Senior U.S. Official Briefing on Yugoslav Elections
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
September 20, 2000
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BALKAN
DEMOCRACY JIM O'BRIEN
September 20, 2000
Washington, D.C.
MR. SWITZER: Greetings to everyone. I'm Tom Switzer, PAO for the
European Bureau here at State concerning Balkan issues, and I
certainly welcome all of you to this briefing today. We are pleased to
have Mr. James O'Brien, who is the Special Advisor to the President
and the Secretary of State for Balkan Democracy.
As you know, he has some, now, 11 years actual experience in the
Department on a range of Balkan issues. And so I think the format we
are going to look at here is that he will give an opening statement of
some five to eight minutes, whatever necessary, and they we will
proceed into Q and A [question and answer] of whatever is of interest
to you. And with that, we will give the mike to Jim.
MR. O'BRIEN: "Actual experience." That's kind of old-fashioned in this
virtual age.
Okay. I'll start this by saying, if I begin to speak too quickly or
indistinctly for your microphones, just start giving me hand signals;
I'll try to accommodate you.
The issue here is the last phase of Europe and democracy, reaching to
Southeast Europe. Over the last decade, the states in that region have
overwhelmingly chosen democracy and aspirations toward joining Europe.
They have made clear that they want their entire region to join them
as they move forward in rejoining Europe.
In the last several years, we have seen Europe reach out to give them
a hand up. So the European Union, its Commission, NATO and other
Western organizations are reaching to the region to try to engage it.
Now this is a move of historic dimensions, because this area has been
the place that empires bumped against one another for hundreds of
years. It was, in some people's eyes, the place Europe stopped, and
then, slowly, the Middle East and the Balkans as its special place
began.
So we have seen a fundamental shift, except for one place: In
Yugoslavia, there is still an attempt to hold onto socialist means of
controlling the population. So we come to this week with the election
against that backdrop. But I think it's important to bear that in
mind, because it captures some of the fundamental forces at work on
the actors in Yugoslavia, as they make their decisions.
The elections this week will be for three levels: local elections in
Serbia; parliamentary elections for Yugoslavia -- that is to say
Serbia and Montenegro; and then presidential elections for Yugoslavia.
For the first time ever, there will be a direct popular election of a
president in Yugoslavia.
What do we expect to happen this weekend? Well, I'll start with the
prediction about results -- that is always somewhat dangerous, so
please take it as appropriately qualified, and then go through our
views on some of the characteristics of the weekend.
First, on results: It would be -- electoral success is one way of
measuring the weekend. For the democratic forces, I think what they
expect is something roughly along these lines, if the elections
proceed at all as they seem.
At the local level, they expect to hold most of the cities. The
opposition controls over 40 cities in Serbia now. They would expect to
retain roughly that number. There may be some shifts. Milosevic
changed the electoral laws last year, to make it easier for his
coalition to win, and the opposition has not always adjusted properly
to the new voting rules. So there may be some cities that go back to
the coalition. But that is within the range of kind of normal progress
for the opposition, I think.
The second: at the parliamentary level, Milosevic will emerge with his
party as either majority, or at least the dominant member of a
plurality. This is because he has gerrymandered the election. He has
placed a number of the seats in safe districts for himself, and he is
relying upon the fact that the ruling coalition in the democratic
Republic of Montenegro has decided not to contest these elections. So
that gives a number of seats that will probably go into Milosevic's
column.
So in measuring how this weekend goes, I think it is important to bear
in mind that those two results are very likely to happen, even if the
opposition does well.
The one that no one has predicted very well -- or can predict -- is
the presidential election. And in this, there are four candidates. The
dominant two are Milosevic, on behalf of the Socialists, and Vojislav
Kostunica, on behalf of the United Opposition. Kostunica is polling
ahead of Milosevic consistently in all polls by whatever source. He is
polling now, in many polls, double digits ahead. We expect that those
numbers will start to -- the lead will start to diminish going into
the election. That's normal. Largely, it has come down.
Also, the regime is starting an increased effort to intimidate voters.
People are being told that their jobs, their pensions, health care,
apartments, depend on them demonstrating that they support and will
vote for Milosevic. So that will get closer.
But I think the basic fact is that, in free and fair elections, the
opposition should expect to win the presidency of Yugoslavia this
weekend.
That is one measure of electoral success. Another measure is that the
opposition emerge from this strengthened. The reason the opposition
has done better over the last several months than most people
expected, is that it has gotten deeper and more united. The depth is
what is especially important. For the first time, the opposition is
not a set of small parties located in Belgrade and one or two other
major cities. It now is an organization that reaches far into Serbian
society. And these are home-grown organizations of students, of the
mothers of students, grandparents of students, teachers, labor unions,
get-out-the-vote activists, voter education people -- all of whom are
committed to seeing some growth of democracy in Yugoslavia. That force
has both disciplined and energized the political parties, so they have
acted much more responsibly. They have united to an extent that I
think many people saw as impossible even a few months ago.
Now, do we think these elections will be free and fair? No. Milosevic
has already taken steps to see that the scales are tilted in his
direction. He has done that by gerrymandering districts; he has
cleaned the voter rolls so that they tend to have people he believes
will be favorable to him; he is holding some voters in reserve,
including those who are dead and no longer able to vote for
themselves; and, in addition, there is a systematic campaign of
intimidation and harassment against democratic activists and the
independent media. So the fundamental conditions for free and fair
elections will not hold in Yugoslavia this weekend.
The opposition decided, nevertheless, that this was their best
opportunity to measure their own success, and to show to the world
that people of Yugoslavia are ready to choose democracy. They decided
to contest that, and we think that was a correct decision. It is the
way in which you measure your success in building democracy in
Yugoslavia.
Now, how will people respond to Milosevic cheating? Well, I think the
first point is that the world will know when he cheats. And this is a
difference from previous Yugoslav elections, when people either
weren't sure, or couldn't prove, or to some extent didn't care,
exactly how he cheated. It is important to bear in mind, there will
be, within Serbia and Montenegro, the opposition has the right, under
Yugoslav law, to see the ballots counted, to see the voting take
place, to count them at each independent local polling station, and
then to pass those results up centrally. There is room for some fraud
in that, but if Milosevic follows the rule of Yugoslav law, the
opposition will know a great deal about how many votes he actually
gets on Sunday.
That leaves room for abuse, primarily in absentee ballots, which could
be worth 100,000 or more, and aren't subject to the same strict
restrictions, and in Kosovo. Here, Bernard Kouchner, the UN
administrator in Kosovo, has laid down, I think, probably the right
line to take. And that is that there will be no elections in Kosovo
this Sunday; that the only body that can conduct elections in Kosovo
is the UN agency; that it will not, because the basic conditions for
free and fair Yugoslav elections don't hold. Milosevic has not
provided the voter lists, he hasn't notified where the polling
facilities would be if there are any, hasn't provided ballots, and
hasn't allowed impartial observers into the polling places. So there
will be no elections.
What there will be probably are some forms of political expressions,
sort of guerrilla theater that looks like elections, and Milosevic
will put that on for a couple of reasons. He will want to have it so
that he can claim, as a cover for claims of fraudulent votes in
Kosovo, and he will want to have it in order to provoke violence
against Serbs, that he can then use as a propaganda tool at home.
And here, I think, again Kouchner has taken the right line; it's to
say that he will bear witness, monitor closely what happens in Kosovo,
so that the world will know how many people actually participate in
whatever small-level political expression takes place on Sunday.
The result will be that it will be difficult for Milosevic to claim
the hundreds of thousands of votes he likely will need in order to
claim victory. He will claim victory, nevertheless. He will not be
able to do so credibly if the poll results hold, and as long as people
pay attention to the way that he is trying to steal the election.
So the question then is, what happens? The people of Yugoslavia make a
choice, and they see it rejected by a man trying to hold power for
himself. And the answer there is, we don't know. No one knows. The one
rule of thumb in a situation like this is that change happens more
quickly than people expect. But you never know exactly when it will
come.
And I think here, the perspective I take is that the democratic forces
of Yugoslavia will emerge stronger and more able to resist Milosevic
and stand up for democracy from this election. And the question of
whether he faces a moment of truth next week is only one question. The
additional issue is whether he can hold back the tide of democracy
that now is present throughout Yugoslavia, and throughout the region
as a whole.
What will the international reaction be? A lot of our reaction will
depend on exactly the circumstances there. We certainly applaud the
courage and the persistence of the democratic activists and the
independent journalists in Yugoslavia who are working to pursue
democracy there.
What we will do are a few things. First, we can ourselves bear
witness. The world will be watching what happens there today. The
people fighting for democracy in Yugoslavia will not be alone. That is
an important sign. When you talk to people from every country that has
been through a democratic transition, the knowledge that they were
supported outside is incredibly important at key moments, when they
decide to go forward and protest the theft of their democracy.
The second thing that we can do is to make clear to Milosevic that he
does not have a free hand. He has perpetuated his rule by provoking
crises, usually just outside Serbia, as a way of distracting people
from the central issue before them. One place we are particularly
concerned about this happening is in Montenegro, where we believe he
has a gleam in his eye about taking out this democratic government
that seems to have taken root inside Yugoslavia.
President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair, Secretary Albright have been
clear: we have a fundamental interest in the stability of this region,
and it would be a mistake for Milosevic to underestimate our
willingness to stand up for our interests. So he has no free hand to
provoke those kinds of crises. He has to stand and confront the tide
inside his own country.
Now, to move on from that and just discuss more generally where we see
the situation going, and then I will take some questions: The issue
before us is whether the democratic forces of Yugoslavia will be able
to sustain themselves in the days after this election, both
immediately after the election, to persuade the people of Yugoslavia
that they have won the election and that Milosevic is trying to
maintain his hold on power illegitimately, and in the longer term.
Democracy in Yugoslavia is important for the region as a whole, but it
is not just one election. It will be a process that will go on.
For that to happen, we need to see the opposition emerge from this
election sustaining the gains that it has made, and I think we will
see that. I think that is the best measure of success going into this
weekend.
The final thing I will talk about is in our response. This is
fundamentally about the decision the people of Yugoslavia face: the
strides that they have made on their own. What the international
community can do is make clear to them the nature of the choice that
is in front of them. The European Union, the United States, have made
clear that we will welcome a democratic Yugoslavia into the
international community.
We have said with the Russians, last week, that we look forward to a
democratic Yugoslavia, so that we can welcome it. The European Union
said sanctions will come off. We have said we will take steps to take
sanctions (off) once the democratic forces are in power. So the choice
before the people of Yugoslavia is whether they want to choose the way
that history is moving; whether they want to choose Europe and the
international community, and all that that brings with it, or whether
they want to continue on the path of isolation that their current
government enforces upon them.
That choice is clearly before them now. As they go to make the choice,
they see all around them in their region citizens who have made the
decision to push for democracy in Europe. That is a set of factors
that no amount of internal manipulation by the Milosevic government
can overcome. I think that is the way in which the fundamental issues
in Yugoslavia today are different from what they have been in previous
years. This weekend is one measuring point for the process of
democracy in Yugoslavia, and it's an important one. It may well be a
pivotal one, but that's something we won't know till we're through the
weekend.
Q: Could you just tell us exactly why you don't want to have an
election in Kosovo? I mean, couldn't it be argued that the Kosovo
Serbs have the right to vote for Milosevic as much as anybody else?
MR. O'BRIEN: Sure, they do. And the official Yugoslav position is that
they have the right to vote in two districts in southern Serbia. So
any Kosovar who wants to participate in this election has the legal
right to do that, and will be able to vote. The question is whether
one wants to conduct a whole election inside Kosovo. No Yugoslav
official has asked to have elections inside Kosovo, and the UN has
said if there were to be elections we would run them. Milosevic
doesn't want to ask the UN to run these elections. He wouldn't win. So
what he's trying to do is manipulate the prospect of
disenfranchisement of Serbs for propaganda purposes. I think that he's
losing that battle. Individuals will be able to vote.
Q: Could I just follow up with that? So you're saying that individuals
will be allowed to vote by going outside of Kosovo and voting in
Serbia proper?
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. That's the official position of the Yugoslav
Government, so that's what they'll be able to do. And UNMIK has said
it will make sure they can do that.
Q: You said that you've made it very clear that Milosevic doesn't have
a free hand in Montenegro, yet at the same time other analysts have
said that Montenegro does not enjoy a "security guarantee." I was
wondering if you could distinguish between these terms. What exactly
does it mean when you've given this message to Milosevic, and what
does a "security guarantee" mean in this situation?
MR. O'BRIEN: Sure. I always like a question that reminds me I'm a
lawyer. A security guarantee usually is a term used to refer to
something like the NATO Treaty. I mean, it's a guarantee that the US
Senate gives its advice and consent to, and so it's a specific term of
art. What we've done -- and I quoted not analysts but the President,
the Secretary, Prime Minister Blair -- is to say to him that it would
be a mistake to underestimate our resolve in this situation. And we
think that's an effective message to Milosevic.
Q: Well, to follow up, how do we report that? I mean, when you say it
would be a mistake, does it mean that -- I mean, there has been a
variety of stories that have been out there in the last couple weeks
on this.
MR. O'BRIEN: I think the more reporters quote government officials,
it's good, so why don't you just do that?
Q: But, really, what does it mean in terms of force? What does it mean
in terms of military support?
MR. O'BRIEN: I think it means it would be -- I mean, he knows that we
have a great military capacity, both in the region and global
projection capacity, so he is aware of what we can do. And the
important part of the statement is that it would be a mistake for him
to underestimate our resolve to act with that force.
Q: Who are the eyes and ears of the US in Yugoslavia? Are there
Americans all over the place on the ground watching this, or are you
relying strictly on reports from the opposition as to how the
elections go? And if that's the case, doesn't that sort of bias the
reporting, as it were?
MR. O'BRIEN: Well, no. I think, for our information, we rely a lot on
international media sources. As well, there are countries with
missions in Belgrade and they provide a lot of information. And then
there are opposition and independent journalists in Yugoslavia. And I
think the point here is the opposition is itself a large coalition
which has an incentive to report the facts fairly, because each of
them wanted to make sure that the news gets out about what is actually
happening.
Q: There is no formal, international even, observer presence set up
formally to monitor?
MR. O'BRIEN: Right. That's one of the ways Milosevic has tried to
avoid having free and fair elections. He rejected a request from the
competent international body, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, to monitor the elections. They organize and
monitor elections the whole European region over. He has denied them
the right to come in and do that.
Q: And if I could quickly follow up on the Kosovo thing, if you can
leave Kosovo to vote, doesn't that essentially screen out the Kosovar
Albanians? It would be a brave Kosovar Albanian who would venture into
Serbia to vote, would it not? And, therefore, won't the results from
Kosovo be completely skewed toward Milosevic?
And, secondly, is there a problem of Kosovar Albanians whose
identities have been erased as a result of the civil strife a year and
a half ago, and who therefore couldn't even vote even if they wanted
to?
MR. O'BRIEN: No, that's a real problem. I think on the first, the
basic point about Kosovo Albanians is that they have said they will
not vote. In fact, they have not voted in Yugoslav elections for more
than a decade. There are some people who believe that if they had
voted, Milosevic and his cronies would have lost a long time ago.
But Milosevic has relied upon Kosovo Albanian votes in elections
before. And the significant point here is, for the first time, people
will be watching and there will be international people -- certainly
in Kosovo -- able to say that Kosovo Albanians did not vote. In the
1997 election, there are reports that as many as 450- to 500,000
Kosovo Albanian votes were claimed for Serbian President Milan
Milutinovic. This was not a surprise to the Kosovo Albanians.
In this case, it will be very difficult to claim credibly that those
people voted, because there will both be monitors in Kosovo and at the
polling places in Serbia, so they'll know whether those people turn
out.
Now, as far as Milosevic's support among Kosovo Serbs, I don't think
it's that great. I mean, there are various poll results, but there are
a number of Kosovo Serbs who have been long-term critics of Milosevic.
In just an election of Kosovo Serbs, it's not at all clear to me how
well he would do.
Q: Why would it be -- if Milosevic knows he's facing an indictment for
war crimes, why would there be any incentive for him to participate
fairly in an election that he could lose? Isn't his argument and
strategy, because of his indictment, to hang on as long as possible or
else he could be arrested?
MR. O'BRIEN: I think there are a couple points about that. I mean, the
first point is he has never participated fairly in an election --
indicted or not. And I think it's a mistake to give that indictment
primacy in his calculations. He is a man who has sought power
ruthlessly and held it for more than a decade before he was indicted.
That behavior wouldn't change if the indictment were wiped away.
But the second point is more fundamental. This is a matter about the
region joining today's international community, and that includes
commitments to the rule of law, including things in the tribunal. I
think it's important for us to be strong in supporting our values,
saying that a Yugoslavia that joins the international community must
respect things like the tribunal. And we'll continue to be strong on
that. And I think that's going to bring democracy in Yugoslavia much
more quickly than attempts to cut deals that would just shore up this
man.
Q: I mean, you've got -- we've seen nine months of sort of
gangland-style murders in Belgrade. You've got this reward out for him
if somebody turns him in. If he steps down in a free election that he
loses, he's going to be easier to get and nab and turn in, isn't he? I
mean, it's just psychology.
MR. O'BRIEN: I think, though, the point for him: he would not be
participating fairly absent the indictment, so I think juxtaposing the
two is unfortunate.
Q: Forget about the past. I'm talking about what's before him right
now: indictment or unfair election.
MR. O'BRIEN: Right. But even that choice I wouldn't accept the
premise. But I think the point for him is that we are strong in
pursuit of our values. He understands strength. He would misinterpret
any suggestion of a deal as a sign of weakness, and he would remain
longer. I think what he will understand is that we are stalwart and
pushing for this, that we will continue to insist on it, and that he
has no option but to come to grips with the fact that the tribunal is
there and is not going away. And those around him need the same
message; they need to understand that this is something he's going to
have to deal with, that there is no way for him to walk away from
this.
Q: Can I just follow up on that very quickly? Is it possible, as far
as the US is concerned, that Milosevic would win an election fairly
and freely? I mean, if he wins, is it a distinct possibility that he
could have done so without stuffing the ballot boxes?
MR. O'BRIEN: No. His polling has never taken him up above -- even at
the height of his popularity -- the high 30 percent, maybe close to 40
percent. And I just don't think it's possible, especially given the
polls that are there now. If by some miracle it happens, we'll all
wonder how the polls were all so wrong, but I don't think it's worth
speculating on the answer.
Q: In light of what you said about Montenegro and the message for
Milosevic there, what is the significance of the timing of the Sixth
Fleet exercises off the Montenegrin coast that begin on Monday? And
what message might Milosevic draw from them?
MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I think the significance is just that we do have a
robust military capability in the region. Milosevic has to be aware of
it. These exercises -- there are regular exercises in the area.
Croatia, which just had its own democratic transition, is a member of
the Partnership for Peace. This is an exercise with Croatia. They have
been long scheduled. And the message he should draw from that, I
think, is just to pay heed to the words I hope we'll see quoted, that
it would be a mistake to underestimate our willingness to stand up for
our interest in the stability of the region.
Q: Have there been other exercises with the Croatian navy?
MR. O'BRIEN: I don't know with the navy. There were other exercises.
There was some sort of amphibious exercise. I think the Pentagon can
run you through what's been going on. There was something in Bosnia
recently. I mean, there are always things happening.
Q: What is your opinion about the statements made by the main
opposition candidate, Mr. Kostunica, very critical against the
international war crimes tribunal, and saying that in case he wins he
would not hand over Milosevic to this tribunal?
MR. O'BRIEN: I think the basic choice before the people in Yugoslavia
-- and Mr. Kostunica -- is whether they want to join today's
international community. The answer he gives is a resounding yes, and
it's echoed by all the people who say they will vote for him. When
they make that decision, they will make a commitment to the rule of
law, both at home where he speaks very strongly, and internationally.
And that will be one of the issues he'll have to grapple with.
Q: I don't know if I'm making too much of this. I just want to ask you
about it. In following up on the EU's announcement on Monday that they
would lift sanctions if Milosevic is kicked out, you said -- the US
said -- we'll take steps to lift sanctions. So it's not a given that
if Milosevic is thrown out, the US will lift sanctions -- all
sanctions -- against Yugoslavia?
MR. O'BRIEN: No, I think what we have to do is, for us, there is some
legislative process and other things. I mean, our commitment -- and I
think the important general line here -- is what the Contact Group
said. We would welcome them into the international community, once the
democratic forces take action. We are being a little cautious about
all the processes, but fundamentally we would welcome them in as a
full partner.
Q: Jim, can you -- as long as you're on the record -- go through --
but you've done it in bits and pieces -- the laundry list, as it were,
of the things Milosevic has done to rig the elections so far? A senior
official in New York last week talked about it, and as long as you're
on the record, would you --
MR. O'BRIEN: I wish that guy were here now. (Laughter.)
Q: Yes, exactly. He was very articulate. (Laughter.)
MR. O'BRIEN: We know Milosevic will try to steal the election, and
there are levers he has used in the past, and we see signs he is using
now. He has gerrymandered seats; he will print ballots, have them
marked beforehand; he will try to substitute ballot boxes; he will try
to bribe and intimidate monitors so that there will be no free and
fair count.
Q: There are monitors?
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. There are -- no, domestic monitors. The domestic
opposition parties, as well as nongovernmental groups, who will be
outside doing a count of participation.
Did you want me to start this from the top?
Q: Editing is -- (inaudible). Andrew interrupted a sound bite, but
never mind. (Laughter.)
MR. O'BRIEN: And it was such a catchy one as well.
Okay. Gerrymandering, stuffing ballot boxes, forcing state workers to
cast ballots already marked for Milosevic, intimidating other people
by threatening them with their jobs and their pensions, substituting
false ballots in ballot boxes -- and all this -- playing with the
count, toying with the way in which the count is conducted, and
probably making that even worse at a recount -- all of which is done
against the backdrop of an attempt to intimidate growing sentiment for
civil society and free press in Yugoslavia. Thousands of democratic
activists have been arrested, harassed, released. Offices have been
raided, computers seized. Tax police have been sent after members of
the opposition and the democratic activists. All of this is an effort
to try to make sure that people do not oppose him at the polls on
Sunday.
Now, the thing that is so remarkable is that the opposition has held
together as well as it has, and continues to forge ahead, toward what
may well be a victory.
Q: You said this morning, in another setting, that were Milosevic to
win, were it to be so overwhelming that even he couldn't ignore the
vote, that there were ways in which he could hijack power; that he
could -- that the opposition candidate could become president, but
that he could control things by other means. Could you address that?
MR. O'BRIEN: Sure. That was, I think, Jim Hooper and Stojan Cerovich
said those things. I guess I want to emphasize the historic nature of
the choice before people Sunday. If Milosevic loses and is forced to
concede defeat, that is remarkable. He will no longer be invincible.
He will no longer be able to guarantee those around him, who sustain
him, that he can keep them in money and power.
There is a range of options theoretically open to him once he concedes
this office. But the raw fact is that he will have put his political
life on the line for the first time since 1992, and will have lost.
And he will be dealing from a position of weakness.
I guess more generally here, the point is people talk about him as
kind of the master of the game, the puppeteer who makes everyone
dance. The fact is that he took over a country that was, at the end of
the Socialist era in Eastern Europe, probably the most advanced of the
economies in the political system -- an open, cosmopolitan society.
And he has reduced the territory multiple times; he has started
several wars; he has lost them all; his country is smaller, poorer,
more isolated and less engaged with the outside world than at any time
in the last decade. And that is not a record of success. And now, for
the first time, he has had to put that record before the people of
Yugoslavia, and I think that is why you are seeing this outpouring of
support for a united opposition.
Q: You certainly talked about -- maybe I'm wrong, but it seems like
the consequence, if Milosevic does steal the elections again, is the
further isolation of his country economically and diplomatically.
However, it appears that maybe, in some cases, Yugoslavia is not that
isolated, particularly in the case of Russia and some recent loans,
and I guess recently also with China. Could you comment on that? Is he
still receiving support from Russia and China and other countries?
MR. O'BRIEN: Well, the Russians assure us that he is not actually
receiving economic support, that the loans announced are essentially
credits to Russian companies to go do business abroad. The Chinese
loans appear to be much the same. Domestically, Milosevic plays this
as a major propaganda victory, but it doesn't appear that the outside
supporters are actually putting much capital in.
Now, more generally, I mean, the important point here, the Russians
say they have no love for Milosevic. They have a long-term historical
attachment to the Serb people; they hope to see them do well with
their unique historical tradition, but I don't think Milosevic will
believe he has any friends there.
And here's it's significant what the Contact Group agreed last week,
that both that Russia joined a statement looking forward to a
democratic Yugoslavia, and that it warned against any threat of
violence against Montenegro. And that's a sign that perhaps
Milosevic's friends will not stand with him if he tries to work his
way through this.
Q: Can you just clarify -- the loans or credits to companies operating
in Serbia?
MR. O'BRIEN: From the Russians, the suggestion was they were credits
to their own heavy, agricultural industry -- basically farm machinery
and things, credits so that their own businesses were able to export.
It is not clear that anyone is taking advantage of any of those
credits. There were reports of other credits, for example, for gas
shipments, and we are told those are not paid or issued, that they are
restatements of credits that were granted in 1997, but not actually
being acted upon.
For the Chinese, it appears these are loans -- there are apparently
some Chinese businesses involved in some construction activities in
Yugoslavia. We are not certain exactly what the story is behind those.
But it appears they are more in terms of credits to allow the Chinese
businesses to work there, not hard currency for Milosevic to use to
perpetuate --
Q: And if I could follow up, I mean, have there been discussions
bilaterally with the United States and China and Russia, in saying,
hey, the whole point here is we are trying to isolate this guy; could
you help us out? Yes?
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. I think, obviously, they have their own views about
both historical ties and the relationship to the US, but I guess one
point I would make here is, for Milosevic, money is a problem. It is
very difficult to track. He has a long-term sophisticated effort to
launder money out of Yugoslavia. But I think there are some
significant developments here.
The Cypriots, earlier this year, closed down the branch of Beogradska
Banka in Cyprus. And this was the primary vehicle by which Milosevic
-- used to work there. It's the vehicle by which he ran money out of
Yugoslavia for a long time. The Cypriots looked at the books; they
discovered that he was essentially running a bankrupt, shell business;
they closed it.
And I think that is a real statement about isolation because you look
to who is going to hold your wallet in a bar fight, and these guys
have just closed the wallet. So I think that is a statement about
where he has friends and doesn't have friends. The public
announcements about potential credits, I think, are much less
significant to him.
Q: Two questions. First, you said, if Milosevic did lose and he did
step down, there would be a range of options available to him. What do
you mean?
MR. O'BRIEN: Well, I think -- theoretical -- the word theoretical is
important in that sentence. The Yugoslav presidency is obviously just
one office, and so various commentators -- including this morning, as
Betsy referred to -- have noted that he could conceivably retire from
public office and simply be head of the Socialist Party and director
of numerous corporations. That's a theoretical possibility.
Another is that he might step down and try to get himself named to a
post in the government of Yugoslavia, under a cabinet position:
another theoretical possibility. Another one still is he might sit out
for a while and then try to run in Serbian elections next year.
But I have to say, those are theoretical options. The political
situation -- if he is forced to concede defeat, the political
situation in Yugoslavia will be different, changed radically, and he
will be dealing from weakness. And so I wouldn't get caught up in
chasing after all these possibilities right now, because the raw fact
of the matter is that he will have put himself on the line and been
rejected and been forced to say, "Uncle."
Q: And the other question is, how much money has the United States
spent funding independent and opposition newspapers, and that sort of
thing?
MR. O'BRIEN: I don't have a breakdown. I guess --
Q: Is it millions, or --
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. I mean, you can get the stuff. It's all publicly
available, and I just don't want to mislead you. But part of the
problem talking about this is the stories all come out as -- they
become a sideshow. The fundamental fact is, people in Yugoslavia are
making a decision to choose democracy. Milosevic is using all of the
resources of government, which amounts to hundreds of millions --
billions -- of dollars, in terms equated to us, to support his own
candidacy.
There are reports of cherry pickers for the street crews putting up
posters in one of the previous election campaigns. It is that petty.
And it ranges through using the financial police, using the border
service, using every instrument of government power to try to hold
himself in place. He has the only nationwide television network that
is supporting him.
So he has got this hundreds of millions, billions of dollars, trying
to skew the playing field. And our role, to the extent there is one,
is to a small extent, try to see if we can level the playing field.
But that is a thing we do globally. We don't pick candidates;
Kostunica doesn't take money from us. He said that publicly. And so to
get in a report about what the US is doing in this essentially already
is an unbalanced discussion. The breakdown is available somewhere, but
I just don't have it.
Q: Just to further balance the discussion a little bit, other than
talking to us, other than the statements that President Clinton has
made and others in the Administration, is the United States doing
anything -- and I want you to answer this as honestly as you can -- to
affect the outcome of this election?
MR. O'BRIEN: What do you mean by "affect the outcome"? Choosing
candidates, or --
Q: Well, in other words, to see that Milosevic is not able to claim a
victory in this election.
MR. O'BRIEN: I think the main way that we affect it -- I mean, it's
partly by not being an issue there -- but it's that we clarify the
choice so that they know that if they want to choose engagement in the
international community, they choose democracy, and there will be
rewards for that. They will become a member; sanctions will come off.
If they want to choose isolation, that is their business; they can
choose isolation.
So there is a stark choice before them. And that is the main way that
we shape their own internal discussions and their decisions about what
they want to do.
Q: I'm talking about doing specific things. I mean, are you making
efforts to communicate this directly to the Serbian people? Are you --
MR. O'BRIEN: Like this.
Q: Yes.
MR. O'BRIEN: Yes. We are being as open publicly as we can about the
choice before them. Obviously, we don't want to become the issue in
the campaign. Milosevic attempts to make us that. But we are letting
them know that they face a very clear choice, and they can face the
choice.
And I think there are signs that that is -- people inside Yugoslavia
understand that. The Serbian Orthodox Church yesterday put out -- I
think it was yesterday or the day before -- but this week they put out
two statements, including I think a very strong statement that urged
people to vote their consciences, in the hope that they would see the
election of a government that was acceptable to all inside the country
and outside of it. And that is a sign that they understand the choice
before them.
Q: Jim, just to get you to refine that last question a bit more, what
was your reaction -- there was a major newspaper story yesterday that
compared your support of the opposition groups in Serbia to the
alleged Chinese interference in the last US election.
MR. O'BRIEN: This was the story I read in Politika today?
Q: It was actually in The Washington Post yesterday. (Laughter.)
MR. O'BRIEN: I'm sorry. My reaction -- I've given it. I think this is
-- it tries to promote what is a sideshow. The real issue is that
people in Yugoslavia are making a choice for themselves. The
unfortunate thing about a story like that is it makes it appear that
we are a central player, and this is really about people in
Yugoslavia. Now it is also -- and it doesn't talk about the way
Milosevic uses resources to bolster his campaign.
And there also were problems in the story. We, in fact, do not have
the money used in the headline. That's a budget request sitting on
Capitol Hill somewhere. Some of the rest of the money was appropriated
very late in the fiscal year. So it not only gets, I think, the basic
facts wrong, but it creates a sideshow that is undeserving, and I
think hurts people who are struggling for democracy.
Q: Jim, as a kind of aside, not so much on the election, but as long
as you are here -- sanctions against Serbia? Can you review what's in
place, or how long they have been in place? Because they have been --
it seems to me on, off and maybe on again?
MR. O'BRIEN: Every which way. There basically are -- I can do this as
exhaustively as you want, but essentially, for right now, there are
three sanctions in place on Yugoslavia. The US has a little bit
broader set, but that's just a quirk of our domestic system. So
essentially there are three.
One is the oil embargo. Two is a ban on travel by senior regime
officials, and that is -- I'm sorry, I'll go back. And the third is a
ban on financial transactions by companies associated with the regime.
Now, you'll notice -- especially those last -- just a factoid -- those
are imposed by the European Union, and we have adopted a policy in
parallel. So they are European Union sanctions; they are not UN
Security Council, or a broader set of sanctions. That's it. And
notice, in particular, how targeted those two primary sanctions are.
They are only on regime officials. We took steps earlier this year to
remove the ban on air travel into Yugoslavia. We decided that was
hurting ordinary Yugoslavs. So the sanctions there focus on the
regime, and on rooting out the people ruling Serbia.
Q: And how long have those been in place?
MR. O'BRIEN: They were put in place at the start of Kosovo, so in late
'98.
Q: Thank you.
MR. O'BRIEN: Thank you. Sorry I was late.
(The briefing was concluded at 3:00 P.M.)
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