June 01, 2000 (11:12 am local time)
Prime Minister Meles' Briefing to the Diplomatic Community
(31 May 2000)
As of today, we have verified that all our territories have been cleared from the invading army. That means our objective of reversing the aggression, by peaceful means if possible or by force if necessary, has been fulfilled. As a result, we have changed the instructions and the mission of our army from one of attacking the enemy to get our territory, to one of a sort of a troop stand down and one of securing and protecting the liberated areas. So as far as we're concerned, as of today, the war is over. What remains to be done is to consolidate this into sustainable, regional peace through negotiations and dialogue. On the military front, as far as we are concerned, the military operations are over, and there will be a few police operations here and there to clear the areas and secure them fully. But basically, the war is over. We will remain where we are on the Zalambessa front. The previous instructions to our army to redeploy on the western front is still standing. The instructions to our forces on the eastern front to clear and secure the newly liberated areas remains and therefore the total picture is one of troop stand down. In the meantime, our army has been given instructions that if there are any, any provocations on the part of the Eritrean army, they should feel free to deal with them in a decisive and vigorous manner. That is where we stand today.
We have for the past two years tried to convince the international community that our agenda is quite simple and quite clear: that of reversing the aggression. As and when the military operations being quite successful, a number of our friends might have felt that the temptation to go beyond the clearly stated objectives would be too high. One cannot deny that the temptations were there. But we believe principles are principles. Principles are there to be respected, both when the going is simple and easy and when the going is difficult. We feel that sticking to the principles when the going was difficult, as in our case, proved to be a bit more difficult than sticking to the principles when the going was relatively easy. And so, we feel we have stuck to our word, our promise that the war will end as soon as all our territories are liberated, not a minute earlier, not a minute later. All our territories have been liberated and as far as we're concerned, the war is over. To repeat, our focus now is on the diplomatic-negotiations fronts. If the Eritrean army insists on extending its "warm welcome" to our army, then we'll have no qualms about making good use of it. If, on the other hand, the Eritrean army has had enough of its "warm welcome," then the war is over. This is where we stand and I prefer to stop here so that I can give you a chance, Your Excellencies, to ask questions that you might have.
Question: Could you say a bit about how the Algiers talks are going and what your expectations are from them and, secondly, you indicated that the Ethiopian army is still in position on the central front, Zalambessa, etc., and I was wondering, could you give us an indication as to when you would see the army possibly withdrawing also from that area?
Meles' Response: I talked about reversing the aggression in some detail. And now today, that is an accomplished fact now. But the peace package was not solely focused on reversing the aggression only. It had elements that dealt with the long-term issues, root causes and so on, such as the delimitation and demarcation of the border on the basis of colonial treaties and international law, such as issues of compensation and so on. These remain valid. We are committed to delimiting and demarcating the border on the basis of colonial treaties and on the basis of the UN Charter. We insist on the fulfillment of the provisions in the peace agreement that dealt with compensation. And we feel that there are other issues, such as the excessive militarization of Eritrean society, that we need to address in the context of a final peace agreement. While we recognize the fact that the invasion has been reversed by non-peaceful means and what remains to be done on the peace table now is to recognize this fact, take note of this fact. We remain committed to the principle of the return to the status quo ante. In this case, the change to the status quo ante of May 6, 1998 is no longer on the Eritrean side. We admit that we have our army in indisputably Eritrean territories at this moment. Because we are committed to the principle of the return to the status quo ante, we agree to redeploy our troops on the May 6 line in the context of a peace agreement. In the meantime, until we have such an arrangement that will allow us to redeploy our troops to the May 6 line, until we have such an arrangement, our troops will remain in positions that they deem are necessary for military purposes, whether they are inside Eritrea or outside. But, we are willing to redeploy to the May 6 positions without too much fuss. What we need is an agreement, cease-fire, cessation of hostilities agreement, which would guarantee that when we redeploy, the Eritrean army will not fill the vacuum left for the purpose of mounting attacks on our army.
If the international community can provide such guarantees, our preference would be to stick to our principles and redeploy to the May 6 positions. If the international community finds it difficult to provide such guarantees, and if it's the view of the international community that we should provide such guarantees for ourselves, we would be willing to redeploy to May 6 positions in areas that do not pose any military disadvantage to us and maintain certain positions that are crucial to guarantee the security of our army. So, whether we fully redeploy to the May 6 positions in the context of a peace agreement, in the context of a cessation of hostilities agreement, would depend on what the international community is prepared to provide by way of security guarantees. If the international community is prepared to provide security guarantees, which would not force us to fight once again, to dislodge the Eritrean army from positions that would cause significant risk for our army, if the international community is prepared to provide such security, we are prepared to redeploy to May 6 positions as soon as we have a cessation of hostilities agreement. If it's the view of the international community that it would be cheaper and easier for our army to provide such guarantees, we are willing to oblige. In the meantime, until we have one or the other, until we have a cessation of hostilities agreement which provides for some security guarantee, provided either by the international community or by our own army sanctioned by the international community, until we get such an agreement, our army will remain in positions that it deems are necessary for its own security, in some instances it will be inside Eritrea, in some instances this will be outside Eritrea. Our hope is that we can get a cessation of hostilities agreement quickly, and then work on a peace agreement, a final peace agreement, once we have a cessation of hostilities agreement. This may come as a surprise to some of you who know that we have been "allergic" to the issue of a cessation of hostilities agreement. It is true that we may have been "allergic" to a cessation of hostilities agreement because the invader was in our territory and we could not commit ourselves to not fight the invader when he was in our territory. Now that the invading army is no longer in our territory, we are willing to agree to a quick cessation of hostilities deal. We are willing to have not just proximity talks, but also face-to-face talks. The enemy is no longer in our territory, so we have no problem talking to him face-to-face.
Question: (inaudible)
Meles' Response: Why we thought it would be in our interest to undertake military measures to remove the aggressor and end the war quickly, not wait for the international community to deliver such an end to the war, was because we felt we did not have time. We felt this war had to end and end quickly. And we had to end quickly so that we could refocus on what we considered to be the real issue that of fighting poverty, famine and the like. The fact that our territory is now free, all our territories are now free from the invader, means that the main problem diverting our attention from the fight against poverty has basically been reversed. Now, there are a few remaining issues that need to be tied up. We need to have a formal cessation of hostilities agreement. We need to have a final peace agreement for us to fully and demobilize. Nevertheless, at the very least, additional mobilization may become unnecessary now. We've been mobilizing and mobilizing for the past two years. While it may take some time before we start to demobilize, there is no question that we have stopped mobilizing. And that is not a matter of semantics; it's a very immediate and material issue. Secondly, as we progress along the peace front, not only can we stop mobilizing, we can start demobilizing. The faster the peace process moves, the faster the demobilization also moves. In this context, I think it would be understandable if Ethiopia were to overcome its naivete with regard to its military posture in the future. The unnatural situation that we had in 1998, where a rogue state which has a track record of attacking its neighbors, and which has a population of 3.5 million, had an army three to four times bigger than that of a country with 60 million people. That unnatural situation we feel would be unlikely to happen again in the future. And therefore the troop numbers of the Ethiopian army are not going to go back to the pre-1998 circumstances. We have learned our lessons. There may be international law, but if you are on the receiving side of those who want to ride roughshod over this international law, you're on your own. That's the lesson that we have learned since 1998. Either you defend yourself or you submit to invasion. There's nothing in between. We have learned that lesson and we are not going to forget that lesson any time soon. And so we will have a robust defense capability even after the end of this war. That level will depend to a large extent on what the international community is prepared to do to enforce the rule of law in this region. If the international community is happy with a country which has 10 percent of its population in the army and which has the proclivity to provoke everyone and anyone, if the international community is not prepared to do something about the militarism in Eritrea, then obviously our defense posture will have to be higher than what we would have liked to have. If, on the other hand, the international community recognizes the folly of allowing the street gangsters in Asmara mobilizing 10 percent of their population into the army in order to intimidate all their neighbors, and if they decide that this Saddam in Asmara needs to be contained and that they should not be given toys, should not be allowed to have toys that are dangerous to himself and to his neighbors, if the international community is prepared to do something about that, then obviously we can have a robust defense at a much lower level. If that is not the case, a robust defense will necessarily imply a much higher level than we would like to have. So, in effect, the demobilization will depend on two things. First, how fast the peace process moves--and we want to move very fast. At the very least, we want to move very fast on the cessation of hostilities agreement. It will also depend on whether the peace agreement and the international community are going to address the real issue of removing some of the toys, very dangerous toys, that the regime in Asmara has. And scaling down the excessive militarization of Eritrean society. If something is done about it in the context of the peace process or otherwise, then we would demobilize and demobilize in a big way because we can have a robust defense at a much lower level. If the appeasement of the clique in Asmara continues, as it has done in the past, then unfortunately, it means we are on our own again and this time around, we do not want to get caught with our pants down.
Question: What would your approach be, which international body would you consider to provide such a framework of which you could get such security guarantees?
Meles' Response: I think it depends on our capacity to protect. So, any international guarantees are not going to be replacements of our own capacity to guarantee our own security. At best they are going to be supplements to it. Because they are going to be supplements to it, we can afford to be less strict about it than if it were the case, that if the case were for the international community to provide the security at the time when we did not have the means to protect our security on our own. Having said that, we would want to have as robust a security guarantee as is feasible. And as I said earlier, the international community has problems providing that security. The international community has problems providing that security guarantee. Although it would be going against our own principles, we would be happy to provide that security on our own so long as it was sanctioned by the international community. I'm told now that the UN is managing major peacekeeping operations, the costs are very high, management problems and so on and so forth. The international community has such major problems and is not in a position to provide security guarantees of the type that we seek. While our preference is to go all the way to May 6 positions across the board, and therefore be loyal to our own principles, while that remains our preferred option, we are prepared to reduce the costs to the international community of providing some security guarantees if such offer on our side is sanctioned by the international community.
[Missing part of text] If Eritrea occupies the high ground near Shilala, the defense of Badme becomes very difficult. The defense of Zalambessa becomes very, very difficult. So what we are asking the international community is to make sure that Shilala and the high ground between Zalambessa and Senafe do not fall into Eritrean hands before we have a final peace agreement. If that is difficult for the international community, our preference is to go all the way to Zalambessa, all the way to Badme, that's our preference because that's our principle. But if the international community would rather that we man the high ground in Shilala and the high ground between Zalambessa and Senafe, among others, if it's the preference of the international community that we do so, we're prepared to do it at no cost to the international community. But if that's going to happen, it will not be because we insist on remaining in Eritrean territory. On the contrary, we insist that the return to the status quo ante be implemented this time around too. The principle does not change because we are on the receiving side of the inconvenience of that principle. The principle still holds true. We have to withdraw to May 6 positions. Last time around it was Eritrea. This time it's on Ethiopia. We agree we have to withdraw to May 6 positions. That's our preference. But when we withdraw to May 6 positions, knowing as we do how these people behave, some bright morning, some of these leaders might have a hangover and decide to have a go at us. We'd rather avoid this problem. The preferred option for us is a security guarantee provided by the international community. That is our preferred option. As an option of last resort, in the event that the international community is not able to provide such guarantees, we would have no problem in providing such guarantee at no cost to the international community, provided this is part of an agreed arrangement. This is not something we are trying to impose on anybody. This is not something that we want to do. What we want to do is go back to May 6 positions. And so, what I'm saying is our policy, our preference is we abandon all areas we have occupied inside Eritrea and we go back to May 6 positions. That's the government's approach, that's our point.
We need security guarantees at that level. If such security guarantees are provided by the international community, so much the better for us. We'll be loyal to our own principles and we'll have security. If that is not possible, and if it's agreed by the international community and the other side that such security can be cheaply provided by Ethiopia, we are prepared to shoulder that responsibility, we are ready to shoulder that responsibility. In the meantime, until we have a cessation of hostilities agreement, we will remain in control of military positions that we feel are necessary for our defense. As soon as we have a cessation of hostilities agreement, we're ready to pull back to May 6 positions. If we have a cessation of hostilities agreement five days from now, we're prepared to begin to redeploy all across to May 6 positions, provided we have a secure area.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally and the representatives of African countries in this country and your governments for your understanding and support of Ethiopia. Many of us have felt there was one major difference between 1936 and 1998. In 1936, we were alone at the table. This time around, we have all of Africa behind us. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally and your colleagues, ambassadors of Africa and your governments.
Issued by the FDRE Office of Government Spokesperson on 01/06/2000
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