11 October 2000
Text: Susan Rice Outlines U.S. Policy on Sierra Leone
(Addresses Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs) (3890)
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice told
Senate lawmakers October 11 that there appears to be "an uneasy
tactical pause" in major military operations against Sierra Leone's
government by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces.
But Rice added in her prepared remarks before the Senate Subcommittee
on African Affairs that as long as the RUF-inspired instability
continues in Sierra Leone, the conflict will have "serious long-term
effects on political and economic development throughout the
subregion. The conflict has drawn in several neighboring countries and
threatens West Africa's stability while draining it of precious
resources. The stakes are therefore high, not only for Sierra Leone's
own long-suffering people, but also for all of West Africa."
Rice said that the RUF now maintains control over large portions of
Sierra Leone. The rebels also have imposed a "reign of terror" over
thousands of innocents and have stifled government efforts "to extend
its authority into these areas of lawlessness and terror. Only under
accountable, responsible, democratic governance can these human rights
abuses be curtailed and minimal living standards reintroduced. Only
when the rule of law is extended to all of Sierra Leone's territory
and those most responsible for the horrendous atrocities are held
accountable before a court of law will the population experience the
freedom and the confidence necessary to rebuild their war-ravaged
country."
Rice said that it is essential to stop the "diamonds-for-guns" trade
between the RUF and Liberian President Charles Taylor and others that
is fueling the conflict. She noted that President Clinton on October
11 signed a proclamation imposing travel sanctions to the United
States on Taylor and other government officials (and their families)
who "impede the peace process" in Sierra Leone.
Critical to achieving peace in Sierra Leone, Rice said, is a
strengthening of the U.N. peacekeeping mission mandate while also
increasing its (UNAMSIL's) numbers.
"Thus, we will continue to work for a new UNAMSIL resolution that
provides a mandate to support the Sierra Leone army in compelling RUF
compliance with its obligation to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
into society," Rice said. "UNAMSIL's U.S.-trained and equipped West
African battalions, once deployed, will form a key component of the
enhanced UNAMSIL, and we expect will play an assertive role in
countering the RUF."
As for the RUF, she said the administration believes that it "must
cease to function as a military force. There must be early and full
disarmament of the RUF through a credible and effective disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process." UNAMSIL also must
have "freedom of movement" as it assists government in gradually
establishing "authority throughout the country." And, she said, the
RUF must "relinquish control of all diamond areas and key
transportation and communication routes" to the government. Nor should
the RUF "be rewarded by being guaranteed a place in the government,"
Rice said.
Given RUF's failure to fulfill its obligations under the Lome Peace
Accords, she said, "only increased pressure on the rebels can reliably
end this conflict and the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone."
Following is the text of Rice's statement as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on African Affairs
Washington, DC, October 11, 2000
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SIERRA LEONE
Achieving Peace and Justice in Sierra Leone
Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you for inviting me today to
testify on Sierra Leone. There have been few civil conflicts during
the past decade as brutal and complex as this one, and I commend you,
Mr. Chairman, and the members of your committee for our shared
interest in trying to bring peace and justice to this tragic country.
As I have said on previous occasions, we remain fully committed to
working with Congress to help ease the suffering of the Sierra Leonean
people and help them find a lasting solution to this crisis.
The Threat of Regional Instability
Mr. Chairman, we have important interests in achieving peace in Sierra
Leone. Continued instability in Sierra Leone will have serious
long-term effects on political and economic development throughout the
sub-region. The conflict has drawn in several neighboring countries
and threatens West Africa's stability while draining it of precious
resources. The stakes are therefore high, not only for Sierra Leone's
own long-suffering people, but also for all of West Africa.
Currently, Sierra Leone is divided. Effective government control is
limited to Freetown and the Lungi peninsula and other areas in the
South -- thanks mainly to the presence of troops from the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Kingdom in
those areas. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) continues to launch
numerous small-scale attacks. UNAMSIL patrols roads between its
peninsular bases and its positions at Kenema, Bo, and Daru. There
appears at present to be an uneasy tactical pause in RUF military
operations.
But as long as the conflict continues, there is a risk that it will
spill over even more dramatically into neighboring countries and
create more instability and human suffering. Liberia has been involved
in this conflict almost from the beginning, and now Guinea is victim
to cross-border incursions by RUF elements and their allies. This has
led to increased domestic instability within Guinea, which is already
hosting nearly half a million refugees from both Sierra Leone and
Liberia. An estimated 5,000 of these refugees have crossed into Guinea
since renewed violence erupted in May.
Dire Humanitarian Conditions
With the RUF still in control of large portions of Sierra Leone, a
significant percentage of the population remains subject to its reign
of terror. This continued control makes it impossible for relief
organizations to provide food and assistance to thousands of victims
of the RUF, including those who have been raped and mutilated. The
people under the RUF's power also do not have access to the most basic
social services, including health care and education. As a result,
they are condemned to lives of fear, sickness, and poverty. We cannot
allow these abominable conditions to endure.
Extending Democratic Governance
That is why it is so important that the United States continue to
support the elected democratic government of Sierra Leone's efforts to
extend its authority into these areas of lawlessness and terror. Only
under accountable, responsible, democratic governance can these human
rights abuses be curtailed and minimal living standards reintroduced.
Only when the rule of law is extended to all of Sierra Leone's
territory and those most responsible for the horrendous atrocities are
held accountable before a court of law will the population experience
the freedom and the confidence necessary to rebuild their war-ravaged
country.
It is also essential to choke the diamond revenues fueling the
conflict, as the RUF continues to trade diamonds for guns with
Liberian President Charles Taylor and others. The United States has a
keen interest in successful implementation of UNSC Resolution 1306,
which we sponsored, in order to ban trade in rough diamonds from
Sierra Leone except those that have a certificate of origin issued by
the Government. We also remain committed to the return of full control
of the diamond mines to the elected government of Sierra Leone.
Supporting the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
Critical to achieving a lasting peace in Sierra Leone is ensuring that
the UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, succeeds. But for UNAMSIL to
succeed it must be strengthened. To this end, we are prepared to
support a substantial increase in the size of the force and the
strength of its mandate. We support increasing its forces from the
current level of approximately 13,000 troops, to at least 20,500 and
are working hard to obtain the necessary commitments from potential
troop contributors.
Equally critical is ensuring that UNAMSIL has the mandate, as well as
the means, to accomplish these goals. An increase in the number of
troops without any strengthening of its mandate, will not produce
results. Thus, we will continue to work for a new UNAMSIL resolution
that provides a mandate to support the Sierra Leone army in compelling
RUF compliance with its obligation to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate into society. UNAMSIL's U.S.-trained and equipped West
African battalions, once deployed, will form a key component of the
enhanced UNAMSIL, and we expect will play an assertive role in
countering the RUF. The United States is committed to the success of
this mission. Furthermore, since Britain's direct military role in
Sierra Leone and its training of the Sierra Leone Army are critical to
stabilizing the situation in that country, support for British
training efforts is also a high priority.
We have also begun to help train and equip seven battalions of West
African troops to bolster the UN forces already deployed there. With
increased capacity, UNAMSIL should be able, together with the Sierra
Leone army now being trained by the British, to help the legitimate
government extend its control over all major population centers, its
borders, and the diamond producing areas.
Dealing With the RUF
We believe that the RUF must cease to function as a military force.
There must be early and full disarmament of the RUF through a credible
and effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
process. A renewed DDR program should include immediate, permanent
physical separation of RUF combatants from their commanders.
The RUF must not interfere with the Government of Sierra Leone's and
UNAMSIL's freedom of movement in Sierra Leone as UNAMSIL assists the
Sierra Leone Army in the progressive extension of the GOSL's authority
throughout the country. The RUF must also relinquish control of all
diamond areas and key transportation and communication routes to the
GOSL.
Furthermore, we believe the RUF should not be rewarded by being
guaranteed a place in the government. However, as an incentive to end
the conflict, individual, disarmed/demobilized members of the RUF who
are not guilty of war crimes or atrocities should not be prohibited
from entering the political life of the country. But the RUF must also
respect the authority of the Special Court.
The Origins of the Crisis in Sierra Leone
It is important to understand the history of the conflict in Sierra
Leone prior to the Lome Agreement of July 1999.
The Revolutionary United Front began its assault against the central
government of Sierra Leone in March 1991 with a two-pronged
cross-border incursion from Liberia. With interruptions, fighting has
continued ever since.
In May 1997, President Kabbah's democratically elected government was
overthrown by a military coup and moved to Conakry, Guinea. The
leaders of the military coup invited the RUF to join them in ruling
the country under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).
President Kabbah and his government were only able to return to
Freetown in March 1998 after being restored to power following the
military intervention by the Nigerian-led regional peacekeeping forces
(ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Over the course of 1998, the RUF and its rebel allies, the former
members of the AFRC and of the Sierra Leone Army who supported them,
regrouped and with external assistance funneled primarily through
Liberia, avoided full defeat by ECOMOG and instead regained the
initiative.
The United States was able to provide ECOMOG with logistics assistance
through an initial $3.9 million contract with Pacific Architects and
Engineers (PA and E) and their sub-contractor International Charters
Incorporated (ICI). The Netherlands provided 80 trucks that were
transported from Liberia, where they had been initially delivered to
ECOMOG.
The European Union at the time was reluctant to assist ECOMOG while
Sani Abacha was still president of Nigeria. The financial burden for
combatting the RUF in Sierra Leone thus fell largely on Nigeria, with
a reported cost of about $1 million per day.
From mid-1998 until late 1999, the RUF and its insurgent allies swept
back from the east through the north and then parts of the west of
Sierra Leone before attacking Freetown itself in early January 1999.
While the forces of ECOMOG eventually drove the RUF back out of
Freetown, it was also clear that the RUF were a force that could not
be defeated by ECOMOG alone. Nor did the international community
appear to have both the will and the ability to defeat the RUF
militarily.
For our part, we had already spent our entire allotted voluntary
peacekeeping budget for Africa on Sierra Leone. In fact, since 1991 we
have spent well over $110 million supporting ECOWAS peacekeeping
missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The United States was far and
away the largest donor to ECOMOG. Moreover, there was also
considerable skepticism among some in Congress about providing further
assistance to ECOMOG under the military regime then governing Nigeria,
which had provided the bulk of the West African troops trying to keep
the rebel forces in check.
Even after the brutal RUF attack on Freetown in January 1999, several
holds were placed on our notifications of intent to program voluntary
peacekeeping funds intended to support the ECOWAS troops. Later in
1999, the newly elected democratic government in Nigeria, now
accountable to its people, decided to withdraw its troops absent a
massive infusion of resources from the international community. This
meant that a military solution -- the effective defeat of the RUF --
was no longer a realistic option. To stop the killing, a negotiated
solution became essential.
Against this backdrop, the regional states sponsored the Lome
discussions that led to a cease-fire in May 1999. Representing the
United States, Reverend Jesse Jackson spent one day in Lome and on
that day, May 18, 1999, succeeded in helping achieve a cessation of
hostilities agreement. The Lome peace agreement that followed two
months later in July 1999 was the result of regional peace
negotiations sponsored by the Economic Community of West African
States between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, which were
supported by the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organization of
African Unity, the United States, Great Britain, and others. The
Foreign Minister of Togo oversaw these negotiations.
Following the Lome Agreement, ECOMOG remained in Sierra Leone to
maintain security, but Nigeria, under the democratically elected
government of President Obasanjo, signaled that it could not continue
bearing the cost of this mission alone. In the absence of a great deal
more direct assistance to ECOMOG, the United Nations would have to
take ECOMOG's place. The United States was unable to assume that
burden alone since we have available less than $15 million a year to
fund non-UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. No other donor was
willing to make any significant contributions to ECOMOG.
The UN Security Council in October 1999 authorized a 6,000-strong
peacekeeping mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to replace the very
small military observer group (UNOMSIL). Nigeria agreed to contribute
troops to UNAMSIL and continue to play a leading role in UNAMSIL
leadership.
Unfortunately, the RUF [flouted] its commitments and violated in the
most horrific ways the Lome agreement. Their reprehensible actions
left Sierra Leoneans still searching for peace. We welcome the capture
of Foday Sankoh and look forward to the day he stands before justice
in a court of law. But we also recognize that his trial alone will not
bring peace -- there is much work that must still be done on the
ground -- by a strengthened UNAMSIL and by the government and army and
people of Sierra Leone.
The Lome accord was a peace agreement widely welcomed by the people of
Sierra Leone. As many members of Sierra Leonean civil society stressed
to Secretary Albright a year ago, the people of Sierra Leone were
desperate for peace -- even if it meant justice were to be deferred.
Peace meant to them that the horrors would finally stop, lives could
be rebuilt, and that the diamond mines could revert to the control of
the government. For the RUF, it was their best chance to lay down
their arms, become a constructive political player in Sierra Leone,
and escape further world ostracism. While the agreement established a
domestic, but not international amnesty, and allowed limited RUF
non-elected representation in the government, it was an agreement that
was freely and willingly negotiated by the Sierra Leonean parties
themselves. If the Lome agreement's provisions had been respected by
the RUF, Sierra Leoneans would be well on their way by now to
rebuilding their impoverished and war-ravaged country.
The Lome agreement, like many others elsewhere before it, was a
calculated risk that didn't play out as the people of Sierra Leone,
the international community, or the United States would have hoped.
Some may now second-guess the inclusion of the rebels in any kind of
peace process, given their grisly record. But this would not be
realistic, given the circumstances. Nor was it the first time that
rebels have taken part in peace talks after committing atrocities.
Mozambique, Guatemala, and El Salvador, to name just three countries,
have stable democratic governments following peace arrangements worked
out between one or more sides once employing terror tactics against
civilian populations.
The people of Sierra Leone would not have us forget that for almost
one full year the atrocities largely stopped, some inaccessible areas
were opened, and more than 20,000 combatants were disarmed.
When the RUF then attacked the UN peacekeepers sent to oversee the
implementation of the Lome peace accord, they violated the will of the
Sierra Leonean people and squandered the opportunity for peace.
Current U.S. Policy Goals
Help the Government of Sierra Leone gain control of territory
We support a UN Security Council resolution that would forge a robust
UNAMSIL operation. This resolution will likely come up in December. In
the interim, we are working with current and potential troop
contributors to secure adequate and capable troops to help restore
peace and stability to Sierra Leone. An augmented UNAMSIL must have
the mandate and the means to support the Sierra Leone Army in
compelling RUF compliance with its obligation to disarm, demobilize,
and reintegrate into society. U.S.-trained and equipped West African
battalions will form a key component of the enhanced UNAMSIL mission
and will be expected to play an assertive role in countering the RUF.
In addition, we place a high priority on supporting the direct
military role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone and its training
of the Sierra Leone army.
Promote Accountability
The Sierra Leone Independent Special Court, whose establishment we
championed, must now become an instrument for swift and exemplary
justice for those members of the RUF and related insurgent groups who
bear the greatest responsibility for violations of international
humanitarian law and related Sierra Leonean law.
Other Sierra Leonean transgressors could be tried in Sierra Leonean
domestic courts or appear before the truth and reconciliation
commission.
Liberia and the RUF
Liberian President Charles Taylor's support and patronage of the RUF
is intolerable and must end. In July, Under Secretary Pickering put
Taylor plainly on notice that he must sever his support for the RUF
and the illicit diamond trade or face the consequences. He made plain
to President Taylor that we will take the necessary measures,
including sanctions, to ensure that the Government of Liberia ceases
aiding the RUF.
Today, the President announced that we will impose travel sanctions on
President Taylor, other Liberian government officials, and their
family members for their support of the RUF. Further sanctions, should
they be necessary, are under active consideration. We call upon the
international community and, in particular, Liberia's regional
neighbors to join in this effort to maximize its effectiveness.
Our intent is to raise the costs to Taylor of his support for the RUF
by limiting his freedom of action, denying him resources, and exposing
as widely as possible to world opinion his destructive role in the
region. There should be no mistaking our position: we recognize the
corrosive role that Taylor is playing in the tragedy of Sierra Leone
and the spreading instability in the region, and we are committed to
bringing his destructive influence to an end.
Strategy and Implementation
Our strategy to bring peace and stability to Sierra Leone involves
ongoing consultation and coordination with the UK, the GOSL, key
regional states, and others at the UN in order to project and win
support for our goals. Accordingly, our approach holds the RUF to its
Lome Agreement obligations to disarm and demobilize while denying the
RUF the political benefits it would have enjoyed had it honored the
original agreement.
We should expect bids from the RUF for a cease-fire or even a new
negotiated settlement, but any such bids must be treated with the
greatest skepticism. There should be no further concessions made to
these rebels and their allies. Although it may be impossible to defeat
the RUF purely by military means, we must insist that the Government
of Sierra Leone and all others hold firm against cease-fires or
negotiated settlements that leave the RUF in control of any territory
or give it a material basis for again challenging the Government of
Sierra Leone's authority.
As I have noted, our primary "tools" in this effort are to harden and
augment UNAMSIL, equip and train West African troops, support the
United Kingdom's training mission for the Sierra Leone Army, curb the
illicit diamond trade, increase pressure on Liberian President Taylor
to stop supporting and directing the RUF, establish the Independent
Special Court, and help the Government of Sierra Leone in the
reconstruction of Sierra Leone's institutions.
A New Approach
The regional states, most in the international community, and the
United States recognize that, given the failure of the RUF to fulfill
its obligations under the Lome peace accord, only increased pressure
on the rebels can reliably end this conflict and the suffering of the
people of Sierra Leone. We call upon Congress to make adequate funding
available to support the United Nations peacekeeping force already
deployed in Sierra Leone.
We have already notified Congress of our intention to support a
Security Council resolution that would strengthen UNAMSIL's mandate
and increase its size from 13,000 to 20,500 troops. To this end, we
are actively engaged in supporting United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan's efforts to identify and recruit additional troops for
UNAMSIL. In addition to asking Congress to support this strengthened
UNAMSIL, we need Congressional support for equipping and training up
to seven West African battalions for effective service in UNAMSIL.
We are also working with our British allies to assist their training
mission for the Sierra Leone Army. Finally, we will seek Congressional
support for the necessary resources to build accountability through
the creation of the Independent Special Court for Sierra Leone to
bring to justice those most responsible for the atrocities perpetrated
on its people. It will be critical in establishing and operating the
Independent Special Court for a number of years, that sufficient and
sustained voluntary funding be contributed by the international
community, including the United States.
Mr. Chairman, we in the Administration are committed to using all the
means that are available to us to help the people of Sierra Leone
break the cycle of violence and impunity plaguing their country. We
must stand together with the West African regional states and the
United Nations to achieve that goal.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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