Centres of Strength
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has assigned itself the role of the "last instance" in establishing the new world order. Russia, while retaining the status of a nation capable of opposing the US in the event of a global nuclear conflict, however stopped being a world power. Political scientists now place it among the so-called regional powers with limited spheres of influence. These functions, too, are hard for the weakened Russia. Losing its position as a world politics agent, it is becoming an object of policies of the US, a world power, and a number of regional powers of Europe and Asia. On the threshold of a new century, Russia is faced with threats defined by its geographic location and the ethnic-confession make-up of its population.
Centres of Strength
The London Economist (Za Rubezhom No. 4, 1998) published a forecast of the alignment of forces on the world political scene at the beginning of the 21st century. Besides different things there are criterions, according to which this or that state can be referred to as a Super Power.
The first criterion refers to a country's economy and its capability to maintain armed forces, which can be deployed anywhere in the world. These armed forces must contain nuclear forces of intercontinental range, as well as expeditionary forces (six mobile infantry and tank divisions with the accompanying artillery). The second criterion of a Super Power implies a government capable of carrying out decisive foreign policy. The third one implies the population's consent to carrying out policy from the position of strength (for this, according to the Economist, a Super Power must have an appropriate ideology - "super idea"). The fourth criterion presupposes motives for a Super Power to interfere in domestic and external affairs of other countries. The authors of this article in the Economist believe that, in general, it's easier to become a Super Power for a country with an authoritarian regime rather than a democratic one.
Then the London forecasters name their Super Powers for the year of 2030. These include, in alignment with the USA, the so-called Euro-American democracies, united by NATO. "Separate America from Europe," the Economist says, "and the favourable prospect will disappear. Being isolated, the Americans will have the means to act and they will maintain a keen devotion to the country's prevailing ideology. However, there will be a lack of important positions to protect..." China was also included in the list of Super Powers.
In the English researchers' opinion, Russia has no chance of becoming a Super Power again, taking into consideration the second and third criteria. In other words, the Economist believes that even in 2030 Russia will not have a government capable of conducting a decisive foreign policy and its population will not approve of a foreign policy, carried out from the position of strength. These arguments demonstrate the West's typical simplistic judgements in relation to Russia. If Russia manages to extricate itself from its social and economic crisis, the second and third criteria, essential for the Anglo-Saxons, will be of no importance at all. It will be quite another matter if Russia gets out of the crisis by 2030 with disastrous material and intellectual consequences. Then after becoming a half-developed country of the Latin-American type, it won't be able to keep even its regional status. It would be expedient to rule out a nuclear conflict for now. But is there any guarantee that by 2030 military and technical thought, let's say in the USA, will not invent a "super weapon" against a nuclear strike? And what would Russia then do with the remains of its morally outdated nuclear potential (left after ratification of the START-2 treaty, disarming the country)?
The underestimation of Islamic states by the English also gives cause for objection. They think that no Islamic state will be able to claim the status of a Super Power in 2030. They may be right. But the authors of the forecast say nothing about the character of conflicts in the 21st century. If they believe that it will be again states that will enter into conflict in the next century, then their forecast of the relative weakness of each Islamic state, taken separately, is correct. If conflicts in the 21st century will be of supranational, ethno-confessional or civilized character, as they say nowadays, then underestimation of the Islamic factor is, at least, myopic, especially as this time the nuclear powers club will have been essentially extended owing to Moslem nations among others. Recent nuclear weapons testing by Pakistan can serve as the latest example.
Besides, one should remember that in the current period, following the Yalta agreements, the world community hasn't given its consent to US domination. Thus, one should rather speak of the USA assuming the "ultimate authority" status from a position of strength. While making its global assessments, the leadership of this country obviously takes into account the fact that nowadays one quarter of the world production and nearly 13% of the world export fall to the share of the USA.
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