DATE=7/28/2000
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE:CHALLENGE IN THE BALKANS
NUMBER=1-00869
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"Challenge in the Balkans." Here is your host,
Robert Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
This month, the Yugoslav parliament, under the
control of President Slobodan Milosevic, passed
several constitutional amendments. One would allow
Milosevic to run for two more terms in office.
Another would reduce the role of Montenegro in the
federal parliament. Montenegro is the other
republic in the Yugoslav Federation along with
Serbia. Milosevic has also been cracking down on
the press and the political opposition, as
Yugoslavia prepares for elections later this year.
"As far as U.S. policy is concerned," said
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "we want to
see Milosevic out of power, out of Serbia, and in
The Hague," where the international war crimes
tribunal has indicted him for war crimes. The U.S.
views Milosevic's removal as key to future
stability in the Balkans.
Joining me today to discuss the situation in the
former Yugoslavia are three experts. Mihajlo
Mihajlov, a former Yugoslav dissident and writer,
is an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Brian Marshall is an international trade
consultant who has served on multiple missions in
the Balkans for the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, or O-S-C-E, as an election
observer and mission coordinator. And Stojan
Cerovic is a senior fellow at the U.S. Peace
Institute and a columnist for the independent
opposition weekly magazine, Vreme, in Belgrade.
Gentlemen, welcome to the program.
Mr. Mihajlov, you have recently traveled
throughout the Balkans. Can you tell us what you
observed in terms of the political climate?
Mihajlov: Yes, I visited Belgrade in Serbia, and
also Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Sandjak, Croatia.
And I was really struck in Kosovo. It is a very
difficult situation there. But in Serbia, I did
not get the impression that -- at that time when I
left in Washington at the end of May, you could
have believed that Yugoslavia was on the brink of
civil war. But then, in Belgrade, it was a much
more peaceful situation than you would expect,
reading world newspapers and so on. I stayed more
than six weeks. But in general, I do not see that
it is a situation that can lead at this moment to
civil war. And I do not see any real threat to
Milosevic's power because the opposition is
divided and because no real alternative program --
not just a leader, but a program of opposition --
is there. So I did not find too much difference
from my previous visit last fall. In Belgrade, I
did not find anything new, in fact.
Host: Brian Marshall, I know in your work with
the O-S-C-E you have been an election observer.
And it is part of Western policy and certainly
U.S. policy to see peaceful change come to the
Balkans through elections. How likely do you think
that is, with elections planned in Kosovo for
October and, at some point this year, in
Yugoslavia itself?
Marshall: We are also having elections in the
United States coming up this November. But the
Balkans particularly are having a number of
elections and it is going to be a good fall for
the international observers. We will be having
elections in Albania, in Macedonia in September,
then Bosnia in November, and Serbia [on September
24] very possibly, if elections are called there.
Host: Has the groundwork been laid for elections
to function as they ought in a constitutional
democratic society as a means of peaceful change?
Marshall: We are getting there. Things are better.
My experience has been in Bosnia, Albania, and
Kosovo two years ago. And I think what I saw in
Bosnia this past spring was much better than what
I remember in 1997. Things were very tense then. I
was in the eastern Republic of Srpska, which is
hard nationalist territory this past spring, and
it was remarkable how different the situation was
in Vishegrad compared to 1997.
Host: Improved?
Marshall: Yes. Much less tense. Even at the time
[Momcilo] Krajisnik [suspected Bosnian Serb war
criminal] was arrested we thought there might be
some problems as a result, but that did not occur.
Host: Mr. Cerovic, could you talk a bit about
the effect of the changes that have been made in
the Yugoslav constitution as they will have an
impact on the elections this year?
Cerovic: Those changes are basically meant to
enable Milosevic to achieve a new mandate,
actually two terms. His actual mandate is set to
expire next year and, according to the actual
constitution, he would not be able to have a new
term. So now they made a change and he will have a
possibility to become a candidate. And he is
apparently going to be a candidate. He hopes that
he will stay in his office for two times four,
which means altogether another eight years, which
is quite a lot. The problem is that, basically,
his legitimacy is eroding. And he is trying to
recreate this atmosphere of, I would say, a
besieged fortress of Serbia. He is exploiting this
international isolation, sanctions, and the Kosovo
situation to show Serbs that Serbia is still
confronting the West and that there are many
really very dangerous signals coming from abroad.
And he would like to create a situation in which
people would side behind him somehow.
Host: Is generating tension with Montenegro part
of his strategy?
Cerovic: That's part of it. That's true. It is
also part of his strategy to win the elections
because we are actually talking about three
elections, which means for president of Yugoslavia
-- and that's Milosevic; he will run for that
apparently -- then federal elections for the
federal assembly, and municipal elections. Those
constitutional changes are meant to, in the first
place, distance Montenegro. Montenegro is a small
republic and a small part of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. And Montenegro is half way out of
Yugoslavia. But Montenegro was thinking about the
option of participating in the elections in order
to help the Serbian opposition to drive Milosevic
out of power. But now Milosevic changed the
constitution in a manner which made it almost
impossible for Montenegro to think about
participation. So they will probably not
participate. So Milosevic's chances are going to
be better.
Host: But he also changed the constitution so
that it is the direct election of the president
and it is a majority of whoever votes, not a
majority of the registered population. It seems
that the strategy is very clever in the following
way. At the G-8 meeting in Japan a short while
ago, a number of European leaders said, these
changes in the constitution are so severe that we
will not recognize any outcome from an election
held according to them. What kind of position does
that leave the democratic opposition inside
Yugoslavia in?
Mihajlov: The democratic opposition immediately
reacted to this G-8 unofficial statement. Some of
the participants, the German foreign minister and
chancellor, they stated that the G-8 will not
recognize these elections. The democratic
opposition, except Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian
Renewal Movement, immediately acted against that
statement because it means that, if the democratic
opposition will be able to unite and to win the
elections -- what does this means if it will not
be recognized by the G-8? So some of the G-8
members now have pulled back and said, of course,
we will recognize a democratic outcome of the
elections, but not Milosevic. So it is a very
strange situation at this moment.
Cerovic: It is not only that. In the Serbian
opposition, they basically understood this message
as a signal to the opposition to boycott the
elections because the results of the elections
will not be honored. There is a dispute within the
opposition over the issue of participation. As
Mihajlov just said, the Serbian Renewal Movement,
which is a major opposition party, decided, at
least for now, that their position is not to
participate.
Host: And Zoran Djindjic [leader of the
opposition Democratic Party] says?
Cerovic: Their position is that they should
participate anyway, even after these changes,
because the problem is that they do not have
actually an alternative to that, to participation
in the elections because, if they do not
participate they will probably be forced to
boycott all those elections, which means not only
for president, but also for federal parliament and
municipal elections. Right now the opposition has
power in most municipalities in Serbia, in most
major cities in Serbia. So that means they will
basically give up the power in those cities. And
there will probably be pretty strong resistance
and unrest in those cities from people who oppose
this movement. They will not be able to understand
why the opposition is doing that.
Host: We can certainly say that, so far, by this
maneuver, Milosevic has succeeded once again in
splitting the democratic opposition inside Serbia.
Cerovic: Well, there were already disputes within
the opposition. But I would say that the
opposition is, except for this Serbian Renewal
Movement which is now basically isolated in the
pro-boycott position, the rest of the opposition
is probably better united than any time before. I
think they are doing a bit better than before. Now
there are regular meetings of the opposition
leaders and experts working on electoral
procedures.
Host: Let me ask you this question. Let us say
the democratic opposition succeeds in uniting.
Because of the suppression of the press in Serbia,
because of the crackdown on the opposition, could
there possibly be a free election in Yugoslavia
later this year?
Mihajlov: The question of the press is also very
stereotyped. At this moment in Belgrade, the
capital lacks information, but in the provinces
there are more than fifty T-V stations. Half of
them are absolutely independent. They are under
pressure but they are independent. But not in
Belgrade.
Host: Because they shut down Studio B and Radio
Station B2-92. These have all been shut down?
Mihajlov: No, Radio B2-92 - you can even listen in
Belgrade, but not [broadcast] from Belgrade, but
from Sombor, one city in Vojvodina. But several
days ago, they allowed it even in Belgrade. But
all these forty or fifty independent radio
stations, they are broadcasting.
Cerovic: He is talking about the local radio and
T-V stations in smaller cities. So this network is
somehow covering Serbia, I would say, more or
less.
Mihajlov: The newspapers have a bad situation
because they do not allow the import of newspapers
and there is only one plant that produces papers.
And they are now without paper. They cannot even
publish every day.
Cerovic: And there is the threat from the
government to take over the last remaining
printing plant which is still printing independent
media. So they are now trying to print outside of
Belgrade in some different printing plants. It is
really far worse than ever. But still, let's go
back to your question: can we really think about
democratic elections with this media situation?
That is a good question, and the media situation
is really bad. But still, according to some polls,
which it is probably important to know, this
ruling coalition, which is Milosevic's party and
two others, one of the Radical Party and JUL
[Yugoslav United Left], a small left wing party of
Milosevic's wife [Mirjana Markovic], their rating
together is considerably lower than the rating of
the united opposition. If we can get a united
opposition, their chances would be pretty good, it
seems.
Mihajlov: Only for parliament. Milosevic is
leading absolutely [in the presidential contest].
Cerovic: There are some nuances here. We still do
not have a united opposition. We still do not know
if the elections will be fair in terms of the
procedure of who is going to count the votes. And
that is a major concern of the opposition. They
are not going to be allowed to control the
procedure. Milosevic will probably try to create
these electoral commissions. His people will
probably count the votes.
Host: And it is too early to say whether the O-
S-C-E would send observers or other outside
organizations?
Marshall: Probably not. We would be very
surprised, but at the same time I have heard that
it is not entirely out of the question. It is an
interesting idea.
Cerovic: There is the other matter of the election
for president. It is true according to polls that
Milosevic is really far ahead of any other
candidate for president. He will get something
like twenty-four, twenty-five percent.
Mihajlov: Draskovic is getting eight percent.
Cerovic: But then there is something else in the
polls. They also asked people to express their
distrust. Milosevic is also far ahead of anybody
else in this negative rating. His negative rating
is actually much higher than his positive rating.
Which means there are a lot of people who would
like to vote against Milosevic. They do not know
for whom, but they do know that they would like to
vote against Milosevic. The way the opposition
understands the results of these polls is that, if
they can just get some candidate that they all
will support, somebody who will enjoy the support
of the united opposition, then that candidate,
whoever it is, will have a good chance to win.
Host: But one would suspect, however, that since
the only other option open to Milosevic other than
winning a four-year term as president is being
taken to a war crimes tribunal in The Hague, he
probably will do anything to win that election.
Mihajlov: Absolutely, and even changing the
constitution. In previous times, one had to win at
least fifty percent of all voters. Now, even only
if five percent of all voters participate, it will
be okay. The majority [of those voting] will elect
the president, even if it is only two hundred
people. If the opposition does not unite, then
probably less than half the population will vote
at all.
Host: I wanted to ask Brian Marshall, since your
experience in Kosovo and Bosnia has been so
extensive, what are the stakes there for the
outcome of a contest between Milosevic and the
democratic opposition?
Marshall: I think that would be very significant,
obviously. I think a lot could happen in terms of
Western assistance, for example. Bosnia is still a
problem area. It is still not succeeding
economically. And an awful lot of the other parts
of the Balkans are not succeeding very well
either. And I think to a fair degree, without
Milosevic there, we could see some progress.
Host: Would you agree with that -- the removal
of Milosevic is the key to Balkan stability at
this point?
Cerovic: Well, I would say that it is very
important for the whole region. Although I am
afraid that this indictment by The Hague did not
really help much. Apparently, Milosevic is now
cornered and he is basically sentenced to be
president of Serbia at any cost and as long as
possible. That is the real meaning of the
indictment.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have
this week. I'd like to thank our guests -- Mihajlo
Mihajlov from the Hudson Institute; former O-S-C-E
election observer Brian Marshall; and Stojan
Cerovic from the U.S. Peace Institute -- for
joining me to discuss the challenge in the
Balkans. This is Robert Reilly for On the Line.
28-Jul-2000 11:10 AM EDT (28-Jul-2000 1510 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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