Ambassador Holbrooke on UN Peacekeeping Assessments Oct. 3
Statement by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, on the Peacekeeping Scale of
Assessments, in the 5th Committee of the General Assembly, October 3,
2000
Mr. Chairman, Fellow Ambassadors and delegates, it is a pleasure to be
here with you again this morning. After yesterday's encouraging
opening session, I have high hopes for the tough work we have ahead.
What we decide in the coming months will be critical to the future of
UN peacekeeping, and the future of the United Nations itself.
Today this committee begins work on its most important task for the
rest of the year -- to fundamentally revamp and institutionalize the
way we finance peacekeeping. We have been concerned about this issue
for nearly forty years, since the Hammarskjold era. At that time, when
the only UN operations were in Congo and the Middle East, the Kennedy
Administration, working with other delegations, sought to make the
system more fair and equitable by pushing for the creation of a
special peacekeeping scale tied to the regular budget scale. They
sought to create a system based on capacity to pay. As a result of
deep political divisions, including a fundamental lack of consensus on
the UN's commitment to peacekeeping, they failed.
At the start of this new century, with the UN's responsibilities
having increased exponentially since the era of Hammarskjold and
Kennedy, we have an historic opportunity to finally get peacekeeping
right. There is now no dispute that the 1973 peacekeeping financing
system is outdated and lacks the political support of the membership;
there is no question that it must be made fair and equitable; there is
no disagreement that UN peacekeeping must be fixed to be saved. It's
clear to all of us that the status quo is not acceptable.
This was most apparent last May, when the catastrophe in Sierra Leone
served as an exclamation point for the overall crisis in peacekeeping.
Since then, we have seen signs of progress: over 75 Member States from
every region and political allegiance joined together to call for
revisions of the UN's ad hoc peacekeeping scale of assessment. Last
month during the Millennium Summit, the leaders of the P5 issued an
historic joint statement that stressed the importance of revising the
peacekeeping scale and emphasized their particular responsibility. And
the United States and Russia issued a separate joint statement
reaffirming our concern about peacekeeping and our commitment to work
together closely on the issue.
Now we begin this discussion in earnest. It is time to get into the
details and to move from words to deeds. With 16 peacekeeping
operations currently underway around the globe, including
five-and-a-half major operations that did not exist over a year ago --
East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo, Kosovo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and
Southern Lebanon -- the clock is ticking. We all know that the UN's
most challenging and important operations face desperate shortfalls in
terms of troops, equipment, and training. For many in this room,
including India, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, Kenya,
Nepal, Nigeria, Poland, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Australia, just to
name a few of the most significant contributors, this means that as we
deliberate, your civilian and military personnel face risks in the
field. For others, shortfalls in peacekeeping capacity mean that their
regions remain vulnerable to conflicts that could and should be
contained by more effective peacekeeping efforts.
Last spring, I referred to this situation -- where capacity outpaces
demand -- as a train wreck waiting to happen. In the intervening
months, there have been some important steps forward, as well as some
distressing developments, particularly in Sierra Leone and East Timor.
I believe that the trains remain on a dangerous track, though now at a
slightly slower speed. To some, the clash between capacity and demand
might seem less imminent, but it is no less real. We cannot allow
signs of progress to diminish our sense of urgency.
There are two strands to the peacekeeping reform effort that must be
addressed simultaneously -- the way DPKO works and the way we finance
its operations. On the first issue, we have seen important progress.
With creativity, foresight and courage, Ambassador Lakhdir Brahimi and
his Expert Panel have put forward a report that charts a course for
strengthening the UN'S peacekeeping capabilities. Their work has
elicited the overwhelming endorsement of the membership, and will be
taken up by the General Assembly this fall. To an extent we have
rarely witnessed before, the UN membership and Secretariat are joined
in a partnership working toward a shared goal.
We must focus that same degree of creativity and partnership on the
second speeding train, the crisis in peacekeeping financing. Without
the resources to back it, the best reform plan is just a set of empty
aspirations. Absent a concrete strategy to address key operational
weaknesses, money invested in peacekeeping will yield no returns. If
combined, however, swift steps toward both operational and financial
reform can bring peacekeeping back from the brink, helping to restore
the UN's reputation, and fulfilling the expectations of those who look
to blue helmets to help restore peace to their streets, neighborhoods,
and villages.
The opportunity is clear and the choice is ours. While Deputy
Secretary Frechette and her team will guide us in implementing the
Brahimi Report, reform of peacekeeping financing is the task of those
of us here in this room. While some of the details are technical,
whether or not to save UN peacekeeping is a political choice in which
we all need to take part. These are, after all, questions of
leadership. Over the past year, we have developed a clearer sense of
what needs to be done.
Virtually all of us recognize that to enter 2001 with the existing ad
hoc system in place -- devised in 1973 to fund a single, six month,
$30 million operation in the Sinai and never intended to set a
precedent -- would be untenable. The record makes clear that even
Brazil, which proposed the ad hoc scheme, acknowledged in 1973 that it
should not set a precedent. This system concentrates 98 percent of
financial responsibility for peacekeeping with just 30 Member States,
leaving the other 159 paying only token amounts regardless of their
economic circumstances. Recognizing that delay would put our
personnel, our global interests, and the UN's standing at risk, the
Members of the Security Council, the P5, the General Assembly, the
Gulf Cooperation Council, and many other individual Member States have
endorsed the urgent need to adopt a revised peacekeeping scale in time
to affect current peacekeeping operations.
We agree on the fundamental principles that must underpin any revision
of the scale, all of which have been enshrined for nearly four decades
in the June 27, 1963 consensus resolution 1874. These principles are
all sound, and have our full support: first, that peacekeeping
expenses are the collective responsibility of all Member States;
second, that the permanent members of the Security Council have a
special responsibility to support peacekeeping; and third, that low
income developing countries have a relatively limited capacity to
contribute. The question we face in the next three months is how to
create a scale that puts these three principles into practice.
First, let me begin with the idea that peacekeeping expenses are the
collective responsibility of all Member States. This means that -- as
a demonstration of our commitment to the UN and an understanding of
our role in the international community -- all Member States must
contribute according to their means. This common sense concept
dictates that our new scale must no longer be predicated on political
divisions and preconceptions. The criteria we use to place Member
States in categories under the scale must be neutral, objective, and
transparent. Per capita income -- which has long been accepted by all
of us as the most universally available, reliable and accurate measure
of countries' ability to pay -- represents a useful and credible basis
for determining fair contribution levels. GNP, the very basis of the
regular budget scale calculation, must also remain a fundamental
determinant of ultimate rates.
Because the existing ad hoc system is so outdated, any scale revision
will mean that some countries will bear greater financial
responsibility for peacekeeping than they do today. Many have already
come forward to say that as a demonstration of their commitment to the
UN, and out of recognition of their current economic circumstances,
they are ready to play an expanded role. Other countries, including
some with limited means, have agreed voluntarily to increase their
financial participation in peacekeeping under the scale. We should all
acknowledge the dedication and foresight of these Member States for
their willingness to commit tangibly to ensuring a sound future for UN
peacekeeping. They are (18): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Malta, Oman,
the Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, and UAE.
Their leadership has paved the way for the rest of us to find a
consensus formula that is fair to all of us, and does justice to both
the UN and the people that depend on it.
The scale also must also better reflect the diversity of the world
economy. The current structure, where countries poised to increase
their contributions must move from 20 percent to 100 percent in a
single step, ignores political and fiscal realities. A rigid
distinction between the wealthy developed and poor developing
countries no longer holds -- there are many shades in between, and
countries do not remain in one place perpetually. In order to allow
countries to increase their contributions on a more graduated basis
that reflects their actual means, we support the creation of an
intermediate group for middle income countries -- a new tax bracket,
so to speak -- comprised of those able to pay something more than a
nominal amount, but less than 100 percent of their regular budget
rates.
Some Member States might prefer the creation of more than one new
group. We are ready to support this idea. Under any such system, there
must be automatic updates so that when countries get richer they move
up, and when they experience economic difficulties, they can move down
with no questions asked. Attached to the written version of my
remarks, which will be available later today, is a proposal that
outlines our ideas in this regard.
In addition to assuring that the scale is up-to-date and flexible, it
must also adequately reflect the special responsibility of all
permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 1946, the year the UN
was created, the United States, Soviet Union, France, Great Britain
and China were the top five financial contributors to the UN,
including in peacekeeping. This is not the case today. Over the past
half-century, the world's economic and political realities have
shifted dramatically, and the scale no longer reflects the role,
status and responsibilities of all Members of the P5.
In 1976, thirty years after the UN's founding we all remained in the
top six. But by 2001, just 3 of the P5 will be among the UN's top five
regular budget and peacekeeping contributors. Nineteen Member States
will pay more than the P5 member with the lowest regular budget
contribution, and 14 will pay at a higher rate for peacekeeping. At
the same time, the U.S.'s peacekeeping assessment has continued to
grow, and will next year top 31 percent -- an all-time high since the
scale was created.
Last month, in their historic session, Presidents Clinton, Putin,
Jiang Zemin and Chirac joined Prime Minister Blair to agree on a set
of principles reaffirming the P5's special role in this organization,
and their duty to meet their obligations to it. In the coming days,
we'll work to continue to translate this momentum into real progress.
To my fellow-P5 Ambassadors: It is up to us to assure that our
Presidents' statement is followed-up by real commitments. If we fail,
their statement will be worth little more than the paper it's written
on, disappointing the expectations of the membership, and setting an
inauspicious precedent for the future.
Finally, any revision of the scale must also take into account the
reality of low income developing counties, and their limited capacity
to contribute. Our stance on this issue, as I conveyed to you last
May, is simple: The United States will not advance or support any
proposal that would increase the peacekeeping assessment rates for
countries with low per capita income. We will support measures that
ensure the continuation of current 80 and 90 percent discount levels
for all low-income countries. We recognize the struggle many countries
face in meeting their annual contributions, and will not ask poorer
nations to shoulder anything more than they are able.
I want to touch briefly on the case of South Africa, which, to my
mind, exemplifies the current problem. South Africa is a victim of our
failure to adapt the ad hoe scale to changing economic realities.
Placed in Group B in 1973, South Africa has been stuck there, despite
a per capita income level that is now below the world average. As I
made clear in May, the U.S. fully supports South Africa's request to
shift groups under a peacekeeping scale. When a revised scale is
adopted, South Africa will no longer be assessed at the same rate as
developed countries with high per capita income. Other countries that
may find themselves in a similar situation in future will benefit from
automatic adjustments based upon objective economic criteria.
Understandably, South Africa wishes to move no later than January
2001, regardless of whether a revised scale is entirely in place by
then. We fully support that request, and will do anything we can to
ensure that it is met.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to discussing the details of our views
and those of others during informal consultations this fall. It is our
hope that we can capitalize on our collective will -- shown during the
Millennium Summit and in our opening session yesterday -- to create an
improved financial structure for peacekeeping in time to support
current operations. Once this new structure is in place, and once it
has the acceptance of the entire membership, we will be in a position
to address the financial implications of the Brahimi Report with
renewed flexibility.
So, my friends, the time has come for action. The future of
peacekeeping will not survive on our eloquence alone. We have three
months. The task ahead is far from easy. But we can succeed as long as
we keep focused on what is at stake -- both in terms of the risks of
our current course, and the potential that can be realized under an
improved system.
Thank you.
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