08.02.2000 17:00 Russia&America, No. 8 VLADIMIR PUTIN'S "ALBATROSSES"
The American President's national security aide Sandy Berger has called Chechnya an "albatross hung round the neck" of Vladimir Putin. Such a statement arouses no objections. On the other hand, it is impossible not to object to the assertions of some politicians and mass media that the latest events in Chechnya were engineered deliberately to enhance Putin's rating.
The leadership of the Republic of Chechnya, a constituent entity within the Russian Federation, embarked on an armed mutiny against the Federal authorities ten years ago. Until very recently Vladimir Putin's name was known only to the most meticulous students of Russia's political upper crust. And not one of them would have linked his name to the events in the North Caucasus. A belief that the operation against the terrorists was mounted specially for the sake of Putin's presidential rating betrays a total lack of understanding of the situation that had arisen in Chechnya by the end of last summer.
For several years, the authorities in Chechnya had enjoyed very extensive autonomy and had established laws of their own on their territory, laws quite different from those recognized universally. This involved encroachments on the property of neighbouring peoples. All those years, Moscow regularly subsidised the economy of the republic - without receiving a single figure from it in the way of financial accounts. Moscow felt compelled to act only when Shamil Basayev began putting into practice his publicly proclaimed plan of founding an "Islamic Republic extending from the Volga to the Don". As for Aslan Maskhadov, he did nothing to stop his subordinates and, thereby, placed himself beyond the pale of the law, although the Federal authorities repeatedly urged him to choose between encouraging terrorist activities and protecting the Chechen population on the basis of universally accepted provisions of the law.
By the middle of last year it had become absolutely clear that no "independent" Chechnya had come into being. Ruled by an armed minority, the republic had degenerated into a criminal enclave. Using religion as a smokescreen, but ignoring its teachings, the criminals in power had corrupted the population, who had forgotten their peaceful occupations, and had impressed upon them what were actually principles of the Nazi ideology. The republic became studded with a network of torture cellars, where hostages - seized for ransom only, without any political motives - were being tormented. The armed minority in power engaged in genocide of the Chechen population, at the same time nurturing insane ideas of seizing neighbouring territories. The implementation of these designs began with the arrogant bandit attack on Daghestan.
The operation against the terrorists would have begun without Putin, since the problem of Chechnya had developed into a problem of the integrity of Russia. No government would have tolerated a separatist enclave on its territory, an enclave that had created a military machine of its own, reinforced with mercenaries gathered from all over the world.
Political problems of this kind are not chosen - they come of their own accord. Circumstances compelled Putin to assume the burden of combating the "criminal international" that had pitched camp on the territory of Chechnya. And the determination with which Putin engaged in this struggle is due not only to his qualities of leadership but also to the arrogance of the challenge of the terrorist leaders in Chechnya to the Federal authorities and to the democratic reforms underway in Russia. The patience of the public was exhausted, and Putin simply could not refrain from using force.
The Nazi enclave in southern Russia had begun to constitute a direct and open threat to the progress of the democratic reforms in the country. Hence, the military operation in Chechnya is nothing but defence of Russia's young democracy, which took up the cudgels for the integrity of the state.
Putin belongs to a new generation of Russian politicians, who are not burdened by the now useless experience of work in Soviet and communist-party institutions. For people like Putin, the issue of whether economic freedoms or private property should "be or not be" has been settled unamibiguously in favour of "to be". This fully applies to recognition of intellectual freedoms as well. That is because Putin's political views took shape not during his work in foreign intelligence but later, in the stormy last decade.
But Putin is highly committed ideologically, provided ideology is taken to mean not party doctrines designed to hoodwink the population but a rational set of ideas on the advancement of the economy and society. He is a liberal supporter of the state system who believes that the values of statehood support and guarantee such values as the rights and freedoms of the individual.
Such ideological principles, naturally, prompt the highly civilised Putin to oppose any isolation of Russia from the world community. But, then, following the same road hardly requires embracing and marching arm-in-arm. Russia under Putin will engage in an active quest for its competitive advantages because passive nations prove to be outside the world time-frame and are deleted from history. Cooperation requires courage of politicians; a cold war requires only large funds. In Putin's view, it is more expedient for Russia to muster its courage and cooperate rather than acquire funds and be locked out. Cooperation implies the courage to compromise. The cold war is merely gun-amplified cowardice. This applies equally to America and to Russia. Governing the world, as Jonathan Swift taught us all, is more difficult than turning a mere school globe.
Meanwhile, soaring over the future of Russia's leader is not one "albatross" but a flock of them. The country's power structure is unconsolidated, and there are anarchist-sentiments in society and its elites, In several constituent entities of the federation a new feudalism has set in, and Chechnya is merely its most extreme manifestation. The change of economic relations has taken place under a very weak state, and the institution of property is therefore badly in need of guarantees and reinforcement. The conception of the country's national security is in an embryonic state. The economy remains unstable, and there is nothing more dangerous to freedom than an economic recession. And, of course, the belief that Putin will cope with this by no means complete list of problems is little more than an advance payment.
But so far there are no cogent reasons for Putin to lose the presidential elections on March 26. He has the backing not only of consolidated elites but of the people. And if Vladimir Putin becomes the new president of Russia, this will suit the Russian public. It should also suit the world community, if it gives up its own "albatrosses", which make it distrust Russia and apply double standards to it.
Mikhail Margelov, Head of the Russian Information Centre
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