DATE=09/30/2000
TYPE=ON THE LINE
NUMBER=1-00887
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line a discussion of United States policy and contemporary issues. This week, "The Yugoslav Elections." Here is your host, Robert Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
President Slobodan Milosevic lost the September 24th presidential election that he scheduled in an attempt to consolidate his power. Milosevic lost despite engaging in a massive crackdown on the media and the political opposition during the campaign. The strong showing by his opponent, lawyer Vojislav Kostunica, stunned the ruling Socialist party. According to independent sources, Kostunica received more than fifty percent of the vote. However, the Belgrade government announced that, though Mr. Milosevic came in second, Mr. Kostunica failed to win an outright majority, thus making a run-off election on October 8th necessary. Mr. Kostunica was backed by an eighteenparty coalition pledged to making a democratic transition after years of dictatorial rule. Mr. Milosevic was indicted last year by the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague. President Bill Clinton said, "because of brave people casting their ballots, [Milosevic] has lost the last vestige of legitimacy. If the will of the people is respected, the doors to Europe and the world will be open again to Serbia."
Joining me today to discuss the Yugoslav elections are three experts. Aleksa Djilas is a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is a sociologist and political commentator in Belgrade. David Binder is a free-lance journalist, who covered the Balkans for the New York Times. And Mihajlo Mihajlov, a former Yugoslav dissident, is an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute. Gentlemen, welcome to the program.
Mr. Djilas, Mr. Kostunica said, after the results, that "Dawn is coming to Serbia."
Djilas: I agree completely. This is a fundamental change in Serbia. Nothing will ever be the same. After thirteen years of rule -- Milosevic, as we remember, came to power in 1987 -- he has been defeated clearly, even though he actually had certain advantages as far as counting the votes is concerned and the media. He's clearly defeated by an individual, and therefore he will never be recognized or accepted again as the leader. So this is, if not the immediate end of Milosevic's political career, then it's much more than the beginning of the end.
Host: Do you agree, Mr. Binder?
Binder: I agree entirely. This is the beginning of the end. There were several before, when some observers thought in 1991, when there were big demonstrations in the streets and the government had to roll out the tanks, that Milosevic was wavering. Again in 1996, when there were huge nightly demonstrations against his government. But this time, I think it's a countrywide rejection of his rule.
Host: Mihajlo Mihajlov, what is different now from the instances that David Binder just mentioned? How is it that the opposition to Milosevic has finally been able to coalesce?
Mihajlov: Yes, but I should be a little bit more cautious because I remember in 1991 there was this huge demonstration, 1992, when Belgrade celebrated that [Milan] Panic won an election and, a day later, it appeared he didn't win an election. Then in 1996 and 1997, three months of demonstrations in the street. So this is, for the first time, that so many people voted against Milosevic and he could not commit a big fraud. But in general, there is nothing new with this attitude of the Serbian people toward Milosevic. And he's a very clever guy and this is only his first step. He'll still have the party; he'll still have the police and army. There are many, many other instruments of power that, even if Kostunica will win the election, he can be limited only to this symbolical presidential place, according to the constitution, as in Germany.
Host: How do you react to those cautionary remarks, Mr. Djilas?
Djilas: I must say that I allow myself much more optimism than Mihajlo Mihajlov, whose opinions of course I respect very much. If we look back in the past, first of all the elections of 1992 when Milosevic won against Panic. He actually did win; he had more votes. But the main reason why he won was that the Albanians [in Kosovo] would not vote. They boycotted the elections. With the Albanian vote, he would have lost already in 1992. And the Albanians in Kosovo, against the advice of the Serbian opposition and the United States and international community, decided to abstain. Then, for example, the demonstrations of 1991, they didn't overthrow Milosevic, but that was a serious blow. His reputation never really recovered after that. Before 1991, we can speak of Milosevic as a national leader, someone who had a large majority of Serbs behind him. But then his influence and reputation deteriorated. For several years he has had less than a third of the support of the population, and, since the bombing campaign, around twenty-percent, one-fifth of the population. So therefore, though all these demonstrations and protests didn't give the results we were hoping for, they did give some results. As far as the demonstrations of 1996-97 are concerned, when Milosevic announced the victory for the local elections, he had to withdraw that announcement. So that was a success. And your question is important: why finally did the opposition unite? Well, because people were unhappy with this disunity of the opposition. And it became obvious in all opinion polls that, unless the opposition unites, people will simply not vote. And they got the message.
Host: David Binder, according to independent poll watchers, there was a substantial victory for Mr. Kostunica, despite the fact that Mr. Milosevic is insisting on this runoff, and despite the fact that the Montenegrins did not participate in the election.
Binder: There weren't very many.
Host: And Vuk Draskovic went his own way with the Serbian Renewal party. That seems to make it all the more remarkable that this magnitude of victory was delivered by the democratic opposition. Do you agree with that?
Binder: I do. I was in Belgrade just before the election and I met Mr. Kostunica. He saw himself as something of a surprise. He himself was surprised at the sudden popularity of his campaign. It was explained to me, by him in a modest way and by others in a more precise and volatile way, that a majority of Serbs had gotten fed up with all of the previous possibilities -- with the manipulative Milosevic, who made empty promises and lost big chunks of Serbian authority, first in Yugoslavia and then even in Bosnia and Kosovo, a part of Serbia. They were disgusted with the power-obsessed Zoran Djindjic, with the mercurial Draskovic. They wanted a normal man.
Host: Is he a normal man?
Binder: Mr. Kostunica campaigned as a normal man. He used the phrase: we want normality. This finally, although he's an utterly uncharismatic person, this got through, this message.
Host: Let me remind our listeners that this is On the Line with Robert Reilly, and this week we're discussing the Yugoslav elections with Aleksa Djilas from the Woodrow Wilson Center, journalist David Binder, and Mihajlo Mihajlov from the Hudson Institute. It was often said, Mihajlo Mihajlov, that the only option for Milosevic was to stay in power or he'd go to jail. In certain remarks of Socialist party members, they have said that it doesn't matter what happens in the election; this man is going to remain president until July 2001 because that's what the new constitutional amendment provides for.
Mihajlov: Maybe, but his brother who is the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, he made a statement that it is incorrect, what prime minister of Yugoslavia [Momir] Bulatovic said, that he can stay in power until June. So Milosevic's brother denies this. But on the other hand, there are two possibilities how, even if Kostunica will be established as the president of Yugoslavia, how he can lose this position. First of all, any secession of Montenegro, even peaceful, will lead to something similar to [Mikhail] Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union disappeared. Gorbachev lost the presidency. If Montenegro secedes, immediately, the presidency of Yugoslavia does not exist.
Host: But if he is president, what would be the impetus for Montenegro to do that now when it seems that it was against Milosevic that they were considering that move in the first place?
Binder: Well, that's all speculation at this point.
Mihajlov: At this point, it's only speculation.
Binder: And for that matter, so is it speculation what Milosevic is going to do, decisively. We don't know at this point.
Djilas: Whether it is legally possible or not for him to stay in power until summer is, to say the least, dubious. But from following Milosevic's career, I am almost certain that he will not do that because it is very important to him to appear as a serious politician. And that would make him look ridiculous. Staying in an office that does not belong to him, I don't think this is something that Milsoevic would ever allow himself to do. And as far as the secession of Montenegro is concerned, there is a distinct possibility for that but, at the same time, the chances that Montenegro will secede are rapidly decreasing with the victory of the democratic opposition in Serbia.
Binder: Exactly, but you brought up The Hague, Mr. Reilly, and the tribunal there. And it was clear then, and it's become even clearer now, that the decision of Louise Arbour, the prosecutor in May, 1999, at the height of the seventy-eight day bombing of Serbia, indicting Milosevic as a war criminal with a green light from the White House, condemned him, not to a trial in The Hague, but to a situation in Serbia where, in the words of the title of [Jean Paul] Sartre's play, he had no exit. And this, it is now clear to me, at least, and to a lot of Serbs, has created an enormous obstacle to a peaceful transition.
Host: I think that's an interesting point to raise: the question of how should the West and the United States react to this series of events, to the declaration of the run-off on October eighth, and, then, to the fact that Mr. Kostunica himself, during the campaign, said that he would not send Mr. Milosevic to The Hague if he won? Is that, or should it be, an impediment to the United States saying: let's remove sanctions?
Djilas: Absolutely not. I completely agree with Mr. Kostunica. Now if you're asking me for my opinion, I think Milosevic is guilty. Nevertheless, there are many factors which speak against him being extradited. First of all, many serious people have questioned how independent and objective The Hague tribunal is. Secondly, in the eyes of many Serbs who don't think much of Milosevic, they are asking themselves, well, why wasn't, for example, President [Franjo] Tudjman of Croatia, who expelled hundreds of thousands of Serbs from Croatia, ever indicted? And thirdly, and this is for me the most important reason, what is more important: to bring one man to justice, though he may very likely be guilty, or to have this peaceful transition to democracy? I think the second factor is much more important.
Host: Do you agree those are the stakes, Mihajlo Mihajlov?
Mihajlov: I absolutely agree with this.
Host: You just mentioned Croatia. As you know, the president and prime minister of Croatia visited the White House this summer. And Croatia has been praised for the progress it has made in that very short period of time since President Tudjman's death. Is that kind of progress possible in Serbia and Yugoslavia with the transition to Mr. Kostunica?
Binder: First of all, some of us would question whether Croatia has made much progress at all towards democracy. There is a cheerleading section in the U-S administration for Croatia. Good luck to them. But I haven't seen much change on the ground. Certainly not in return of refugees, to name one category.
Host: Though they claim there's been a substantial amount of return.
Binder: Baloney.
Host: But you don't think Croatia is better now than it was under Tudjman?
Binder: It's somewhat better, but it's not a heck of a lot. I would be skeptical about dramatic changes. After all, Yugoslavia has been under sanctions for ten years and increasing political isolation. For me, it's almost a sardonic laugh that the United States State Department says we have seen convincing evidence that the opposition has won. For heaven's sake, the United States doesn't have any assets in Yugoslavia. None. There's no embassy; there are no official Americans.
Host: Well, I think they were referring to the Center for Free Elections and Democracy, which had representatives at the polling stations. But the point I'd like to raise is not so much how Croatia is doing, it is: how well can Serbia do during a transition? Mihajlo Mihajlov, you were being somewhat skeptical?
Mihajlov: I am skeptical because, first of all, the election in Croatia occurred after the death of President Tudjman.
Host: Good point.
Mihajlov: President Milosevic is very alive.
Djilas: Alive and kicking.
Binder: He might outlast President Clinton.
Host: And in fact we have to face October eighth.
Mihajlov: Yes, and during his regime. During the last thirteen years, there were two presidents of Yugoslavia, President Zoran Lilic, and then Dobrica Cosic, whom he kicked out, despite the fact that he [Milosevic] was not president of Yugoslavia. So he can again turn this presidency into something absolutely symbolic.
Host: All right. Let's first of all get to the first step, which is October eighth. Given the fact that he lost, even with what some people call massive voter fraud and ballot stuffing during this past election, he will be at such a greater disadvantage on October eighth. Is there any way that Milosevic can pretend to win that one?
Djilas: I don't think so. I think he is realistic enough to know that he has lost. And I think, in one way or another, he will concede the defeat. There may be some troubles, some problems, but ultimately he will concede defeat.
Mihajlov: But he needs these two weeks to prepare something, to prepare his transfer to some other place.
Djilas: I also think that Milosevic's allies are abandoning him. First of all, the ruling coalition consists of Milosevic's Socialist Party, of the party of the left, the so-called JUL [United Yugoslav Left], which belongs to Milosevic's wife, and [Vojislav] Seselj's Radical party, which is an extreme nationalist party. But the Radical party is already showing signs of abandoning Milosevic. For example, they were the first to publish accurate results of the elections. And then Milosevic has allies in Montenegro. President [Milo] Djukanovic of Montenegro boycotted the elections. But the prime minister of Yugoslavia, who is also from Montenegro, his party fought in the elections. And they will get quite a large number of seats because Montenegro, which is very small, gets a disproportionate number of seats in the parliament.
Host: There is also a claim, by the way, that Mr. Bulatovic was asked by Milosevic to stuff a hundred thousand ballots in Montenegro. The interesting thing about the story is that they claim Mr. Bulatovic refused to do that.
Djilas: I don't believe this is true. But I would not see Bulatovic, though he is an opportunist, as a man who would steal a hundred-thousand votes. I just don't think he's an ally on whom Milosevic can count. Because for him, the main thing is that Serbia and Montenegro stay together, but that's something that the Serbian opposition and Kostunica also want.
Host: Can we talk briefly toward the close of the program here about the significance of these elections in the parliament and also at the municipal level.
Binder: Well, the significance at least is that people know what they voted for. And it's pretty hard to falsify the election at a higher level when it went in a certain way at the lower level. So I think that works for Kostunica.
Host: Because in the municipal elections the democratic opposition did so well?
Mihajlov: It is extremely important, the results on the local level despite it's being local. On the local level, even the counting of the votes is very important, all these election lists and so on. So for the future, the local level is extremely important and this is a big surprise that the opposition did so well.
Djilas: I was surprised also.
Mihajlov: Because it was not a united list, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and S-P-O, the Serbian Renewal Movement, were divided. They didn't even go into the election as united. Everybody believed that, even if Kostunica wins the presidency, the Socialist Party of Serbia will win many local elections. But that didn't happen.
Host: But because Montenegro boycotted the election, the Milosevic coalition did do well in the federal parliament. Is that right. Mr. Djilas?
Djilas: Exactly, yes, because those Montenegrins who want to continue their union with Serbia, who want to stay inside Yugoslavia, they are also pro-Milosevic and they did vote.
Host: And how big a problem will this present in the future for Mr. Kostunica?
Djilas: Well, this is an important question. I don't think that Milosevic can count on those Montenegrins in the parliament to support him under any circumstances. And I think also that Kostunica and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia can make a very good offer to these Montenegrins, offer them ministerial positions.
Host: Because they're interested in maintaining that unity?
Djilas: Exactly. And people of Montenegro will support that because they want unity with Serbia.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have this week. I'd like to thank our guests Aleksa Djilas from the Woodrow Wilson Center; journalist David Binder; and Mihajlo Mihajlov from the Hudson Institute for joining me to discuss the Yugoslav elections. This is Robert Reilly for On the Line.
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