Chapter 9
On November 25, 1998, Aslan Maskhadov gave an interview to the Panorama newspaper from Baku. It may be worth quoting the entire interview, because it highlights the disagreement between the Chechen president and his opponents on several crucial issues.
- "How come that field commanders that were previously subordinate to you are now so hard on your resignation? One can't question the patriotism of Israpilov or Basayev...."
- "I think that there is nothing strange or frightening here. All people can't think alike. Each believes that strengthening independence is his strategic goal. But each has his own concept and approach.
"I have always adhered to the principle: to fight well when one's got to fight and work well. Even during the war, I was looking for ways to stop it. To fight against a big power is a heavy burden for a small nation. We won that war thanks to Allah. Today, we need to do what we can to prevent a new war, to strengthen the state and the army to ward off possible aggression, to achieve a diplomatic victory over Russia, become a subject of international law and acquire a legal status. And they believe that one needs to blow up railway terminals and make attempts on presidents.
"We have a different approach. I believe that we should sign a fully-fledged treaty with Russia in the first place. We need the warmest and closest relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, like with brothers. They are our strategic partners and neighbours. Caucasian republics being part of Russia should decide for themselves with whom they are going to stay. But if Russia wages war against any one of them, every Chechen will have the right to take part in that war".
- "So, your opponents are not happy with your policy towards Azerbaijan and Georgia".
- "No, they aren't. Chechens were actively involved in the war between Abkhazia and Georgia on the Abkhazian side. Basayev and Israpilov were engaged in combat in Abkhazia, too. I am sure it was a strategic mistake. It was a bluntly pro-Russian policy. We spoiled our relations with Georgia and were thus caught in a trap. We even had a link to Azerbaijan via Daghestan, while Georgia was the only neighbour we had a direct access to, and that access was closed. We were duped. I am doing everything I can now to open up a route to Georgia, not to make war with them, but to pave a way to our brothers. Perhaps, they don't quite understand this".
- "When I talked with Basayev, he told me that he was not quite happy with the level of Chechen-Azeri relations".
- "It is very important for them to supports the Lezghins. All peoples must be free, get their national sovereignty, etc. I am telling them again: Lezghins should know better who they are going to be with - Azerbaijan or Daghestan. That's not our business. To meddle with the internal affairs of other republics - constituent members of Russia - or Azerbaijan or Georgia is a serious mistake, to my mind".
- "Don't you think that Chechens may be inadvertently involved in the Russian policy which uses the Lezghin factor to exert pressure on Azerbaijan?"
- "Not knowingly, but out of ignorance and out of an erroneous approach. This is playing into Russia's hands, to present Chechens as terrorists who don't know how to live in peace with their neighbours. This drives away our neighbours, businesspeople and investors".
- "Will you manage a dialogue with the radical forces?"
- "The dialogue is there. The Chechen people have seen them as they are. This is extremely important. After this, it doesn't matter how radical they want to be. They won't manage to do anything anyway. The people tired from war are adhering to my principles in approaching these issues, and this is very important. The whole nation supports me, and they are supported by 50 - 100 people. Practically everybody who fought together with Raduyev and Basayev has turned their back on them. The only remaining party is the radical Islamic movement, Khattab and his henchmen. Others believe that this is bad politics".
- "Will the new government be based on teips?"
- "This cabinet of ministers won't be set up like the first time. That's the way it happened last time, not to offend any party or clan. Today, I have the moral right not to follow that way: people have already seen that it leads nowhere.
"Perhaps, social and economic issues are not the top priorities in my policy at this stage. The most crucial thing for me is to prevent civil bloodshed. And the nation upholds this. I have been making concessions for two years, but I can't keep mocking my people any more while pandering to their whims. We are going to put the emphasis on professionalism and administrative skills. A person appointed to a ministerial position must know his job!"
- "It all started after vice president Vakha Arsanov left the republic. Or he engineered all this and then left to deflect suspicions, or the radical forces decided to use the absence of an influential man".
- "Arsanov played absolutely no role in it. He cannot change the situation strategically. In general terms, it all started from him. He was the first to speak in the parliament, and everything kept evolving from that scenario. Being the closest aide of the president, he was supposed to astonish everybody with the news that Maskhadov had appropriated all the nation's wealth and wouldn't share it with anyone. He was to astonish the people, and the rest is details: a convention, a congress, appeal to the parliament, teachers' rally... The people understood everything correctly, as a betrayal of the president. Basically, it indicates total ignorance of the mentality and the mindset of one's own nation. Even the most miserable people whom he supposedly wants to protect will denounce a person closest to the president who speaks against him when the president is away. This is indecency. If it happened when I was in Chechnya, it would be perceived in a different light".
- "Aslan Aliyevich, I have never seen you so concerned before..."
- "The worst thing of all is that the situation here is seen as extremely complicated, as if we're teetering on the brink of war, and Maskhadov is clinging to power. It is difficult to explain that Maskhadov is sitting so tightly, that he can't be unseated. People outside of our state don't know what our approaches to problems essentially are. They only know that Chechens have booted out the Russian army. And then they don't know what's happening now anymore.
"I know better who is worth what there. I have always been in the front trenches. I know the capability, character and psychology of everyone. Practically everyone has gone through my hands, all the way down to the last soldier. It is impossible to make me think different. I am concerned, that their monkey business hampers my work, civilised relations with other countries and investor relations. Their interference has put a spanner in the works but won't change anything."
- "What if they turn out stronger and a confrontation will spark off?"
- "They will never turn out stronger. There used to be 16 commanders under me. Atgeriyev, Alikhadzhiyev or Khambiyev are not worse that Raduyev or Basayev. They are decent people, who know what I seek and they won't let the president down. How can they provoke confrontation, if they don't have a single soldier behind them? Those who used to be with Raduyev and Basayev came to me and said, "We have understood. We're ready to build a nation". Will they dare to duel me? The people won't support them. They can keep on babbling, losing their authority as they go. It is a pity it has happened".
On January 27, 1999, Maskhadov marked his second anniversary in office. Analysing the situation in Chechnya at that time, many observers described it as close to chaos. Journalist Ilya Maksakov writing on North Caucasian affairs titled his article on Maskhadov's two-year presidency "Chechnya Nearing Chaos" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 27, 1999).
He wrote that one year before Maskhadov had been praised for keeping the peace in the North Caucasus overcoming the resistance of his opponents and trying to keep all political forces in the republic under control. At that time, the Chechen leader hadn't seemed so lonely and helpless. He had been opposed by the parliament who refused to approve the new government, but his bitter foe Shamil Basayev had been the president's right arm and set up the cabinet of ministers. Generally, when making the difficult decision to run for the presidency in January 1997, Aslan Maskhadov proceeded from the assumption that the new Chechen leader must represent the resistance forces to keep them in control and adapt thousands of fighters to new peaceful life. Two years after, this became the major failure of the president, Maksakov wrote, whereas the better part of his former followers presented the biggest threat to the Grozny government.
Every meaningful analysis of Chechnya today contains a reference to the standoff of major world powers in the North Caucasus. Many analysts maintain that Chechnya had been following a well-calculated path since 1991 and became a testing range for US geopolitical experimenters who tried their schemes there via Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other countries and political forces. The motivation of Western strategists can be interpreted in a number of ways. For instance, they can be nudged ahead by the global crisis looming over the United States, or its strong desire to control world energy sources. At any rate, substantial capital resources are actually seeping into Chechnya. Indeed, it is not the Russian federal authorities that sponsor the spread of the Wahhabi movement all over the North Caucasus, which is anything but traditional in that region, or training camps for guerrilla fighters. Each such cadet costs a lot of money, particularly considering that every male Chechen has a large family to support. The underlying meaning of the current processes, especially in view of the US officially declaring the Caucasus a sphere of its interests, is alienating this region from Russia, most observers agree. The alienation may be based on employing factors totally unacceptable for the country, like the Wahhabi movement or laying the Caspian pipeline through other countries.
In this sense, Chechnya is a constant factor in weakening Russia. Instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus plays into the hands of those who want to weaken Russia. In Chechnya itself, these global processes manifest themselves as the ongoing squabble of various groups prodding Chechnya to chaos. No national identity is possible for Chechnya without clarifying its relations with Russia first. Obviously, Chechnya won't be a regular member of the Russian Federation anymore, at least for decades to come. On the other hand, Moscow hasn't done anything to bolster its position in the region so far. As yet, disintegration has been a prevalent trend in Chechnya, local observers have noted, while the seven-year independence multiplied by the havoc of war has brought nothing but total misery.
The national tradition is being undermined too, whereas the imposed Islamic dogmas - Shariah and Shura - disguise the political interests of extremists. This is why everyone who can leave Chechnya is doing so, while Chechens working in all regions of Russia are supporting their relatives who have to stay in their native land. The threat of degradation is looming thick and high, as no opportunities of education are available.
Maskhadov's opponents are chipping one bit off his institutional system after another. The Shariah court has already attempted to dissolve parliament, and if the president's opponents manage to overcome the resistance of parliament (say, by luring them into the so-called shura) the next blow will be dealt at the head of the republic.
In the meantime, Chechnya has never had Shariah rule or the shura. All issues were resolved by the Mehk-khel, the national council composed of the elders, leaders of the nine Chechen tuhkums, each combining the numerous teips. Shariah judges are fairly young people who received their education (or, rather, a special vision of the fundamentals of the Koran) in Arab countries. Both the official Grozny, Mufti and elders stand against this "Arabisation" of Chechnya. Chechens say that no one managed to turn them into Russians for 70 years, so no one will manage to turn them into Arabs. Nonetheless, undermining the national tradition and imposing concepts strange to them remain a serious destabilising factor.
The loss of control by Aslan Maskhadov resulted in a situation in which even his former active supporters called on him to hold new elections and let the nation choose a national leader. Maskhadov might still have a chance to be one, provided he is capable of imposing his will and executing his decisions. After the war, it was more difficult for Maskhadov to exercise his powers than for Dzhokhar Dudayev, who rose to ascendancy on the surge of the independence enthusiasm. The incumbent president, however, has not used available opportunities, observers have noted.
On the other hand, the national tradition of the Chechens cannot be completely destroyed, since no outside force can sever blood relations. In this context, no order can be instilled in Chechnya from only the official position. Any leader will have to draw on relations between teips, which are being actively frustrated now. Stronger teip relationships may effectively oppose powerful financial flows, whereas it is money that remains the ultimate force in Chechnya now. So far, extremists proclaiming themselves proponents of "pure Islam," or the Wahhabi, have been trying to destroy teip relations. Wahhabi forces have become an independent opposition to the religious tradition in Chechnya offering subservient subjugation, denial of any independent thinking or temporal education.
Besides, Ilya Maksakov added, the Chechen elite believes that the leaders of the armed opposition cannot become true statesmen. Neither Yandarbiyev, nor Basayev, nor Raduyev, nor Udugov with their radical slant on war with Russia or Islamisation of Chechnya can build a normal institutional system. Aslan Maskhadov used to be the most independent figure (at least, independent from Arab dollars), since all his opponents won't let each other go independent, striving to earn their pay. Basically, power in Chechnya was picked up by strangers not associated with the national elite or intelligentsia.
The republic remains hostage to several armed groups fully alienated from the nation. This void of power in Chechnya can't last forever, and the situation in the republic will be seriously influencing the entire country throughout this crucial year for Russia.
The developments of 1999 support this forecast. Details will be available in the next review, Chechen Chronicles '99.
This review was compiled on October 31, 1999
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