a
very effective political movement, mobilized over a poor issue to
these people in the same way that you can have the synagogue being an
effective organizational mechanism. And so then you have the public
manifestation of it. And so I look at the organizational aspect as
being the core issue. It becomes more of a problem because the primary
opposition, not only in the Palestinian areas but also in the Arab
world, is Islam is opposition by virtue of the fact that mosque
remains to be the most important instrument for social organization
that is allowed, because you don't have genuine political opposition
in most of these places. And so as a consequence, what you're
essentially doing is you're providing what is an existing opposition
with existing mobilizational structure, a very sharp weapon to turn
against the governments and authorities.
Now, most of the reasoning for it isn't just over the question of
Jerusalem. There is opposition for a number of reasons. But that's why
it becomes that. And in the process you start having people running
for their lives. You know, when you have -- go burning a synagogue or
burning a mosque in Tiberius, or even Israeli-Arabs and Israeli-Jews
killing each other, it becomes an issue. By the way, even in Israeli
democracy it's been a fascinating story about the role of religion. In
the early days, in the Islamic political groups refused to even by
part of the Israeli system because they considered it to be
illegitimate. They didn't vote, they didn't run for elections. After
the Oslo Accords they though thought the conflict is coming to an end
so they'd better get their share of the goods from the government. So
they decided to run and vote and fill their own candidates in the
Israeli Knesset. Today we have a couple of Islamic fundamentalist
members of the Israeli Knesset.
Now, what does that do? That means that those members, because they're
representing Islamic groups, they're going to use Islamic symbols to
lure the public away from other parties, especially the secular
parties in the Arab sector, the former Communist Party which
essentially dominated for a long time. So as a consequence it's in
their interest to highlight religious issues to bring more votes. And
they succeeded, by the way, last time around, by highlighting the
religious issues in Nazareth to gain more votes in the Israeli Knesset
than did the secular parties among the Arabs in Israel. So that's what
I'm talking about.
As for Bill Clinton, just briefly, I don't think the question really
anymore is his legacy. I think it is of national security interest to
the United States now. Any president would put a lot of time on it,
not in the same way. He did lose-I think he's still admired and
respected by the Palestinians and the Israelis. He did lose some of
his luster since Camp David. The Israelis think, for example, because
of the UN vote where the US abstained, I think he's not blaming the
Palestinians enough, and the Palestinians believe that he's blaming
them too much. And that has resulted in, you know, some shaking of the
confidence. But the Israelis certainly trust him a lot more than the
Palestinians right now.
Question: Andrew Schneider, Kiplinger Washington Editors. What do you
think is the likelihood that Arafat will go ahead with his planned
declaration for unilateral independence that he'd claimed he'd go
ahead with in November?
R. Haass: When he went around the world he was met with a resounding
lack of support for it, as you know, even places in Europe where
traditionally he received a much warmer welcome. The question is how
that's changed now, and I think that might depend upon what's going on
on the ground. I think people will be reluctant to support it if they
think it would trigger some massive sort of violence. A lot might
depend upon whether there has been any resumption of any sport of a
diplomatic process between Israelis and Palestinians. I think it's
harder for him to hold off. In the absence of anything going on the
pressure will grow on him to do it, so again, it seems to me it argues
for one of two courses, either trying to start up some kind of
step-by-stepism, as difficult as that is, or failing that, to make
sure that if he is going to go ahead with it it's clearly scripted or
concerted with the Israelis so they understand what's coming, and the
Palestinians understand what's coming in return. What you want to
avoid, I think, is a situation where he does it and it's seen
effectively as a hostile act and the Israelis then retaliate in all
sorts of ways, and then the Palestinians retaliate back, and then
we're off to a very unfortunate set of races.
Question: Rick Whittle with the Dallas Morning News. If the
Palestinians have lost faith in the US as an honest broker and the US
broker has lost faith in Arafat as an honest negotiator, and if the
Camp David summit failed because it wasn't prepared in advance, what
would you think would be accomplished in an emergency summit? What
should the agenda be, and how should the US prepare to go into it?
S. Telhami: Well first of all, I don't think they've lost faith. I
think the term lost faith too strong. I describe it as a crisis of
confidence. I think the relationship between Arafat and Clinton is
still a good, working relationship and I think there is still a level
of confidence that is considerably smaller than it was. I think they
need to build it because what's required is not just to have a
relationship but a persuasive relationship because you need to affect
the decisions of the other. And in that sense there is a crisis that
could be rebuilt. I don't think that's beyond retrieval, although
obviously given the timing it's very, very tough.
The aim-in my judgment, the aim of the summit should be to do two
things. One, to put a structure that would stop the cycle of violence.
It's number one. I think that right now if you have it you're going to
have really a change-fundamental change in the conflict that's not
going to be reversed. So you're going to have that. And number two,
you have to have statements from both leaders, an appeal to their
people to redefine, you know-it has to be a very serious public
posture by both of them, the commitment to avoid violence. And number
three, building that relationship of confidence between the US and the
Palestinians, including adding a structure element to it, perhaps by
appointing an emissary that would work on it full time.
R. Haass: I would simply say that you don't have it unless you've
written a communique in advance. You know that you're going to get
enough out of the summit to make it worth it. You can't afford another
failure. So you've got to-if you're going to have a summit it's got to
be clear before it happens that you're going to have a clear call for
cessation of violence, some steps to support that, and the beginnings
of some sort of a political process. That seems to me to be the
minimum requirement to hold any summit.
Yes, ma'am.
Question: Geraldine Pitts, Fox News Channel. This is a question, Mr.
Haass, that's directed towards you. Mr. Telhami mentioned in his
opening remarks the issue of oil. How significant do you feel oil is,
and particularly in terms of US interest?
R. Haass: Oil is extraordinarily important. It's not simply the fact
that we import so much of it, but oil, literally and figuratively
fuels the industrialized world. So the most important aspect of oil is
its availability, which is the supply question. And right now that
hasn't come into question, although supplies are short, which is
driving up prices. But the second facet of oil is the price. And
clearly the high prices have spooked the market, clearly the high
prices are feeding inflationary pressures around the world, and it
will dramatically also-if they stay this high-the prices will
dramatically effect economic growth rates because it will eat into
that. So it's important obviously. And I think the goal is to keep it
available, in adequate supplies, and so far, at least, again, there
haven't been any supply interruptions and there's no clear signs there
will be. And second of all, to the extent this situation calms it will
undo the price spike of yesterday, oil will again, I think, start
moving downwards, and I think it's not unrealistic to hope that oil
settles somewhere in the mid-20s in terms of dollars per barrel. But
that ought to be the goal because you cannot minimize the impact of
oil on either the American economy, and more fundamentally, the world
economy.
Well, we've kept you here for an hour and I want to thank you for
coming this morning. And I hope events are not such that we have to do
another one of these. I want to thank Shibley Telhami, and thank you
all for coming to Brookings this morning.
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