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The Balkans

The arch of instability created by the US with the participation of Moslems spreads from Spain to the northern regions of China, with Yugoslavia being one of its very important sections.

The situation in the Balkans, including the Serbian territory of Kosovo, remains one of the main problems of world politics today.

It is common knowledge that Russia is against a military solution to the conflict. However, it is under strong pressure from NATO countries, which increasingly insist on appeasing the confronting parties with the help of a military action. The NATO exercises conducted in the air space of Yugoslavia's neighbour-countries - Albania and Macedonia - on June 16 became a demonstration of force. Thirteen of NATO's sixteen countries participated.

On the eve of that show of strength tough demands had been set forth to the Serbs at the meeting of the NATO countries' defence ministers in Brussels and the meeting of their foreign ministers in London. The Serbs were to immediately withdraw their troops from Kosovo, cease fire and resume negotiations to settle their differences by political methods.

Russia continues to insist that the West regard the Kosovo conflict as an internal problem of a sovereign country; it does not support the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union. Unlike the West, Moscow emphasises the need to exercise pressure on both confronting parties and not only on the Serbs.

Great hopes for the peaceful settlement of the conflict are pinned in European capitals on Moscow's ability to influence Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic and Yeltsin met on June 16.

In the opinion of Izvestia political commentator Maksim Yusin (June 17, 1998), the West's demand that Serb troops be pulled out of Kosovo was unacceptable for the Yugoslav leader. To call things by their real names, the withdrawal of Yugoslavian army from Kosovo would merely mean the handing over of control over that province to separatists. A Chechen variant is offered to Serbs. Formally, Kosovo will remain a part of Yugoslavia, but in reality it will be an independent state. Kosovo is for Serbs of greater importance than the lost territories of Bosnia and Croatia. There, the war was waged for outlying provinces. Serbs regard Kosovo as the cradle of their nation. Not a single Yugoslav leader would dare to give up that province even under pressure from the whole of the Western world.

As a result of the Moscow talks Russia and Yugoslavia signed a joint statement. President Milosevic pledged to settle the Kosovo problem by "political means on the basis of the equality of all citizens and ethnic communities" and, with a view to it, resume talks immediately with moderate Kosovo Albanians headed by Ibragim Rugova. At the same time, Milosevic refused to withdraw his army and special troops from Kosovo. The Moscow statement stipulates a gradual reduction of military presence in Kosovo "as terrorist activities are being stopped." Milosevic stressed at the press conference that Yugoslav army troops have the right to stay in any part of Yugoslavia and for this reason the demand of the global community for the Serb troops to pull out from Kosovo "may not even be discussed." In accordance with the Moscow agreements, Belgrade took a pledge to ensure the free return of all refugees and migrants to Kosovo. Milosevic promised to ensure unrestricted access to Kosovo for foreign diplomats and international humanitarian organisations.

US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin discussed on June 16 the results of the Russian-Yugoslav talks on the Kosovo situation. Both Presidents agreed that the Yeltsin-Milosevic agreement was a step in the right direction, which satisfied some of the demands of the Contact Group and was aimed to stop violence in the region.

However, at a briefing held after Clinton's conversation with Yeltsin, White House press secretary Michael MacCarry said that NATO would closely watch how the promises given by President Milosevic were being fulfilled. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also said that NATO would, nonetheless, continue preparations for possible military action. British and French leaders were also in favour of such preparations.

Commenting on Radio Liberty about Russia's position on Kosovo (Efir-digest, June 17, 1998), US politologist Michael Radu from the Philadelphia Institute of International Relations said that in the given situation Moscow played a positive role as a counterbalance to those who would be ready to resort to a military action against Yugoslavia. In his opinion, such an operation could have unpredictable consequences. The probability of the UN Security Council's veto would cool down the more radically-minded leaders.

The US assumed its pro-Moslem stand with regard to Yugoslavia in 1993, when Bill Clinton became President. This was when the idea that Serbs are the culprits of the war and Bosnian Moslems were the victims of the aggression was elaborated. (The article "US and the Crisis in Yugoslavia: 1991-1997" by G.V. Kornilov was published in the journal USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology No. 5, 1998.) By that time Washington had come to regard itself as the "supreme judge" in the settlement of problems all over the world. So, its interference in the affairs of Yugoslavia was a "matter of honour." Washington launched intensive diplomatic activities in favour of the creation of the Moslem-Croatian Federation. Through the private company Military Professional Resources the US helped Croatia to upgrade its army and prepare the summer 1995 offensive campaign. At the same time it actively tried to get the embargo on arms deliveries to Bosnian Moslems lifted. As is known, in 1995 NATO began intensive air strikes against Serb positions. On November 1, 1995, negotiations between the confronting parties of Bosnia began in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy in Dayton, Ohio. Moslems were represented by Alija Izetbegovic, Croatia by Franjo Tudjman and Serbia by Slobodan Milosevic. The so-called Dayton agreements were concluded as a result of the talks.

For the US the true aim of these agreements was to tie the warring parties tighter to itself and by using instability to enhance its influence in the Balkans (it already had influence in Macedonia, Albania and partly in Greece). The Washington Administration is still obsessed with the idea of providing military assistance to Bosnian Moslems. Having realised that it is impossible to count on the mutual deterrence of Moslems and Croats, the US started creating two pillars of influence among Bosnian Moslems. The first was the post-Mojaheddin army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the second - the political elite of Bosnian Moslems who were free from any obligations to Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is indicative that the US decided to support not the titular states - Serbia and Croatia, but Moslems in both of them.

US interference has not settled the Balkans conflict. Some analysts say that Washington motivated itself by arrogance and the desire to demonstrate the inability of Europeans to solve problems on its own continent. We think that it did not even set the goal of solving the conflict, because it is far easier to maintain one's "global leadership" in the wake of instability.