Chapter 8
On October 30, 1998, Nezavisimaya Gazeta commented that the vision of a free economic zone in Chechnya, which had been discussed the previous August by Maskhadov and Kiriyenko, had become bleaker after Kiriyenko's departure from office. Peace and crime control in the Caucasus were still a remote possibility, although they could help implement economic projects.
After a two-hour meeting in Vladikavkaz, Primakov and Maskhadov agreed that both parties needed to make efforts towards eliminating the consequences of the military confrontation and use the time remaining before the year 2001 as defined by the previous agreements to defuse contradictions and elaborate a common position, not to fan tensions, RIA Novosti reported. To achieve this, other southern constituent members of the Federation should be involved in the negotiating process in a broader way, Primakov maintained. "Out of specific actions developed today", the Premier said, "we have chosen the establishment of a joint MIA commission, payment of pensions, salaries to teachers, doctors and benefits to WW2 veterans residing in Chechnya from the federal budget".
Aslan Maskhadov stressed, for his part, that it was essential to honour the agreements already reached by Moscow and Grozny. "We are not far from the final resolution of the conflict between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. Stability in Russia depends on the stability in Chechnya, and vice versa", Maskhadov said, adding that in spite of the complicated situation in his republic, there would be no civil war there, no matter how some parties would like this, because the Chechen nation supported its legitimately elected president.
Said Bitsoyev (Novye Izvestia, October 30, 1998) wrote that while negotiations were still in progress in North Ossetia, anti-government rallies broke loose in Grozny. Thus a meeting called by field commanders Basayev, Raduyev and Israpilov was distinctly critical of Maskhadov for his trip to Vladikavkaz and "willingness to rush to a meeting of the Russian Premier with regional leaders at the first beckoning, forgetting that he is the president of an independent country". More than 400 people gathered at a stadium in Grozny calling once again to put the president on Shariah trial.
Kidnapping has been a lucrative business and a trump card in political intrigues for several years in the Caucasus. Shamsutdin Mamayev and Nikolai Babichev of Kommersant Vlast (November 3, 1998) analysed the situation in Chechnya and implications of the Primakov - Maskhadov meeting from this perspective. Predictably, they didn't manage to leave Caspian oil out of the picture. Even the chronicle cited in the article leads to obvious conclusions.
On July 3, 1997, in Moscow, President Geidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan signed an agreement on oil transit via Chechnya. On the same day, British teachers James John and Camilla Carr were abducted in Grozny. Considering that British Petroleum was the operator of the international consortium set up to produce and transport Azeri oil, the strike was dealt precisely.
When Maskhadov came to London in March 1998, he was told that British investment in Chechnya depended directly on the fate of the British nationals held in captivity in his republic. The ex-premier and BP adviser, Margaret Thatcher, personally requested that Maskhadov deal with the John and Carr situation promising to secure hefty investment in his republic in return.
Maskhadov did what he could. The anti-terrorist squad swooped on the drafting office in Urus-Martan, where the then little known field commander Arbi Barayev kept the two British subjects. However, the squad encountered unexpected resistance from "unidentified terrorists". The operation was compromised and the hostages were taken away by the fleeing kidnappers.
"The unidentified terrorists" were Raduyev's gunmen. Maskhadov had to step back, since waging a war against "General Dudayev's Army" threatened to spill over into a civil war. Nonetheless, the Chechen president invited leaders of North Caucasian republics and representatives of Georgian and Azeri presidents in April 1998 to present an ambitious project of the Caucasian common market previously approved by the West. The whole project spun around the shipment of Caspian oil to the world markets.
When it came to getting Moscow's approval, "unknown terrorists" first shelled a motor convoy of the Russian General Staff and then abducted presidential envoy Valentin Vlasov.
Throughout 1998, intransigent fighters kept trying to export the "Islamic revolution" to neighbouring Daghestan. The developments began with a Wahhabi attack on a military base in Buinaksk and reached their climax in May when the Khachilayev brothers captured the State Council building in Makhachkala and hoisted a green Islamic flag. Basayev said he would send his gunmen to help the Khachilayevs, while Raduyev threatened to start a war on Makhachkala and Moscow.
Maskhadov ran out of patience and said that the Khachilayev brothers were in pursuit of their clan interests and warned the revolting commanders, "Daghestan is a military adventure, which you should stay away from". However, the recalcitrant ignored his words of warning. Thanks to their operations, oil companies and potential foreign investors lost all interest in Chechnya altogether.
The infuriated Maskhadov claimed that Raduyev deserved to be executed in Grozny's central square. Journalists remarked that it was not an actual threat, but rather a sign of weakness from the Chechen president, who was unable to free the hostages and put his republic in order, if only in very general terms.
Then, another notorious figure popped up on the already cluttered scene - Boris Berezovsky. The British hostages were set free on September 20 to everyone's surprise. The involvement of the CIS Executive Secretary, Boris Berezovsky, in their liberation was sensational too. Salman Raduyev handed over the hostages to Berezovsky personally. At their first press conference, the British admitted that they had been placed in a pit with Russian Government envoy Vlasov.
Below is an excerpt from an article by Andrei Avsitidiisky published by the Riga-based daily, the Chas, on November 4, 1998:
"The president of Chechnya has repeatedly accused Boris Berezovsky of paying ransoms for hostages in Ichkeria. According to the Chechen leader, this is not a particularly good thing, since this only 'encourages the bandits and discredits my nation'. The president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, provided more details as to how Boris Abramovich [Berezovsky] 'discredited the Chechen nation': 'He talks directly with Chechen field commanders, the same Salman Raduyev, and makes deals with them. In exchange for computers, which Raduyev's home is now stuffed with. He is now equipped better than some Russian secret services'.
"For his part, the CIS Executive Secretary was deeply offended by Maskhadov's accusations and called them 'astounding' in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda. 'I was personally involved in the freeing of 55 persons and never paid a single penny for them!' Berezovsky noted with a tinge of pride in his voice. He also remarked that he heard a hopeless note in the words of the Chechen president. 'Maskhadov has been renounced by Russia and is now being renounced by the world. He is not capable of keeping Chechnya under control,' Boris Berezovsky said in a live interview with the Echo of Moscow radio".
Shortly after, a group of Russian POWs was set free with the help of Raduyev and Berezovsky. The question of Berezovsky's motivation now entered the public domain. Raduyev offered an answer. In an interview with Russian media he said, "Berezovsky applied to us as the CIS executive secretary and not as a politically minded businessman."
To understand the meaning of that remark, authors observed, it is essential to recall what Berezovsky was busy doing in Chechnya as a deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council. He firmly linked negotiations with that republic with the Caspian oil project. Moreover, he didn't make a deal with Grozny alone, but talked with Baku, Alma-Ata and Tbilisi. He achieved some success then. The first Azeri oil was shipped via Chechnya in 1997. Berezovsky was fired in the autumn of 1997, however.
His comeback to politics came in May 1998 when he was appointed CIS Executive Secretary at the CIS summit meeting in Moscow. This new position enabled him to deal with the Caspian oil project, which concerned several CIS member-states on a perfectly legitimate basis. To achieve success, Berezovsky needed firm support in Moscow, but he had none. The Ministry of CIS Affairs was dismantled, and its vestiges transferred to the Foreign Ministry run by his foe Primakov.
After the resignation of the Kiriyenko cabinet, Berezovsky attempted to turn the situation to his advantage again, but in vain. Instead, his rival, Primakov, came into the ascendancy as the Prime Minister.
The Executive Secretary could do little but start his own negotiations with Chechnya. Berezovsky applied a pragmatic approach. He didn't talk with those who supported the project, but rather with its opponents, namely Salman Raduyev, who actually leads the opposition in Chechnya.
The authors arrived at the conclusion that if Berezovsky succeeded in his quest, he would seriously shore up his position in Russia and the CIS. He would also do an invaluable favour to the CPC. However, it could also result in a coup d'etat in Grozny. His negotiations were limited only to field commanders, who set hostages free and decided on the oil shipment terms.
Maskhadov was thus becoming a redundant figure. This is why the Chechen president made a desperate attempt to stay afloat by issuing an edict against kidnappers. His attempt was nearly abortive, though. (Shadid Bargishev's murder.) And the united opposition demanded Maskhadov's resignation.
Help came from where no one expected it. Berezovsky's old foe Primakov came into play on the official Grozny's side.
In a nutshell, we were all to see a battle royal. The deputy chief of the Russian President's administration, Yevgeni Savostyanov, particularly noted that for Russia "the entire organisation of the energy source transportation from the Caspian region is a dominating element of the 21st century politics. However, that system cannot be constructed without due account of problems in Chechnya" when commenting on the Primakov - Maskhadov meeting.
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